govinfo:USCOURTS-mdd-8_25-cv-04116-0

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND 
 
 * 
BRUNO MPOY ET AL., 
 * 
Plaintiffs, 
 * 
v. 
 * Civil No. 25-4116-BAH 
MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD, ET AL., 
 * 
 Defendants. 
 * 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
MEMORANDUM & ORDER 
 
The above -captioned action was recently reassigned from Judge Chuang to the 
undersigned. See ECF 13. 1 The operative amended complaint in this case, ECF 9, overlaps 
significantly with the amended complaint in Civ. No. 23-1927-BAH, see Civ. No. 23-1927-BAH, 
ECF 38. In that complaint, Plaintiffs Bruno K. Mpoy (“Mpoy”) and Theodora Mpoy (“Theodora”) 
named as defendants the State of Maryland, Montgomery County, Marcy Waxman, Re/Max Realty 
Group, Farrokh Mohammadi, Mohammadi & Humayun, LLC, C.L.A. Title & Escrow (“CLA 
Title”), Sharon T. Diamant, Esq., Diamant Gerstein, LLC, Dontrice P. Hamilton, Susan M. Bryant, 
Kathryn M. Huff, Captain Robin Lewis (in her personal and official capacities as a Montgomery 
County Sheriff’s Department employee), Corey Ryan Clifford (in his personal and official 
capacities as a Montgomery County Sheriff’s Department employee), Kevin Borge (in her personal 
and official capacities as a Montgomery County Sheriff’s Department employee), Brad Morton (in 
his personal and official capacities as a Montgomery County Sheriff’s Department employee), 
Ralph Aloi (in his personal and official capacities as a Montgomery County Sheriff’s Department 
 
1 Unless otherwise specified, citations to ECF docket numbers refer to docket entries in Civ. No. 
25-4116-BAH. 

2 
employee), Frank D. Pruitt (in his personal and official capacities as a Montgomery County 
Sheriff’s Department employee), Lenworth W. Black (in his personal and official capacities as a 
Montgomery County Sheriff’s Department employee) (all Sheriff’s Department employee 
defendants are collectively referred to as “Sheriff Defendants”), Madhuri Perera (in her personal 
and official capacities as a Montgomery County Department of Health a nd Human Services 
employee), Denise Anderson (in her personal and official capacities as a Montgomery County 
Department of Health and Human Services employee), Cesar Ivan Eloisa (in her personal and 
official capacities as a Department of Housing and Community Affairs employee), Tamala 
Robinson (in her personal and official capacities as a D epartment of Housing and Community 
Affairs employee), Karen Lemus (in her personal and official capacities as a Montgomery County 
Department of Health and Human Services employee), two Jane Does (in their personal and 
official capacities as Montgomery County Department of Health and Human Services employees), 
Joe Oden (in his personal capacity as the General Manager of Days Inn), Officer M. Brkovich (in 
his personal and official capacities as a Montgomery County police officer), and Officer John Doe 
(in his personal and official capacities as a Montgomery County police officer). See id. at 1–4. 
Mpoy brought the following claims: 
• a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against Defendants Aloi, Borge, Black, Clifford, Morton, Pruitt, 
Lemus, Jane Doe No. 1, Jane Doe No. 2, Waxman, Brkovich and John Doe for violation 
of his Fourth Amendment Rights when the defendants allegedly entered his home and 
private motel room (count I), id. at 39–40 ¶¶ 267–74; 
 
• a § 1983 claim for violation of his Fifth Amendment Rights against Defendants Aloi, 
Borge, Black, Clifford, Morton, Pruitt, Lemus, Jane Doe No. 1, Jane Doe No.2, and 
Waxman alleging that he was deprived of his property without adherence to procedures 
laid out in Maryland statutes (count II), id. at 40–41 ¶¶ 275–81; 
 
• a § 1983 claim for violation of his Fourteenth Amendment Rights against Defendants Aloi, 
Borge, Black, Clifford, Morton, Pruitt, Lemus, Jane Doe No. 1, Jane Doe No. 2, Waxman, 
Mohammadi, CLA Title, Brkovich, and John Doe (count III), id. at 41–42 ¶¶ 282–91; 
 

3 
• a claim for violation of Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights against 
Defendants Mohammadi, Waxman, CLA Title, Aloi, Borge, Black, Clifford, Morton, 
Pruitt, Lemus, Jane Doe No. 1, Jane Doe No. 2, Brkovich and John Doe (count IV), id. at 
42–44 ¶¶ 292–300; 
 
