govinfo:USCOURTS-flsd-1_26-cv-22766-0

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
 

 
LUIS MEDELLIN HERNANDEZ, 
 
 Petitioner, 
 
v. 
 
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Secretary, U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, et al., 
 
 Respondents. 
__________________________________________/ 
 
ORDER GRANTING IN PART PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 
 THIS CAUSE comes before the Court upon Petitioner Luis Medellin Hernandez’s 
Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (the “Petition”). ECF No. [1]. Respondents 
filed a R esponse Opposing the Petition. ECF Nos. [7]. Upon due consideration of the 
parties’ submissions, the pertinent portions of the record, and the applicable law, for the 
reasons explained below, the Petition is GRANTED IN PART. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Petitioner is a Mexican citizen who first entered the United States in June 2001.1 
ECF Nos. [1] at ¶¶ 1 –2; [8-2] at 3. Approximately twenty years later, o n October 18, 
2025, Petitioner filed Form I -589, Application for Asylum and Withholding of Removal 
with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”), which remains 
pending. ECF Nos. [1] ¶ 73, [8-2] at 3. 
 
1 Petitioner’s prior criminal history was not addressed by Respondents in its analysis 
and is not relevant to the Court’s analysis here. 
Case 1:26-cv-22766-JB Document 9 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/05/2026 Page 1 of 10
 
2 
 
On March 30, 2026, Petitioner was taken into custody by the United States 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) at his I-589 interview. ECF Nos. [1] ¶ 
74, [7] at 2. Once in custody, ICE served Petitioner with a Warrant for Arrest of Alien. 
ECF No. [8-3]. On the same day, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) issued 
a Notice to Appear (“NTA”), classifying Petitioner as “an alien present in the United 
States who has not been admitted or paroled.” ECF No. [8-1] at 1. The NTA charges 
Petitioner under section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) 
as “an alien present in the United States without being admitted or paroled” and under 
section 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the INA as “an immigrant who, at the time of application for 
admission, is not in possession of a valid unexpired immigrant visa, reentry permit, 
border crossing card, or other valid entry document required by the [INA], and a valid 
unexpired passport, or other suitable travel document[.]” Id. at 4. 
DHS initiated removal proceedings against Petitioner, which remain pending. 
ECF No. [8 -5] at 1. Petitioner is currently being held at the Krome Processing Center 
(“Krome”) in Miami, Florida. ECF No. [8-4]. Petitioner is scheduled for hearing before 
an Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”) immigration judge (“IJ”) on May 
11, 2026. ECF No. [8-5]. 
On April 21, 2026, Petitioner filed the instant Petition. ECF No. [1]. Petitioner 
raises three claims. Id. Count I alleges that Petitioner’s continued detention without an 
individualized bond hearing violates the INA because the mandatory detention provision 
a 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) was improperly applied to him, as he “is not an arriving alien” 
and “was arrested well within the interior of the United States, far from any border or 
port of entry, and years after his unlawful entry.” Id. ¶¶ 85–87. Counts II and III allege 
Case 1:26-cv-22766-JB Document 9 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/05/2026 Page 2 of 10
 
3 
 
that Petitioner’s continued detention without an individualized bond hearing violates 
substantive and procedural due process. Id. ¶¶ 92–102. Petitioner requests that the 
Court declare that (1) he “is not subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), and that 
he is lawfully detainable, if at all, only under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)” and (2) his continued 
detention without an individualiz ed bond hearing violates the INA and procedural and 
substantive due process. Id. ¶¶ 105– 06. Petitioner further requests that the Court 
“order[] Respondents to release Petitioner immediately, or, in the alternative, order 
Respondents to release Petitioner if he is not provided a bond hearing within seven (7) 
days after the Court’s order[.]” Id. ¶ 107. 
Respondents filed its Response to the Petition. ECF No. [7]. The Response does 
not set forth any analysis of the legal arguments that offered only a “ abbreviated” 
memorandum of law,2 arguing that “Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 
§ 1225(b)(2), because he was present in the United States without being admitted or 
paroled.” Id. at 3. Respondents acknowledge that “several Judges in this District have 
reached the opposite conclusion,” than Respondents. Id. at 5. Respondents “rel[y] upon, 
and incorporate[] by reference, the legal arguments it presented” in Gil-Paulino v. Sec’y 
of the U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. , No. 25 -cv-24292, ECF No. [41] (S.D. Fla. Oct. 10, 
2025), Hernandez Alvarez v. Acting Warden Roger Morris, et al. , No. 25-cv-24806, ECF 
No. [6], and Cerro Perez v. Parra, et al. , No. 25-cv-24820, ECF No. [9] (S.D. Fla. Oct. 27, 
2025). Id. at 7. In so doing, Respondents acknowledge that the Court’s decisions in Gil-
 
