govinfo:USCOURTS-flsd-1_26-cv-22397-0

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
 

 
ELIAS ISSA HABASH, 
 
Petitioner, 
 
v. 
 
WARDEN, KROME SERVICE 
PROCESSING CENTER, et al., 
 
Respondents. 
______________________________________/ 
 
ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 
 
THIS CAUSE comes before the Court upon Petitioner Elias Issa Habash’s Petition for 
a Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”), [ECF No. 1], filed on April 7 , 2026. Petitioner alleges 
that he has been unlawfully committed to detention and seeks that the Court order his immediate 
release. See Pet. ¶ 1, Prayer for Relief. The Court having reviewed the Petition,1 the relevant 
submissions, and applicable law, it is hereby 
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Petition is DENIED as set forth herein. 
BACKGROUND 
Petitioner is a stateless Palestinian2 who has resided in the United States since 1982, when 
he entered as a lawful permanent resident. Pet. ¶¶ 33, 41; Resp. at 3. In 1994, Petitioner was 
 
1 On April 10, 2026, Respondents filed a Response to Petitioner’s Habeas Petition (“Response”), [ECF 
No. 8]. Petitioner subsequently filed a Reply, [ECF No. 15]. Further, after the Court entered an Order 
Requiring Sur-Reply, [ECF No. 16], Respondents submitted a Sur -Reply, [ECF No. 17]. Accordingly, 
the Petition is fully briefed and ripe for review. 
 
2 Respondents maintain that Petitioner is a native and citizen of Jordan. Resp. at 3. Petitioner however 
asserts that “[a]lthough Mr. Habash has been issued Jordanian, temporary two -year passports, these 
passports were issued as travel and identification documents for Palestinians, not as proof of Jordanian 
citizenship.” Pet. ¶ 40. And because “[t]hese characteristics are consistent with the status of a Palestinian 
resident rather than a Jordanian national [] Mr. Habash’s nationality is properly characterized as a 
stateless Palestinian.” Id. 
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indicted in Ohio on charges of engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity, conspiracy to engage in a 
pattern of corrupt activity, three counts of petty theft, theft, two counts of trafficking in food 
stamps, and four counts of forgery. Pet. ¶ 42; Resp. at 3. After his petty theft charges were merged 
into a single theft charge, a jury convicted him of the remaining charges, with the exception of the 
charge of conspiracy to engage in a pattern of corrupt activity. Pet. ¶ 42. He then served five years 
of his seven-year sentence. Pet. ¶ 42. 
In June 1997, Petitioner was issued a Notice to Appear (“NTA”) , charging him with 
removability under sections 237(a)(2)(A)(ii) and 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Immigration Nationality 
Act (“INA”). Resp. at 4. After completion of his criminal sentence, Petitioner was placed into 
detention in September 2001, and, on January 3, 2002, an Immigration Judge ordered Petitioner 
removed to Jordan, revoking his status as a lawful permanent resident. Pet. ¶ 43; Resp. at 4. On 
February 25, 2002, the Board of Immigration Appeals dismiss ed Petitioner’s appeal of the 
Immigration Judge’s decision as untimely. Pet. ¶ 43; Resp. at 4. On June 10, 2002, Petitioner was 
released from custody on an Order of Supervision (“OSUP”), and, since that date, Petitioner has 
complied with the conditions of his OSUP. Pet. ¶¶ 44–45; Resp. at 4. 