• a 42 U.S.C. § 1985 claim against all Defendants (count V), id. at 44 ¶¶ 301–04; 
 
• an intrusion upon seclusion claim against Defendants Aloi, Borge, Black, Clifford, Morton, 
Pruitt, Waxman, Brkovich and John Doe (count VI), id. at 44–45 ¶¶ 305–10; 
 
• a § 1983 claim for unlawful seizure of his house and cars in violation of the Fourth, Fifth, 
and Fourteenth Amendments against Defendants Aloi, Borge, Black, Clifford, Morton, 
Pruitt, and Montgomery County (count VII), id. at 45–46 ¶¶ 311–19; 
 
• a claim for violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and Section 504 of 
the Rehabilitation Act against Montgomery County (count VIII), id. at 46–48 ¶¶ 320–36; 
 
• a claim for wrongful arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment against Defendants 
Brkovich and John Doe (count IX), id. at 49 ¶¶ 337–42; 
 
• a claim for defamation by conduct, slander, and libel against all Defendants (count X), id. 
at 49–50 ¶¶ 343–48; 
 
• a claim for violation of 11 U.S.C. § 362 against Montgomery County (count XI), id. at 50–
51 ¶¶ 349–53; 
 
• a common law fraud claim against Waxman and CLA Title & Escrow (count XII), id. at 
51 ¶¶ 354–58; 
 
• a common law theft claim against Waxman and CLA Title & Escrow (count XIII), id. at 
52 ¶¶ 359–62; 
 
• a gross negligence claim against all Defendants (count XIV), id. at 52–53 ¶¶ 363–72; 
 
• another claim for violation of Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights against 
Defendants Brkovich, John Doe, Joe Oden (count XV), id. at 53–54 ¶¶ 373–77; 
 
• a claim for violation of the Fourth Amendment based on “invasion of privacy” against the 
Sheriff Defendants and Montgomery County for the impoundment of Mpoy’s vehicles 
(count XVI),
2 id. at 54 ¶¶ 378–79; 
 
 
2 The Court construed this claim as being brought pursuant to § 1983. See Civ. No. 23-1927-BAH, 
ECF 37, at 8 n.5. 

4 
• a § 1983 claim for violation of Md. Code Ann., Real Prop. § 14- 132(c) against Waxman, 
Sheriff Defendants, Lemus, Jane Doe 1, and Jane Doe 2 (count XVII), id. at 54–55 ¶¶ 380–
85; 
 
• a trespass to chattel claim against unspecified “Defendant(s)” (count XVIII), id. at 55 ¶¶ 
386–90; 
 
• a § 1983 claim for intentional tort of conversion against Defendants Waxman, 
Mohammadi, and CLA Title (count XIX), id. at 55–56 ¶¶ 391–95; 
 
• a § 1983 claim for unjust enrichment against Defendants Montgomery County, the Sheriff 
Defendants, Waxman, Mohammadi, Diamant, Hamilton, and Bryant (count XXI 3), id. at 
56–57 ¶¶ 396–99; and 
 
• a § 1983 for violation of Md. Code Ann., Real Prop. § 10-708 against Defendants Waxman 
and CLA Title (count XX), id. at 57 ¶¶ 400–03. 
 
The Court screened the complaint pursuant to its obligation under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and 
dismissed Defendants State of Maryland, Re/Max Realty Group, Farrokh Mohammadi, 
Mohammadi & Humayun, LLC, CLA Title, Sharon T. Diamant, Diamant Gerstein, LLC, Dontrice 
P. Hamilton, Susan M. Bryant, Kathryn M. Huff, and Joe Oden, and counts V, VIII, X,4 XII, XIII, 
XIV, XVI, XVII, XIX, XXI, and XX. See Civ. No. 23- 1927-BAH, ECF 37, at 22. The Court 
also dismissed Theodora as a plaintiff as she did not appear to actually assert any claims. See id. 
at 21. The case was ultimately dismissed without prejudice on December 9, 2025, because Mpoy 
submitted summonses for only some defendants, see Civ. No. 23-1927-BAH, ECF 39, and did not 
 
3 The amended complaint had listed this claim as a second count “XIX,” so the Court relabeled it 
as count XXI. See Civ. No. 23-1927-BAH, ECF 37, at 8 n.7. 
 