2 Respondents’ reliance on unspecified arguments they raised in three different cases 
before another court is not persuasive. The Court will only c onsider specific 
arguments raised before this Court. 
 
Case 1:26-cv-22766-JB Document 9 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/05/2026 Page 3 of 10
 
4 
 
Paulino, Hernandez Alvarez, and Cerro Perez “would control the result here if the Court 
adheres to that decision,” at least until the appeals are resolved in Hernandez Alvarez 
and Cerro Perez, which are currently pending before the Eleventh Circuit. Id. at 6–7. 
 
II. ANALYSIS 
District courts have the authority to grant writs of habeas corpus. See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2241(a). Habeas corpus is fundamentally “a remedy for unlawful executive detention.” 
Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008) (citation omitted). A writ may be issued to a 
petitioner who shows that he is being held in custody in violation of the Constitution or 
federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). The Court’s jurisdiction extends to challenges 
involving immigration detention. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001). 
A. Legality of Petitioner’s Mandatory Detention 
Respondents contend that Petitioner is an “applicant for admission” under 8 
U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), making him subject to mandatory detention and ineligible for a bond 
hearing. ECF No. [7] at 3–4. Petitioner asserts that his detention is governed by 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1226(a), which allows for the release for noncitizens on bond. ECF No. [1] ¶ 90. The 
Court examines each of these statutes in turn. 
i. 8 U.S.C. § 1225 
 Section 1225 governs the inspection, detention, and removal of applicants for 
admission. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225 et seq . Applicants for admission are defined as 
noncitizens “present in the United States who ha[ve] not been admitted” or those 
“arriv[ing] in the United States.” Id. All applicants for admission “must be inspected by 
immigration officers to ensure that they may be admitted into the country consistent 
Case 1:26-cv-22766-JB Document 9 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/05/2026 Page 4 of 10
 
5 
 
with U.S. immigration law.” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 287 (2018). 3 To that 
end, “U.S. immigration law authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens seeking 
admission into the country under §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2).” Id. at 289 (emphasis added). 
“Section 1225(b)(1) applies to aliens initially determined to be inadmissible due to 
fraud, misrepresentation, or lack of valid documentation.” Id. Such noncitizens are 
generally subject to expedited removal “without further hearing or review.” 8 U.S.C. § 
1225(b)(1). However, if the noncitizen expresses “an intention to apply for asylum” or a 
fear of persecution,” the statute requires referral to an interview with an immigration 
officer. Id. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii). If the immigration officer finds a “credible fear,” the 
noncitizen “shall be detained for further consideration of the application for asylum.” Id. 
Respondents do not argue that Petitioner is subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 
1225(b)(1). 
On the other hand, “Section 1225(b)(2) is broader” and “serves as a catchall 
provision that applies to all applicants for admission not covered by § 1225(b)(1).” 
Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287. Noncitizens covered under § 1225(b)(2) are detained for 
removal proceedings “if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien 
seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted” into the 
country. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Importantly, detention under § 1225(b)(2) is 
mandatory. See Gomes v. Hyde, No. 25-cv-11571, 2025 WL 1869299, at *8 (D. Mass. July 
7, 2025). 
 
