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govinfo:USCOURTS-flsd-0_25-cv-61623-0

U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida · 2026-06-04

· GavelSight synced 2026-09-06 03:52:16

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
 
CASE NO. 25-61623-CIV-DAMIAN/Strauss 
 
CAROLE ORCHANIAN, 
 
 Plaintiff, 
v. 
 
MSC CRUISES S.A.,  
 
 Defendant. 
________________________________/ 
 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS 
PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT [ECF NO. 10] 
 
THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Defendant, MSC Cruises S.A.’s  (“MSC” or 
“Defendant”), Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint, filed November 10, 2025. [ECF No. 
10 (“Motion”)]. 
  THE COURT has considered the Motion, the parties’ memoranda [ECF Nos. 15, 19], 
the pertinent portions of the record , including the Complaint [ECF No. 1] , and all relevant 
authorities and is otherwise fully advised. For the reasons that follow, this  Court finds that 
the Motion in due to be granted. 
I. BACKGROUND1 
Plaintiff, Carole Orchanian (“Ms. Orchanian” or “Plaintiff”), alleges that on May 18, 
2024, while a passenger on board the MSC S eascape (“Vessel”), she slipped and fell on a 
“foreign, wet, slippery, and/or transitory substance present on the tile floor surface” as she 
 
1 The facts set forth here are taken from the allegations in the Complaint. [ECF No. 1 
(“Compl.”)]. For purposes of considering the Motion, the allegations in the Complaint are 
taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the non- movant. See 
Devengoechea v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 889 F.3d 1213, 1220 (11th Cir. 2018). 
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was exiting the elevators in the middle of the Vessel on Deck 18.  Compl. ¶ 12. According to 
Ms. Orchanian, “[t]he dangerous condition was not open and obvious to a reasonable 
passenger . . . because the dangerous condition was translucent and therefore not immediately 
detectable through ordinary senses.” Id.  She alleges she sustained injuries to her “body and 
extremities, including [a] right knee complex medial meniscal tear requiring surgery .” Id. ¶ 
14. 
On August 11, 2025, Ms. Orchanian filed a Complaint against MSC, asserting two 
negligence-related claims: Negligent Maintenance (Count I) and Negligent Failure to Warn 
(Count II). See generally id. In the Motion to Dismiss now before this Court, MSC argues that 
the Complaint should be dismissed because Ms. Orchanian fails to plausibly plead MSC’s 
actual or constructive notice  of the alleged risk creating condition. See generally Mot. In the 
Response, Ms. Orchanian argues that her  allegations about (1) the length of time the 
substance had been present on the floor surface, (2) the  “high-traffic area ” where she fell 
establishing a tendency for there to be risk creating conditions causing passengers to slip and 
fall, (3) MSC’s own policies and procedures for cleaning and inspecting such areas , and (4) 
prior similar lawsuits provide sufficient factual support for her claim that MSC was on notice. 
See generally ECF No. 15 (“Response”). In its Reply, MSC argues that Ms. Orchanian ’s 
allegations concerning prior lawsuits are conclusory and lack any detail s by which 
constructive notice could be imputed for the particular hazardous condition in this case. MSC 
further argues that Ms. Orchanian’s allegations regarding the “length of time,” the existence 
of internal policies and procedures, and that the area was a “high -traffic area” are all 
insufficient to establish actual or constructive notice. See generally ECF No. 19 (“Reply”). The 
Motion is fully briefed and ripe for adjudication.  
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II. LEGAL STANDARD 
“To survive a motion to dismiss [under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)], a 
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief 
that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. 
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A pleading withstands a motion to dismiss if it alleges 
“factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.  ( citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). This pleading 
standard “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an 
unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting 
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). When considering a motion to dismiss, a court must construe the 
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and take the factual allegations as true. 
See Brooks v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 116 F.3d 1364, 1369 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing  
SEC v. ESM Grp., Inc., 835 F.2d 270, 272 (11th Cir. 1988)). 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) also requires that a pleading contain a “short 
and plain statement of the claim” showing the pleader is entitled to relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 
8(a)(2). The complaint must “give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the 
grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (cleaned up).  
III. DISCUSSION 
A. Pleading Negligence Claims In Maritime Actions. 
Maritime law governs actions arising from alleged torts committed aboard a ship 
sailing in navigable waters. Keefe v. Bahama Cruise Line, Inc., 867 F.2d 1318, 1320-21 (11th Cir. 
1989). To plead negligence in a maritime  tort case, “a plaintiff must allege that (1) the 
defendant had a duty to protect the plaintiff from a particular injury; (2) the defendant 
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breached that duty; (3) the breach actually and proximately caused the plaintiff’s injury; and 
(4) the plaintiff suffered actual harm.” Chaparro v. Carnival Corp., 693 F.3d 1333, 1336 (11th 
Cir. 2012). “With respect to the duty element in a maritime context, ‘a shipowner owes the 
duty of exercising reasonable care towards those lawfully aboard the vessel who are not 
members of the crew.’” Guevara v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd. , 920 F.3d 710, 720 (11th Cir. 2019) 
(quoting Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 630 (1959)).  
This reasonable-care standard “requires, as a prerequisite to imposing liability, that the 
carrier have had actual or constructive notice of the risk-creating condition, at least where . . 
. the menace is one commonly encountered on land and not clearly linked to nautical 
adventure.” Keefe, 867 F.2d at  1322; see Holland v. Carnival Corp., 50 F.4th 1088, 1094 (11th 
Cir. 2022) . “A plaintiff can establish constructive notice by alleging ‘ that the defective 
condition exist[ed] for a sufficient period of time to invite corrective measures.’” Holland, 50 
F.4th at 1095 (quoting Guevara , 920 F.3d at 720; alteration in original) . A plaintiff can also 
establish constructive notice by plausibly alleging that “substantially similar incidents 
occurred in which ‘conditions substantially similar to the occurrence in question must have 
caused the prior accident.’” Id. at 1096 (quoting Guevara, 920 F.3d at 720).  
MSC’s Motion turns on whether Ms. Orchanian’s allegations regarding the length of 
time the alleged dangerous condition existed, MSC’s inspection and cleaning policies , the 
nature of the area where she fell being a “ high-traffic area,” and prior lawsuits against MSC  
are sufficient to establish actual or constructive notice . For the following reasons, this Court 
concludes that the allegations as to all four of these issues are insufficient. 
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B. Whether Plaintiff Has Pled Actual Notice. 
 
