govinfo:USCOURTS-ohsd-1_25-cv-00781-1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 
WESTERN DIVISION 
 
JERMEAL WHITE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UNIT MANAGER CHIEF J. OPPI, 
Defendant. 
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Judge Jeffery P. Hopkins 
 
 
 
ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 
 
This matter is before the Court on the Order and Report and Recommendation (Doc. 
17) (the “R&R”) issued by Magistrate Judge Chelsey M. Vascura on December 19, 2025. In 
the R&R, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the Court dismiss Plaintiff Jermeal White’s 
(“Plaintiff” or “Mr. White”) Amended Complaint (Doc. 16) against Defendant J. Opp y1 
(“Defendant”), the Unit Manager Chief at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility 
(“SOCF”), for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Doc. 17. The 
Magistrate Judge also recommends that the Court deny Mr. White’s Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. Doc. 10. Mr. White has filed objections. Doc. 
21. For the reasons set forth below, Mr. White’s objections (Doc. 21) are OVERRULED, and 
the R&R (Doc. 17) is ADOPTED. Because the Court dismisses this action, Mr. White’s 
additional motions for a preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order (Docs. 22, 
23) are denied as MOOT. 
 
1 Mr. White initially named Defendant “J. Oppi” in the original Complaint. Compl., Doc. 1. His subsequent 
amendments, however, clarify that the correct spelling is “Oppy.” See Am. Compl., Doc. 16, PageID 90. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
 On May 18, 2018, Mr. White received a disciplinary conduct report from Unit Case 
Manager Leslie Azbell (“Ms. Azbell”) due to his alleged attempt to form an inappropriate 
relationship with her during Mr. White’s incarceration at SOCF.2 Compl., Doc. 1, PageID 
11. The report states that Mr. White sent a letter to Ms. Azbell requesting that she bring him 
$100.00, a cell phone, and explicit photographs of herself for Mr. White to keep. Id. Mr. White 
allegedly stated that Ms. Azbell was his “woman” and that , at some point, he would be 
“coming home to [ her].” Id. In the report, Ms. Azbell shared that she feared for her safety 
around Mr. White because she was required to see him on a regular basis during her rounds 
at the prison. Id. After a hearing on the matter , the Rules Infraction Board (the “Board”) 
found Mr. White guilty of attempting to form an inappropriate personal relationship with Ms. 
Azbell. Id. at PageID 12. Mr. White asserts, however, that the report was “very . . . untruthful” 
and that officials at the prison have prepared multiple fake disciplinary conduct reports about 
him “for no reason.” Id. at PageID 3; Doc. 16, PageID 91. 
Shortly thereafter, on May 18, 2018, Sergeant Dillow issued a separate disciplinary 
conduct report charging Mr. White with assault and disobedience of a direct order. Compl., 
Doc. 1, PageID 14. Sergeant Dillow reported that, following a hearing, Mr. White “suddenly 
came across [the] desk lunging at” Sergeant Dillow and “headbutting [him] in the shoulder 
area striking [him] several times” which led to an altercation between the two. Id. Mr. White 
maintains that this report was “untruthful,” but the disciplinary records reflect that the Board 
ultimately found Mr. White guilty of the alleged conduct. Id. at PageID 4, 14–15; Doc. 21, 
 
2 In Magistrate Judge Chelsey M. Vascura ’s December 19, 2025, R&R (Doc. 17), she carefully sets out the 
factual allegations asserted by Mr. White in this case. The Court only briefly summarizes those allegations 
here and directs attention to Magistrate Vascura’s well-crafted R&R for a more exhaustive discussion of the 
facts. See Doc. 17, PageID 96–97. 
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PageID 120. Mr. White asserts that, at some point, he was transferred to another institution 
but returned to SOCF in 2024. Compl., Doc. 1, PageID 3. Upon his return, Defendant housed 
Mr. White in a unit where Ms. Azbell primarily worked. Id. He alleges that in January 2025, 
Ms. Azbell told Mr. White that she hated him and that he should not have returned to SOCF. 
Id. He further alleges that Ms. Azbell’s unit staff stated that they would make Mr. White’s life 
a “living hell” at the prison. Id. To address these remarks, Mr. White asserts that he made 
repeated complaints and requests to Defendant to transfer prisons stating that he was in 
“imminent danger” because of the prior incidents with Ms. Azbell and Sergeant Dillow. Id. 
at PageID 4–5. However, he states that those requests were completely disregarded by 
Defendant. Id. at PageID 3–4, 6; Doc. 16, PageID 93. Finally, because of his current housing 
at SOCF, Mr. White asserts that he suffers from emotional distress, sleep disruption, and 
severe mental-health issues. Compl., Doc. 1, PageID 4. 
On October 27, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in forma pauperis and pro se asserting 
constitutional claims under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 , seeking declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief against 
Defendant. Id. at PageID 7–8. He subsequently filed an Amended Complaint (Am. Compl., 
Doc. 16) on December 19, 2025. The same day, the Magistrate Judge issued an R&R (Doc. 
17) recommending dismissal of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (Doc. 16) and recommending 
denial of Mr. White’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order3 
 