On November 19, 2026, Petitioner was apprehended by Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement, Enforcement and Removal Operations (“ICE ERO”) pursuant to his OSUP. Pet. ¶ 
46; Resp. 4. Thereafter, ICE ERO made a custody determination and decided to hold Petitioner 
pending his removal,
3 and his OSUP was thereafter revoked . Pet. ¶ 47; Resp. 4. On December 
15, 2025, Petitioner was served with Notice to Alien of File Custody Review informing him that 
his custody would be reviewed on February 16, 2026. Resp. at 4–5. ICE ERO then decided “not 
to release Petitioner determining that he has not demonstrated that he does not pose a danger to 
 
3 Petitioner is currently detained at Krome North Service Processing Center. Pet. ¶ 32; Resp. at 5. 
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the community, to the safety of other persons, or to property.” Resp. at 5. While Petitioner alleges 
that he “did not receive any interview regarding ICE’s decision to revoke his OSUP and redetain 
him,” Pet. ¶ 48, Respondents maintain that “ DHS provided Petitioner notice, an informal 
interview, and an opportunity to address the reasons for the revocation on November 19, 2025, 
and subsequently on April 8, 2026.” Sur-Reply at 2. 
Specifically, on November 19, 2025, ICE issued a written revocation notice to Petitione r, 
informing him that “his order of supervision was being revoked to enforce [his] removal order and 
that he will promptly be afforded an informal interview and the opportunity to respond to the 
reasons for the revocation and to provide evidence to demonstrate that [his] removal is unlikely.” 
Id. at 3 (internal quotations omitted). That same day, he was given an informal interview that, 
according to Respondents , “complied with the regulation that allows revocation when ICE 
determines that it is ‘appropriate to enforce a removal order . . . against an alien’ and when ICE 
finds that the ‘purposes of release have been served.’” Id. (quoting Decl. of Officer Delgado, Ex. 
J, [ECF No. 8-10] ¶ 19; 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l)(2)). And on April 8, 2026, Petitioner was approached 
by the Deportation Officer assigned to his case, “was asked questions relating to ‘ how he felt ’ 
about his supervision being revoke d [and] was then given a document memorializing his 
statements.” Reply at 9 ; see also Sur-Reply at 4–5 (discussing how at the second informal 
interview on April 8, 2026, “Respondent [] informed Petitioner about the grounds for his detention 
and afforded him the opportunity to respond to his detention.”). 
Further, on December 25, 2025 and January 5, 2026, Petitioner declined to complete the 
Jordanian travel document application. Resp. at 5. After he agreed to do so on February 9, 2026, 
the travel document request was submitted to the Embassy of Jordan, and the application remains 
pending. Id. 
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On April 7 , 2026, Petitioner filed this action requesting that the Court (1) assume 
jurisdiction over this matter; (2) “[d]eclare that Petitioner’s detention violates the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a), and the Accardi doctrine;” (3) “[o]rder 
Petitioner’s immediate release;” and (3) “[a]ward Petitioner costs and reasonable attorneys’ 
fees[.]” See Pet., Prayer for Relief. On April 8, 2026, Petitioner submitted an Emergency Motion 
for Temporary Restraining Order, [ECF No. 6], which the Court denied on April 15, 2026. See 
[ECF No. 14]. 
LEGAL STANDARD 
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, federal district courts “within their respective jurisdictions” have 
the authority to hear applications for habeas corpus by any person who claims to be held “in 
custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 
The “essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that 
custody,” and thus to be within the “core of habeas corpus,” a petitioner must seek “either 
immediate release from that confinement or the shortening of its duration.” Prieser v. Rodriguez, 
411 U.S. 475, 484, 489 (1973). Section 2241 authorizes federal courts to hear challenges to 
immigration detention . Zadvydas v. Davis , 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001) (noting that “28 U.S.C. 
§ 2241[ ] confers jurisdiction upon the federal courts to hear” challenges to the “lawfulness of 
immigration-related detention”). 
ANALYSIS 
Petitioner maintains that his detention violates 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) because “there is no 
significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Pet. ¶¶ 69–73. Petitioner 
also maintains that his detention violates his Fifth Amendment due process rights. Pet. ¶¶ 74–97. 
And Petitioner also asserts that “Respondents violated agency regulations governing who and upon 
what findings it may properly revoke an order of supervision when it revoked Petitioner’s order” 
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and that Respondents violated the A dministrative Procedure Act (“APA”) because “[t] he 
revocation was also not in accordance with the INA and implementing regulations governing who 
may lawfully revoke an order of supervision and under what circumstances.” Pet. ¶¶ 74, 107. 