4 The conclusion of the Court’s order erroneously named count XI, the bankruptcy stay violation 
claim, rather than count X, the defamation claim. See Civ. No. 23-1927-BAH, ECF 37, at 22. The 
body of the order makes clear that the defamation claim was dismissed. See id. at 12–13. 
 

5 
submit U.S. Marshal service of process forms as directed. See Civ. No. 23-1927-BAH, ECFs 41 
and 43.5 
The above-captioned case was filed three days later on December 12, 2025, and randomly 
assigned to a different judge of this Court as the two cases were not marked as related. Mpoy 
brings suit against the very same defendants he initially named in the prior action’s amended 
complaint. Compare ECF 9 in Civ. No. 25- 4116-BAH, with ECF 37 in Civ. No. 23- 1927. 
Plaintiffs Theodora and Crispin Mpoy also purport to bring claims, though which claims they bring 
and against whom is not entirely clear .6 Despite the Court’s dismissal of certain claims and 
defendants, Mpoy now brings nearly identical claims against the exact same defendants, including 
defendants previously dismissed. From the best the Court can tell, the claims brought in Civ. No. 
25-4116-BAH differ from the previous claims in the following ways: 
• Count II ( the § 1983 Fifth Amendment claim) includes additional allegations against 
Mohammadi based on a violation of Mpoy’s Fifth Amendment rights “not to be compelled 
to testify against [one]self, to benefit from the assistance of counsel, and to compel witness 
in his favor,” ECF 9, at 29 ¶ 174; 
 
• Count III (the § 1983 Fourteenth Amendment due process claim) includes several more 
facts about Defendants Huff and Bryant, asserting that they “repeatedly stopped Mpoy 
from buying out the interest of his ex- wife in their family home through mediation at the 
Appellate Court of Maryland and therefore deprived him of the equal protection of the 
laws,” id. at 30 ¶ 179; 
 
• Count IX ( wrongful arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment against Defendants 
Brkovich and John Doe) is now brought expressly pursuant to § 1983, id. at 34–35 ¶¶ 197–
98; 
 
 
5 Mpoy was apparently able to file these forms in this action. See ECF 10 (ordering Plaintiffs to 
complete the U.S. Marshal forms for each defendant and that the Clerk issue the summonses with 
the U.S. Marshal forms when submitted); ECF 11 (summonses and U.S. Marshals issued by the 
Clerk). 
6 As before, there are sections of the instant amended complaint purportedly brought by Theodora 
and Crispin Mpoy. See ECF 9, at 40–43 ¶¶ 224–34. However, each individual claim appears to 
have been brought by only Mpoy, as the allegations refer to “Plaintiff” and “Mpoy” in the singular. 
See generally id. at 28–39 ¶¶ 171–223. 

6 
• Count XV is now brought pursuant to Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, 
not Article 24, id. at 37 ¶¶ 211–12; 
 
• Count XVI (the Fourth Amendment claim for “invasion of privacy” against the Sheriff 
Defendants and Montgomery County) is now brought pursuant to § 1983 and seeks to 
vindicate harm allegedly suffered when these defendants “forcibly entered [Mpoy’s] 
residence without a warrant or valid writ of possession,” id. at 38 ¶¶ 213–14; 
 
• Three counts previously brought pursuant to § 1983 ((1) Count XVII – for violation of 
Md. Code Ann., Real Prop. § 14-132(c) against Waxman, the Sheriff Defendants, Lemus, 
Jane Doe 1, and Jane Doe 2; (2) Count XIX – for intentional tort of conversion against 
Waxman, Mohammadi, and CLA Title ; and (3) what is now Count XX – for unjust 
enrichment against Defendants Montgomery County, the S heriff Defendants, Waxman, 
Mohammadi, Diamant, Hamilton, and Bryant) are now brought as standalone claims, not 
claims under § 1983, id. at 38 ¶¶ 215–17, at 39 ¶¶ 220–23 
 
• Count XVIII (the trespass to chattel claim) now appears to be brought specifically against 
Defendants Waxman, Lemus, Jane Doe No 1, Jane Doe No 2, Aloi, Borge, Black, Clifford, 
Morton, and Pruitt, rather than unspecified “Defendant(s),” id. at 38–39 ¶¶ 218–219; and 
 
• Mpoy no longer brings a claim for violation of Md. Code Ann., Real Prop. § 10-708 (which 
had been count XX), see generally id. 
 