“Actual notice exists when the defendant knows about the dangerous condition.” 
Holland, 50 F.4th at 1095.  Ms. Orchanian does not allege that MSC or any of its employees 
specifically knew about the “foreign, wet, slippery, and/or transitory substance” on the tile 
floor surface adjacent to the elevators in the middle of the vessel on Deck 18 on the date of 
the incident. Nor does Ms. Orchanian allege that anyone informed MSC of the alleged hazard 
before she fell. Ms. Orchanian also fails to allege that MSC took any corrective action as to 
the alleged hazard, such as by placing a warning sign or crew member adjacent to the alleged 
hazard-creating condition, that might indicate  MSC had actual notice. See Anders v. Carnival 
Corp., No. 23-21367-CIV, 2023 WL 4252426, at *6 (S.D. Fla. June 29, 2023) (Altonaga, C.J.) 
(citing Carroll v. Carnival Corp., 955 F.3d 1260, 1265 (11th Cir. 2020); Guevara , 920 F.3d at 
720-22; Sorrels v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd. , 796 F.3d 1275, 1288- 89 (11th Cir. 2015)). To the 
contrary, Ms. Orchanian alleges that there were no “written or orally delivered warnings, 
appropriate signage, markings, or placement of cones” near the area where she fell. See 
Compl. ¶ 24. Therefore, Ms. Orchanian has not alleged facts demonstrating that MSC had 
actual notice. Also, there is no allegation that the hazardous condition, the foreign substance 
on the tile floor surface near the elevator s on Deck 18, was created by MSC’s employee or 
that any other facts indicating that an employee “must have actually known” both where the 
hazardous condition was located and that it posed a substantial danger in that location. See 
Higgins v. Costa Crociere S.P.A. Co., 969 F.3d 1295, 1303 (11th Cir. 2020). Thus, the Complaint 
does not include facts demonstrating actual notice on the theory that MSC created the hazard 
at issue. 
 
