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govinfo:USCOURTS-dcd-1_25-cr-00292-2

U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia · 2026-06-05

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
 
 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
Plaintiff, 
 
v. 
 
JORDAN HOLLEY 
 
Defendant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Crim. No. 25-292 (EGS) 
 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
Pending before the Court is Defendant Jordan Holley’s 
Motion for Bond Review (“Motion”). See Mot., ECF No. 33.1 Mr. 
Holley requests that the Court review his bond status and 
release him to the High Intensity Supervision Program (“HISP”) 
with the same conditions that were put in place by Magistrate 
Judge Sharbaugh on September 15, 2025. 
Upon careful consideration of the parties’ submissions, and 
because in view of the totality of the circumstances, Mr. Holley 
has failed to produce credible evidence to overcome the 
presumption that “no condition or combination of conditions will 
reasonably assure . . . the safety of the community” pursuant to 
 
1 When citing electronic filings throughout this Opinion, the 
Court cites to the ECF page number, not the page number of the 
filed document. 

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18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3)(E), the Court DENIES Mr. Holley’s motion 
and orders Mr. Holley detained pending trial. 
I. Background 
A. Procedural 
Mr. Holley is charged with one count of Travel With Intent 
to Engage in Illicit Sexual Conduct, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2423(b). At his arraignment on September 15, 2025, Magistrate 
Judge Sharbaugh released him to HISP into the custody of his 
mother and with robust conditions, including that he has no 
access to computers or other Internet-connected electronic 
devices. See Order, ECF No. 9. Three days later, Chief Judge 
Boasberg reversed the decision after the government presented 
evidence of additional online conversations Mr. Holley had with 
perceived minors. See Minute Order (Sep. 18, 2025). 
After the case was assigned to this Court, Mr. Holley filed 
a Motion to Reinstate, seeking to be released into the custody 
of his mother with the same conditions imposed by Magistrate 
Judge Sharbaugh. See Mot. to Reinstate, ECF No. 18. After a 
hearing on October 28, 2025, the Court denied Mr. Holley’s 
motion. See generally United States v. Holley, Crim. No. 25-252, 
2025 WL 3507180 (D.D.C. Dec. 3, 2025). The Court concluded that 
the nature and circumstances of the offense, the weight of 
evidence, and Mr. Holley’s history and characteristics weighed 
in favor of detention; and that the nature and seriousness of 

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the danger that his release would pose could not be mitigated by 
the concededly robust conditions imposed by Magistrate Judge 
Sharbaugh because Mr. Holley’s parents could not monitor him 
twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. See generally id. 
Mr. Holley is incarcerated at Northern Neck Regional Jail 
(“Northern Neck”). 
Mr. Holley filed the pending Motion for Bond Review on 
February 5, 2026. See Mot., ECF No. 33. The government filed its 
opposition on February 13, 2026. See Opp’n, ECF No. 34. The 
Court held a status hearing on February 24, 2026, after which it 
ordered Mr. Holley to submit an evaluation of his mental health 
status to the Court, including steps taken to address recent 
mental health crises during his pretrial confinement in this 
case, and to provide information about current efforts to 
provide him with appropriate mental health care. See Order, ECF 
No. 37. On April 21, 2026, Mr. Holley submitted a Supplement to 
his Motion for Bond Review with an attached Pre-Trial 
Psychosexual Risk Assessment (“Risk Assessment”). See Suppl., 
ECF No. 38; Risk Assessment, ECF No. 38-1. The government filed 
its reply on April 28, 2026. See Gov’t’s Reply, ECF No. 39. Mr. 
Holley filed his reply to the government’s reply to his 
supplement on May 5, 2026. See Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 40. 
 
 

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B. Pre-Trial Psychosexual Risk Assessment 
The Risk Assessment of Mr. Holley was prepared by Dr. 
Hildembrand Forensic Psychology Consulting on April 6, 2026. 
Risk Assessment, ECF No. 38-1 at 1. The purpose of the Risk 
Assessment is “to estimate the likelihood of future sexual or 
violent offending based on empirically derived risk factors. 
These tools compare an individual's score to groups of similar 
offenders to determine the proportion who have reoffended over 
time.” Id. at 20. 
The Risk Assessment was based on the following information 
and tests: (1) review of materials related to the criminal 
charges against Mr. Holley; (2) review of mental health records 
from Northern Neck and educational/developmental documentation 
from the Kennedy Krieger Institute; (3) four interviews of Mr. 
Holley totaling four hours; (4) an interview of Mr. Holley’s 
parents; (5) a battery of psychological and psychosexual testing 
designed to evaluate Mr. Holley’s personality structure, 
emotional functioning, impulse control, and areas of potential 
sexual deviance; (6) “[a]n actuarial risk assessment instrument 
(Static-99R) and a structured professional judgment framework 
informed by the SVR-20 . . . to estimate Mr. Holley's risk for 
sexual recidivism”; and (7) ongoing clinical consultation with 
Mr. Holley's treating sex-offender-specific therapist, Dr. 