Accordingly, there are three questions before the Court: (1) whether Petitioner is lawfully 
detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) and whether that detention comports with due process; 
(2) whether the Court can hear Petitioner’s challenge to his removal order, and, if so, whether the 
revocation of his OSUP comports with applicable regulations and the Constitution; and (3) whether 
Petitioner’s detention is in violation of the APA and the Accardi doctrine. 
I. Petitioner is lawfully detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231 and his detention 
comports with due process. 
Section 1231 provides that “when an alien is ordered removed, the Attorney General shall 
remove the alien from the United States within a period of 90 days.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (a)(1)(A) . 
But the removal period “shall be extended beyond a period of 90 days and the alien may remain 
in detention during such extended period if the alien fails or refuses to make timely application in 
good faith for travel or other documents necessary to the alien’s departure or conspires or acts to 
prevent the alien’s removal subject to an order of removal.” Id. § 1231(a)(1)(C). 
Petitioner claims that he has been detained longer than the post -removal-period detention 
statute permits and in violation of his due process rights. Specifically, Petitioner argues that “ 8 
U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) [] authorizes post -removal-period detention only under constitutionally 
limited circumstances” and that “his continued detention violates [the statute] because there is no 
significant likelihood of removal in the reasonabl y foreseeable future.” Pet. ¶¶ 70– 71; 74–97. 
Respondents, however, counter that “Petitioner here has [] been in custody . . . shorter than 
necessary to state a claim for unreasonable detention[.]” Resp. at 7. The Court agrees. 
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In Zadvydas v. Davis , the Supreme Court held that the post -removal-period detention 
statute, § 1231, “read in light of the Constitution’s demands, limits an alien’s post-removal-period 
detention to a period reasonably necessary to bring about that alien ’s post-removal-period 
detention to a period reasonably necessary to bring about that alien's removal from the United 
States. It does not permit indefinite detention. ” 533 U.S. 678, 689 (2001). As this Court has 
explained, “[t]o avoid reading the statute as violating the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause 
and to create uniform standards for evaluating challenges to post -removal-period detention, the 
Supreme Court held that any detention of six months or less was a ‘ presumptively reasonable 
period of detention,’ and that ‘an alien may be held in confinement until it has been determined 
that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.’” Grigorian 
v. Bondi, No. 25- CV-22914-RAR, 2025 WL 1895479, at *8 (S.D. Fla. July 8, 2025) (quoting 
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701). 
Thus, to state a Zadvydas claim, the petitioner must show (1) “post-removal order detention 
in excess of six months” and (2) “a good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of 
removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Akinwale v. Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 1050, 1052 (11th 
Cir. 2002). Here, Petitioner’s Zadvydas claim fails because he has not been detained for more than 
six months, and, even if he had been, there is a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably 
foreseeable future. 
