govinfo:USCOURTS-kywd-4_26-cv-00066-0

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY 
OWENSBORO DIVISION 
 
JAPHSON CARRASCO CALDERON, Petitioner, 
 
v. Civil Action No. 4:26-cv-66-RGJ 
 
SAMUEL OLSON, et al., Respondents. 
 
* * * * * 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 
 
 This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Japhson Carrasco Calderon’s Writ of Habeas 
Corpus. [DE 1]. Respondents responded on February 12, 2026. [DE 5]. Petitioner replied on 
February 17, 2026. [DE 8]. The parties agreed that no evidentiary hearing is necessary. [DE 6; DE 
9]. This matter is ripe for adjudication. For the reasons below, this Court DENIES the Petition for 
Writ of Habeas Corpus. [DE 1]. 
I. Background 
Petitioner Japhson Carrasco Calderon (“Calderon”) is a 34 -year-old native and citizen of 
Nicaragua. [DE 1 at 1]. In August 2019, Calderon entered the United States without inspection. 
[Id.]. Although entering without inspection, Calderon encountered border patrol agents shortly 
thereafter. [Id.]. Shortly after his encounter, Calderon self-deported to Nicaragua. [Id.]. On August 
8, 2021, Calderon again entered the United States without inspection. [DE 5 -1 at 23]. On March 
24, 2025, Calderon was arrested by Immigration and Cu stoms Enforcement (“ICE”). [ Id.]. ICE 
also served Calderon a Notice of Intent/Decision to Reinstate his Prior Order of Removal. [DE 5-
3 at 26]. Calderon then alleged a fear of return to Nicaragua. [ Id.]. On December 11, 2025, an 
Immigration Court granted Calderon “withholding only” relief from being removed to Nicaragua. 
[Id.]. Consequently, on this date, the order of the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) exhausted Calderon’s 
administrative remedies, and his order of removal became final. [DE 5 at 15]. On February 5, 2026, 
ICE served Calderon with a Notice of Removal to Mexico. [DE 5 -6 at 31]. ICE is currently PageID #:
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screening Calderon for fear of removal to Mexico. [DE 5 at 15]. Neither party disputes that 
Calderon is subject to a final order of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231. [DE 5 at 16; DE 8 at 41]. 
Calderon seeks a Writ of Habeas Corpus alleging that his current detention is in violation 
of Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 690 (2001). [DE 1 at 5]. The United States contends that Calderon 
is properly detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1231 pursuant to the Zadyvdas standard. [DE 5 at 16-18]. 
II. Discussion1 
A. Relevant Immigration Framework 
8 U.S.C. § 1231 controls the detention of non-citizens “during” and “beyond” “removal.” 
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2) -(6). The “removal period” begins once a noncitizen ’s removal order 
“becomes administratively final.” 8 U.S.C. § 123l(a)(l)(B). The removal period lasts for 90 days, 
during which ICE “shall remove the [non-citizen] from the United States.” And ICE “shall detain 
the [non-citizen]” as it carries out the remov al. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(l)-(2). After the initial 90-day 
period, a noncitizen “ordered removed. . . as inadmissible under section 1182 of this title. . . may 
be detained beyond the removal period” or “released” subject to terms of supervision. 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1231(a)(6); Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 683. For post -removal detention to be permissible, the 
removal must be reasonably foreseeable. Id. at 699. What constitutes reasonable foreseeability is 
determined on a case-by-case inquiry, with no specific point in time where the detention becomes 
constitutionally impermissible. Id. However, the Supreme Court held that a period of detention 
under six months is a “ presumptively reasonable period of detention. ” Id. at 701. This does not 
mean that any detention longer than six months is unreasonable. Id. After six months, the detention 
 