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Hildembrand, to obtain additional information regarding treatment 
engagement, progress, and risk management. Id. at 1-3. 
Mr. Holley has been receiving “sex-offender—specific 
treatment” from Dr. Hildembrand since December 17, 2025, by 
attending weekly virtual sessions. Mot., ECF No. 33 at 2. The 
Risk Assessment states that Mr. Holley is consistently engaged 
in his treatment, is willing to examine his own behavior, and is 
committed to changing his behavior. Risk Assessment, ECF No. 38-
1 at 15. With regard to the progress of his treatment and his 
current functioning, the Risk Assessment states as follows: 
Overall, Mr. Holley is making early but 
meaningful progress in areas directly related 
to risk, including emotional regulation, 
coping, sexual self-control, and 
accountability. Continued treatment will be 
important to build on these gains and support 
their application in a less structured 
environment. These gains would likely be 
further supported in a structured, community-
based setting, where he can continue to 
practice and reinforce these skills. 
Id. at 16. 
The Risk Assessment’s findings, conclusions, and estimates 
most relevant to Mr. Holley’s danger to the community are 
described below. 
Findings from the Sexual Adjustment Inventory (“SAI”) 
include that Mr. Holley has “significant difficulty with sexual 
self-regulation, including elevated sexual preoccupation and 

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dissatisfaction.” Id. at 18. This test found “no evidence of 
sexual interest in children” and his score for sexual assault 
was in the “moderate range.” Id. The Risk Assessment concludes 
that “the findings suggest that his sexual behavior is best 
understood within a broader pattern of sexual dysregulation, 
poor coping, and impulse control difficulties, rather than a 
fixed deviant sexual interest pattern.” Id. at 19. 
The Actuarial Risk Assessment (“ARA”) estimates relative 
sexual recidivism risk based on several factors. Id. at 20. The 
conclusion from this assessment is that “if [Mr. Holley] 
maintains abstinence from pornography and substances and 
continues in structured treatment,” he is most comparable with 
persons who have been found to sexually recidivate at a rate of 
approximately 4.6% to 9.6% over five years. Id. at 21. 
The Structured Professional Judgment Framework noted that 
although the charged “offense and related online behavior support 
the presence of deviant sexual ideation involving minors, the 
available data do not support a stable or preferential sexual 
interest in children.” Id. at 21. Overall, the framework 
“supports the conclusion that Mr. Holley's risk is best 
understood as context-dependent, dynamic, and manageable with 
appropriate treatment and supervision, rather than indicative of 
a fixed or enduring pattern of sexual dangerousness.” Id. 
 

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The Dynamic Risk Factor Assessment (“DRFA”) looks at risk 
factors that may be most relevant to re-offending. Id. at 22. 
This assessment indicates that the following risk factors are 
present with Mr. Holley: (1) sexual preoccupation based on his 
difficulty with sexual self-regulation; (2) deviant sexual 
interest (such as a preference for children) is “present, but 
embedded within a broader pattern of compulsive and dysregulated 
sexual behavior rather than a primary or exclusive deviant 
orientation”; (3) lack of emotionally intimate relationships with 
adults; (4) lifestyle impulsivity; (5) poor problem solving; and 
(6) negative social influences. Id. at 22-26. This assessment 
indicates that the following risk factors are not present: (1) 
emotional congruence with children; (2) resistance to rules and 
supervision; and (3) hostility/grievance. Id. 
The Risk Assessment states that despite the evidence in 
the criminal case, 
the available evidence does not support a 
diagnosis of Pedophilic Disorder (F65.4), as 
there is insufficient evidence of a fixed, 
sustained, and preferential sexual interest 
in prepubescent children. Objective testing 
did not identify a stable pedophilic arousal 
pattern, and his broader history is more 
consistent with sexual dysregulation, 
compulsive sexual behavior, and use of sexual 
activity as a coping mechanism, rather than a 
primary attraction to children. 
Id. at 26. However, the data does support a diagnosis of 

