govinfo:USCOURTS-flsd-1_25-cv-24126-1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
 

 
JEWISH VOICE FOR PEACE, 
SOUTH FLORIDA, 
 
 Plaintiff, 
 
v. 
 
CITY OF MIAMI BEACH, et al., 
 
 Defendants. 
______________________________________/ 
 
ORDER GRANTING IN PART MOTION TO DISMISS 
 
 THIS CAUSE comes before the Court on Defendants’ Joint Motion to Dismiss Complaint 
(“Motion”), [ECF No. 30], filed on October 16, 2025. On October 30, 2025, Plaintiff filed a 
Response in Opposition (“Response”), [ECF No. 37], to which Plaintiff replied on November 26, 
2025 (“Reply”), [ECF No. 68]. For the following reasons, it is hereby 
 ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED IN PART. 
BACKGROUND 
Plaintiff Jewish Voice for Peace, South Florida (“JVP”) is the South Florida Chapter of a 
national organization that “mobilize[s] Jewish communities to advocate for a just society in 
Palestine and Israel rooted in human rights rather than oppression[.]” Complaint (“Compl.”), [ECF 
No.1] ¶ 14. Defendant City of Miami Beach (“the City”) “is a municipality organized and existing 
under the laws of the State of Florida and located in Miami-Dade County, Florida.” Compl. ¶ 15. 
Defendant Steven Meiner (“Mayor Meiner”) is the Mayor of the City. Compl. ¶ 16. Both Mayor 
Meiner and Defendant David Suarez (“Commissioner Suarez”) are members of the Miami Beach 
City Commission, “the legislative body of the City.” Compl. ¶¶ 16–17. 
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Plaintiff alleges that “[o]ver the past two years, members of Plaintiff [JVP] have repeatedly 
spoken out —in public protests and at City Commission meetings —against Israel’s [actions ,]” 
Resp. at 1, but that “Defendants have aggressively sought to silence critics of Israel[.]” Compl. ¶ 
5. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have suppressed their speech in two primary 
ways: (1) “by repeatedly and arbitrarily requiring that [JVP] and its members move their protest 
activities from the public sidewalks where they have sought to protest to a site that impaired their 
ability to reach their intended audience”; and (2) by enacting “an Ordinance that authorizes the 
police to order any protester standing on a public sidewalk to move from the sidewalk.” Compl. 
¶¶ 8, 10. 
Since 2023, JVP has protested at Art Basel, Miami Beach’s annual art show, and at other 
high-profile events in Miami Beach. Compl. ¶ 18. On December 8, 2023 at Art Basel, about 100 
protestors, including JVP members , “gathered on the sidewalk in front of the Miami Beach 
Convention Center to protest Israel’s actions in Gaza.” Compl. ¶ 6. The protestors “held signs[,] 
[] shared informational leaflets with attendees[,] [and] displayed messages criticizing Israel’s 
actions in Gaza and advocating for Palestinian rights.” Compl. ¶ 19. They also “displayed a nearly 
60-foot-long banner reading, ‘Let Palestine Live.’” Compl. ¶ 20. Plaintiff maintain s that they 
neither blocked the entrances to the Convention Center nor obstructed sidewalk pedestrian traffic. 
Compl. ¶¶ 18, 21. 
Following the protest, on December 13, 2023, Mayor Meiner sponsored an item at a City 
Commission meeting to “ discuss/take action concerning demonstrations directly in front of the 
convention center during Art Basel .” Compl. ¶ 27 (quoting Commission Memorandum, Ex. 1, 
[ECF No. 1-1]. In that item, Mayor Meiner specifically made reference to the JVP protest, noting 
that the “group repeatedly chanted the phrase ‘From the river to the sea, Palestine will be free[,]’ 
[a] phrase widely interpreted to call for genocide against the Jewish Peo ple.” Compl. ¶ 27; 
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Commission Memorandum, Ex. 1, [ECF No. 1 -1].1 Ultimately, “[t]he item was not reached at 
[that] December [City Commission] meeting.” Compl. ¶ 29. 
Thereafter, on March 11, 2024, twenty JVP members attempted to protest outside th e 
Miami Beach Convention Center at the Aspen Ideas Climate Conference, but were prevented from 
doing so by the Miami Beach police who instead “redirected [them] to a ‘Free Speech Zone’ nearly 
200 yards away from the conference entrance ” where they “were unable to hand flyers to 
conference attendees, [and] attendees [were un]able to read protesters’ signs, take their flyers, or 
hear their chants.” Compl. ¶¶ 30–32. When a JVP member lamented the protestors’ placement at 
a City Commission Meeting following the Climate Conference, Mayor Meiner responded that 
“‘I’m actually proud of it’ . . . later add[ing] that part of the reason he ordered the police to move 
the climate protesters was because ‘certainly [he] did not want the images that we’ve seen on other 
occasions,’ seemingly referencing photographs of the Let Palestine Live banner at Art Basel [.]” 
Compl. ¶¶ 34–35 (internal citations omitted). 
Two days later, on March 13, 2024, the City Commission considered two items that were 
either sponsored or co- sponsored by Mayor Meiner and Commissioner Suarez, and that were, 
according to Plaintiff, “introduced to target viewpoints that the Mayor and Commissioner Suarez 
disagree with, namely, criticism of Israel.” Compl. ¶¶ 37–39. 