1 Neither party asserted any jurisdiction-related arguments. However, the Court has analyzed jurisdiction 
of remedies in similar circumstances, such as Edahi v. Lewis, 2025 WL 3466682, at *2-3 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 
27, 2025) and incorporates its reasoning into this opinion. Neither party asserted any exhaustion -related 
arguments and no applicable statute or rule mandates exhaustion. However, because many decisions in 
similar cases by district courts within the Sixth Circuit discuss this principal, the Court incorporates its 
analysis on exhaustion of remedies from a previous case, Edahi, 2025 WL 3466682, at *3, and the Court 
waives the exhaustion requirement for the same reasons. PageID #:
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of the noncitizen may continue to be constitutionally permissible according to a burden shifting 
framework. Id. First, the noncitizen must “ provide[] good reason to believe that there is no 
significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Id. If this is met, the burden 
shifts to the United States. The United States must “respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that 
showing.” Id. “And as the period of prior post -removal confinement grows, what counts as the 
‘reasonably foreseeable future’ necessarily shrinks.” Lopez v. Raycraft, 2026 WL 1370583, at *12 
(E.D. Mich. May 15, 2026) (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701). “Said differently: A person with 
a final removal order ‘may be held in confinement until it has been determined that there is no 
significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.’” Id. 
B. Application to Calderon 
Calderon’s final order of removal was considered final pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231 on 
December 11, 2025. [DE 5 at 16]. As of today, Calderon is still within the six month detention 
period, which is presumptively reasonable. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. “Although the Supreme 
Court established a six -month period of presumptively reasonable detention,” courts have found 
that Zadvydas does “not preclude a detainee from challenging the reasonableness of his detention 
before such time.” See, e.g., Munoz-Saucedo v. Pittman , 789 F. Supp. 3d 387, 395 –96 (D.N.J. 
2025) (citing, inter alia, Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699–701). If a person can prove that “his removal 
is not reasonably foreseeable ” then he can overcome the United States’s presumption of 
reasonableness. Id. at 397. But “in most cases, this heavy standard will be impossible to meet and 
habeas petitions will be easily denied. ” Lopez, 2026 WL 1370583, at *12 (citing Cruz Medina v. 
Noem, 794 F. Supp. 3d 365, 375 (D. Md. 2025) ; see also, Guerra -Castro v. Parra, 2025 WL 
1984300, *4 (S.D. Fla. July 17, 2025) (rejecting a habeas petition prior to a six-month detention 
because the claim was “premature”). And “successful petitioners under the Zadvydas framework 
prototypically include persons whom the government is ‘unable to remove ’” Euceda v. Evans, PageID #:
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2017 WL 1534197, at *4 (E.D. Va. Apr. 24, 2017) (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 695). It also 
includes persons who are “ left in [a] removable -but-unremoveable limbo .” Jama v. Immigr. 
Customs Enf’t, 543 U.S. 335, 347 (2005). 
Calderon cannot meet his burden. Calderon has been served a notice of removal and has 
undergone screening to a third-party county. [DE 5 at 18 -19]. Calderon asserts that “there is no 
indication of whether Mexico is a safe third country” and thus his detention is not permissible. 
[DE 8 at 41]. He also states that “[w] hatever a reasonable time to detain is, it has certainly been 
exceeded here.” [Id.]. But Calderon must “offer more than ‘conclusory statements’ suggesting he 
will not be removed.” Esmaeili v. Noem, 2026 WL 240661, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2026) (quoting 
Andrade v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 538, 543 (5th Cir. 2006)) ; see also, Wang v. Bondi, 2026 WL 
1113519, at *3 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 24, 2026) (holding that the Petitioner must provide “evidence 
showing that removal is not significantly likely” ). And although Calderon has been detained for 
roughly five months, that fact, without more, is insufficient to meet his burden. Smith v. Simon, 
2019 WL 4143088 , *4 (N.D. Ohio July 17, 2019) (holding that the “mere passage of time” is 
inadequate to obtain Zadvydas relief) (quoting Beckford v. Lynch, 168 F. Supp. 3d 533, 539 
