govinfo:USCOURTS-ilsd-3_25-cv-00062-3

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 
 
Pedro Chairez, Plaintiff(s). 
 
Plaintiff, 
 
vs. 
 
Marcellus Ottensmeier, et al., 
 
Defendants. 
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MEMORANDUM & ORDER 
DUGAN, District Judge: 
 Plaintiff Pedro Chairez, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections 
currently detained at Menard Correctional Center, proceeding without counsel, moves 
for reconsideration of Claim 3 a second time. (Doc. 52). Plaintiff invokes Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 60(b)(5), or al ternatively Rule 60(b)(6), and asks the Court to reinstate 
Claim 3, the Fourteenth Amen dment due process claim agai nst Defendant Schoenbeck 
concerning the December 2023 disciplinary proceedi ngs and the Adjustment 
Committee’s reliance on confidential informants. Defendants oppose the motion. (Doc. 
56). For the reasons discussed below, the motion is DENIED. 
BACKGROUND 
 The Court screened Plaint iff’s Complaint under 28 U.S.C. Section 1915A on 
January 23, 2025. (Doc. 3). The court allowed Plai ntiff to proceed on claims concerning 
alleged retaliation, due process in connection with administrative detention, interference 
with mail, and restrictions on in-person visitation. The Court dismissed Claim 3, which Page ID
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challenged Defendant Schoenbeck’s handling of the December 2023 disciplinary hearing 
and the use of confidential informants. The Court explained that the direct consequences 
of the disciplinary ticket were three months of segregation and three months of C-grade; 
Plaintiff’s separate allegations concerning longer-term administrative detention were 
analyzed separately under Claim 2. (Doc. 3 at 16–18). 
 Plaintiff then moved for reconsideration of the dismissal of Claim 3. (Doc. 7). The 
Court denied that motion on June 9, 2025. (D oc. 38). The Court again concluded that 
Claim 3 was limited to the process due in connection with the disciplinary proceedings 
themselves, that the procedur es applicable to the admini strative-detention placement 
were already being litigated under Claim 2, an d that Plaintiff had not alleged that he 
lacked notice of the disciplinary allegations or an opportunity to present his views to the 
Adjustment Committee. 
 Plaintiff now argues that the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Jackson v. Anastasio, 150 
F.4th 851 (7th Cir. 2025), changed the governing law and requires reinstatement of Claim 
3. Plaintiff reads Jackson to mean that a short term of segregation, and particularly any 
later administrative detention that follows a disciplinary proceeding, necessarily and 
categorically imposes an atypical and significant hardship requiring more formal process 
than the informal process provided for in Ealy v. Watson, 109 F.4th 958 (7th Cir. 2024). Page ID
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LEGAL STANDARD 
 Plaintiff cites Rule 60(b), but Rule 60(b) is not the rule that governs this motion. 
Rule 60(b) applies to a final judgement, order, or proceeding. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). The 
dismissal of Claim 3 was not a final judgement because other claims remain pending and 
the Court did not enter a partial final judgement under Rule 54(b). 
 Recognizing that the Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court theref ore construes 
Plaintiff’s filing as a request to revise an interlocutory ruling under Rule 54(b). Rule 54(b) 
provides that an order deciding fewer than a ll claims may be revised at any time before 
final judgement. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). This construction gives Plaintiff the benefit of the 
more flexible rule and considers the substance of his filing despite the Rule 60 label. 
 Rule 54(b) gives the Court discretion to take a second look at a non-final ruling, 
but it does not require the Court to revisit the same issue each time a party disagrees with 
the result. Reconsideration is appropriate when there is a good reason for a second look, 
such as new controlling law, newly discovered fa cts, or a clear error in the prior ruling. 
While arguably Plaintiff’s reliance on Jackson does not provide a fair reason to look again 
at Claim 3, for the purposes of expediency and explanation, the Court will in this instance 
accommodate Plaintiff. Accordingly, the question is whether Jackson changes the analysis 
for this Plaintiff and this claim as he asserts. It does not. 
D
ISCUSSION 
 Jackson does not warrant reinstatement of Claim 3 because the decision in that case 
is not the one the Plaintiff describes. Despite Plaintiff’s characterization, Jackson did not Page ID
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hold that every short term of disciplinary segregation creates a protected liberty interest. 
It also did not hold that administrative dete ntion is, by itself, always an atypical and 
significant hardship. 
 Jackson involved a prisoner who spent three months in disciplinary segregation 
under conditions the Seventh Circuit described as appalling. The prisoner submitted 
evidence that his segregation cell had feces and urine on the walls, constant noise from 
inmates banging on the cell doors, water contaminated with bacteria that caused 
Legionnaire’s disease, and roaches and mice. Jackson, 150 F.4th at 860–61. The Seventh 
Circuit held that, “[m]oving forward, such a short term of solitary confinement combined 
with comparable disgusting conditions will suffice to show a loss of protected liberty 
requiring procedural protections.” Id. at 864. The court also made clear that three months 
in segregation is not long enough, standing alone, to create a liberty interest. Id. at 862. 
 That distinction controls here. Plaintiff does not allege in Claim 3, or in the present 
motion, that his December 2023 disciplinar y sanction placed him in disciplinary 
segregation under conditions comparable to those in Jackson or that were otherwise 
“disgusting”. Id. at 860. Plaintiff here only allege s that the disciplinary ticket led to 
administrative detention, and that administra tive detention is by its vary nature an 
atypical and significant hardship. He does not even allege that the “conditions in 
segregation were considerably harsher than those of the normal prison environment.” Id. 