As a threshold matter, Petitioner’s detention does not violate the implicit six-month period 
read into the post-removal-period detention statute under Zadvydas. Petitioner contends that “[t]he 
six-month presumptively reasonable removal period for Petitioner expired on February 1, 2026 as 
calculated by aggregating the period of post-removal-order detention beginning February 25, 2002, 
and continuing through his re -detention on November 19, 2025[.] ” Pet. ¶ 72. In support of this 
position, Petitioner points to courts that have permitted such aggregation for purposes of 
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establishing the length of post -removal detention. See Dulovi v. Mordant, No. 2:26-CV-00643-
SPC-NPM, 2026 WL 787645, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 20, 2026) (“[Permitting] the six -month 
presumptively reasonable period of detention [to] reset[] each time a noncitizen is detained [is] 
inconsistent with Zadvydas.”). But c ourts that have considered factual circumstances similar to 
those here have rebuffed this contention. For example, in Flores-Reyes v. Assistant Field Off. Dir., 
the petitioner similarly tried to argue that his prior detention from 2000 to 2002 should be 
aggregated with his current detention period, beginning on October 29, 2025. No. 26-CV-20226, 
2026 WL 406708, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 13, 2026). The court, in rejecting this argument, noted that 
given “the executive branch’s immigration-related expertise and statutory authority to effectuate 
removals, we don’t think Zadvydas precludes the government from detaining a criminal alien for 
‘even one day’ just because he was detained for six months over twenty years ago .” Id.; see also 
Barrios v. Ripa, No. 1:25-CV-22644, 2025 WL 2280485, at *8 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 8, 2025) (“[I]f the 
Court counted detentions in the aggregate, any subsequent period of detention, even one day, 
would raise constitutional concerns. And adjudicating the constitutionality of every re -detention 
would obstruct an area that is in the discretion of the Attorney General— effectuating removals.”); 
Meskini v. Att’y Gen. of United States, No. 4:14-CV-42-CDL, 2018 WL 1321576, at *3 (M.D. Ga. 
Mar. 14, 2018) (noting that Zadvydas is not a “‘Get Out of Jail Free Card’ that may be redeemed 
at any time just because an alien was detained too long in the past.” (internal quotation omitted)). 
The Court acknowledges P etitioner’s concern— that by resetting the Zadvydas detention 
period, DHS would be allowed to “avoid judicial scrutiny[.]” Pet. ¶ 63. But “ this concern has 
little application here [because Petitioner’s] prior detention ended in 2002—over twenty years (and 
three different administrations) ago. And there’s no evidence that, in circumstances like ours, the 
government has engaged in the kind of evasive scheme” alluded to in the cases cited by Petitioner. 
Flores-Reyes, 2026 WL 406708, at *3. Accordingly, because Petitioner is not permitted to count 
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his prior detention and current detention in the aggregate, he has only been in custody for 
approximately five months, since November 19, 2025. 
Even if Petitioner were able to satisfy the six -month period, his argument suffers from 
another defect —his refusal to complete his travel documents . As stated herein, under § 
1231(a)(1)(C), “[t]he removal period shall be extended beyond a period of 90 days and the alien 
may remain in detention during such extended period if the alien fails or refuses to make timely 
application in good faith for travel or other documents necessary to the alien ’s departure[.]” 8 
U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(C) (emphasis added). Thus, “[a petitioner’s] refusal to voluntarily sign his 
travel document . . . [can] extend[] [the] removal period beyond the 90 days following the issuance 
of [a] Final Administrative Order of Removal.” Vaz v. Skinner, 634 F. App’x 778, 782 (11th Cir. 
2015). Indeed, “Courts in this Circuit have consistently held that, when a habeas petitioner ‘ is 
responsible for thwarting his removal, he cannot show that there is no reasonable likelihood that 
he will not be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future if he cooperates with DHS[.] ’” 
Lambert v. Garland, No. 22- 23976, 2023 WL 2016841, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 15, 2023) (quoting 
Vaz, 634 F. App’x at 782). 
Here, Petitioner declined to complete his Jordanian travel document application on two 
occasions— December 25, 2025, and January 5, 2026. Resp. at 5. Because “[t]he six-month period 
is tolled [] if the alien acts to prevent his removal[,] ” Guo Xing Song v. U.S. Att ’y Gen., 516 F. 
App’x 894, 899 (11th Cir. 2013) , Petitioner’s removal period began once his travel document 
request was submitted to the Embassy of Jordan. Resp. at 8. 
Lastly, even if Petitioner could establish a period of detention greater than six months, his 
Zadvydas claim would still fail because there is a significant likelihood of removal in the 
reasonably foreseeable future. Specifically, Respondents “intend to remove Petitioner to Jordan 
and his application remains pending as of February 2026.” Resp. at 9. Petitioner contends that 
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removal is not foreseeable because “over two months later, Respondents still cannot identify any 
acceptance by Jordan.” Reply at 6. But “a delay in issuance of travel documents does not, without 
more, establish that a petitioner ’s removal will not occur in the reasonably foreseeable future [.]” 
