govinfo:USCOURTS-cand-3_25-cv-01445-1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
DE'RON A. CHEEVES, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
 
CHRISTINE CORPUS, et al., 
Defendants. 
 

 
 
ORDER VACATING JUDGMENT 
AND REOPENING CASE; 
DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH 
LEAVE TO AMEND 
 
 
 
De’Ron Cheeves, a detainee at Maple Street Correctional Center in San Mateo County 
proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court 
dismissed and closed the case for failure to file a complete in forma pauperis (IFP) application or 
pay the filing fee and entered judgment. Dkt. Nos. 6, 7. Cheeves has now completed his IFP 
application and requested to reopen the case. Dkt. No. 14. He is granted leave to proceed IFP by 
separate order. For the reasons identified below, judgment will be vacated, the case reopened, 
and the complaint dismissed with leave to amend. 
DISCUSSION 
I. Standard of Review 
A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a prisoner 
seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 
U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any 
claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or 
seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se pleadings must, however, be liberally construed. See United States v. 
Qazi, 975 F.3d 989, 993 (9th Cir. 2020). 

 
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the 
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “Specific facts are 
not necessary; the statement need only “‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is 
and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citations 
omitted). While Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, it demands more than an 
unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 
677–78 (2009). A pleading that offers only labels and conclusions, or a formulaic recitation of 
the elements of a cause of action, or naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement does 
not suffice. Id. 
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: 
(1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that 
the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. 
Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 
II. Cheeves’s Allegations 
Cheeves sues now-former sheriff of San Mateo County, Christina Corpus, and alleges 
that the “no mail policy” from October 5, 2022 to the date of filing causes him financial hardship 
and impacts his relationship with his family members. He seeks damages. 
III. Analysis 
Prisoners enjoy a First Amendment right to send and receive mail. See Witherow v. Paff, 
52 F.3d 264, 265 (9th Cir. 1995). A prison, however, may adopt regulations or practices which 
impinge on a prisoner’s First Amendment rights as long as the regulations are “reasonably 
related to legitimate penological interests.” See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). The 
Turner standard applies to regulations and practices concerning all correspondence between 
prisoners and to regulations concerning incoming mail received by prisoners from non-prisoners. 
See Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 413 (1989). In the case of outgoing correspondence 
from prisoners to non-prisoners, an exception to the Turner standard applies. Because outgoing 
correspondence from prisoners does not, by its very nature, pose a serious threat to internal 

 
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prison order and security, there must be a closer fit between any regulation or practice affecting 
such correspondence and the purpose it purports to serve. See id. at 411-412. 
Cheeves has not provided enough information about the policy he challenges for the 
court to determine whether he states a cognizable claim. In addition, he has not explained how 
the defendant is responsible for the policy. He may file an amended complaint in which he 
describes the policy in greater detail and explains how it is attributable to the former sheriff 
herself. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the court orders as follows: 
1. The Clerk shall vacate the prior judgment and reopen the case. 
2. Even liberally construed, the allegations do not give rise to any federal claims 
against any defendants. The complaint is dismissed with leave to amend to remedy the 
deficiencies noted above. 
3. If Cheeves wishes to file a First Amended Complaint (FAC), he must do so within 
twenty-eight days from the date of this order. The FAC must include the caption and civil case 
number used in this Order and the words FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT on the first page. 
Because an amended complaint completely replaces the original complaint, Cheeves must 
include in it all the allegations he wishes to present. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 
(9th Cir. 1992). He may not incorporate material from his original complaint by reference. 
Failure to amend within the designated time will result in the dismissal of this case with 
prejudice. 
3. It is Cheeves’s responsibility to prosecute this case. He must keep the court informed 
of any change of address by filing a separate paper with the clerk headed “Notice of Change of 
Address,” and must comply with the court’s orders in a timely fashion. Failure to do so may 
result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 41(b). 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 
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Dated: June 5, 2026 
______________________________________ 
VINCE CHHABRIA 
United States District Judge 
 

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