First, Ordinance No. 2024-4604, entitled “Obstructing of Pedestrian and Vehicular Traffic 
Prohibited” (hereinafter “Ordinance”) was passed and adopted on March 13, 2024, to take effect 
on March 23, 2024. Ordinance, [ECF No. 1-7] at 2–3. Acknowledging that “sidewalks, streets, 
alleys, beach walks, and beach entrances play a vital role in city life as conduits for pedestrian 
 
1 Plaintiff disagrees with Defendants’ characterization of this phrase, noting that it is instead “an 
aspirational call for freedom, human rights, and peaceful coexistence, not death, destruction, or hate.” 
Compl. ¶ 27 n.1. 
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movement and access[,] . . . [and as] a fundamental and necessary foundation for cities ” and that 
“when an individual ’s path is blocked . . . it can force them onto the street or other dangerous 
terrain where there is a risk of death or injury” , the Ordinance was enacted to “provide citizens 
and visitors the right to move freely and safely through the city.” Id. at 1. 
The Ordinance prohibits the following conduct: 
(a) Any person who, walks, stands, sits, lies, or places an object in such 
manner as to intentionally block or impair passage or movement by another person 
or by a vehicle, or to require another person or a vehicle to detour or to take other 
evasive action to avoid physical contact, and who, after being ordered by a law 
enforcement officer to move or to move the object, and such person or such object 
remains in or on any public sidewalk, street, alley, beach walk, or beach entrance 
in such a manner as to block or impair passage or movement by another person or 
by a vehicle, or to require another person or a vehicle to detour or take other evasive 
action to avoid physical contact, shall be guilty, pursuant to this Section, of the 
offense of Obstructing of Pedestrian and Vehicular Traffic. 
 
Id. at 2. The Ordinance includes a carve out for “protected activities” which it defines as “[a]cts 
authorized as an exercise of one’ s First Amendment right to demonstrate, picket or to legally 
protest[.]” Id. Under the Ordinance, these acts, “shall not constitute Obstructing of Pedestrian and 
Vehicular Traffic unless a nearby adequate and available alternative forum is offered and provided, 
to which the subject or subjects refuse to move.” Id. “Permitted [a]ctivities”, which are defined 
as “[a]cts authorized by a permit duly issued by a lawful authority”, are likewise not deemed to be 
a violation of the Ordinance. Id. 
Second, the Mayor and City Commission adopted Resolution No. 2024- 32971 
(“Resolution”), [ECF No. 1-6], which “direct[ed] the City Administration to implement in advance 
and enforce time, place, and manner restrictions in order to regulate and control future protests and 
demonstrations to the fullest extent permitted by law, with the aim of ensuring public safety and 
protecting City residents, preventing disturbances, and preserving the rights of all[.]” Resolution 
at 1 –2. It also “direct[ed] the Miami Beach Polic e Department to notify the Mayor and City 
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Commission of protests of any size taking place in the city within one (1) hour of obtaining that 
information to establish a reasonable basis to believe that a protest will occur.” Id. at 2. Plaintiff 
alleges that the Resolution was intended to “encouarg[e] . . . ‘restrictions of ‘future protests and 
demonstrations to the fullest extent permitted by law.’” Compl. ¶ 46 (quoting Commission 
Memorandum, [ECF No. 1-3]). And though it “created no new crime, [it] invokes the threat of 
the new Ordinance as an enforcement mechanism.” Compl. ¶ 49. 
The Resolution also “recognizes the importance of fostering strong and peaceful 
international relations by supporting nations that share these values, including the State of Israel.” 
See Resolution at 1; Compl. ¶ 48. Plaintiff points to the original draft of the Resolution which 
included more significant “viewpoint-specific language.” Compl. ¶ ¶ 47–48. For example, the 
draft resolution, in the face of “unprovoked attacks by the terrorist organization 
Hamas . . . reaffirm[ed the Cit y’s] unwavering support for Israel and its people [.]” Draft 
Resolution, [ECF No. 1-5] at 1. It further “directed the City Administration to consider purchasing 
state of Israel bonds . . . as a symbolic gesture of support for the people of Israel ” and 
“condemn[ed] any words, expressions, phrases, or sayings that mean, imply, or could be 
interpreted as referencing or promoting genocide, particularly phrases like ‘From the River to the 
Sea’”. Id. at 2. 
In addition to the “discriminatory intent evinced by this legislative history”, Plaintiff 
highlights statements made, and actions taken by Mayor Meiner and Commissioner Suarez at the 
March 13, 2024 meeting indicating that the Resolution and Ordinance “were intended to be 
employed against critics of Israel and supporters of Palestine.” Compl. ¶ 50. Specifically, Plaintiff 
alleges that Mayor Meiner interrupted and ordered the Clerk to cut off the microphone of JVP 
members who made statements about Israel which he disagreed with, see Compl. ¶¶ 52–53; that 
Mayor Meiner disallowed criticism of Israel and that Commissioner Suarez “wholeheartedly 
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agreed” with Mayor Meiner’s position, see Compl. ¶¶ 55–56; that Mayor Meiner “explained that 
he proposed the [Resolution] because he has not been happy with the way things have gone on 
these anti-Israel protests” see Compl. ¶ 62 (internal quotations omitted); and that Commissioner 
Suarez confirmed on his official Facebook page that the [Resolution] was passed in response “to 
several pro-Palestinian demonstrations in the city in recent months .” See Compl. ¶ 63 (internal 
quotations omitted). 
