govinfo:USCOURTS-njd-2_20-cv-07084-3

Not for Publication 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 
 
TRUSTEES OF INTERNATIONAL 
UNION OF PAINTERS AND ALLIED 
TRADES DISTRICT COUNCIL 711 
HEALTH & WELFARE FUND, et al., 
 Plaintiffs, 
 v. 
 
INDEPENDENT WALLCOVERING, INC., 
 
 Defendant. 
 
 
Civil Action No.: 20-7084 (ES) (MAH) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OPINION 
 
SALAS, DISTRICT JUDGE 
 
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Plaintiffs’ 1 unopposed Motion for 
Enforcement of the Parties’ Settlement Agreem ent. (D.E. No. 30 (“Motion”) & D.E. No. 30-2 
(“Mov. Br.”)). Having carefully considered Plaintiffs’ submissions and other relevant portions of 
the record without oral argument (see Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); L. Civ. R. 78.1(b)), and it appearing: 
1. Plaintiff International Union of Painters and Allied Trades District Council 71—a 
labor organization—and Defendant Independent Wallcovering, Inc.—an employer—were parties 
to a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”). (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 13–14 & 20). The CBA allegedly 
required, among other things, that Defendant make payments to th e Funds, permit Plaintiffs to 
perform audits to determine the amount of those payments, and post a surety bond or cash deposit 
to secure its obligation to make those payments. (Id. ¶¶ 20–23, 35–36, 41, & 45). 
 
1 Plaintiffs International Union of Painters and Allie d Trades District Council 711 Health & Welfare Fund, 
International Union of Painters and Allied Trades District Council 711 Vacation Fund, and Painters District Council 
711 Finishing Trades Institute (collectively, the “Funds”) ar e “the employer and employee trustees of [certain labor 
management trust funds].” (D.E. No. 7 (“Am. Compl.”) ¶¶ 5–7). PageID:
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2. Plaintiffs originally co mmenced this action on June 10, 2020, (D.E. No. 1), and 
filed an Amended Complaint on July 23, 2020, (Am. Compl.). Plaintiffs sought an order 
compelling Defendant to (i) submit to audits unde r the CBA; (ii) remit any payments owed as 
reflected in the results of those audits; and (iii) provide the Funds with a $50,0000 security deposit 
pursuant to the CBA. ( See generally id. ). Defendant did not time ly respond to the Amended 
Complaint, and the Clerk of the Court entered de fault on September 28, 2020. Plaintiffs filed an 
initial motion for default judgment on March 19, 2021, (D.E. No. 16), which the Court denied, 
without prejudice, by Order dated November 10, 2021, (D.E. No. 18). Plaintiffs filed a renewed 
motion for default judgment on December 31, 2021, (D.E. No. 21), which the Court ultimately 
granted by Order dated September 30, 2022, (D.E. No. 23). 
3. Among other things, the September 30, 2022 Order (i) obligated Defendant to 
“provide either a cash or surety company bond in the amount of $50,0000”; (ii) required Defendant 
to submit to a payroll audit; and (iii) directed Plaintiff to file a motion, afte r completion of that 
audit, “requesting judgment to be entered against Defendant fo r the amount of fringe benefit 
contributions and union dues found to be due and ow ing in accordance with the audit, including 
interest and liquated damages, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §1132(g)(2).” (D.E. No. 32). 
4. By letter dated November 4, 2024, Plai ntiffs’ counsel advised: “Upon the 
completion of the Defendant’s payroll audit, the parties entered into a Settlement Agreement to 
resolve the Defendant’s delinquent ob ligations.” (D.E. No. 26 at 1; see also D.E. No. 30-3 
(“Settlement Agreement”)). Counsel further represented that, pursuant to the Settlement 
Agreement, Defendant had execu ted a Consent Judgment, and th at the Settlement Agreement 
authorized Plaintiffs to enter that j udgment under certain circumstances. ( See generally id.). 
Plaintiffs thus requested leave to file a moti on to have the Court enter the Consent Judgment PageID:
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against Defendant. (Id. at 1). The Court granted leave by Order dated November 7, 2024. (D.E. 
No. 27). Plaintiffs filed the instant application on November 19, 2025.2 (D.E. No. 30). 
5. Several provisions of the parties’ Settle ment Agreement, (D.E. No. 30-3 at 3–11 
(ECF Pagination)), are relevant here. For instan ce, Section 1, titled “Total Debt”, provided that 
Defendant owed the Funds “contribu tions, interest, liquidated damages, and attorneys’ fees/costs 
in the amount of $60,049.72 [(the “T otal Debt”)],” and provided an itemized breakdown of that 
sum. (Settlement Agreement at 1). The Settlement Agreement further provided that Defendant 
would “pay the Plaintiffs the Total Debt of $60,049.72 in fifteen (15) monthly installment 
payments” in accordance with a set schedule. ( Id. at 1–2). The Settlement Agreement also 
included language setting forth the parties’ rights and obligations in the event of a default, 
including Defendant’s right to cure any such de fault within 10 days of receiving notice of same 
from Plaintiff. ( Id. at 4). With regard to situations in which Defendant breaches the Settlement 
Agreement and fails to timely cure its default, the Settlement Agreement provided: 
Plaintiffs may take whatever actions [they] consider[] reasonably 
appropriate to collect all amounts owed to [them] by [Defendant]. 
The Plaintiffs can recover the unpaid balance of the Total Debt plus 
interest of two percent (2%) above the prime rate charged by the 
Plaintiffs' depository bank as of January 1 and July 1, which interest 
shall remain in effect until the ne xt interest rate determination. In 
addition, the Plaintiffs can recover all attorneys' fees and costs and 
related collection costs [they incur] as a result of a breach of this 
Agreement by [Defendant]. 
(Id. at 3). 
 