Shaikh v. Meade, No. 21-23752, 2022 WL 844420, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 22, 2022) (quoting Linton 
v. Holder , No. 10- 20145, 2010 WL 4810842, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 4, 2010), report and 
recommendation adopted, No. 10-20145-CIV, 2010 WL 4810651 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 19, 2010)). 
In sum, Plaintiff has failed to state a Zadvydas claim because he cannot establish post -
removal order detention in excess of six months . But, even if he could, there still exists a 
significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. Akinwale, 287 F.3d at 1052. 
Accordingly, Counts I and II of the Petition warrant denial. 
II. The Court has jurisdiction over Petitioner’s challenge to his detention and the 
revocation of his OSUP comports with due process. 
Next, Petitioner contends that Respo ndents’ “ revo[cation of] Petitioner’s order of 
supervision without providing notice and a meaningful opportunity to respond violated procedural 
due process under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution [,]” citing to this Court’s 
Grigorian decision. Pet. ¶ 97; Reply at 8–10. Specifically, Petitioner points to Respondent’s 
alleged “failure to provide Petitioner . . . an informal interview[.]” Resp. at 9. Respondents 
counter that the Court cannot hear Petitioner’s challenge to his removal order—but even if it could, 
the revocation of Petitioner’s OSUP comports with applic able regulations and the Constitution. 
Resp. at 9–13. 
Contrary to Respondents’ contention, the Court has jurisdiction to hear Petitioner’s 
challenge to his removal order . Respondents maintain that “the REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. 
No. 109-13, § 106(a), 199 Stat. 231 (May 11, 2005) amended the Immigration and Nationality Act 
[] to provide that petitions for review filed in the appropriate Courts of Appeals were to be the sole 
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and exclusive means for judicial review of final orders of removal.” Resp. at 9 (internal quotations 
and citations omitted). But the Eleventh Circuit has held that “[a petitioner’s] challenge to his 
continued detention is [] distinct from a challenge to his removal order. ” Linares v. Dep ’t of 
Homeland Sec ., 529 F. App’ x 983, 984 (11th Cir. 2013) . Here, because “[Petitioner] is not 
challenging his removal order, the Real ID Act would not apply, and his claim can still be brought 
under § 2241. Therefore , the district court would have jurisdiction over the claim.” Id. at 984–
85 (internal citation omitted); see also Madu v. U.S. Att ’y Gen., 470 F.3d 1362, 1367 (11th Cir. 
2006) (“[W]hile the REAL ID Act amended § 1252(b)(9) by adding an explicit bar on habeas 
jurisdiction over certain claims, the Act did not expand the scope of (b)(9) by making it applicable 
to cases other than those involving ‘review of an order of removal’”). 
While the Court has jurisdiction to hear Petitioner’s challenge to his continued detention, 
it does not find a procedural due process violation. Section 241.4(l)(2) permits revocation “in the 
exercise of discretion when, in the opinion of the revoking official : (i) The purposes of release 
have been served; (ii) The alien violates any condition of release; (iii) It is appropriate to enforce 
a removal order or to commence removal proceedings against an alien; or (iv) The conduct of the 
alien, or any other circumstance, indicates that release would no longer be appropriate.” 8 C.F.R. 
§ 241.4(l)(2). 