On April 3, 2024, at the next City Commission meeting, held at the Miami Beach 
Convention Center, fewer than ten JVP members gathered outside to protest. Compl. ¶¶ 66–67. 
While they did not block the sidewalk or impede traffic, they were ordered to move by the police. 
Compl. ¶¶ 70–71. Plaintiff allege s that “[u]pon information and belief” the prohibition on their 
protest “ was made in response to the expressed or implied wishes of [] Mayor Meiner and 
Commissioner Suarez. ” Compl. ¶ 72. Though the protestors “reluctantly c omplied” to avoid 
arrest, they were “render[ed] unable to leaflet attendees.” Compl. ¶ 71. 
On December 7, 2024, JVP once again sought to demonstrate, as it had in 2023, on the 
sidewalk in front of the Convention Center at Art Basel. Compl. ¶¶ 73–75. However, when the 
protestors arrived at the Convention Center, they were ordered “ not to engage in any political 
activity while on the public sidewalk” and informed that “anyone holding a sign or attempting to 
unfurl a banner on that sidewalk would be immediately arrested. ” Compl. ¶ 77. And when 
protestors “asked for justification for the ‘Security Zone,’ officers showed Plaintiff’s police liaison 
the cover sheet of an official polic e ‘Special Action Event Plan’ entitled ‘Let Palestine Live’ Art 
Basel Protest[.]” Compl. ¶ 80. Police then “forced protestors to move to the south side of City 
Hall, on 17th Street, around the corner from the Convention Center [where] attendees of Art Basel 
at the Convention Center wer e unable to see the protesters and protesters were unable to speak 
with attendees, hand them flyers, or ask for signatures on their petition.” Compl. ¶¶ 83–84. 
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On September 10, 2025, Plaintiff brought the instant Complaint, seeking to “ continue 
protesting Israel’s actions and policies in public places in Miami Beach, including in front of the 
Convention Center, and [out of] fear that Defendants will require them to move from the places 
they choose to protest.” Compl. ¶ 87. Plaintiff’s Complaint includes four causes of action, alleging 
(1) that the Ordinance is invalid on its face because its overbroad terms permit the police to move 
protesters from places they have a right to be; (2) that the Ordinance is invalid on its face because 
its vague terms permit arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement; (3) that the Miami Beach Police 
have improperly limited Plaintiff’s right to protest by ordering that they move from public places 
at which they have a right to be ; and (4) that the Ordinance has been enforced against Plaintiff 
because of Defendants’ hostility to Plaintiff’s views about Israel. See Compl. ¶¶ 88–92. On this 
basis, they request that the Court declare the Ordinance unconstitutional; issue a permanent 
injunction prohibiting Defendants from interfering with Plaintiff’s right to peacefully protest on 
public sidewalks in the City; and award Plaintiff compensatory and punitive damages. See Compl., 
Relief. 
In furtherance of its right to protest, on November 7, 2025, Plaintiff filed an Expedited 
Motion for Preliminary Injunction “ to secure its First Amendment right to protest peacefully on 
the public sidewalk outside the Miami Beach Convention Center during 2025 Art Basel [.]” Mot. 
for Prelim. Inj., [ECF No. 40] at 1. After holding an evidentiary hearing, the Court denied the 
Motion for Preliminary Injunction, finding the special event plan for 2025 Art Basel to be content 
neutral, to be narrowly tailored in furtherance of a significant government interest , and to leave 
open ample alternatives for communication . See generally Order Denying Mot. for Prelim. Inj., 
[ECF No. 69]. 
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LEGAL STANDARD 
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual 
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). When 
reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a court must accept as true all factual 
allegations contained in the complaint, and the plaintiffs receive the benefit of all favorable 
inferences that can be drawn from the facts alleged. See Chaparro v. Carnival Corp., 693 F.3d 
1333, 1337 (11th Cir. 2012); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 
A court considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is generally limited to the facts contained in 
the complaint and attached exhibits—but may also consider documents referred to in the complaint 
that are central to the claim and whose authenticity is undisputed. See Wilchombe v. TeeVee Toons, 
Inc., 555 F.3d 949, 959 (11th Cir. 2009). While the court is required to accept as true all allegations 
contained in the complaint, courts “are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as 
a factual allegation.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Dismissal pursuant to 
Rule 12(b)(6) is not appropriate unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set 
of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Magluta v. Samples, 375 F.3d 
1269, 1273 (11th Cir. 2004) (citation and quotation omitted). 
ANALYSIS 
Defendants seek to dismiss all of Plaintiff’s claims in this action. See generally Mot. 
Specifically, Defendants assert that the Complaint is an impermissible shotgun pleading ; that 
Plaintiff lacks standing to challenge the Ordinance and that its claims challenging the Ordinance 
are not ripe; and that Plaintiff’s causes of action fail as a matter of law. Defendants also maintain 
that the claims against Mayor Meiner and Commissioner Suarez in their individual capacities 
should be dismissed with prejudice because these officials are protected by legislative immunity. 
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The Court first considers the threshold question of whether Plaintiff has standing. Finding that it 
does, the Court nevertheless concludes that the Complaint is a shotgun pleading and fails to state 
a claim on which relief can be granted. 