3 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A, the Magistrate Judge screened Mr. White’s Amended 
Complaint (Am. Compl., Doc. 16) to determine whether it stated any cognizable claim or instead was subject 
to dismissal as frivolous, malicious, failing to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeking relief 
from an immune defendant. Based on that screening, the Magistrate Judge recommended dismissal of Mr. 
White’s Amended Complaint (Am. Compl., Doc. 16) and denial of his request for injunctive relief (Doc. 10). 
In conducting the initial screening, the Magistrate Judge considered Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (Am. 
Compl., Doc. 16) together with his original Complaint (Compl., Doc. 1) and construed those filings 
collectively. See Doc. 17, PageID 97. 
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(Doc. 10). See Doc. 17, PageID 102–03. Mr. White has filed objections (Doc. 21) to the R&R. 
The matter is now ripe for review. 
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
If a party objects within the allotted time to a report and recommendation, the Court 
“shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed 
findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); see also 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). Upon review, the Court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in 
part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” Id. § 636(b)(1). 
III. LAW AND ANALYSIS 
The Magistrate Judge construed Mr. White’s Amended Complaint ( Am. Compl., 
Doc. 16) and related filings as asserting claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based upon three 
theories: (1) that Defendant allegedly failed to protect Mr. White from a serious risk of harm; 
(2) that he was allegedly denied an effective grievance process ; and (3) that Mr. White was 
allegedly subjected to false conduct reports . Doc. 17, PageID 99. She then concluded that 
none of these theories provided a viable basis for relief. Id. At this juncture, Mr. White raises 
three objections to the R&R. First, he contends that the Magistrate Judge erred in concluding 
that he failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim; second, he contends that he should be 
permitted to pursue punitive damages based on his mental and emotional distress; and third, 
he contends that the Magistrate Judge erred in recommending a denial of his motion for a 
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. See Doc. 21. The Court addresses 
each objection in turn. 
 
 
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1. Mr. White’s Eighth Amendment Failure to Protect Claim 
In the R&R, the Magistrate Judge applied the familiar two-part test governing Eighth 
Amendment failure -to-protect claims . That test requires plaintiffs, such as Mr. White, to 
satisfy both an objective and a subjective component. Farmer v. Brennan , 511 U.S. 825, 834 
(1994); Helling v. McKinney , 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993). Under the objective component, Mr. 
White must plausibly show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk 
of serious harm. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Under the subjective component, Mr. White must 
show that prison officials had a “sufficiently culpable state of mind,” or in other words, were 
deliberately indifferent toward him.4 Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991). The Magistrate 
Judge concluded that Mr. White’s allegations were insufficient on both prongs. Doc. 17, 
PageID 101–02. 
Upon de novo review, the Court agrees. As noted, Mr. White alleges that Defendant 
knowingly housed him in the same prison unit as Ms. Azbell and around Sergeant Dillow 
despite the 2018 incidents and his later problems with staff. Compl., Doc. 1, PageID 3–4. He 
further claims that, even after he repeatedly told Defendant that he feared for his safety, 
Defendant refused to approve his transfer to a nother prison. Id. at PageID 3–4; Doc. 16, 
PageID 93 (“[Mr.] White has sent me numerous kites concerning a transfer to another facility. 
I have told him numerous times that he is not eligible and to stop sending kites to me about 
this issue. He continues to send kites disobeying my direct orders.”). Under the most generous 
interpretation of the objective component of the test, Mr. White’s allegations, taken as true, 
 