Petitioner contends that “Respondents cannot rely on 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l)(2)(iii) where the 
alleged basis for revocation is wholly unsupported at the time of execution.” Reply at 8. In 
support, he points to the fact that the Notice of Revocation of Release was signed on November 
19, 2021, not November 19, 2025, and that “Respondents have not provided any valid reason for 
why the re-detention was executed four years later. ” Reply at 8. But Respondents note that this 
was “likely a typo” and that this fact is “supported by the Notice of Revocation’s second page, 
which lists November 19, 2025 as the operative date on the Proof of Service and next to the 
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detainee’s signature, as well as by the two Declarations.” Sur-Reply at 3 n.2. Indeed, the Petition 
indicates that Petitioner was re-detained on November 19, 2025, Pet. ¶ 46, and does not raise the 
November 19, 2021 date issue. See Herring v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 397 F.3d 1338, 1342 (11th 
Cir. 2005) (“As we repeatedly have admonished, ‘[a]rguments raised for the first time in a reply 
brief are not properly before a reviewing court.’” (quoting United States v. Coy, 19 F.3d 629, 632 
n.7 (11th Cir. 1994)). 
The remaining challenge to the revocation of Petitioner’s OSUP focuses on the adequacy 
of the informal interview. Upon revocation of an OSUP under § 241.4(l), an alien must be 
“notified of the reasons for revocation.” 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l)(1). “[A]fter his or her return to [ICE] 
custody” the alien must be “afforded an initial informal interview promptly . . . to afford the alien 
an opportunity to respond to the reasons for revocation stated in the notification.” Id. “If the alien 
is not released from custody following the informal interview,” ICE must then commence “[t]he 
normal review process . . . with notification to the alien of a records review and scheduling of an 
interview, which will ordinarily be expected to occur within approximately three months after 
release is revoked.” Id . § 241.4(l)(3). A s this Court has explained, “the notice and interview 
requirement stated in § 241.4(l)(1) applies to revocation under § 241.4(l)(2).” Grigorian v. Bondi, 
No. 25-CV-22914-RAR, 2025 WL 2604573, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 9, 2025). 
Petitioner contends that “ [t]he extremely brief interaction between the ICE officer and 
Petitioner at the time of his check -in and at the time he was taken into custody cannot fulfill § 
241.4(l) requirements[.]” Reply at 9. Petitioner notes that he “was just recently approached by 
Officer Delgado on April 8, 2026 [and] was asked questions relating to ‘ how he felt ’ about his 
supervision being revoked. He was then given a document memorializing his statements. ” Id. 
However, Defendant maintains that Petitioner was given an informal interview both on November 
19, 2025, and on April 8, 2026. Sur -Reply at 3, 5. Upon review of the record, the Court is 
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persuaded that Petitioner was provided an informal interview that comports with ICE’s own 
regulations and procedural due process. 
Petitioner’s Notice of Revocation Release indicates that Petitioner “[would] promptly be 
afforded an informal interview and the opportunity to respond to the reasons for the revocation 
and to provide evidence to demonstrate that [his] removal is unlikely.” Ex. H, [ECF No. 8- 8] at 
1. Petitioner’s I-213 Form, dated November 19, 2025, indicates that “Subject was advised that his 
Order of Supervision is being revoked, and an informal interview was conducted.” Ex. A, [ECF 
No. 8- 1] at 2. And the fact an informal interview was conducted is bolstered by affidavits 
submitted by Respondents . See Decl. of Joseph A. Delgado, Ex. J., [ECF No. 8- 10] ¶ 18 
(“Petitioner was informed [on November 19, 2025] that his OSUP was being revoked and an 
informal interview was conducted.”); Second Decl. of Joseph A. Delgado, Ex. L ., [ECF No. 17-
11] ¶ 9 (same). Thus, the weight of the evidence runs contrary to Petitioner’s “unsworn allegation” 
that “the informal interview was not provided to Petitioner in violation of 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l) .” 
See Sur-Reply at 3–4; Reply at 9. 