I. Plaintiff has Standing to Bring this Action 
The Court begins with Defendants’ attack on Plaintiff’s standing, because “[s]tanding is a 
threshold jurisdictional question which must be addressed prior to and independent of the merits 
of a party’s claims.” Bochese v. Town of Ponce Inlet, 405 F.3d 964, 974 (11th Cir. 2005) (internal 
quotations and citations omitted). Thus, “[i]n the absence of standing, a court is not free to opine 
in an advisory capacity about the merits of a plaintiff’s claims.” Id. 
Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to the adjudication of 
“Cases” and “Controversies” only. U.S. Const Art. III § 2; Stalley ex rel. U.S. v. Orlando Reg ’l 
Healthcare Sys., Inc ., 524 F.3d 1229, 1232 (11th Cir. 2008) . This case- or-controversy clause 
requires that plaintiffs “must establish that they have standing to sue” in federal court. Raines v. 
Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997). To establish the individual standing prerequisites, a plaintiff must 
have “(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the 
defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. 
Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016). “The ‘foremost’ standing requirement is injury in fact.” 
Trichell v. Midland Credit Management, Inc., 964 F.3d 990, 996 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Steel 
Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment , 523 U.S. 83, 103 (1998)). An injury- in-fact exists if a 
plaintiff has “suffered ‘an invasion of a legally protected interest’ that is ‘concrete and 
particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’” Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 339 
(quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). 
“[A]n association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members when: (a) its members 
would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are 
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germane to the organization’s purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested 
requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.” Greater Birmingham Ministries 
v. Sec’y of State for State of Ala. , 992 F.3d 1299, 1316 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting Hunt v. 
Washington State Apple Advertising Comm ’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977) ). To establish 
associational standing under the first prong , “an organization must ‘ make specific allegations 
establishing that at least one identified member ha[s] suffered or [will] suffer harm .’” Ga. 
Republican Party v. SEC, 888 F.3d 1198, 1203 (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting Summers v. Earth Island 
Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 498 (2009)). 
Defendants’ Motion focuses on the first prerequisite to Article III standing: the injury -in-
fact requirement. Defendants assert that Plaintiff cannot establish that any of its members has 
suffered a purported injury- in-fact by the Ordinance’s enactment, nor can Plaintiff “conjure 
standing by showing a sufficient threat of future injury.” Mot. at 13. Defendants additionally, or 
in the alternative, assert that Plaintiff’s claims challenging the Ordinance are not ripe for the same 
reasons. Id. at 14–15. 
In support of their argument that Plaintiff has not suffered an injury -in-fact, Defendants 
highlight that no members have been “actually cited under the Ordinance ”; specifically, at Art 
Basel 2023 and at the 2024 Climate Conference protest, the Ordinance had not yet been enacted, 
and Plaintiff does not allege that the Ordinance was applied to any JVP members at the 2024 Art 
Basel protest. Mot. at 13. While this may be true , Plaintiff does allege that on April 3, 2024, at 
the Commission Meeting after the enactment of the Ordinance, a group of JVP members gathered 
on the sidewalk in front of the Convention Center and was ordered to move. Compl. ¶¶ 66–71. 
While these members were not specifically cited under the Ordinance , Plaintiff does plead that 
they complied “[i]n order to avoid arrest” and that the “City’s Police [] enforce[ed] the Anti-Protest 
Resolution and Ordinance against those demonstrating in support of Palestinian rights and in 
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critique of Israel.” Compl. ¶ 66; see also LaCroix v. Town of Fort Myers Beach, Fla., 38 F.4th 
941, 947 (11th Cir. 2022) (discussing how in Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 455–456 (1974), 
standing w as found where “ a plaintiff was warned to stop hand- billing and threatened with 
prosecution by the state if he disobeyed.” ) Accordingly, drawing inferences in the light most 
favorable to Plaintiff from the facts alleged, see Chaparro, 693 F.3d at 1337, a nd given the 
Eleventh Circuit’s directive to “ apply the injury -in-fact requirement most loosely where First 
Amendment rights are involved,” Harrell v. The Fla. Bar, 608 F.3d 1241, 1254 (11th Cir. 2010), 
the Court is persuaded that at least one JVP member has suffered an injury -in-fact sufficient to 
establish organizational standing. 
 Further, even if the Ordinance has not been enforced against Plaintiff, the threat of future 
injury is sufficiently imminent to permit pre -enforcement review. “A threat of future injury is 
sufficient to establish standing when ‘ the threatened injury is certainly impending or there is a 
substantial risk that the harm will occur.’” Dream Defs. v. Governor of the State of Fla., 57 F.4th 
879, 887 (11th Cir. 2023) (quoting Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 158 (2014)). 
The Eleventh Circuit applies a two -part test to determine whether such an injury is sufficiently 
imminent: (1) “ the plaintiff must have an intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably 
affected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed by a statute ”; and (2) “there must exist a 
credible threat of prosecution.” Id. (cleaned up) 
Here, Plaintiff alleges that its members “ wish to continue protesting Israel’s actions and 
policies in public places in Miami Beach, including in front of the Convention Center[.]” Compl. 
