govinfo:USCOURTS-txsd-2_25-cv-00123-3

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 
CORPUS CHRISTI DIVISION 
 
 
JAMES MICHAEL RESER, 
 
              Plaintiff, 
 
VS. 
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    CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:25-CV-00123  
  
JAMIE MAGDALINE MARTIN, et al., 
 
              Defendants. 
 
 
ORDER ADOPTING MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION  
Before the Court is Defendant Daniel Gamache’s request for attorneys’ fees  (D.E. 
46, p. 10). On March 19, 2026, United States Magistrate Judge Jason B. Libby issued his 
Memorandum and Recommendation (M&R), recommending that the Court grant 
Gamache’s request and award him $14,160.00 in attorneys’ fees . D.E. 63. Both parties 
were provided proper notice of, and opportunity to object to, the Magistrate Judge’s M&R. 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Special Order No. C-2023-1. Plaintiff timely 
filed his objections on April 2, 2026. D.E. 66.  
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 A district court must review de novo  any portion of a magistrate judge’s proposed 
findings and recommendations on dispositive matters to which the parties have filed 
specific, written objections. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). After considering proper objections, the 
district court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, those portions of the 
proposed findings and recommendations. Id. As to any portion for which no objection is 
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
June 05, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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filed, a district court reviews for clearly erroneous factual findings and conclusions of law. 
United States v. Wilson, 864 F.2d 1219, 1221 (5th Cir. 1989) (per curiam). 
DISCUSSION  
Plaintiff first objects to the M&R’s conclusion that his claims against Gamache were 
“frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.”  D.E. 66, p. 2  (Objection II(A)) . He 
claims that the Magistrate Judge failed to give effect to three facts: (1) a meeting with 
Gamache prior to Martin filing false statements; (2) Gamache filing a sworn statement 
regarding when he became aware of Plaintiff; and (3) Plaintiff’s detail regarding his theory 
of joint action. Id. Plaintiff does not explain how these facts  support any finding of 
wrongdoing by Gamache toward Plaintiff; they merely document Gamache’s existence in 
Plaintiff’s general orbit. These facts were previously considered and rejected as supporting 
any claim. D.E. 57, pp. 20-22; D.E. 62, p. 6. The first objection is OVERRULED.  
Second, Plaintiff argues that his “joint-action theory” of liability against Gamache  
is a legitimate legal theory. D.E. 66, pp. 2-4 (Objection II(B)). While conspiracy or joint-
action claims under §  19831 are cognizable , Plaintiff’s problem is that his evidence, 
whether direct or circumstantial, does not reflect any actionable wrongdoing. Joint action 
without evidence of Gamache’s unlawful or tortious purposes is legally meaningless.  
Therefore, Plaintif’s citation of cases addressing joint activity for wrongful purposes are 
inapposite because he lacks evidence of any unlawful purpose perpetrated by Gamache. 
D.E. 66, pp. 3-4 (part III). Plaintiff’s second objection is OVERRULED.  
 