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C. Whether The Allegations Regarding Length of Time And Prior Incidents Are 
Sufficient To Plausibly Allege Constructive Notice. 
 
As set forth above, a plaintiff may sufficiently allege constructive notice by alleging 
that the hazardous condition existed for a sufficient amount of time to invite corrective 
measures or by alleging substantially similar incidents involving conditions similar to those 
that caused the incident in the plaintiff’s case. Initially, this Court agrees with MSC  that the 
barebone allegations in the Complaint regarding the foreign substance on the tile floor surface 
near the elevators on Deck 18 do not plausibly show that the alleged hazard had been present 
“for a sufficient period of time such that [MSC] should have been aware of it or tend to show 
that the [foreign substance]  was on the [ floor surface ] for an amount of time sufficient to 
impute constructive notice to [MSC].” Holland, 50 F.4th at 1096.  
In the Response, Ms. Orchanian does not address how her allegations plausibly show 
that the foreign substance was on the tile floor surface  for a sufficient amount of time such 
that MSC should have been aware of it . Ms. Orchanian provides no factual allegations 
regarding how long this condition allegedly existed prior to the accident. Similarly, there are 
no allegations in the Complaint regarding any  specific characteristics about the foreign 
substance on which she slipped , or the surface conditions adjacent to the foreign substance, 
that would indicate that it was on the tile floor  for a sufficient amount of time . The sole 
allegation in the Complaint describing the foreign substance is in a sentence disclaiming the 
open and obvious nature of the dangerous condition because it was “translucent and therefore 
not immediately detectable through ordinary senses.” Compl. ¶ 12. In short, Ms. Orchanian 
has not plausibly alleged facts showing that the foreign substance was present on the tile floor 
surface near the elevators for a sufficient period of time such that MSC should have known 
about it such that it would have had constructive notice of it.
 
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The Court then turns to Ms. Orchanian’s allegations of “substantially similar slip-and-
fall incidents.” She alleges the following six prior incidents that occurred on the same vessel 
or on MSC’s other vessels within the same class of ships: 
a. Guerra v. MSC Cruises, S.A., No. 23 -cv-23366. The plaintiff was exiting 
an elevator on Defendant’s “Seashore” vessel when they slipped and fell 
on a wet, slippery, foreign, and/or transitory substance on the floor 
surface after exiting the elevator on Deck 8, causing them to sustain  
personal injuries. This incident occurred on September 8, 2022. 
 
b.  Wray v. MSC Cruises, S.A., No. 22 -cv-20504. The plaintiff, upon exiting 
the elevator on Defendant’s “Seashore” vessel, slipped and fell on a wet, 
slippery, foreign, and/or transitory substance on the floor surface, 
causing them to sustain personal injuries. This incident occurred on 
December 3, 2021. 
 
c.  Diane Jackson v. MSC Cruises, S.A., No. 24 -cv-21577. The plaintiff was 
walking near the elevator by the spa on Deck 8 of Defendant’s 
“Seascape” vessel when she slipped on a wet, slippery, foreign, and/or 
transitory substance on the floor surface, causing her to sustain personal 
injuries. This incident occurred on December 31, 2022. 
 
d.  Lomuto-Stinsman v. MSC Cruises, S.A., No. 24 -cv-62110-WPD. The 
plaintiff was  exiting an elevator on Deck 14 of Defendant’s 
“Meraviglia” vessel when she slipped and fell due to a wet, slippery, 
foreign, and/or transitory substance on the marble floor surface in front 
of the elevator, causing her to sustain personal injuries. This incident 
occurred on August 8, 2023.  
. . . 
 
f. Rolfs v. MSC Cruises, S.A., Case No. 24- 20695-DSL. The plaintiff was 
walking near the elevators on Defendant’s “Seascape” vessel when they 
slipped and fell due to a wet, slippery, foreign, and/or transitory 
substance on the floor surface, causing them to sustain personal injuries. 
This incident occurred on April 23, 2023. 
 
g.  Chang v. MSC Cruises, S.A., Case No. 24- cv-62397-WPD. The plaintiff 
was walking near the elevators in the middle of the vessel on Deck 8 of 
Defendant’s “Seashore” vessel when she slipped and fell due to a wet, 
slippery, foreign, and/or transitory substance present on the marble  
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floor surface, causing her to sustain personal injuries. This incident 
occurred on December 4, 2023. 
 
