govinfo:USCOURTS-dcd-1_26-cv-00920-2

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
 
DARRYL C. CARTER, 
 
 Plaintiff, 
 
 v. Civil Action No. 26-920 (JEB) 
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
 
Defendant. 
 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
This case concerns the efforts of pro se Plaintiff Darryl C. Carter to obtain documents 
from the Federal Bureau of Investigation through the Freedom of Information Act. Since July 
2021, Plaintiff has been seeking to compel the FBI to produce a broad range of documents, and 
he has refused to narrow his request either in response to agency inquiries or in litigation. The 
FBI nonetheless searched for responsive records and turned up more than 2 million pages. It 
subsequently produced 1,475 pages to Plaintiff, even though he had agreed to pay only $50 in 
duplication fees. The Government now moves for summary judgment, claiming that its search, 
limited production, and withholding were reasonable, and Carter has not responded. The Court 
will grant the Motion. 
I. Background 
The backstory for this case begins in 2021 with a FOIA request initially submitted by 
Carter to the FBI on June 23 of that year. His request sought, without any limitation, “[a]ll 
documents; emails; memos; notes; papers; text messages; land line telephone records; . . . and 
human readable communication . . . regarding 1.) ‘Formal complaints submitted electronically’” 
as well as “2.) ‘Tips’ via FBI Tips link” within the period of June 1–22, 2021, and it noted his 

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willingness to pay up to $50 for the documents. See ECF No. 86-4 (Joseph E. Bender, Jr. 
Declaration), ¶ 5. Carter also asked the FBI for expedited processing. Id. When the Bureau 
denied this latter request, he filed suit in the Southern District of New York under 5 U.S.C. § 552 
et seq. See ECF No. 2 (Compl.). On August 4, the case was transferred to the Eastern District of 
New York given that Plaintiff’s residence is located there. See ECF No. 13 (First Notice of 
Transfer). Carter then unsuccessfully appealed the transfer order to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit. See ECF No. 16 (Mandate). 
The FBI ultimately searched for documents that would be responsive to his request. Not 
surprisingly, the search yielded more than 2 million pages, which entailed tens of thousands of 
dollars for duplication and processing fees. See Bender Decl., ¶ 18. The FBI nonetheless 
processed 1,548 pages, which was proportionate to the $50 Carter had agreed to pay. See ECF 
No. 86 (Mot.) at 8. Of those pages, it produced 1,475 and withheld the remaining 73 under 
FOIA Exemptions 6 and 7. Id. Plaintiff then filed a letter to the court in the Eastern District of 
New York seeking to transfer the case to the District of Columbia. See ECF No. 82 (Mot. to 
Transfer). The Government did not oppose Plaintiff’s motion, see ECF No. 83 (Resp. to Order to 
Show Cause), so the case was transferred to this Court. See ECF No. 84 (Second Notice of 
Transfer). 
The Government now moves for summary judgment, contending that it performed its 
s
tatutorily mandated duties to search for all documents that may be responsive, and it has 
produced to him 1,475 pages, commensurate with the amount in fees that Carter has initially 
agreed to pay. See Mot. at 5–8. The Government also argues that it has appropriately withheld 
73 pages in accordance with FOIA exemptions. Id. at 9. Plaintiff has filed no response despite 
direction from the Court to do so. See ECF No. 87 (Neal Order). 

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II. Legal Standard 
Summary judgment may be granted if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute 
as t
o any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(a); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48 (1986); Holcomb v. 
Powell, 433 F.3d 889, 895 (D.C. Cir. 2006). An issue of material fact is one that is capable of 
changing the substantive outcome of the litigation. See Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248 (“Only 
disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will 
properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.”); Holcomb, 433 F.3d at 895. “A party 
asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion” by “citing to 
particular parts of materials in the record” or “showing that the materials cited do not establish 
the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible 
evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). Factual assertions in the moving party’s 
affidavits or declarations may be accepted as true unless the opposing party submits his own 
affidavits, declarations, or documentary evidence to the contrary. Neal v. Kelly, 963 F.2d 453, 
456 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
FOIA cases are typi cally decided on motions for summary judgment. See Brayton v. Off. 
of the U.S. Trade Representative, 641 F.3d 521, 527 (D.C. Cir. 2011). In a FOIA case, a court 
may grant summary judgment based solely on information provided in an agency’s affidavits or 
declarations when they “describe the justifications for nondisclosure with reasonably specific 
detail, demonstrate that the information withheld logically falls within the claimed exemption, 
and are not controverted by either contrary evidence in the record nor by evidence of agency bad 
faith.” Larson v. Dep’t of State, 565 F.3d 857, 862 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). Such 
agency affidavits or declarations “are accorded a presumption of good faith, which cannot be 