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Paraphilic Disorder—Non-consenting Persons based on his 
“recurrent deviant sexual behavior involving non-consenting 
others over time.” Id. 
The Risk Assessment concludes that “[o]verall, Mr. Holley 
presents as an individual whose risk is situational and 
modifiable rather than fixed or predatory in nature. With 
continued treatment, structured support, and ongoing monitoring, 
his risk is expected to remain manageable over time.” Id. at 29. 
The Risk Assessment contains the following treatment and risk 
management recommendations: (1) individual and group sex-offender-
specific treatment; (2) a psychiatric evaluation and medication 
management upon his release; (3) substance use treatment and 
monitoring in view of his history of abuse of alcohol and 
cannabis; (4) sexual behavior focused support such as Sex Addicts 
Anonymous; (5) family counseling and psychoeducation; (6) 
behavioral monitoring such as sexual history polygraph testing and 
substance abuse testing; (7) supervision and environmental 
controls including no unsupervised contact with minors, and 
restrictions and monitoring related to Internet use and online 
activity; and (8) ongoing clinical monitoring. Id. at 30-32. 
II. Legal Standard 
“In our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to 
trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception.” 
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987). The 

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“provisions for pretrial detention in the Bail Reform Act of 
1984 fall within that carefully limited exception.” Id. The Act 
provides that if a judicial officer finds by clear and 
convincing evidence that “no condition or combination of 
conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person 
as required and the safety of any other person and the 
community, such judicial officer shall order the detention of 
the person before trial.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1). The danger a 
person poses to the community is a sufficient reason to order 
pretrial detention. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 754-55; United States 
v. Simpkins, 826 F.2d 94, 98 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
The government bears the burden of showing that no 
condition or combination of conditions can mitigate danger to 
the community based on clear and convincing evidence. See United 
States v. Munchel, 991 F.3d 1273, 1279-80 (D.C. Cir. 2021); 18 
U.S.C. § 3412(f) (articulating clear and convincing evidence 
standard for dangerousness determination). “[I]n determining 
whether there are conditions of release that will reasonably 
assure the appearance of the person . . . and the safety of . . 
. the community”, see 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g); courts consider four 
factors: “(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense 
charged, (2) the weight of the evidence against the person, (3) 
the history and characteristics of the person, and (4) the 
nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the 

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community that would be posed by the person's release.” Munchel, 
991 F.3d at 1279 (internal quotations omitted). The Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (“D.C. Circuit”) 
explains that “a defendant's detention based on dangerousness 
accords with due process only insofar as [his] history, 
characteristics, and alleged criminal conduct make clear that he 
... poses a concrete, prospective threat to public safety.” Id. 
at 1280; see id. at 1282 (explaining that government must 
demonstrate defendant's “identified and articulable threat to 
the community”). 
“When there is probable cause to believe that the defendant 
committed an offense involving a minor victim under 18 U.S.C. § 
2252(a)(2), as here, there is a rebuttable presumption that ‘no 
condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure 
... the safety of the community.’” United States v. Farina, No. 
25-cr-232, 2025 WL 2651249, *2 (D.D.C. Sept. 16, 2025) (quoting 
18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3)(E)). “Once the rebuttable presumption is 
triggered, ‘the defendant bears the burden of production to 
offer some credible evidence contrary to the statutory 
presumption.’” Id. (citing United States v. Blanchard, No. 18-
MJ-101, 2018 WL 4964505, at *4 (D.D.C. Oct. 15, 2018) (quoting 
United States v. Alatishe, 768 F.2d 364, 371 (D.C. Cir. 1985)). 
“The defendant may carry this burden by coming forward with some 
evidence that he will not ... endanger the community if 

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released.” Id. (quoting United States v. Garner, No. CR 24-533, 
2025 WL 1575848, at *3 (D.D.C. Mar. 11, 2025) (citation 
omitted)). “If the defendant rebuts the presumption ‘the 
presumption is not erased but rather remains in the case as an 
evidentiary finding militating against release to be weighed 
along with other evidence.’” Id. (internal citation omitted). 
III. Analysis 
There has been no change to: (1) the nature and 
circumstances of the offense with which Mr. Holley is charged, 
(2) the weight of the evidence against him, or (3) his history 
and characteristics; and so the Court incorporates its prior 
conclusions here. See generally Holley, 2025 WL 3507180. Rather, 
Mr. Holley focuses on the nature and seriousness of the danger 
to any person or the community that would be posed by his 
release. 
Specifically, Mr. Holley argues that he should be released 
pending trial for two reasons. First, Dr. Hildembrand informed 
defense counsel that “Mr. Holley’s rehabilitative efforts would 
be optimized if he were in the community, meeting in person with 
[her] and his peers as part of group therapy.” Mot., ECF No. 33 
at 2–3. Mr. Holley states that his treatment requires him to be 
“honest and open about his sexual sobriety, urges, and thoughts 
around treatment,” but that “it is life-threatening to be open 
about [these issues] while incarcerated.” See id. at 3. Second, 