Even if Petitioner is correct that the “ extremely brief interaction between the ICE officer 
and Petitioner at the time of his check-in and at the time he was taken into custody cannot fulfill § 
241.4(l)”, see Reply at 9, the second informal interview conducted on April 8, 2026 likely renders 
any violation harmless. The Eleventh Circuit has held that “ even where a governmental entity 
fails to follow its own regulations providing for procedural safeguards, it is not a denial of due 
process if the individual was provided with adequate notice such that his rights were not 
prejudiced.” Sharma v. Drug Enf ’t Agency, 511 F. App’ x 898, 902 (11th Cir. 2013) ; see also 
Surovtsev v. Noem , No. 1:25- CV-160-H, 2025 WL 3264479, at *9 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 31, 2025) 
(“[E]ven if the respondents did violate the[] procedures [requiring notice, informal interview, and 
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opportunity to respond and present limited evidence ], any error was harmless in light of the 
expanded procedure that [petitioner] has received throughout this case.”). 
Here, both parties agree that Respondents provided Petitioner a second informal interview 
on April 8, 2026. Reply at 9; Sur-Reply at 5–6. At this interview, Petitioner “was asked questions 
relating to ‘how he felt ’ about his supervision being revoked. He was then given a document 
memorializing his statements.” Reply at 10; see also Second Decl. of Joseph A. Delgado, Ex. L., 
[ECF No. 17- 1] ¶ 10 (“On April 08, 2026, in an abundance of caution, I conducted a second 
informal interview”). According to Petitioner, this is evidence that “ Respondents are attempting 
to clear up procedural defects after the fact. ” Reply at 10. But Petitioner’s second interview 
constitutes an adequate post-deprivation remedy available to cure the violation, such that Petitioner 
was not wholly deprived of his due process rights. See Sharma, 511 F. App’x at 902. The factual 
circumstances here are unlike those addressed by this Court in Grigorian, where petitioner had 
never “received a meaningful opportunity to be heard or to contest the basis for his re-detention.” 
Grigorian, 2025 WL 2604573, at *9. And while “the eventual promise of a formal review [is not] 
enough to cure a due process violation” , see id ., Petitioner here was actually given a second 
informal interview. Thus, Petitioner’s reliance on Grigorian is inapposite. 
In sum, the evidence indicates that Petitioner was provided an informal interview when he 
was first taken into custody on November 19, 2025. And even if he was not, his second informal 
interview on April 8, 2026, provided Petitioner a sufficient opportunity to be heard. Accordingly, 
the revocation of Petitioner’s OSUP comports with due process. 
III. Petitioner’s APA and Accardi claims fail. 
Petitioner alleges that his detention violates 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) and (D) and the Accardi 
doctrine. Pet. ¶¶ 98–102, 103–114. Under § 706(2), courts are obligated to “hold unlawful and 
set aside agency action” that is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
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accordance with the law [,]” that is “contrary to constitutional right [or] power[,] ” or that is “in 
excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory righ t[.]” 5 U.S.C. § 
706(2). 
As a threshold matter, habeas petitions are generally not a proper vehicle for an APA cause 
of action. Indeed, “[h] abeas has traditionally been a means to secure release from unlawful 
detention, but [Petitioner seemingly] invokes the writ . . . to obtain authorization to stay in this 
country.” Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 107 (2020). Indeed, a number 
of courts, when presented with APA claims in a similar context, have noted that a habeas petition 
“is the wrong vehicle for the job.” Rodriguez Curbelo v. Noem, No. 2:26-CV-749-KCD-NPM, 
2026 WL 925638, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 6, 2026) (explaining that “[t] rying to shoehorn a 
freestanding APA challenge into a habeas petition simply does not work . . . [because a] habeas 
petition comes with a streamlined procedure, fast-tracked rules, and a nominal filing fee. An APA 
challenge, by contrast, is a standard civil action with a heftier filing fee and following the ordinary, 
more deliberate pace of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Litigants cannot sidestep those 
standard requirements by simply slapping a habeas label on an administrative complaint.”); 
Alvarez v. Noem , No. 5:26- CV-0013-JKP, 2026 WL 93972, at *7 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 9, 2026) 
(rejecting Petitioner’s APA claim because “Petitione rs do not specifically seek any non- habeas 
relief and have not paid the required filing fee for any such claim.”). 