2 While Plaintiffs filed an initial motion to enforce the Settlement Agreement on November 21, 2024, (D.E. 
No. 28), the Court denied that application, without prejudice, to give Plaintiffs the opportunity to file a brief in support. 
(D.E. No. 29). The Court also directed that Plaintiffs’ revised submission “account for [their] legal entitlement to all 
amounts [they] seek[] to recover” and “provide updated information, supported by a sworn declaration and 
documentation as may be appropriate, regarding the interest and attorneys' fees owed through the date of submission.” 
(Id.). PageID:
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6. On November 14, 2023, Defendant executed a Consent Judgment. (D.E. No. 30-3 
at 13–14 (ECF Pagination) (“Consent Judgment”)). The Consent Judgment stated, in relevant part: 
Upon the occurrence of an event of default described in the 
Settlement Agreement dated July 2023 between the [Defendant] and 
Plaintiffs, [Defendant] authorizes the holder to m ove for judgment 
at any time against it and, in or der to carry out this provision, 
authorize any attorney of any court to appear in the District of New 
Jersey to enter judgment against it in favor of th e holder of this 
Consent Judgment, for the full am ount of its liability less any 
payments made under the Settleme nt Agreement, plus reasonable 
attorneys' fees, applicable costs and interest. 
 
[Defendant] agrees that a judgment may be entered against it, upon 
the filing of an affidavit, executed and sworn to under the penalties 
of perjury, to which is attached a copy of this C onsent Judgment, 
and which alleges the amounts then due to the Plaintiffs. 
 
(Id.). 
 