I. SECTION 1915 SCREENING OF THE OPERATIVE COMPLAINT 
 
For the same reasons articulated in Civ. No. 23-1927-BAH, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, 
counts V (the § 1985 claim), VIII (the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claim), X (the defamation 
claim), XII (the common law fraud claim), XIII (the common law theft claim), XIV (the gross 
negligence claim), and XVI (the duplicative Fourth Amendment claim) are dismissed. Defendants 
State of Maryland, Re/Max Realty Group, Farrokh Mohammadi, Mohammadi & Humayun, LLC, 
CLA Title, Sharon T. Diamant, Diamant Gerstein, LLC, Dontrice P. Hamilton, Susan M. Bryant, 
Kathryn M. Huff, and Joe Oden are also dismissed for the same reasons previously articulated. 
The minor additional detail (such as the allegations against Huff and Bryant regarding count III) 
does not cure the deficiencies previously identified. The remaining claims, including new or 
amended claims, will be narrowed as described below. 

7 
 Count II, the § 1983 Fifth Amendment claim, must also be summarily dismissed. First, as 
against Mohammadi, Mpoy appears to allege that Mohammadi infringed his Fifth Amendment 
right against self -incrimination and right to counsel. See ECF 9, at 29 ¶ 174. Mohammadi’s 
“representation of Mpoy’s ex-wife in the divorce proceedings . . . is not sufficient to make him a 
state actor. ” Civ. No. 23- 1927-BAH, ECF 37, at 16 (citations omitted). Further, the Fifth 
Amendment’s protections are plainly inapplicable in the context of Mpoy’s divorce proceedings. 
Mpoy has not alleged that any compelled statements have been used against him in a criminal case. 
“Fourth Circuit precedent dictates that the right [against self -incrimination under the Fifth 
Amendment] is not violated until the coerced statements are used against the speaker at a criminal 
trial.” Young v. Nicholson, No. 7:23- CV-00258, 2024 WL 4224959, at *4 (W.D. Va. Sept. 18, 
2024) (collecting case and dismissing § 1983 claim based on Fifth Amendment self-incrimination 
where plaintiff did not allege that any “incriminating statements were used against him at a 
criminal trial”) ; cf. Salinas v. Texas , 570 U.S. 178, 189 (2013) (“[P]opular misconceptions 
notwithstanding, the Fifth Amendment guarantees that no one may be ‘compelled in any criminal 
case to be a witness against himself’; it does not establish an unqualified ‘right to remain silent.’”). 
As to the right to counsel, there is no right to counsel in civil proceedings, see, e.g., Lloyd v. Elliott, 
89 F.3d 828 (Table) (4th Cir. 1996), and “[a]bsent custodial interrogation, there is no infringement 
on the [criminal] suspect's Fifth Amendment rights,” United States v. Hornsby, 666 F.3d 296, 309 
(4th Cir. 2012) (citing Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 486 (1981)). 
 As to the Fifth Amendment due process claim against the other defendants named in this 
count, crucially, none of them are federal actors, which is necessary to trigger Fifth Amendment 

8 
due process protections.7 See Pub. Utilities Comm'n of D.C. v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 461, (1952) 
(noting that the Fifth Amendment “ appl[ies] to and restrict [s] only the Federal Government ”); 
Blankumsee v. Galley, Civ. No. PWG-15-837, 2016 WL 270073, at *6 n.8 (D. Md. Jan. 21, 2016) 
(citing Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 500 n.3 (1975) ) (noting that Fifth Amendment due 
process protection did not apply in that case because the defendants were all state actors) . 
Plaintiff’s due process allegations are properly considered through his claims brought under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
The conversion claim Mpoy now brings against Waxman Mohammadi , and CLA Title 
(count XIX) will also be dismissed. The Court previously construed Mpoy’s “common law theft” 
claim brought against Waxman and CLA Title (and brought again here) as a claim for conversion. 
Civ. No. 23-1927-BAH, ECF 37, at 14. The claim was dismissed because the allegations did “not 
describe the requisite mental state or even point to any specific acts of ” the defendants against 
whom this action was brought.” Id. The same is true again. Mpoy alleges that “Defendants 
Waxman, Mohammadi, and CLA Title & Escrow converted Mpoy’s money for their own benefit 
to his detriment. As a result, Mpoy suffered monetary damages .” ECF 9, at 39 ¶ 221. These 
allegations are not sufficient to state a claim for conversion, so the claim will be summarily 
dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. 
Mpoy brings an unjust enrichment claim against Defendants “ Montgomery County and 
individual sheriffs to be specifically identified during discovery [for] enrich[ing] themselves 
unjustly when they dispossessed Mpoy of his Mercedes and BMW vehicles unlawfully and 
 
7 Had Mpoy alleged a “takings clause” violation, that claim could be actionable against state actors, 
but he does not allege such a claim . See Qwest Commc’ns Corp. v. City of Greensboro, 440 F. 
Supp. 2d 480, 494 n.9 (M.D.N.C. 2006) (“The ‘takings clause’ of the Fifth Amendment does apply 
to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, but Plaintiff does not allege a Fifth Amendment 
‘taking’ in the Complaint.” (citing Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 383 (1994))). 