4 The Sixth Circuit in Berkshire v. Dahl described the subjective component this way , “state of mind is one of 
deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety. Although the deliberate indifference standard describes a 
state of mind more blameworthy than negligence, this standard is satisfied if the official knows of and 
disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which 
the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the 
inference.” Berkshire v. Dahl, 928 F.3d 520, 535 (6th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). 
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appear to show that he might be incarcerated under conditions posing a risk of serious harm. 
Here, Mr. White claims to be in fear of staff members with whom he has a difficult history 
and that he has been subjected to verbal harassment, threats, and multiple disciplinary charges 
since his return to SOCF in 2024. Compl., Doc. 1, PageID 3–4. 
Under well-established Sixth Circuit precedent, however, “a plaintiff must allege that 
he has suffered or is threatened with suffering actual harm as a result of the defendants’ acts 
or omissions before he can make any claim with an arguable basis in Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence.” Wilson v. Yaklich, 148 F.3d 596, 600–02 (6th Cir. 1998) (emphasis added) 
(“However legitimate [the plaintiff’s] fears may have been, we nevertheless believe that it is 
the reasonably preventable assault itself, rather than any fear of assault, that gives rise to a 
compensable claim under the Eighth Amendment.”) (citation omitted); Wells v. Jefferson Cnty. 
Sheriff Dep ’t, 159 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1011 (S.D. Ohio 2001) (“Absent any assault on him, 
Wells’s Eighth Amendment failure -to-protect claim has no substance.”). Here, Mr. White’s 
allegations—that Ms. Azbell stated that she hates him, that he should not have returned to 
SOCF in 2024, and that unit staff would make his life a “living hell” —constitute , at best, 
fears, allegations of harassment, and non-physical retaliation. Wilson, 148 F.3d at 600–02; 
Compl., Doc. 1, PageID 3. 
However, the Court can not discount the seriousness of the 2018 physical altercation 
involving Sergeant Dillow and Mr. White. Id . at PageID 14. As to that incident, Mr. White 
alleges that he was falsely accused of assault and states that the incident shaped his 
relationship with certain SOCF staff. See Doc. 21, PageID 120. The Board nevertheless found 
Mr. White guilty of that violation. Compl., Doc. 1, PageID 14 –16. Even accepting Mr. 
White’s account of the 2018 events as true, however, his assertions (Doc. 21) do not allege 
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that any similar assault or attempted assault has occurred, or nearly occurred, since his return 
to SOCF in 2024. Helling , 509 U.S. at 36 (“[The objective factor] requires a court to assess 
whether society considers the risk that the prisoner complains of to be so grave that it violates 
contemporary standards of decency to expose anyone unwillingly to such a risk. In other 
words, the prisoner must show that the risk of which he complains is not one that today’s 
society chooses to tolerate.”). Here, there is roughly a six-year gap between the 2018 incident 
and Mr. White’s return to SOCF. That incident, standing alone, does not turn Mr. Whi te’s 
more recent allegations of fear and harassment into an ongoing substantial risk of serious 
harm that “violates contemporary standards of decency” for Eighth Amendment purposes. 
Id. Indeed, the passage of several years without any new instances of physical harm 
significantly undermines any inference that Mr. White now faces a substantial risk of serious 
harm in the future. Therefore, Mr. White’s allegations presented here are insufficient to satisfy 
the objective component. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. 
The same shortcomings present themselves under the subjective component of the 
two-part test governing Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claims. The subjective standard 
is satisfied only if the official acted with a “sufficiently culpable state of mind” —that is, 
deliberate indifference—and “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or 
safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that 
a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837. 
Here, Mr. White alleges that Defendant refused his requests to be transferred and left him 
housed in a unit near Ms. Az bell and around Sergeant Dillow, but he does not allege that 
SOCF staff have assaulted him since his return in 2024 or that any specific, imminent threat 
of physical attack has been carried out or come close to fruition. Compl., Doc. 1, PageID 3 –
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4. At most, the pleadings describe a longstanding conflict with certain staff, verbal 
harassment, and a disagreement over housing and transfer decisions. See Doc. 16, PageID 93. 
Standing alone, those allegations do not plausibly show that Defendant could or should have 
drawn the inference that Mr. White faced a substantial risk of serious physical harm and then 
disregarded that risk, as Farmer requires. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837; Bishop v. Hackel, 636 F.3d 
757, 767 (6th Cir. 2011). The Court therefore agrees with the Magistrate Judge that Mr. White 
has not satisfied the subjective component of an Eighth Amendment failure -to-protect claim 
and, for the reasons already discussed, has not satisfied the objective component either. 
2. Grievance Process, Allegations of False Reports, and Damages 
The Magistrate Judge also addressed Mr. White’s allegations that he has been denied 
a fair grievance process and has been subjected to false or untruthful conduct reports. Doc. 
17, PageID 100. In the R&R, the Magistrate Judge correctly concluded that these allegations 
fail to state constitutional claim s as there is no “constitutional right to be free from false 
accusations of misconduct” nor “to an effective prison grievance procedure.” Jackson v. 
Hamlin, 61 F. App’x 131, 132 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Freeman v. Rideout, 808 F.2d 949, 951 (2d 
Cir.1986)); Argue v. Hofmeyer , 80 F. App’ x 427, 430 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[ The inmate ’s] 
allegations do not state a claim because there is no inherent constitutional right to an effective 
prison grievance procedure.”). Here, the disciplinary records attached to the pleadings reflect 
that Mr. White received written notice of the charges , attended several hearings, offered his 
own defense during the hearings on more than one occasion, and received an appeal notice 
informing him of his appellate rights that specifically said “you [Mr. White] may appeal this 
decision to the warden. The appeal must be submitted using the provided form . . . within 7 
days of receiving of disposition.” Compl., Doc. 1, PageID 18–19. 
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Mr. White does not allege that those proceedings , in which he actively participated, 
lacked the basic procedural safeguards afforded under due process. Rather, he largely 
reiterates that the tickets were untruthful and that he is dissatisfied with the outcome. Compl., 
Doc. 1, PageID 3; Doc. 16, PageID 91. However, those arguments do not present cognizable 
claims under the law. Lee v. Pauldine, No. 1:12-cv-077, 2013 WL 65111, at *8 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 
4, 2013) (“[T]he mere filing of [a false] charge itself’ does not constitute a cognizable claim 
under § 1983 so long as the inmate ‘was granted a hearing, and had the opportunity to rebut 
the unfounded or false charges.’”) (citation omitted). In addition, because Mr. White has not 
stated a viable constitutional violation, his request for compensatory and punitive damages 
also fails. Compl., Doc. 1, PageID 8. 
3. Request for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order 
Finally, Mr. White seeks a preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order 
directing his immediate transfer to another institution, asserting that he is in “imminent 
danger” at SOCF because of prior incidents with staff, ongoing harassment, and the risk of 
future fabricated assault charges. Doc. 10, PageID 61. The Magistrate Judge recommends 
denial of that relief.
5 Doc. 17, PageID 103. The issuance of injunctions and temporary 
restraining orders are extraordinary remedies governed by Rule 65. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65. In 
determining whether to grant or deny injunctive relief, the court considers the following 
factors: “(1) whether the movant has a strong likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether 
the movant would suffer irreparable injury without the injunction; (3) whether issuance of the 
injunction would cause substantial harm to others; and (4) whether the public interest would 
 