7. Plaintiffs represent that Defendant “rem itted twelve (12) monthly installment 
payments of $4,003.31 totaling $48,039.72, representing payments due on July 15, 2023, through 
June 15, 2024.” (D.E. No. 30-1 (“ Bushinsky Cert.”) ¶ 11). Defe ndant, however, “has failed to 
remit any subsequent monthly installment paym ents due from July 15, 2024[,] to September 15, 
2024, pursuant to the installment payment schedule listed in [the Settlement Agreement].” (Id.). 
8. Plaintiffs provided Defendant with formal notice of that default by letter dated 
August 30, 2024, and advised Defendant that it had te n days to cure the same. (D.E. No. 30-3 at 
24 (ECF Pagination)). Defendant failed to do so. (Bushinsky Cert. ¶ 13). 
9. “Because a settlement agreem ent is a form of contract , allegations of breached 
settlement obligations are governed by contract law.” Jacob’ s Limousine Transportation, Inc. v. 
City of Newark, 688 F. App’x 150, 151 (3d Cir. 2017) (citing Plymouth Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Illinois 
Mid-Continent Life Ins. Co., 378 F.2d 389, 391 (3d Cir. 1967)). “A court must grant a motion to 
enforce if it finds that a defendant breached a duty created by a binding agreement and that the PageID:
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breach caused the plaintiff to suffer damages.” Id. at 151–52. In essen ce, the Court applies a 
breach of contract analysis. To establish a breach of contract claim under New Jersey law, which 
governs the terms of the parties’ Settlement Agreement, (Settlement Agreement at 5), a plaintiff 
“must allege (1) a contract between the parties; (2) a breach of that contract; (3) damages flowing 
therefrom; and (4) that the party stating the claim performed its own contractual obligations.” 
Frederico v. Home Depot, 507 F.3d 188, 203 (3d Cir. 2007); see also DeCozen Chrysler Jeep Corp. 
v. Fiat Chrysler Automobiles, LLC, No. 22-0068, 2025 WL 822995, at *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 13, 2025) 
(“To state a claim for breach of contract under New Jersey law, a plaintiff must allege facts 
demonstrating ‘(1) the existence of a valid contract; (2) that plaintiff performed under the contract; 
(3) the defendant’s breach of the contract; and (4) damages resulting from the breach.’” (citation 
omitted)); Goldfarb v. Solimine , 245 A.3d 570, 577 (2021) (same) (quoting Globe Motor Co. v. 
Igdalev, 139 A.3d 57 (N.J. 2016)). 
10. Here, Plaintiffs have establ ished each of the requisite elements for a breach of 
contract claim vis-à-vis the Sett lement Agreement. First, the Settlement Agreement is a valid 
contract, as it was a negotiated agreement supported by valuable consideration: the parties’ mutual 
resolution of their dispute. See Goldfarb, 245 A.3d at 578 (“To prevail on a claim of breach of 
contract, a party must show that a contract has been made, w ith an offer, acceptance, and 
consideration all present[.]”). Second, as described above, De fendant breached the Settlement 
Agreement by failing to make cer tain payments required there under. Third, it appears that 
Plaintiffs performed each of their obligations under the Settlement Agreement, including providing 
Defendant with formal, written notice of the aforementioned br eaches. Finally, Defendant’s 
breach—a failure to pay the sums required under the parties’ Settlement Agreement—plainly PageID:
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harmed Plaintiffs. The Court th erefore finds that Plaintiffs are entitled to enforcement of the 
Settlement Agreement. 
11. Plaintiffs now ask the Court to enter judgment against Defendant pursuant to the 
Consent Judgment. The Court finds that, be cause of Defendant’s default under Settlement 
Agreement and subsequent failure to cure, Plaintiffs are entitled to “ the full amount of 
[Defendant’s] liability less any payments made under the Settlement Agreement, plus reasonable 
attorneys' fees, applicable costs and interest.” (Consent Judgment). 
12. The Settlement Agreement required Defendant to pay a total of $60,049.72 across 
fifteen monthly installments. (Settlement Agreem ent at 1–2). Defendant paid twelve of those 
installments before defaulting, leaving a principal balance of $12,010.00. Plaintiffs are entitled to 
that sum. Plaintiffs are also entitled to interest on that balance at the rate specified in the Settlement 
Agreement, running from July 15, 2024 (the date of Defendant’s initial default) through the 
present. (Settlement Agreement at 3 (“The Plaintiffs can recover the unpaid balance of the Total 
Debt plus interest of two per cent (2%) above the prime rate charged by th e Plaintiffs' depository 