More fundamentally, claims under the APA are only reviewable where there is “final 
agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court[.]” 5 U.S.C. § 704. But 
Petitioner here has not established final agency action because “detention does not constitute a 
final agency action[.]” Hernandez v. Collins , No. 1:26-CV-289, 2026 WL 673557, at *3 (W.D. 
Tex. Mar. 9, 2026). Moreover, “[Petitioner] has an adequate remedy [in a court]— the very habeas 
petition he filed to get through the courthouse doors.” Rodriguez Curbelo, 2026 WL 925638, at 
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Page 15 of 16 
 
*5; see also Trump v. J.G.G ., 604 U.S. 670, 674 (2025) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (noting that 
“habeas corpus, not the APA, is the proper vehicle” because there is an “adequate remedy in a 
court[.]”). 
Even on the merits, Petitioner’s APA claim must fail because, for the reasons explained 
herein, Petitioner’s detention is not violative of the law or the Constitution. Accordingly, 
“[b]ecause Petitioner was [] treated as the INA [and the Constitution] requires, the government has 
not acted arbitrarily or capriciously.” Fleurimond v. Noem , No. CV-26-00037-PHX-MTL, 2026 
WL 507542, at *3 (D. Ariz. Feb. 24, 2026). 
Finally, Petitioner cannot assert an Accardi claim. Petitioner claims that “Respondents’ 
revocation of the Petitioner’s Order of Supervision and decision to ignore instructions in the 
release notification should be set aside” because, under the Accardi doctrine, agencies are required 
to follow their own regulations. Pet. ¶¶ 99–102 (citing United States ex rel. Accardi v. 
Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 68 (1954) ). Under this doctrine, “agency deviation from its own 
regulations and procedures may justify judic ial relief in a case otherwise properly before the 
court.” Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 976 (11th Cir. 1984), aff’d, 472 U.S. 846 (1985) (quotation 
omitted). 
As evidence of the agency’s deviation from its own regulations, Petitioner points to the 
fact that “ Petitioner’s order of supervision was not revoked by the ICE Executive Associate 
Director” and that “[n] o findings were provided to Petitioner that revocation was in the public 
interest[.]” Pet. ¶¶ 108–109. But there is no authority “that requires Respondents to publicly 
document every time an official delegates aut hority to another official” and “ the relevant 
regulation does not mandate that the revoking official explicitly state in the Notice of Revocation 
of Release that the revocation was in the public interest and that the matter could not be referred 
to the Executive Associate Commissioner. ” Barrios, 2025 WL 2280485, at *7. Petitioner also 
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points to Respondents’ alleged failure to conduct an informal interview. But, as discussed herein, 
the record indicates that informal interviews were conducted on two occasions: November 19, 
2025 and April 8, 2026. 
Thus, the agency does not appear to have deviated from its own regulations. And, even if 
it had, “ the Court would not grant the extraordinary remedy [Petitioner] seeks: outright release 
from custody.” Bonachea v. Noem, et al., No. 2:26-CV-653-KCD-NPM, 2026 WL 1096846, at 
*5 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 23, 2026) (noting the fact that petitioner “was initially taken into custody cannot 
override Congress’s inescapable command that he must remain detained now.”); Acosta Gonzalez 
v. Noem, No. 26-60781, 2026 WL 1077836, *4 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 20, 2026) (rejecting Accardi claim 
because the Supreme Court has held that “if sufficient ground for [Petitioner’s] detention by the 
government is shown, he is not to be discharged for defects in the original arrest or commitment.” 
(quoting Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 662 (1892)). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows: 
1. Petitioner Elias Issa Habash’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, [ECF No. 1], is 
DENIED. 
2. All deadlines are TERMINATED, and any pending motions are DENIED. 
3. The Clerk shall CLOSE this case. 
DONE AND ORDERED in Miami, Florida, this 4th day of May, 2026. 
 
 
_________________________________ 
RODOLFO A. RUIZ II 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
Case 1:26-cv-22397-RAR Document 18 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/05/2026 Page 16 of 16

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