3 Indeed, Jennings began its analysis by emphasizing the temporal and categorical 
distinction between the detention statutes. Section 1225 applies to noncitizens who 
are “seeking admission into the country” at the border or a port of entry , whereas 
section 1226 governs those “already in the country pending the outcome of removal 
proceedings.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 285–89. 
Case 1:26-cv-22766-JB Document 9 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/05/2026 Page 5 of 10
 
6 
 
ii. 8 U.S.C. § 1226 
Federal immigration law “also authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens 
already in the country pending the outcome of removal proceedings.” Jennings, 583 U.S. 
at 289 (emphasis added). Section 1226(a) provides that when a noncitizen has been 
“arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the 
United States,” the Attorney General may either continue to detain the in dividual or 
release them on bond or conditional release. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). The statute thus 
“establishes a discretionary detention framework.” Gomes, 2025 WL 1869299, at *2. 
Importantly for purposes of this action, “[f]ederal regulations provide that aliens 
detained under [section] 1226(a) receive bond hearings at the outset of detention.” 
Jennings, 583 U.S. at 306 (citing 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(d)(1), 1236.1(d)(1)); see also Lopez 
Benitez v. Francis, No. 25 -Civ-5937, 2025 WL 2371588, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2025) 
(“To be sure, a noncitizen detained under [sec tion] 1226(a) is undoubtedly entitled to a 
bond hearing before an immigration judge.”). 
iii. Petitioner’s Detention Is Governed By 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), Not 
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) 
Whether section 1225(b)(2) or section 1226(a) governs Petitioner’s detention is a 
question of statutory interpretation squarely within the Court’s jurisdiction. Pizarro 
Reyes v. Raycraft , No. 25 -cv-12546, 2025 WL 2609425, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Sep. 9, 2025) 
(noting that the interplay of these two sections is a matter “of statutory interpretation 
belong[ing] historically within the province of the courts.”) (citing Loper Bright Enter. v. 
Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 386 (2024)); Barrios v. Shepley , No. 25 -cv-00406, 2025 WL 
2772579, at *5 (D. Me. Sept. 25, 2025) (district court had jurisdiction to review 
petitioner’s challenge to the “statutory framework” regarding his detention); see Gomes, 
Case 1:26-cv-22766-JB Document 9 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/05/2026 Page 6 of 10
 
7 
 
2025 WL 1869299, at *8 n.9 (“Courts must exercise independent judgment in determining 
the meaning of statutory provisions”); Mosqueda, 2025 WL 2591530, at *7 (district court 
had jurisdiction to decide whether § 1225 or § 1226 applied as “[t]hese are purely legal 
questions of statutory interpretation.”). 
From the outset of Petitioner’s case, DHS proceeded under section 1226. 
Specifically, the NTA that DHS issued to Petitioner did not classify him as an “arriving 
alien.” ECF No. [ 8-1] at 1 . Instead, the NTA classified and charged him as an alien 
present in the United States who has not been admitted or paroled. Id . at 1, 4. This 
classification places him squarely within section 1226. See e.g., Pizarro Reyes, 2025 WL 
2609425, at *8 (emphasizing ICE’s selection of “present” rather than “arriving” on the 
NTA as evidence that § 1226 applied); see also Hyppolite v. Noem, No. 25-4304, 2025 WL 
2829511, *8 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2025) (respondent’s initial classification of petitioner 
“certainly is relevant to the Court's assessment of the credibility and good faith of 
‘Respondents’ new position as to the basis for [Hyppolite’s] detention, which was adopted 
post hoc and raised for the first time in this litigation.’”) (citation omitted); Perez v. Berg, 
No. 25-cv-494, 2025 WL 2531566, at *2 (D. Neb. July 24, 2025) (“T he Court notes that 
the government itself charged Petitioner as an alien present in the United States who 
has not been admitted or paroled rather than an arriving alien.”) (quotations omitted). 
In addition, “[w]hereas [section] 1225 governs removal proceedings for ‘arriving 
aliens,’ [section] 1226(a) serves as a catchall.” Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft, No. 25-cv-12546, 
2025 WL 2609425, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 9, 2025). As the Supreme Court stated in 
Jennings, section 1226 “creates a default rule” that “applies to aliens already present in 
the United States.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 303. The inclusion of a “catchall” provision in 
Case 1:26-cv-22766-JB Document 9 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/05/2026 Page 7 of 10
 