bank[.]”)). Finally, Plaintiffs may recover reas onable attorneys’ fees and costs. (Settlement 
Agreement at 3; Consent Judgment ). The Court will address Plai ntiffs requests for awards of 
interest and attorneys’ fees/costs in turn. 
13. Beginning with the interest accrued on the remaining principal, Plaintiffs have 
submitted a detailed chart reflec ting the appropriate interest rate (which fluctuates based on the 
“Prime” rate) and associated in terest calculations for each period running between July 16, 2024 
(the day following Defendants’ default) and November 13, 2025. (D.E. No. 30-3 at 26 (ECF 
Pagination)). The Court has reviewed those calcu lations and adopts them herein by reference. 
Thus, the Court finds that Plai ntiffs are entitled to recover interest in the amount of $1,542.48 PageID:
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through November 13, 2025. For the period of November 14, 2025 through December 9, 2025 (a 
span of 26 days), the contractual interest rate remained at 9.00%, thereby yielding simple interest 
in the amount of $77.00. From December 10, 2025 th rough the present (a span of 177 days), the 
contractual interest rate has remained at 8.75%, thereby yielding simple interest in the amount of 
$509.60. Adding those amounts to the interest owed through November 13, 2025, the Court finds 
that Plaintiffs are entitled to interest in the total amount of $2,129.08 through the date of judgment. 
14. Plaintiffs also seek an award of $6,181.00 in attorneys’ fees and costs. (Mov. Br. at 
7–9). “In determining whether [a] request for a ttorneys’ fees is reasonable, the Court must 
calculate a ‘lodestar’ amount equal to the num ber of hours reasonably expended multiplied by a 
reasonable hourly rate.” Sundesa, LLC v. Tejarah Int'l Inc., No. 20-2609, 2020 WL 6781579, at 
*1 (D.N.J. Nov. 17, 2020) (citing Blakey v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc. , 2 F. Supp. 2d 598, 602 (D.N.J. 
1998)). “In making this calculation, the Court must ‘carefully and critically evaluate the hours and 
the hourly rate set forth by counsel.’” Id. (quoting J &J Snack Foods, Corp. v. Earthgrains Co. , 
No. 00-6230, 2003 WL 21051711, at *6 (D.N.J. May 9, 2003)). Here, Plaintiffs’ counsel 
represents: 
[L]egal services were performed by Steven J. Bushinsky, Esquire, a 
member of the law firm of O’Br ien, Belland & Bushinsky, LLC at 
the rate of $175.00 per hour; Daniel H. Mariani, Esquire, former 
associate, at the rate of $175.00 per hour; Diane Harman, paralegal, 
at the rate of $70.00 per hour; and Denielle D’ Amore, paralegal, at 
the rate of $70.00 per hour. 
(Bushinsky Cert. ¶ 24). Plaintiffs’ counsel further represents that those rates are “at or below the 
market rate for the legal services provided in this specialized area of ERISA fringe benefit 
collection law.” (Id. ¶ 23). The Court agrees, based on its experience with the legal rates in this 
market. PageID:
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15. The Court must next determine whether th e number of hours counsel devoted to 
the relevant tasks was reasonable. Plaintiffs’ counsel submitted their time records, which describe 
the actions counsel took in response to Defendant’s breaches of the Settlement Agreement. (D.E. 
No. 30-3 at 28–31 (ECF Pagination)). Having reviewed those records, which reflect Defendant’s 
serial breaches of the Settlement Agreem ent (i.e., beyond those underlying the instant 
application),3 the Court finds that both the activities reflected therein and the time spent completing 
them are reasonable. In turn, the Court finds that Plaintiffs are entitled to recover attorneys’ fees 
in the amount of $6,181.00. Plaintiffs have not iden tified any other costs incurred as a result of 
Defendant’s breach. 
16. In sum, the Court finds that Plaintiffs are entitled to a judgment in the total amount 
of $20,320.08, comprised of the following: (1) a principal amount of $12,010; (2) simple 
prejudgment interest on that amount (at the rate set forth in the Settlement Agreement) running 
from July 16, 2024 through today, in the amount of $2,129.08 and (3) attorneys’ fees and costs in 
the amount of $6,181.00. The Court will therefore GRANT the Motion and provide that relief. 
An appropriate Order follows. 
 
 
s/ Esther Salas 
 E s t h e r S a l a s , U . S . D . J . 
 
Date: June 5, 2026 
 
3 The Settlement Agreement permits Plaintiffs to recover “al l attorneys’ fees and costs . . . it incurs as a result 
of a breach of this Agreement by [Defendant].” (Settlement Agreement at 3). That recovery is therefore not limited 
to the uncured breaches that ultimately led Plaintiffs to file this motion. PageID:
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