1   While Plaintiff has at times purported to raise a conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985, his objection focuses on 
his claims under § 1983. See D.E. 66 
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Third, Plaintiff objects to the M&R’s mention of his criminal history and parole 
status as irrelevant and violative of Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 15 (1980).  D.E. 66, p. 4 
(Objection IV(A)). The Magistrate Judge only mentioned Plaintiff’s prior custody because 
it is relevant to the factual background involved in this case. Therefore, it was not improper 
for the Magistrate Judge to mention it when briefly recounting the facts. It had no material 
impact on the analysis of Plaintiff’s claims or his defense aga inst the claim for attorney’s 
fees. The third objection is OVERRULED. 
Fourth, Plaintiff objects that the Magistrate Judge treated “Plaintiff’s claims against 
all defendants as one undifferentiated mass, ignoring that Plaintiff asserted separate, 
distinct claims against Gamache.”  He continues that his claims, so treated, were 
mischaracterized as vindictive. D.E. 66, pp. 4 -5 (Objection IV(B). He claims that the 
Magistrate Judge did not address the evidence. However, the M&R considered all claims 
and found them unsupported. There is no evidence of Gamache’s wrongdoing , regardless 
of whether the allegations were addressed generally or with specificity . Plaintiff’s fourth 
objection is OVERRULED.  
Fifth, Plaintiff objects that the Court challenged him to prove his claims  against 
Gamache (which he tried to do) ; the Court did not direct him to  dismiss the claims. D.E. 
66, p. 5 (Objection s IV(C) and (D) ). Plaintiff mischaracterizes the Magistrate Judge’s 
directive. The Magistrate Judge warned Plaintiff that he had not alleged sufficient facts to 
support a claim against Gamache and he afforded Plaintiff an opportunity to amend  his 
complaint to clearly articulate wrongdoing. Plaintiff was given a choice to dismiss the 
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claims or demonstrate their plausibility. He chose to proceed on his claims despite an 
inability to make plausible fact allegations. Plaintiff chose to prolong what he was warned 
would be an inevitable dismissal if he did not have appropriate facts. Plaint iff’s fifth 
objection is OVERRULED. 
Plaintiff’s sixth objection is indistinguishable from his first objection and is 
OVERRULED for the same reasons. See D.E. 66, pp. 5-6 (Objection IV(E)).  
Seventh, Plaintiff objects that he incurred his own attorney’s fees defending against 
the allegedly false reports filed by Martin, allegedly with Gamache’s knowledge. D.E. 66, 
p. 6 (Objection IV(F)).  Without some duty to Plaintiff or an affirmative act taken by 
Gamache against Plaintiff, any alleged passive knowledge on Gamache’s part is 
immaterial. The fact that Plaintiff incurred attorney’s fees has no impact  on whether his 
claims against Gamache were frivolous or baseless. The seventh objection is thus 
OVERRULED. 
Eighth, Plaintiff objects that, under Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826 (2011), the Court may 
only award fees that were a direct result of a frivolous claim. D.E. 66, pp. 6-7 (Objection 
V). He contends that the fees incurred for filing the first motion to dismiss should not be 
awarded because  the motion was denied.  He then argues  that any work on the second 
motion to dismiss should be  minimal because additional work was not necessary, having 
largely been done with respect to the first motion.   
The only reason that the first motion to dismiss was denied was to afford Plaintiff 
an opportunity to amend, which is common in litigation. It does not mean that the first 
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motion lacked merit. And any efficiency in bringing the second motion is attributable to 
the work done on the first motion because Plaintiff failed to materially enhance his claims. 
Consequently, the denial of the first motion does not require any reductio n in the fees 
reasonably incurred in Gamache’s defense of this case . The work on the first motion 
prompted a requirement that Plaintiff reconsider and/or amend and it supported the second 
motion to dismiss. The eighth objection is OVERRULED. 
Ninth, Plaintiff objects that fees that Gamache incurred to defend against Plaintiff’s 
motion to disqualify counsel should not be included because his argument in that motion 
had merit. D.E. 66, p. 7 (Objection VI). This argument was not raised in Plaintiff’s response 
(D.E. 50) to the motion to dismiss (D.E. 46), in which the request for attorney’s fees, 
supported by affidavit (D.E. 46-1), was made. Consequently, it was waived. United States 
v. Armstrong, 951 F.2d 626, 630 (5th Cir. 1992); see also, e.g., Place v. Thomas , No. 2-
40923, 2003 WL 342287, at *1 (5th Cir. Jan. 29, 2003) (per curiam).  The ninth objection 
is OVERRULED. 
CONCLUSION 
Having reviewed the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations set 
forth in the Magistrate Judge’s Memorandum and Recommendation, as well as Plaintiff’s 
objections and all other relevant documents in the record, and having made a de novo 
review of the portions of the Magistrate Judge’s Memorandum and Recommendation  to 
which objections were specifically directed, the Court OVERRULES Plaintiff’s 
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objections and ADOPTS as its own the findings and conclusions of the Magistrate Judge 
(D.E. 63). Accordingly, Gamache is awarded $14,160.00 in reasonable attorneys’ fees.  
 ORDERED on June 5, 2026. 
 
_______________________________ 
NELVA GONZALES RAMOS 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
 
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