Compl. ¶ 13. From the six incidents, two occurred on the same vessel, MSC’s Seascape, and 
of those two incidents, one occurred near the elevators by the spa on a different deck and it is 
not clear on which deck the second incident occurred. See id. ¶¶ 13.c, 13.f. All the cases cited 
in this paragraph involve generic falls on a “wet, slippery, foreign, and/or transitory 
substance.” See id. ¶ 13. 
In her Response, Ms. Orchanian  argues that she  has pled  “very factually specific 
allegations of prior incidents supporting the allegations of negligence by [MSC].” Resp. at 3–
4. But, as MSC points out, Ms. Orchanian merely “provides names, dates, case numbers and 
vessel names” for the six prior incidents . Reply at 3. That is, she “fails to allege facts that 
make the connection between her alleged accident and the cited incidents beyond the fact that 
all the incidents were slip and falls on [floor surfaces near the elevators of an MSC] ship.” 
Pollard v. Carnival Corp., No. 24 -cv-20497, ECF No. 25, Order Granting Motion to Dismiss 
(S.D. Fla. Oct. 11, 2024) (Martinez, J.). Ms. Orchanian nonetheless contends that she has 
alleged “six prior incidents, either on the Seascape or sister ships, where a passenger was 
exiting an elevator or walking near or in front of an elevator on the ships when they slipped 
and fell on foreign and/or transitory substances on the floor.”
2 She argues that the alleged 
prior incidents are sufficient to “establish the ‘reasonable tendency’ for there to be a foreign, 
transitory substance in those areas and for passengers to slip and fall.” Resp. at 5. However, 
Ms. Orchanian does not set forth specific factual allegations that indicate or suggest that the 
incidents are substantially similar, such as the type of substance she fell on, the length of time 
 
2 Ms. Orchanian acknowledges that the incident cited in paragraph 13.e, Paige v. MSC Cruises, 
S.A., does not appear to be in a similar area to her slip and fall. See Resp. at 5, n.1. 
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the substance was present, or the type of floor surface on which the substance was present.  
Rather, she simply includes the case styles and general information indicating the individuals 
fell on liquid on floors near elevators and alleges in a conclusory fashion that the case s are 
similar. While it is possible that these cases are substantially similar, Ms. Orchanian has not 
included sufficient facts from which to determine if they are, and it is not for this Court to fill 
in those blanks for her . See Reyes v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd., No. 24 -cv-20542, 2025 WL 
560637, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 7, 2025) (Martinez, J.) (“A district court cannot and will not fill 
in the blanks for an argument that plaintiffs have not developed.”).  
 To be clear, “the prior similar incidents needn’t be identical to survive a motion to 
dismiss,” but the allegations must go beyond mere conclusory recitals and need to at the very 
least identify the deck/location (e.g., pool deck), type of hazard (e.g., water), name of the vessel 
or vessel class if the vessel is different, and any other details that show that the incidents are 
substantially similar. See Spotts v. Carnival Corp., 711 F. Supp. 3d 1360, 1366 (S.D. Fla. 2024) 
(Altman, J.). The allegations in the Complaint do not do so and are, therefore, insufficient to 
show constructive knowledge based on prior incidents. 
Therefore, Ms. Orchanian does not plausibly allege facts demonstrating MSC’s 
constructive notice based on her allegations relating to  the length of time the dangerous 
condition was present or those regarding prior similar incidents. 
D. Whether The Allegations Regarding The Risk-Creating Condition Being Present In 
A “High-Traffic Area ” And MSC’s Policies And Procedures Are Sufficient To 
Plausibly Allege Constructive Notice. 
 