9 
profited from the impoundment and sale thereof.” ECF 9, at 39 ¶ 223. He alleges unjust 
enrichment against Waxman and Mohammadi based on their alleged “agree[ment] with each other 
and with others to use state power to take forcibly money from Mpoy’s home equity.” Id. Finally, 
he alleges that “Defendants Diamant, Hamilton, and Bryant enriched themselves unjustly to the 
detriment of Mpoy when they, individually, agreed with Mohammadi, Waxman, and other 
individuals to take Plaintiff ’s money without rendering the services they promised.” Id. This 
claim will be summarily dismissed as brought against Defendants Waxman, Mohammadi, 
Diamant, Hamilton, and Bryant. 
A Maryland claim for unjust enrichment contains three elements: (1) “[a] benefit conferred 
upon the defendant by the plaintiff”; (2) “(a)n appreciation or knowledge by the defendant of the 
benefit”; and (3) “[t]he acceptance or retention by the defendant of the benefit under such 
circumstances as to make it inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without the payment 
of its value.” Hill v. Cross Country Settlements, LLC , 936 A.2d 343, 351 (Md. 2007) (quoting 
Berry & Gould, P.A. v. Berry, 757 A.2d 108, 113 (Md. 2000)). At the same time, the doctrine of 
unjust enrichment “may not be reduced neatly to a golden rule.” Id. “A successful unjust 
enrichment claim serves to ‘deprive the defendant of benefits that in equity and good conscience 
he ought not to keep, even though he may have received those benefits quite honestly in the first 
instance, and even though the plaintiff may have suffered no demonstrabl e losses.’” Id. at 352 
(quoting Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Dev. v. Mullen, 886 A.2d 900, 921 (Md. App. 2005)). “To sustain 
an unjust enrichment claim, a plaintiff must have provided an actual benefit to the defendant. 
‘[M]erely alleging one’s own loss is not enough.’” Froelich v. Erickson, 96 F. Supp. 2d 507, 524 
(D. Md. 2000) (quoting Kline v. Signet Bank, 651 A.2d 442, 445 (Md. App. 1995)), aff’d sub nom. 
Froelich v. Senior Campus Living, LLC, 5 F. App’x 287 (4th Cir. 2001). “Also, when an express 

10 
contract is present, the plaintiff cannot recover under the theory of unjust enrichment.” Id. (citing 
Bright v. QSP, Inc., 20 F.3d 1300, 1306 (4th Cir. 1994)). 
Plaintiff’s allegations are too conclusory to state a claim for unjust enrichment against 
Waxman, Mohammadi, Diamant, Hamilton, and Bryant. He has not alleged what benefit he 
provided to Waxman or Mohammadi personally. Further, the Court previously took judicial notice 
of the fact that Hamilton, Bryant, and Diamant (and the firm Diamant Gerstein, LLC) were Mpoy’s 
own former counsel in Mpoy’s state divorce proceeding. See Civ. No. 23-1927-BAH, ECF 37, at 
3. Even assuming that the benefit Mpoy provided these defendants was money, this money would 
presumably have been paid pursuant to a contract for “services they promised.” ECF 9, at 39 
¶ 223. An unjust enrichment claim is therefore not actionable here. 
In sum, the Court summarily dismisses in whole counts II (the Fifth Amendment claim), V 
(the § 1985 claim), VIII (the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claim), X (the defamation claim), XII 
(the common law fraud claim), XIII (the common law theft claim), XIV (the gross negligence 
claim), XVI (the duplicative Fourth Amendment claim), and XIX (conversion). Count XX (the 
unjust enrichment claim) is dismissed in part as against Waxman, Mohammadi, Diamant, 
Hamilton, and Bryant. The State of Maryland, Re/Max Realty Gr oup, Farrokh Mohammadi, 
Mohammadi & Humayun, LLC, CLA Title, Sharon T. Diamant, Diamant Gerstein, LLC, Dontrice 
P. Hamilton, Susan M. Bryant, Kathryn M. Huff, and Joe Ode n are also dismissed. Despite 
previously dismissing Plaintiff Theodora in the prior case, the Court will liberally construe the 
operative complaint here and let Theodora and Crispin remain as parties to the case. See Nichols 
v. Bumgarner, 173 F.4th 511, 519 (4th Cir. 2026) (advising that liberal construction of pro se 
complaints includes how a court interprets which parties are implicated in a claim). 
The following claims alleged in the amended complaint, ECF 9, remain: 