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rebutted by ‘purely speculative claims about the existence and discoverability of other 
documents.’” SafeCard Servs., Inc. v. SEC, 926 F.2d 1197, 1200 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (quoting 
Ground Saucer Watch, Inc. v. CIA, 692 F.2d 770, 771 (D.C. Cir. 1981)). 
III. Analysis 
Congress enacted FOIA “to pierce the veil of administrative secrecy and to open agency 
act
ion to the light of public scrutiny.” Dep’t of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976) 
(quotation marks and citation omitted). “The basic purpose of FOIA is to ensure an informed 
citizenry, vital to the functioning of a democratic society, needed to check against corruption and 
to hold the governors accountable to the governed.” John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 
U.S. 146, 152 (1989) (citation omitted). The statute provides that “each agency, upon any 
request for records which (i) reasonably describes such records and (ii) is made in accordance 
with published rules . . . shall make the records promptly available to any person.” 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552(a)(3)(A). 
Defendant contends that it is en
 titled to summary judgment for two reasons. It maintains 
first that the search performed in response to Plaintiff’s request was adequate. See Mot. at 5–7. 
It also argues that certain withholdings were proper. Id. at 9–15. Here, the Bureau makes factual 
assertions through declarations, which the Court will accept as true at this stage given that 
Plaintiff has not submitted his own affidavits, declarations, or documentary evidence to the 
contrary. Neal, 963 F.2d at 456 (noting that factual assertions in movants’ declarations may be 
accepted as true unless opposing party submits evidence to the contrary). The Court addresses 
each of Defendant’s two assertions in turn. 
 
 

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A. Adequacy of Search and Release 
“An agency fulfills its obligations under FOIA if it can demonstrate beyond material 
doubt that its search was ‘reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents.’” Valencia-
Lucena v. U.S. Coast Guard, 180 F.3d 321, 325 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (quoting Truitt v. Dep’t of 
State, 897 F.2d 540, 542 (D.C. Cir. 1990)); see also Steinberg v. Dep’t of Just., 23 F.3d 548, 551 
(D.C. Cir. 1994). “[T]he issue to be resolved is not whether there might exist any other 
documents possibly responsive to the request, but rather whether the search for those documents 
was adequate.” Weisberg v. Dep’t of Just., 745 F.2d 1476, 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The 
adequacy of an agency’s search for documents requested under FOIA “is judged by a standard of 
reasonableness and depends, not surprisingly, upon the facts of each case.” Id. To meet its 
burden, the agency may submit affidavits or declarations that explain the scope and method of its 
search “in reasonable detail.” Perry v. Block, 684 F.2d 121, 127 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Absent 
contrary evidence, such affidavits or declarations are sufficient to show that an agency complied 
with FOIA. Id. “If, however, the record leaves substantial doubt as to the sufficiency of the 
search, summary judgment for the agency is not proper.” Truitt, 897 F.2d at 542. 
To demonstrate the adequacy of its search, Defendant offers two declarations: one from 
Joseph E. Bender, Jr., then the Acting Section Chief of the Record/Information Dissemination in 
the Information Management Division of the FBI; and another from Amie Marie Napier, that 
Section’s subsequent Chief. See Bender Decl., ¶ 1; ECF No. 86-2 (Amie Marie Napier 
Declaration), ¶ 1. These declarations describe the extensive steps that the Bureau undertook in 
response to Carter’s two-part request. As to the first, the FBI concluded that a request for all 
“formal complaints submitted electronically” did not provide sufficient detail or criteria to 
conduct a feasible search. See Bender Decl., ¶ 17. 

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As to the second part, the FBI searched the Central Records System, turning up more 
than 2.3 million pages of potentially responsive documents from approximately 589,000 tips 
during the period specified by Carter’s request. Id., ¶ 18. The FBI’s declarations demonstrate a 
comprehensive search through its internal records, including a scoping review to identify the 
pool of potentially responsive documents. See Napier Decl., ¶ 15–24. The Court finds that these 
steps sufficiently capture Plaintiff’s correspondingly broad request and adequately match the 
request’s criteria. 
The declarations also detail the reasoning behind the Bureau’s decision to process and 
release o
nly a fraction of the identified pages to Carter. Agencies must charge fees for the 
processing of documents requested under FOIA. See 28 C.F.R. § 16.10(a). Here, the declarants 
estimate that duplicating the full swathe of records found would cost between $70,000 and 
$117,000. See ECF No. 86-5 (Bender Exhs.), Exh. K (Duplication Fee Letter). Carter, however, 
has consented to pay only $50. See id., Exh. A (eFOIA Req.). The FBI explained its estimated 
fee to Carter and notified him that he could narrow the scope of the request to reduce the 
duplication cost. See Bender Decl., ¶ 18. The Bureau maintains that it has fulfilled its 
responsibility by turning over 1,475 pages of FOIA-responsive records to Plaintiff — the number 
his $50 budget would cover. See Mot. at 8. Absent any contrary proposal from Carter agreeing 
to pay the heightened fee cost, the Court agrees that the FBI’s search and production decisions 
have fulfilled its FOIA obligations to this point. See SafeCard, 926 F.2d at 1201 (noting that 
agency declarations are accorded “a presumption of good faith, which cannot be rebutted by 
purely speculative claims about the existence and discoverability of other documents.”) 
(quotation marks omitted). 