5 Mr. White also filed two additional motions styled as requests for preliminary injunctions and temporary 
restraining orders. See Docs. 22, 23. He filed the first (Doc. 22) on the same day as his objections to the R&R, 
and the second (Doc. 23) several months after the objection deadline. Because the Court adopts the R&R 
and dismisses this action, both motions for injunctive relief (Docs. 22, 23) are now moot. 
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be served by issuance of the injunction. ” City of Pontiac Retired Emples. Ass’n v. Schimmel, 751 
F.3d 427, 430 (6th Cir. 2014). The party seeking injunctive relief must prove its case by clear 
and convincing evidence. See Hartman v. Acton, No. 2:20 -cv-1952, 2020 WL 1932896, at *2 
(S.D. Ohio Apr. 21, 2020) (citation omitted). 
The Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Vascura that Mr. White has failed to make 
the kind of showing necessary to warrant injunctive relief. For the reasons already discussed, 
the Amended Complaint (Doc. 16) fails to state a plausible Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment 
claim, so Mr. White cannot establish a likelihood of success on the merits. Nor has he shown 
irreparable harm warranting the extraordinary remedy of a transfer order. His allegations 
describe fear, verbal harassment, and the possibility of future fabricated charges, but not any 
recent physical harm or concrete attempt on his safety since his return to SOCF in 2024. See 
Wilson, 148 F.3d at 600–01; Wells, 159 F. Supp. 2d at 1010–11. The remaining two factors, 
harm to others and the public interest, also weigh against granting the requested relief. 
Ordering Mr. White’s immediate transfer would insert the Court into day-to-day housing and 
security decisions traditionally entrusted to prison officials, without showing that such 
intervention is necessary because of an imminent, serious risk of harm to Mr. White. See 
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84–85 (1987) (“Where a state penal system is involved, federal 
courts have . . . additional reason to accord deference to the appropriate prison authorities.”). 
On this record, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that the facts as alleged do not 
favor the extraordinary relief Mr. White seeks. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Mr. White’s objections (Doc. 21) are therefore OVERRULED, and the R&R (Doc. 
17) is ADOPTED. Accordingly, this action is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Mr. 
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White’s additional motions for a preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order 
(Docs. 22, 23) are DENIED as MOOT. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
June 4, 2026 
 Jeffery P. Hopkins 
 United States District Judge 
 
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