¶ 87; see Dream Defs., 57 F.4th at 887 (concluding that “the plaintiffs’ members face an injury 
that is sufficiently imminent for standing purposes [in part because] the plaintiffs’ members wish 
to exercise their right to protest, speech that is affected with a First Amendment interest, and 
believe that [the law] prevents them from doing so.”) . Defendants counter that “such 
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generalizations are too abstract to support standing[,]” see Resp. at 14, but the cases to which 
Defendants cite are factually distinct. In Elend v. Basham, the Court found plaintiffs’ allegations 
that they “fully intend to peacefully express their viewpoints in the future” too vague to establish 
a future threat of injury because “the complaint contained no further explication of the time, 
location, audience, or nature of protest activity contemplated.” 471 F.3d 1199, 1204 (11th Cir. 
2006). And in LaCroix v. Lee Cnty., Fla., plaintiff “failed to provide the location of his future free 
speech activity with the requisite specificity to demonstrate a substantial likelihood of future 
injury.” 819 F. App’x 839, 843 (11th Cir. 2020). 
In contrast to these cases, Plaintiff has “allege [d] with particularity the location at which 
[it] would likely incur a future injury.” Id. Plaintiff seeks to protest at the Convention Center, see 
Compl. ¶ 87, an assertion that is only bolstered by Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction, 
which Plaintiff filed “ to secure its First Amendment right to protest peacefully on the public 
sidewalk outside the Miami Beach Convention Center during 2025 Art Basel .” See generally , 
Mot. for Prelim. Inj., [ECF No. 40]. 
 Finally, Plaintiff satisfies the “credible threat of prosecution” prong of the two-part test to 
establish standing. Dream Defs. , 57 F.4th at 887. Plaintiff has been threatened with arrest “ for 
engaging in the very behavior [it] intends to repeat” in front of the Convention Center. LaCroix , 
38 F.4th at 947. Plaintiff has therefore alleged a credible threat of enforcement. 
 Having found that Plaintiff has suffered or will imminently suffer an injury -in-fact, the 
Court finds that Plaintiff has Article III standing to bring this action.
2 
 
2 Defendants assert that because “Plaintiff’s claims are not ripe for review for the same reason” it lacks 
standing, see Resp. at 15, and that Plaintiff’s “claims are not ripe because the Ordinance has not been 
enforced against any of its members.” Reply at 2. But for the same reasons stated herein, the Court rejects 
Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff’s claims are not ripe. 
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II. The Complaint is a Shotgun Pleading 
Defendants maintain that the Complaint is a “quintessential shotgun pleading, in that (1) 
each count fails to incorporate or identify in the specific count the factual allegations that support 
the claims; (2) each count fails to adequately identify the specific kind of First Amendment 
violation being alleged; (3) it fails to specify which counts are brought against which Defendants; 
and (4) it fails to include a prayer for relief at the end of each count and instead contains one final 
prayer for relief at the end of the Complaint.” Mot. at 9–10. Plaintiff counters that the “Complaint 
describes in detail the ‘grounds’ for Plaintiff’s claim [and] . . . then alleges four First Amendment 
claims that arise from Defendants’ actions, thereby giving the Defendants ‘adequate notice of the 
claims against them and the grounds upon which each claim rests.’” Resp. at 6 (quoting Weiland 
v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff ’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1323 (11th Cir. 2015)). The Court disagrees, 
finding Plaintiff’s Complaint to be shotgun in nature. 
The Eleventh Circuit has explained that “[t]he essence of a shotgun pleading is ‘that it is 
virtually impossible to know which allegations of fact are intended to support which claim(s) for 
relief.’” Vujin v. Galbut, 836 F. App’x 809, 814 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Anderson v. District 
Bd. of Trustees of Cent. Florida Cmty. Coll ., 77 F.3d 364, 366 (11th Cir. 1996)). There are four 
types of pleadings that produce this problem: (1) “complaints that contain ‘multiple counts where 
each count adopts the allegations of all preceding counts, causing each successive count to carry 
all that came before and the last count to be a combination of the entire complaint ’”; (2) 
“complaints that are ‘replete with conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not obviously connected 
to any particular cause of action ’”; (3) “complaints that do not separate ‘each cause of action or 
claim for relief ’ into separate counts”; and (4) “complaints that ‘ assert multiple claims against 
multiple defendants without specifying which of the defendants are responsible for which acts or 
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omissions, or which of the defendants the claim is brought against.’” Id. at 815 (quoting Weiland, 
792 F.3d at 1321-23). 
Here, the Court finds multiple defects with in Plaintiff’s Complaint. First , Defendants 
reproach the Complaint for its “ fail[ure] to incorporate any of its factual allegations into the 
specific counts of the Complaint, leaving Defendants guessing as to which of the 87 paragraphs of 
factual allegations are intended to support which of Plaintiff’s four claims.” Mot. at 10. 
Defendants are correct. The Court’s independent review of Plaintiff’s Complaint indicates that it 
suffers from the same defect as the one at issue in Wagner v. First Horizon Pharm. Corp., where 
“[t]he central problem [ with the complaint was] that the factual particularity of the first 175 
paragraphs [was] not connected to the otherwise generally pled claim in any meaningful way.” 