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Plaintiff does not allege that the search was inadequate, nor does he question the 
duplication fees required in order for the FBI to fully produce the millions of responsive 
documents. Instead, Plaintiff offers scattershot claims, alleging, for example, that the Bureau is 
engaged in a “‘Shadow Game’” where the “government . . . [is] hiding and harassing one on the 
‘Shadows’ via, virtually, my entire online presence.” ECF No. 56-1 (Darryl C. Carter 
Declaration), ¶ 6. As Carter never responds to the Government’s factual assertions that the 
search was thorough and documented, the Court can conclude only that they are true. As a 
result, it holds that the search was legally adequate, and the Government is thus entitled to 
summary judgment on this issue. 
B. Exemptions 
Next up is the propriety of the Government’s withholdings of certain documents from 
Carter. FOIA provides that “each agency, upon any request for records which (i) reasonably 
describes such records and (ii) is made in accordance with published rules . . . shall make the 
records promptly available to any person.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A). Nine categories of 
information are exempt from FOIA’s broad rules of disclosure. Id., § 552(b)(1)–(9). These 
exemptions are to be “narrowly construed,” Rose, 425 U.S. at 361, and the reviewing court must 
bear in mind that FOIA mandates a “strong presumption in favor of disclosure.” Nat’l Ass’n of 
Home Builders v. Norton, 309 F.3d 26, 32 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting U.S. Dep’t of State v. Ray, 
502 U.S. 164, 173 (1991)). An agency may withhold any records that satisfy the requirements of 
at least one exemption. See U.S. Dep’t of Just. v. Reps. Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 
749, 755 (1989). The Bureau here has withheld certain documents or portions of documents, 
invoking Exemptions 6, 7(C), and 7(E). The Court looks at Exemptions 6 and 7(C) together 
because they both implicate privacy interests and then considers Exemption 7(E). 

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1. Exemptions 6 and 7(C) 
Exemption 6 protects “personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of 
whic
h would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552(b)(6). Exemption 7(C) excludes “records of information compiled for law enforcement 
purposes . . . to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or 
information . . . could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal 
privacy.” Id., § 552(b)(7)(C). Both provisions require agencies and reviewing courts to “balance 
the privacy interests that would be compromised by disclosure against the public interest in 
release of the requested information.” Beck v. Dep’t of Just., 997 F.2d 1489, 1491 (D.C. Cir. 
1993) (quoting Davis v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 968 F.2d 1276, 1281 (D.C. Cir. 1992)). 
Although both exemptions require agencies and reviewing courts to weigh the same 
interests, the balance tilts more strongly toward nondisclosure in the context of Exemption 7(C) 
because “Exemption 7(C)’s privacy language is broader than the comparable language in 
Exemption 6 in two respects.” Reps. Comm., 489 U.S. at 756. First, Exemption 6 encompasses 
“clearly unwarranted” invasions of privacy, while Exemption 7(C) omits the adverb “clearly.” 
Id. Second, Exemption 6 prevents disclosures that “would constitute” an invasion of privacy, 
while Exemption 7(C) targets disclosures that “could reasonably be expected to constitute” such 
an invasion. Id. Both differences are the result of specific amendments, reflecting Congress’s 
conscious choice to provide greater protection to law-enforcement materials than to personnel, 
medical, and other similar files. Id. Courts have accordingly held that Exemption 7(C) 
“establishes a lower bar for withholding material” than Exemption 6. ACLU v. Dep’t of Just., 
655 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2011); see also Beck, 997 F.2d at 1491. 