11 
• Count I (§ 1983 Fourth Amendment claim) against Defendants Aloi, Borge, Black, 
Clifford, Morton, Pruitt, Lemus, Jane Doe No. 1, Jane Doe No. 2, Waxman, 
Brkovich and John Doe; 
 
• Count III (§ 1983 Fourteenth Amendment claim) against Defendants Aloi, Borge, 
Black, Clifford, Morton, Pruitt, Lemus, Jane Doe No. 1, Jane Doe No. 2, Waxman, 
Brkovich, and John Doe; 
 
• Count IV ( Article 24 claim ) against Defendants Waxman, Aloi, Borge, Black, 
Clifford, Morton, Pruitt, Lemus, Jane Doe No. 1, Jane Doe No. 2, Brkovich and 
John Doe; 
 
• Count VI (intrusion upon seclusion claim) against Defendants Aloi, Borge, Black, 
Clifford, Morton, Pruitt, Waxman, Brkovich and John Doe; 
 
• Count VII (§ 1983 claim for unlawful seizure of his house and cars in violation of 
the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments ) against Defendants Aloi, Borge, 
Black, Clifford, Morton, Pruitt, Waxman, and Montgomery County; 
 
• Count IX (Fourth Amendment wrongful arrest ) against Defendants Brkovich and 
John Doe; 
 
• Count XI (11 U.S.C. § 362 claim) against Montgomery County; 
 
• Count XV (Article 26 claim) against Defendants Brkovich, and John Doe; 
 
• Count XVII (violation of Md. Code Ann., Real Prop. § 14- 132(c)) against 
Defendants Waxman, the Sheriff Defendants, Lemus, Jane Doe No. 1, and Jane 
Doe No. 2; 
 
• Count XVII (trespass to chattel) against Defendants Waxman, Lemus, Jane Doe 
No. 1, Jane Doe No. 2, Aloi, Borge, Clifford, Morton, and Pruitt; 
 
• Count XX (unjust enrichment) against the Sheriff Defendants and Montgomery 
County. 
 
To be clear, the parties should not read into the fact that certain claims have not been summarily 
dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. The Court does not intend to insinuate that any surviving 
claims necessarily will survive a motion to dismiss, should the remaining defendants file any. The 
parties are free to litigate the remaining claims as they see fit. 
II. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 
 

12 
For the foregoing reasons , it is this 4th day of June , 2026, by the United States District 
Court for the District of Maryland, hereby ORDERED that: 
1. The amended complaint, ECF 9, IS CIRCUMSCRIBED as described herein; 
2. Counts II (the Fifth Amendment claim), V (the § 1985 claim), VIII (the ADA and 
Rehabilitation Act claim), X (the defamation claim), XII (the common law fraud 
claim), XIII (the common law theft claim), XIV (the gross negligence claim), XVI (the 
duplicative Fourth Amendment claim), and XIX (conversion) are DISMISSED IN 
WHOLE; 
3. Count XV (the Article 26 claim) is DISMISSED IN PART as against Oden; 
4. Count XX (the unjust enrichment claim) is DISMISSED IN PART as against Waxman, 
Mohammadi, Diamant, Hamilton, and Bryant; 
5. Defendants State of Maryland, Re/Max Realty Group, Farrokh Mohammadi, 
Mohammadi & Humayun, LLC, CLA Title, Sharon T. Diamant, Diamant Gerstein, 
LLC, Dontrice P. Hamilton, Susan M. Bryant, Kathryn M. Huff, and Joe Oden ARE 
DISMISSED from this action and need not answer the amended complaint regardless 
of whether service has been effectuated on them; 
6. The Clerk SHALL SEND a copy of this memorandum and order to Plaintiffs Bruno, 
Theodora, and Crispin Mpoy and counsel of record. 
 
 
 /s/ 
Brendan A. Hurson 
United States District Judge 
 

Passage view · GavelSight