In sum, Plaintiff pins his hopes on an overly broad reading of the holding in Jackson. He 
overlooks that Jackson does not change long-standing precedent that standing alone, 
segregation measured in months does not implicate a liberty interest. Page ID
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 The distinction between Claim 2 and Cl aim 3 is important. Claim 2 remains 
pending and concerns the notice and justification for Plaintiff’s placement and continued 
placement in administrative detention. If Plaintiff has evidence that his administrative 
detention was unsupported, poorly explained, retaliatory, or otherwise unlawful, that 
evidence relates to Claim 2. The fact that administrative detention officials later 
considered or referred to the December 2023 disciplinary matter does not mean that 
Jackson revives the separate disciplinary-hearing claim that the Court designated as Claim 
3. 
 For that reason alone, reconsideration is not warranted. Jackson changed the law 
only for short terms of solitary confinement combined with comparable appalling 
conditions, and Plaintiff has not alleged similar conditions as part of Claim 3. 
 But there is a second, independent reason that the motion fails. Even if the Court 
assumed for the purposes of this motion that Plaintiff had identified a protected liberty 
interest, Claim 3 would not proceed because Plaintiff has not shown that he was denied 
the process required under current Seventh Circuit law. 
 About two months after Jackson, the Seventh Circuit decided Torres v. Brookman , 
155 F.4th 952 (7th Cir. 2025). Torres involved a Menard prisoner who received three 
months in disciplinary segregation and alleged harsh and unsanitary conditions. The 
Seventh Circuit assumed, without deciding, that the conditions created a protected 
liberty interest. It still affirmed judgement for the defendants because Adams v. Reagle, 91 
F.4th 880 (7th Cir. 2024), held th at prisoners who do not face loss of good-time credit or Page ID
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other sentence-lengthening punishment are entitled only to informal, non-adversarial 
due process. Torres, 155 F.4th at 958–61; see also Adams, 91 F.4th at 89–96. 
 Informal due process does not require the full set of procedures described in Wolff 
v. McDonnell , 418 U.S. 539 (1974), unless good-tim e credits or another sentence-
lengthening punishment is at stake. Under Adams, Ealy, and Torres, the relevant question 
remains whether Plaintiff received notice of the reasons for the disciplinary action and an 
opportunity to present his views. As di scussed in the Court’s first Denial of 
Reconsideration, the pleading s and exhibits show that he did. (Doc. 38). Plaintiff 
continues to disagree with the use and reliab ility of the confidential-source information. 
The Court understands that concern. But Jackson did not address or change the law 
governing confidential informants in prison disciplinary proceedings. The Court has 
already considered that issue, twice. (Doc. 3); (Doc. 38). Plaintiff’s disagreement with the 
Courts conclusions does not show that he lacked notice or a chance to respond, and it 
does not make Claim 3 viable under Jackson. 
 Plaintiff also clarifies that he intended to challenge the adequacy of the 
disciplinary notice itself. The Court understands Plaintiff to argue that the December 2023 
ticket did not give him enough detail about the “who, what, how, when” of the alleged 
conspiracy to allow him to pr epare a defense. (Doc. 52) at 3. The Court has considered 
that clarification. It does not change the result. 
 The disciplinary report identified the charged offenses, the date and approximate 
time of the report, the location as Internal Affairs, the theory that drugs and drug 
paraphernalia were being received through institutional mail an d distributed inside Page ID
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Menard, the alleged drug as methamphetam ine, and the basis for the charge as 
statements from three confid ential sources who identified Plaintiff as a source of 
distribution. (Doc. 1) at p. 63; (Doc. 38) at pp. 2–3. The report also advised Plaintiff that 
he could appear, give a written or oral statement, request wi tnesses, and request 
additional time if was unable to prepare a de fense. (Doc. 1) at p. 63. Under the informal 
due process standard applicable to Claim 3, th e Constitution required only notice of the 
reason for the disciplinary segregation and an opportunity to present his views. Ealy v. 
Watson, 109 F.4th 958, 965 (7th Cir. 2024); Adams v. Reagle, 91 F.4th 880, 895 (7th Cir. 2024). 
The ticket and hearing procedures satisfied that standard. 
 Although Rule 54(b) governs this motion, the result would have been the same 
under Rule 60(b). Rule 60(b)(5) would not apply because, as discussed above, Jackson did 
not reverse or vacate any judgement on which this Court’s ruling was based. Rule 60(b)(6) 
also would not apply because Jackson does not create an extraordinary circumstance 
requiring Claim 3 to be reopened. 
Disposition 
 For these reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion for Rule 60 Fed. R. Civ. Procedure is DENIED. 
Claim 3 remains dismissed, and Defendant Schoenbeck remains terminated. Claims 1, 2, 
4, and 5 remain pending. 
 Nothing in this Order decides the merits of Claim 2 or limits Plaintiff’s ability to 
litigate the due process issues that remain pending concerning his administrative-
detention placement and continuing reviews. Page ID
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 Plaintiff is advised that the Court has now twice reconsidered the dismissal of 
Claim 3. Further motions seeking to revive Claim 3 may be summarily denied if they 
repeat arguments the Court has already addressed, or, as here, rely on authority that does 
not change the analysis. This warning does not prevent Plaintiff from litigating Claims 1, 
2, 4, and 5, complying with case deadlines, re sponding to motions, or preserving his 
disagreement with the dismissal of Claim 3 for review. 
SO ORDERED. 
Dated: June 4, 2026 
 
 
 ______________________________ 
 D A V I D W . D U G A N 
 U n i t e d S t a t e s D i s t r i c t J u d g e 
 
Judge 
Dugan
Digitally signed 
by Judge Dugan 
Date: 
2026.06.04 
09:20:04 -05'00' Page ID
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