464 F.3d 1273, 1279 (11th Cir. 2006). Similarly, in Embree v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., the 
Eleventh Circuit affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of the complaint as a shotgun pleading on 
the ground that Plaintiff had failed to “clearly delineate which factual allegations [were] relevant 
to each claim.” 779 F. App’ x 658, 660–663 (11th Cir. 2019) (finding it to be “more than a 
‘technical deficiency’” in a complaint where “most of the counts . . . made conclusory and 
convoluted allegations against certain subsets of the defendants, all the while referring to the same 
general factual allegations[.]”). 
Plaintiff likewise has “failed to restate any pertinent facts relating to the individual counts 
or otherwise incorporate any of the preceding general allegations [.]” Id. at 663. For example, in 
the first cause of action, after citing two cases, Plaintiff merely states that “the Ordinance grants 
the police authority in violation of the Fir st Amendment” because it “does not require the police 
to determine that there exists an interest that is sufficiently significant to warrant imposing such a 
limitation before requiring protesters to move from the sidewalk [.]” Compl. ¶ 89. Notably, 
Plaintiff does not state any facts relevant to its claim that the Ordinance is overbroad, leaving “a 
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reader of the complaint [to] speculate as to which factual allegations pertain to which count.” 
Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1359 n.9 (11th Cir. 1997). And in the fourth 
cause of action, Plaintiff alleges “[t]he comments of Defendant [Mayor] Meiner and Defendant 
[Commissioner] Suarez before and after passage of the Ordinance demonstrate unequivocal 
hostility towards the ideas expressed by members of [JVP].” Compl. ¶ 92. But Plaintiff does not 
clarify which statements demonstrate such hostility or make any attempt to cross reference the 
prior factual allegations. 
Second, Plaintiff’s Complaint is “replete with conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not 
obviously connected to any particular cause of action.” Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1322. A complaint 
falls into this category of shotgun pleadings where it contains in its facts section “scattered legal 
arguments, legal standards, legal conclusions, and even [] citations to legal authorities [] [which 
are] then incorporated . . . into [the] various causes of action.” Arrington v. Green, 757 F. App’x 
796, 797–798 (11th Cir. 2018). 
Here, Plaintiff’s factual discussion of the Ordinance is riddled with legal conclusions and 
legal arguments . It states that “[t]he
 Ordinance is unconstitutionally overbroad [,]” that “[a] 
person’s right to use public sidewalks for such purposes may not be abridged on the plea that it 
may be exercised in some other place [,]” and that “the Ordinance is unconstitutionally vague[,]” 
citing to numerous legal authorities throughout the Complaint. Compl. ¶¶ 42–45 (citations and 
internal quotations omitted). Further, a significant portion of the factual discussion is devoted to 
the Resolution, including its adoption, text, and enforcement . See Compl. ¶¶ 46–49, 53, 62–63. 
But none of the causes of action actually reference the Resolution, thus rendering it “not obviously 
connected to any particular cause of action[,]” Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1322—thereby requiring 
Defendants to infer which causes of action the Resolution may plausibly relate to. 
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Next, Defendants contend that Plaintiff both fails to “specify which claims are asserted 
against which of the three Defendants ” and fails to indicate “whether the specific claims are 
asserted against the individual defendants in their individual or official capacities .” Mot. at 11. 
Plaintiff responds that it is “self-evident” that the first three causes of action are “asserted against 
the Defendant City of Miami Beach . . . [and that] the fourth cause of action names Defendants 
Meiner and Suarez explicitly.” Resp. at 9. The Court, however, agrees with Defendants that they 
“should [] not [be] required to rely upon Plaintiff’s unpled assurances.” Reply at 4. 
A pleading is shotgun in nature where it “assert [s] multiple claims against multiple 
defendants without specifying which of the defendants is responsible for which acts or omissions, 
or which of the defendants the claim is brought against.” Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1324. And a 
complaint falls into this category where it “fails to provide notice of what claims each defendant 
must defend against.” Tran v. City of Holmes Beach, 817 F. App ’x 911, 914 (11th Cir. 2020) . 
Here, “[n]one of the counts specify that the claims (if any) in them are against any of the officials 
named or referred to in the ‘parties section.’” Id. Even if Plaintiff is correct that it is “self-evident” 
which claims are asserted against which D efendants, see Resp. at 9, “[the] parties as well as the 
Court are [still] left to guess what they might be.” Tran, 817 F. App’x at 914. And the third cause 
of action refers to Defendants collectively, when it states that “Defendants violated Plaintiff’s First 
Amendment rights . . . .” See Compl. ¶ 91. But Plaintiff has “not provided sufficient notice of 
which defendants are claimed to be responsible for which acts and omissions [where it] refer[s] to 
defendants collectively.” Tran, 817 F. App’x at 914. 
Further, because “Plaintiff does not specify [in his claims] whether he is suing [Defendants] 
in their official or individual capacities . . . they do not know whether they might be personally 
liable for any [] judgment rendered against them or not [.]” Boe v. Garcia , No. 24 -10057, 2024 
WL 3861058, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 16, 2024), report and recommendation adopted, No. 24- CV-
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10057, 2024 WL 4006165 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 30, 2024). Though Plaintiff contends that “long-settled 
§ 1983 doctrine makes clear that claims for damages against individuals is always in their 
individual capacity, and claims for injunctive relief, in their official capacity [,]” it is not for the 
Court or Defendants to read such “long-settled [] doctrine” into the Complaint. Resp. at 9. To do 
so would impermissibly “rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.” 
Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168–1169 (11th Cir. 2014). 