Ms. Orchanian also alleges that MSC had constructive notice because  the dangerous 
condition was in a “high traffic area such that [MSC] knew or should have known of the 
likelihood of foreign, wet, slippery, and/or transitory substances forming due to spills or 
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otherwise.” Compl. ¶ 13. The Eleventh Circuit has held that such factual allegations, without 
more, are insufficient to establish constructive notice. See Newbauer v. Carnival Corp., 26 F.4th 
931, 935–36 (11th Cir. 2022)  (“[The plaintiff] alleged in her complaint that Carnival had 
constructive notice of the wet substance on the deck because it was in a ‘ high traffic dining 
area,’ but she failed to provide any factual allegations supporting the notion that high traffic 
in the area gave Carnival notice of the condition . . . . Likewise, [the plaintiff] failed to allege 
a sufficient factual basis to support her conclusory allegation that Carnival had actual or 
constructive knowledge of the hazard based on the ‘regularly and frequently recurring nature 
of the hazard in that area.’”); see also Holland, 50 F.4th at 1095–96 (holding the allegation that 
“the hazard occurred on a highly trafficked staircase that was potentially visible to many 
crewmembers and was subject to the regulation of safety agencies” was insufficient to 
plausibly allege notice). Courts in this District have found similar allegations insufficient to 
establish notice. See Kendall v. Carnival Corp ., No. 1:23-cv-22921-KMM, 2023 WL 8593669, 
at *3 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 8, 2023) (Moore, J.) (finding the allegation that “Defendant had notice 
of the allegedly dangerous condition because of the length of time the surface had existed in 
a high traffic area of the ship” was insufficient to establish notice) (internal quotation omitted); 
Colarte v. Carnival Corp., No. 1:24-cv-22203, 2024 WL 4124295, at *7 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 23, 2024) 
(Goodman, Mag. J.), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 4122238 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 9, 
2024) (Williams, J.) (finding the allegation that “Carnival knew of the dangerous condition 
through other passengers on Defendant’ s ships [that] have previously been injured under 
similar circumstances” was insufficient to establish notice) (internal quotation omitted). 
As to Ms. Orchanian’s remaining allegations, that MSC was on notice of the alleged 
dangerous condition based on its own policies and procedures requiring inspection and 
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cleaning of the area where she fell, “ [t]he mere allegation that a defendant had developed 
safety standards applicable to the site of an alleged injury is insufficient to survive a motion 
to dismiss, even when coupled with allegations of prior similar incidents.” Wheeler v. MSC 
Cruises, S.A., No. 25-cv-60384, ECF No. 17, Order on Motion to Dismiss (S.D. Fla. July 28, 
2025) (Leibowitz, J.) ; see also Holland , 50 F.4th at 1095 (affirming dismissal where plaintiff 
alleged that prior similar slip and fall incidents on a staircase were “frequent” and that safety 
agencies had “developed safety  standards applicable to the staircase”);  Watson v. Carnival 
Corp., No. 1:24-cv-21019, 2024 WL 4137299, at *12 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 21, 2024) (Goodman, 
Mag. J.), report and  recommendation adopted , 2024 WL 4132931 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 10, 2024) 
(Williams, J.) (applying Holland  to dismiss case where plaintiff alleged that the defendant’s 
“internal safety materials . . . demonstrate[d] ‘a reasonable tendency for the type of hazard at 
issue’”). Ms. Orchanian offers nothing to explain how MSC’s policies and procedures would 
have given it notice here.  
Based on the above standards, the allegations here fall short. Therefore, Ms. 
Orchanian does not plausibly allege facts demonstrating MSC’s constructive notice based on 
her allegations that the dangerous condition was present in a high traffic area or those 
regarding MSC’s inspection and cleaning policies and procedures. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, this  Court finds that Plaintiff, Carole Orchanian, has 
not sufficiently alleged facts sufficient to support a theory of MSC’s actual  or constructive 
notice of the condition that allegedly caused her slip-and-fall.  
However, it is possible  that a more carefully drafted complaint including additional 
factual support might sufficiently establish MSC’s actual or constructive notice. “Generally, 
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where a more carefully drafted complaint might state a claim, a plaintiff must be given at least 
one chance to amend the complaint before the district court dismisses the action with 
prejudice.” Bryant v. Dupree, 252 F.3d 1161, 1163 (11th Cir. 2001) (cleaned up). 
Accordingly, it is hereby  
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s 
Complaint [ECF No. 10] is GRANTED.  
The Complaint [ECF No. 1] is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. In the event 
Plaintiff intends to file an Amended Complaint, she shall do so within fourteen (14) days of 
the date of this Order. 
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers in the Southern District of Florida, this 4th 
day of June, 2026. 
 
  _______________________________________ 
MELISSA DAMIAN 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
 
cc: Counsel of record 
 
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