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Mr. Holley states that he attempted suicide twice since being 
incarcerated. Id. at 3. 
Following the completion of the Risk Assessment, Mr. Holley 
argues in his supplemental filing that granting him pre-trial 
release to receive “outpatient treatment would not only 
eliminate one of the two major stressors contributing to [his] 
mental health crisis, i.e., incarceration and pending legal 
sanctions, but also would provide the most effective means to 
manage any risk that [he] poses to reoffend.” Suppl., ECF No. 38 
at 3 (quoting Risk Assessment, ECF No. 38-1 at 32). 
A. Treatment and Risk Management 
The treatment and risk management section of the Risk 
Assessment indicates that Mr. Holley needs to employ a variety 
of strategies to address what led to the actions that form the 
factual basis of the charges against him and to reduce the risk 
that he will engage in them again. See Risk Assessment, ECF No. 
38-1 at 30-32. The Risk Assessment states that “outpatient 
treatment . . . would provide the most effective means to 
manage any risk that Mr. Holley poses to reoffend.” Id. at 32. 
The Court acknowledges Mr. Holley’s position that outpatient 
treatment would be more effective than the virtual treatment he 
is receiving while detained. Suppl., ECF No. 38 at 3. The Court 
also acknowledges that Mr. Holley’s detention results in him not 
being able to participate in group therapy or participate in 

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activities such as Sex Addicts Anonymous. Id. at 3–4. The Court 
is also mindful that Mr. Holley is unable to be “honest and 
open” about his issues while incarcerated. For the reasons 
explained below, however, the Risk Assessment does not rebut the 
presumption of dangerousness. 
First, the Risk Assessment emphasizes that Mr. Holley is in 
the early stages of making progress to address his various 
issues. Id. at 16. The Court commends Mr. Holley for his 
progress so far, but the fact is that when the Risk Assessment 
was issued, he had been receiving therapy for a little over 
three months, as compared with many years of engaging in the 
sexual behaviors and substance abuse described in the Risk 
Assessment. Mr. Holley emphasizes that “while the Report does 
not suggest that treatment in custody does not work, it does 
highlight that further meaningful progress depends on a setting 
where those skills can actually be practiced and monitored.” 
Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 40 at 4. The Court acknowledges this 
distinction; however, the question before the Court is whether 
the presumption of dangerousness has been rebutted. Despite the 
progress Mr. Holley made between December 2025 and April 2026, 
and treatment planned for him should he be released, he cannot 
be monitored twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. The 
Court notes that the Risk Assessment indicates that “monitoring” 
him is a critical piece of his treatment. 

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Second, the findings from the SAI indicate that Mr. Holley 
has “significant difficulty with sexual self-regulation, 
including elevated sexual preoccupation and dissatisfaction.” 
Risk Assessment, ECF No. 38-1 at 18. The Court noted in its 
December 2025 Memorandum Opinion that is it not possible for Mr. 
Holley to be monitored continuously. See Holley, 2025 WL 
3507180, at *8. Accordingly, if Mr. Holley were released, he 
could obtain the means to access the Internet, could obtain 
pornography, and could obtain alcohol and cannabis; all of 
which, according to the Risk Assessment, influence his inability 
to sexually self-regulate. See generally Risk Assessment, ECF 
No. 38-1. Similarly, the ARA, which estimates his chances of 
sexually recidivating at 4.6% to 9.6% over five years, is 
contingent upon his abstinence from pornography and substances. 
Id. at 20–21. As noted above, the Court cannot be assured of his 
abstinence from pornography and substances since he cannot be 
monitored twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. 
Third, although the Risk Assessment concludes that there is 
insufficient evidence of a fixed, sustained, and preferential 
sexual interest in prepubescent children, id. at 26; the record 
in this case demonstrates otherwise. Mr. Holley emphasizes that 
“Dr. Hildembrand concludes that Mr. Holley’s behavior is much 
more consistent with sexual compulsivity, disinhibition, and 
impaired judgment, rather than a fixed arousal preference. That 