Finally, Defendants maintain that “the Complaint improperly fails to include a prayer for 
relief at the end of each count and instead contains one final prayer for relief at the end of the 
Complaint[,] [leaving] Defendants guessing as to which form of relief is being requested in, and/or 
is tethered to, which cause of action.” Mot. at 12. Plaintiff maintains that it has complied with 
Rule 8(a)(3) and has “properly described the relief sought at the end of the Complaint, immediately 
after alleging the claims upon which relief should be granted. ” Resp. at 9. The Court, however, 
finds that Plaintiff has failed to “clearly articulate the relief requested” as to each specific cause of 
action. Ely v. Mobile Cnty. Sch. Bd., No. CV 15-566-KD-M, 2016 WL 3188926, at *8 (S.D. Ala. 
May 11, 2016), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Ely v. Bd. of Sch. Commissioners 
of Mobile Cnty., Alabama, No. CV 15-0566-KD-M, 2016 WL 3189244 (S.D. Ala. June 7, 2016). 
Given this deficiency, it is consequently “unclear which causes of action seek damages and which 
causes of action seek equitable relief.” Mika v. Rollins Coll., No. 6:25-CV-1110-JSS-RMN, 2026 
WL 679128, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 11, 2026) (finding a complaint’s failure to articulate the relief 
requested in each cause of action to be “impermissible”) ; see also Al -Rayes v. Willingham , No. 
3:15-CV-107-J-34JBT, 2016 WL 6080826, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 15, 2016), report and 
recommendation adopted, No. 3:15- CV-107-J-34JBT, 2016 WL 6071636 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 17, 
2016) (“[T]he [complaint] improperly fails to tie the relief sought . . . to specific counts and 
defendants.”). 
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In sum, Plaintiff’s Complaint is a shotgun pleading. The Court is troubled by the inferences 
Plaintiff asks the Court to make in order to find that the Complaint gives Defendants adequate 
notice of the claims asserted against them. Indeed, “[f]ostering [such] guesswork is not a goal of 
pleading, and requiring it violates not only Rule 8 but also Rule 10(b).” Tran, 817 F. App’x at 
914. Accordingly, Plaintiff is afforded one opportunity to amend its Complaint. See Vibe Micro, 
Inc. v. Shabanets, 878 F.3d 1291, 1296 (11th Cir. 2018) (“When a litigant files a shotgun pleading, 
is represented by counsel, and fails to request leave to amend, a district court must sua sponte give 
him one chance to replead before dismissing his case with prejudice on non- merits shotgun 
pleading grounds.”). 
III. Plaintiff has Failed to Properly Plead its Causes of Action 
Under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, 
to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 
550 U.S. at 570). Defendant s contend that “the four counts do not specify the precise First 
Amendment claims being asserted and whether they are facial or as applied claims [and that] the 
Complaint does not even attempt to plead the elements of any such claims.” Mot. at 2. The Court 
agrees, finding that each claim fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to 
Rule 12(b)(6). 
 First, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim that the Ordinance is facially unconstitutional and 
substantially overbroad. “A party may challenge an ordinance under the overbreadth doctrine in 
cases where every application creates an impermissible risk of suppression of ideas, such as an 
ordinance that delegates overly broad discretion to the decisionmaker [.]” Catron v. City of St. 
Petersburg, 658 F.3d 1260, 1269 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Forsyth Cnty. v. Nationalist Movement, 
505 U.S. 123, 129 (1992)). In Catron, the Eleventh Circuit found that “Plaintiffs [had] stated no 
claim for the extraordinarily rare overbreadth invalidation” they sought where they “contend[ed] 
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the trespass ordinance [was] overbroad in the discretion it [gave] city employees to issue trespass 
warnings . . . [but] allege[d] no facts to support this attack- on-expression argument[.]” 658 F.3d 
at 1269–70. Plaintiff here has similarly stated that “the Ordinance does not require the police to 
determine that there exists an interest that is sufficiently significant . . . before requiring protesters 
to move from the sidewalk[.]” Compl. ¶ 89. And Plaintiff has likewise alleged no facts that could 
“plausibly suggest an ‘ impermissible risk of suppression of ideas ’ in ‘every application’ of the 
ordinance.” Catron, 658 F.3d at 1270 (quoting Forsyth Cnty., 505 U.S. at 129). Accordingly, 
Plaintiff has failed to state a claim that the Ordinance is unconstitutionally overbroad. 
 Second, Plaintiff’s challenge to the Ordinance for vagueness is also deficient. Plaintiff 
alleges that the terms of the Ordinance “permit arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement” because 
they “empower[] a police officer to determine when a person standing on a sidewalk ‘intentionally 
block[s] or impair[s] passage or movement by another person[.] ’” Compl. ¶ 90. “In bringing a 
facial challenge to an ordinance for vagueness, a party who engages in some conduct that is clearly 
proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others.” 
Catron, 658 F.3d at 1271 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Thus, to determine whether 
Plaintiff’s own conduct is clearly proscribed by the terms of the Ordinance , “[the Court] must 
determine whether the terms [of the ordinance] are vague as applied to Plaintiffs’ circumstances.” 
Id. (emphasis added). 