8 
 
section 1226, particularly following the more specific provision in section 1225, is “likely 
no coincidence, but rather a way for Congress to capture noncitizens who fall outside of 
the specified categories.” Pizarro Reyes, 2025 WL 2609425, at *5; see also Barrera , v. 
Tindall, No. 3:25 -cv-541, 2025 WL 2690565, at *4 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 19, 2025) (citation 
omitted). The circumstances surrounding Petitioner’s detention align with section 
1226(a), not section 1225(b)(2). Indeed, other Courts in this Circuit and District have 
uniformly rejected Respondents’ expansive interpretation of section 1225. See, e.g., Gil-
Paulino v. Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 25-cv-24292, ECF No. [41], (S.D. Fla. 
Oct. 10, 2025) (respondent’s interpretation of the INA “directly contravenes the statute” 
and “disregards decades of settled precedent”); see also Pizarro Reyes, 2025 WL 2609425, 
at *7 (“Finally, the BIA's decision to pivot from three decades of consistent statutory 
interpretation and call for Pizarro Reyes’ detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) is at odds with 
every District Court that has been confronted with the same question of statutory 
interpretation.”); Puga, No. 25-24535, 2025 WL 2938369, at *3–6; Merino v. Ripa, No. 25-
23845, 2025 WL 2941609, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 15, 2025); Lopez v. Hardin, No. 25-cv-830, 
2025 WL 2732717, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 25, 2025); Alvarez v. Morris, 25-cv-24806, ECF 
No. [6], (S.D. Fla. Oct. 27, 2024) (collecting cases). 
The Court recognizes that this issue is currently before the Eleventh Circuit Court 
of Appeals in Hernandez -Alvarez v. Warden, Federal Detention Ctr. Miami, et al. and 
Cerro Perez v. Assistant Field Office Director, et al. , and that the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals in Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, et al. and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in 
Avila v. Bondi, recently issued decisions in Respondents’ favor. See Buenrostro-Mendez, 
166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026); Avila, 170 F.4th 1128 (8th Cir. 2026). In any event, neither 
Case 1:26-cv-22766-JB Document 9 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/05/2026 Page 8 of 10
 
9 
 
decision is controlling on this Court, and the Eleventh Circuit has not ruled on the 
matter. As such, there is no binding authority that contravenes the previous decisions 
of this Court. Indeed, most case law has consistently held that detainees such as 
Petitioner are entitled to an individualized bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). 
Accordingly, Petitioner’s detention is governed by section 1226(a) and, therefore, 
he is entitled to an individualized bond hearing before an IJ. As such, Petitioner’s 
mandatory detention under section 1225(b) without conducting a dangerousness and risk 
of flight determination is unlawful. 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as 
follows: 
1. Petitioner Luis Medellin Hernandez’s Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas 
Corpus, ECF No. [1], is GRANTED IN PART. The Court has determined that Petitioner 
falls under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), and accordingly, Respondents shall promptly afford 
Petitioner an individualized bond hearing consistent with 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) or otherwise 
release Petitioner. 
2. Respondents shall, within 24 hours of the bond hearing, file a Status Report 
indicating the outcome of the bond hearing and, if release on bond is denied, the reason(s) 
for the denial. 
3. Count I of the Petition is GRANTED and the remaining Counts are 
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 
4. The Clerk is directed to CLOSE this case. 
Case 1:26-cv-22766-JB Document 9 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/05/2026 Page 9 of 10
 
10 
 
5. Any pending motions are DENIED AS MOOT. 
DONE AND ORDERED in Miami, Florida, this 5th day of May, 2026. 
 
 
_______________________________________ 
 JACQUELINE BECERRA 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
 
Case 1:26-cv-22766-JB Document 9 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/05/2026 Page 10 of 10

Passage view · GavelSight