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As a result, if the records and information Defendant seeks to withhold in this case were 
“compiled for law enforcement purposes,” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7), the Court need only address 
whether the agency has properly withheld these documents under Exemption 7(C), and there is 
no need to consider the higher bar of Exemption 6. This criterion is plainly satisfied here, as 
records of tips submitted to the FBI are plainly documents that are compiled during the course of 
investigation, prosecution, and other law enforcement activities. See Pub. Emps. for Env’t Resp. 
v. U.S. Section, Int’l Boundary & Water Comm’n, U.S.-Mex., 740 F.3d 195, 203 (D.C. Cir. 
2014) (describing that record is “compiled” for law-enforcement purposes if it was “created, 
gathered, or used” for such purposes). 
This threshold question answered, the Court must now balance the privacy interests at 
sta
ke in disclosure with the public interest in release. Nat’l Archives & Recs. Admin. v. Favish, 
541 U.S. 157, 172–74 (2004) (describing this balancing test). The first step in the Exemption 
7(C) analysis is to determine whether there is, in fact, a privacy interest in the materials sought. 
See ACLU, 655 F.3d at 6. In this context, the Supreme Court has rejected a “cramped notion of 
personal privacy” and emphasized that “privacy encompass[es] the individual’s control of 
information concerning his or her person.” Reps. Comm., 489 U.S. at 763. To constitute a 
privacy interest under FOIA, the claimed interest must be a “substantial privacy interest [, which] 
is anything greater than a de minimis privacy interest.” Multi Ag Media LLC v. Dep’t of Agric., 
515 F.3d 1224, 1229–30 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
Defendant argues that the withheld documents implicate substantial privacy interests. To 
support t
his argument, the Bureau provides factual evidence that these documents include names 
and identifying information of FBI Special Agents and other staff. See Mot. at 12; Napier Decl., 
¶¶ 34–36. The Court finds that there is a substantial privacy interest in protecting the identity of 

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Special Agents and other FBI employees given that revealing their identities may expose them to 
harassment. See Wood v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 432 F.3d 78, 88 (2d Cir. 2005) 
(recognizing privacy interest under FOIA in identities of government investigators where 
revealing their identities would lead to embarrassment or harassment). 
As with the rest of this Motion, Carter offers up no countervailing public interest to offset 
the pr
ivacy interests asserted by the FBI. To the extent that there is any inherent public interest 
in these documents, the Court finds that it would not offset the substantial privacy interests 
detailed in the Government’s Motion. The FBI accordingly prevails on the balancing test and 
may withhold documents under 7(C). 
2. Exemption 7(E) 
Exemption 7(E) allows agencies to withhold information that “would disclose techniques 
and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines 
for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be 
expected to risk circumvention of the law.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(E). 
In order for the Government to invoke the “techniques and procedures” prong of 7(E), it 
must d
emonstrate that its withholdings meet three basic requirements. First, like with all 
exemptions under § 552(b)(7)(E), the Bureau must show that the documents were in fact 
“compiled for law enforcement purposes” and not for some other reason. Id. Second, it must 
establish that the records contain law-enforcement techniques and procedures that are “generally 
unknown to the public.” Nat’l Whistleblower Ctr. v. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 849 F. 
Supp. 2d 13, 36 (D.D.C. 2012) (quoting Albuquerque Pub. Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 726 F. 
Supp. 851, 857 (D.D.C. 1989)). Finally, the Government must show that disclosure “could 
reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law.” Id. 

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Defendant clears the first bar because the records at issue were clearly compiled for law 
enforcement purposes, as the records contain non-public information regarding investigative 
techniques and other procedures to advance the Bureau’s law-enforcement mission. See Napier 
Decl., ¶¶ 44–49. Defendant also satisfies the second requirement because the records relate to 
the Bureau’s law-enforcement techniques that were not generally known. Indeed, these records 
include the identities of certain investigative databases and the techniques used to determine 
which tips warrant additional investigation. Id., ¶ 50. As the Bureau states, “Disclosing the 
criteria used by investigators to determine whether complaints and information warrant further 
investigation would reveal key information about FBI investigative strategies.” Id., ¶ 50. The 
Court thus concludes that the second requirement is met because “[t]he phrase ‘techniques and 
procedures[]’ . . . refers to how law enforcement officials go about investigating,” surveilling, or 
preventing crime. Allard K. Lowenstein Int’l Hum. Rts. Project v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 626 
F.3d 678, 682 (2d Cir. 2010); Pub. Emps. for Env’t Resp., 740 F.3d at 203. Last, the 
Government explains that if these documents were disclosed, it would lead to the risk of 
circumvention of the law because potential wrongdoers could gain expertise to hack or disrupt 
law-enforcement databases. See Napier Decl., ¶¶ 46, 48, 52. These documents, therefore, were 
properly withheld under Exemption 7(E). 
IV. Conclusion 
For
 these reasons, the Court will grant Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. A 
separate Order to that effect will issue this day. 
/s/ James E. Boasberg 
JAMES E. BOASBERG 
Chief Judge 
Date: June 5, 2026 
 

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