Here, though Plaintiff points to a specific term of the Ordinance that it maintains is 
overbroad, it does not connect this term to Plaintiff’s specific circumstances, thus precluding 
Plaintiff’s ability to state a claim. Relatedly, the claim fails to allege facts to allow “the Court [to] 
reasonably infer that the Ordinance is unconstitutionally vague in the ways [that Plaintiff] 
contends.” Fla. Action Comm., Inc. v. Seminole Cnty ., 212 F. Supp. 3d 1213, 1225 (M.D. Fla. 
2016); see also Henderson v. McMurray , 987 F.3d 997, 1005 (11th Cir. 2021) (discussing how 
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plaintiffs “fail to explain why the [ordinance’s] alleged chilling effect on their speech renders it 
unconstitutionally vague.”) 
Next, the third cause of action alleges that “ Defendants violated Plaintiff’s First 
Amendment rights when Miami Beach police officers denied Plaintiff’s members access to the 
Convention Center’s sidewalks[.]” Compl. ¶ 91. Here, unlike in Amnesty Int ’l, USA v. Battle , 
Plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to put Defendants on notice as to “which of their actions 
allegedly violated [Plaintiff’s] rights” and has not “provide[d] enough information for the court to 
determine whether those facts indeed set out a violation of rights and whether those rights were 
clearly established when these incidents occurred.” 559 F.3d 1170, 1180 (11th Cir. 2009). Indeed, 
Plaintiff does not say when or how Defendants violated Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights. Nor 
does Plaintiff allege that it was unable to communicate its message or handout leaflets from the 
special protest zone. See id. (noting that the “complaint makes clear” that plaintiff’s First 
Amendment rights were violated because it was “unable to have a successful protest rally and 
unable to pass out Amnesty literature as a result of Defendants’ creation of a police cordon.”). “At 
base, [the third cause of action] contains a legal conclusion—a violation of First Amendment 
rights—with no factual allegations concerning what that violation was or how the Defendants 
caused those unspecified violations.” Stolpmann v. Lentz, No. 618CV293ORL37DCI, 2018 WL 
4376409, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 22, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, No. 
618CV293ORL37DCI, 2018 WL 4539623 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 21, 2018) (finding that plaintiff failed 
to state a First Amendment claim). 
Finally, Plaintiff fails to adequately plead its fourth cause of action , because it is unclear 
whether Plaintiff is challenging the enforcement of the Ordinance, as the cause of action suggests, 
or “the Ordinance itself” as well. See Compl. ¶ 92. Specifically, the cause of action states that the 
“Ordinance has been enforced against Plaintiff because of Defendants’ hostility to Plaintiff’s views 
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about Israel[,]” but Plaintiff thereafter pleads that “[t]he Ordinance itself, and the actions of Miami 
Beach police officers in enforcing it” are a product of Mayor Meiner and Commissioner Suarez’s 
hostility towards the ideas expressed by JVP’s members. Compl. ¶ 92 (emphasis added). 
The Court therefore agrees with Defendant s that “ this count fails to make clear the 
government action challenged or the cause of action asserted [.]” See Mot. at 20. “The result is 
confusion both for the Defendants in trying to frame a responsive pleading and for the undersigned 
in trying to determine the scope of Plaintiff’s claims.” Rodriguez v. Daniels, No. 6:21-CV-1739-
PGB-EJK, 2022 WL 22234574, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 1, 2022), report and recommendation 
adopted, No. 6:21- CV-1739-PGB-EJK, 2022 WL 22234577 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 3, 2022). And 
Plaintiff’s inclusion of a singular brief paragraph supporting this fourth cause of action, see Compl. 
¶ 92, is simply insufficient for the Court to infer that Defendants’ hostility towards Plaintiff’s 
viewpoint led to their refusal to allow Plaintiff to protest at the Convention Center. Resp. at 18. 
* * * 
For the reasons explained herein, Plaintiff has failed to adequately plead its causes of 
action. At most, they are “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by 
mere conclusory statements, [which] do not suffice” under Rule 12(b)(6). Ashcroft , 556 U.S. at 
678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). The Court further advises that the deficiencies addressed 
herein, both with respect to the shotgun nature of the Complaint and pleading sufficiency, are non-
exhaustive. The onus is ultimately on Plaintiff to correct its deficient pleading. Jackson v. Bank 
of Am., N.A., 898 F.3d 1348, 1352 (11th Cir. 2018) (affirming dismissal after counsel was given 
an opportunity to file an amended complaint but “made no effort to correct its deficiencies, [] 
choosing to stand on his deficient pleading.”). 
 
 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows: 
1. Defendants’ Joint Motion to Dismiss Complaint, [ECF No. 30], is GRANTED IN 
PART.3 
2. Plaintiff’s Complaint, [ECF No. 1], is DISMISSED without prejudice and with 
leave to refile. Plaintiff is directed to file a First Amended Complaint consistent 
with this Order by June 19, 2026. 
3. Failure to timely file a First Amended Complaint shall result in the dismissal of 
this case without further notice. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b). 
DONE AND ORDERED in Miami, Florida, this 26th day of May, 2026. 
 
 _________________________________ 
 RODOLFO A. RUIZ II 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
 
3 Given that the Court is g ranting Plaintiff leave to amend its Complaint, the Court finds it premature to 
consider Defendants’ argument that the claims against Mayor Meiner and Commissioner Suarez in their 
individual capacities should be dismissed with prejudice due to legislative immunity. Mot. at 22–25. 
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