(W.D.N.Y. 2016). Although the passage of time necessaril y “shrinks” what is considered as the 
‘reasonably foreseeable future ,” the passage of time alone is insufficient. Lopez, 2026 WL 
1370583, at *12. As a result, Calderon has failed to meet his burden at this stage “to come forward 
with evidence showing that removal is not significantly likely to occur sometime soon.” Wang, 
2026 WL 1113519, at *3; see also, Abdalla v. Johnson, 2017 WL 345731, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 
24, 2017) (holding that Petitioner had not met his burden on a Zadvydas claim, even a year into 
detention, because petitioner “provide[d] no evidence” that removal was unlikely to occur in the 
near future). PageID #:
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In Jama, the Supreme Court held that petitioner had met this burden because the “petitioner 
had definitively established that no country would accept him.” Woldeghergish v. Lynch, 2025 WL 
4648129, *10 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 23, 2025) (citing Jama, 543 U.S. at 347); Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 
at 510, 527 (2003) (the primary question is whether removal is “(n)o longer practically 
attainable”); Miranda v. Garland, 34 F.4th 338, 361 (4th Cir. 2022) (“ [Z]advydas should not be 
expanded beyond the context of the indefinite and potentially permanent detention involved here.”) 
Calderon has not “definitively established” that Mexico, nor any other country, would not accept 
him. Jama, 543 U.S. at 347. Simply stating that a country is unsafe, without other evidence, is 
insufficient to meet the initial burden . Ahmed v. Brott, 2015 WL 1542131, at *4 (D. Minn. Mar. 
17, 2015) ; report and recommendation adopted , 2015 WL 1542155 (D. Minn. Apr. 7, 2015) 
(collecting cases). Thus, as the record currently stands , Calderon has not demonstrated that he is 
facing a “potentially permanent detention” which Zadvydas, and the Fifth Amendment, prohibit. 
Miranda, 34 F.4th at 361; see Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699-701. As a result, Calderon fails to meet 
his initial burden. Id. 
Moreover, ICE has demonstrated that Calderon is likely to be removed in the reasonably 
foreseeable future. Medina, 794 F. Supp. 3d at 375. The United States has provided to the Court 
Calderon’s notice of removal and a sworn declaration by Calderon’s Supervisory Detention and 
Deportation Officer (“SDDO”). [DE 5 -7 at 32 -33]. The declaration states that “ICE regularly 
deports aliens to Mexico, including as third-country removals” and that “ICE has several flights a 
week to Mexico.” [ Id.]. As a result , ICE has provided evidence that supports his removal is 
reasonably foreseeable. Lin v. Warden, 2026 WL 412115, *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2026) (holding 
that the United States has provided sufficient evidence that removal was reasonably foreseeable 
and denying the habeas petition); Woldeghergish, 2025 WL 4648129, *10 (denying habeas petition 
while the United States was only waiting for travel documents prior to removal); Thai v. Hyde, PageID #:
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788 F. Supp. 3d 57, 61 (D. Mass. 2025) (holding that evidence of the United States’s removal 
efforts are “sufficient grounds for the Court to conclude that petitioner's removal is foreseeable”). 
District courts within the Sixth Circuit routinely use sworn declarations from ICE officers as 
evidence that removable is reasonably foreseeable. See, e.g., Woldeghergish, 2025 WL 4648129, 
*11 (holding that a declaration from a SDDO regarding Petitioner’s removal process demonstrates 
that removal is reasonably foreseeable); Ahmed v. U.S. Att’y Gen, 4271704, *2 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 
29, 2017) (holding that because of the SDDO’s declaration, “petitioner has not provided good 
reason to believe that his removal is unlikely in the reasonably foreseeable future”); Estenor v. 
Holder, 2011 WL 5572596, *2-4 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 24, 2011) (same). 
Accordingly, Calderon’s Zadvydas claim fails. He has not proven that he is unlikely to be 
removed in the near future. “Should the Government’s efforts to secure removal ultimately stall or 
fail to bear fruit, Petitioner remains free to file a new petition asserting that continued detention is 
no longer reasonable.” Wang, 2026 WL 1113519, at *4. 
III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the Court DENIES Calderon’s Petition for Writ of Habeas 
Corpus [DE 1].
June 5, 2026 PageID #:
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