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distinction matters because it directly informs how risk is 
understood and throughout the Report Mr. Holley’s risk is framed 
as dynamic and responsive to treatment.” Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 
40 at 3. The Court concludes, however, that even if Mr. Holley’s 
risk is “dynamic and responsive to treatment,” this does not 
provide evidence to rebut the presumption of dangerousness 
because Mr. Holley cannot be monitored twenty-four hours a day, 
seven days a week. Furthermore, the record in this case 
demonstrates that Mr. Holley does have an interest in engaging 
in sexual activity with children, specifically, there is 
evidence of multiple online conversations about engaging in 
sexual activity with children culminating in travel to the 
District of Columbia to engage in sexual activity with a child. 
Fourth, the DRFA, which the Risk Assessment states are risk 
factors that may be most relevant to re-offending, id. at 22; 
indicates that six of the nine risk factors are present with Mr. 
Holley. Specifically, the Risk Assessment identifies the 
following risk factors as being present: (1) sexual 
preoccupation based on his difficulty with sexual self-
regulation; (2) deviant sexual interest (such as a preference 
for children) is “present, but embedded within a broader pattern 
of compulsive and dysregulated sexual behavior rather than a 
primary or exclusive deviant orientation;” (3) lack of 
emotionally intimate relationships with adults; (4) lifestyle 

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impulsivity; (5) poor problem solving; and (6) negative social 
influences. Id. at 22-26. Mr. Holley concedes that while the Risk 
Assessment 
acknowledges meaningful risk factors, it 
consistently frames Mr. Holley’s risk as 
something that is modifiable and manageable 
with the right structure and oversight. In 
plain terms, despite Mr. Holley’s risk 
factors, Dr. Hildembrand believes that he 
remains a good candidate for community-based 
treatment because he has shown a positive 
response so far, with real progress in urge 
control, self-monitoring, accountability, and 
an understanding of victim impact. 
Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 40. Again, the Court commends Mr. Holley 
for the progress he has made in the four months leading up to 
the issuance of the Risk Assessment. However, and as he 
concedes, the Risk Assessment “acknowledges meaningful risk 
factors.” Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 40 at 4. Although the Risk 
Assessment maintains that these factors can be managed with 
structure and oversight, because Mr. Holley cannot be monitored 
twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, the Risk Assessment 
does not provide evidence to rebut the presumption of 
dangerousness. 
 

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B. Mental Health Issues 
 
The Risk Assessment states that Mr. Holley is “not actively 
suicidal though he continue[s] to endorse passive suicidal 
ideation (no plan).” Risk Assessment, ECF No. 38-1 at 12. That 
said, “[h]is current risk level remains high due to his recent 
attempt and ongoing stressors of being incarcerated and pending 
legal sanctions.” Id. 
The Court is mindful that releasing Mr. Holley could 
eliminate the mental health stress that is contributing to his 
suicide risk level. However, Mr. Holley can continue weekly 
therapy sessions with Dr. Hildembrand virtually. The record here 
demonstrates that these sessions have a positive influence on 
him. Id. at 4 (noting that Northern Neck mental health 
documentation states that Mr. Holley met with Dr. Hildembrand on 
December 26, 2025, and afterwards “report[ed] he discussed with 
his therapist today how he ended up on suicide watch and feels 
positive after talking about his concerns that lead to suicide 
watch”). 
Furthermore, the information provided by defense counsel 
demonstrates that Northern Neck has been responsive to his 
mental health needs. Specifically, he has been placed on the 
“mental health acute list for monitoring of his mental health 
needs.” Suppl., ECF No. 38 at 3. He met with a mental health 
provider three times in December 2025, and as a result of the 

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last meeting in December, he was placed on suicide watch. Id. 
Three days after being placed on suicide watch, he reported no 
suicidal ideation. Id. Northern Neck secured a telemedicine 
psychiatric consultation for Mr. Holley on December 29, 2025, 
resulting in him being prescribed an antidepressant, although it 
is unclear the extent to which he has been able to take the 
medication. Id. at 4. 
Accordingly, the Court concludes that Mr. Holley’s mental 
health needs are being addressed at Northern Neck and through 
virtual therapy with Dr. Hildembrand. 
IV. Conclusion 
The Court commends Mr. Holley for his engagement with his 
treatment and sincerely hopes this continues; however, for all 
the reasons discussed above, the Risk Assessment does not 
provide evidence that rebuts the presumption that he is a danger 
to the community. The government has therefore shown by clear 
and convincing evidence that no conditions can reasonably assure 
the safety of the community. An appropriate Order accompanies 
this Memorandum Opinion. 
SO ORDERED. 
Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan 
United States District Judge 
June 5, 2026 

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