govinfo:USCOURTS-flsd-2_02-cv-14191-1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
 
CASE NO. 02-14191-CIV-COHN/MAYNARD 
 
CARLOS JENNIS, 
 
 Petitioner, 
 
v. 
 
SECRETARY FOR THE  
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 
 
 Respondent. 
 / 
ORDER ADOPTING REPORT OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE 
THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon the Report and Recommendation [DE 40] 
(“Report”) submitted by United States Magistrate Judge Shaniek M. Maynard regarding 
Petitioner Carlos Jennis’ Amended Motion to Reopen Habeas Proceeding Pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) [DE 34] (“Motion”).  Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
636(b)(1), the Court has conducted a de novo review of the Motion, Respondent’s 
Response [DE 37], Petitioner’s Reply [DE 39], the Report, Petitioner’s Objections to the 
Report [DE 41], and the record in this case, and is otherwise advised in the premises.  
Upon careful consideration, the Court will adopt the Report, overrule Petitioner’s 
Objections, and deny the Motion. 
As detailed in the Report, Petitioner is a state prisoner serving a life sentence for 
first-degree murder, attempted first-degree murder, attempted voluntary manslaughter, 
and shooting at a vehicle.  DE 40 at 1.  He unsuccessfully sought relief through a direct 
appeal and a state postconviction motion.  Id.  He then initiated this habeas proceeding 
in 2002, raising, among other grounds, ineffective assistance of counsel based on (1) 
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failure to call an exculpatory witness, (2) failure to request a jury instruction, (3) failure to 
challenge a biased juror, and (4) counsel’s conflict with Petitioner.  DE 2 at 11-22.  The 
Court denied his habeas motion in 2003 and the Eleventh Circuit declined to issue a 
certificate of appealability.  DE 20 & DE 24.   
Now, after 20 years of inactivity, Petitioner moves to reopen this case under Rule 
60(b)(6), citing “extraordinary circumstances that undermined the integrity of the original 
[f]ederal habeas proceeding.”  DE 34 at 1.  These circumstances are Petitioner’s 
discovery of a written plea offer for 38.5 years that Petitioner contends prosecutors 
delivered to his counsel prior to trial but was not known to him until he received it in 
response to a 2024 records request.  Id. at 2.  Petitioner thus argues that this 
proceeding was “based on an incomplete and misleading record” and that the Court 
“was unaware of a material constitutional violation[.]”  Id. at 4 (emphasis in original). 
Judge Maynard concludes in the Report that, although Petitioner carefully 
characterizes his attack as targeting the omission of the written plea offer from this 
habeas proceeding, his Motion is effectively a second habeas petition.  DE 40 at 4-5.  
As there is no evidence that Petitioner sought or obtained an order from the Eleventh 
Circuit allowing the Court to adjudicate a successive petition, Judge Maynard further 
concludes that the Court lacks jurisdiction and must deny the Motion.  Id. at 5.  The 
Court agrees with Judge Maynard’s reasoning and analysis and will adopt the Report in 
full. 
Petitioner’s Objections to the Report lack merit and mostly reiterate his 
characterization of the Motion as attacking a defect in the integrity of this habeas 
proceeding rather than presenting a new claim for relief.  See DE 41.  Petitioner claims 
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that because his original habeas motion alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective 
because he had a conflict of interest, the instant Motion does not raise a new claim but 
instead offers proof of this alleged conflict of interest.  Id. at 3.  Petitioner also relies on 
Zakrzewski v. McDonough, 490 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir. 2007) to support his argument that 
a Rule 60(b) motion is not a successive habeas motion when it alleges fraud on the 
court.  Id. at 5-6.  
As Judge Maynard explained in the Report, where, as here, the Court has 
already resolved Petitioner’s habeas claim on the merits, the Court must view a Rule 
60(b) motion “challenging that decision with particular skepticism.”  Franqui v. Fla., 638 
F.3d 1368, 1371 (11th Cir. 2011).  Regardless of how Petitioner characterizes the 
Motion, it clearly seeks to raise a claim of ineffective assistance for failing to convey a 
favorable plea offer.  Thus, this case is unlike Zakrzewski because there, the 
“[p]etitioner’s motion [did] not assert or reassert allegations of error in his state 
convictions,” but concerned alleged fraudulent representations to the district court by 
petitioner’s habeas counsel.  490 F.3d at 1267.  Accordingly, it is  
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows: 
1. The Report and Recommendation [DE 40] is ADOPTED in its entirety. 
2. Petitioner’s Objections [DE 41] are OVERRULED. 
3. Petitioner’s Amended Motion to Reopen Habeas Proceeding Pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) [DE 34] is DENIED. 
4. A certificate of appealability is DENIED.  The Court notes that pursuant to 
Rule 22(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, Movant may  
 
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now seek a certificate of appealability from the Eleventh Circuit. 
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Fort Lauderdale, Broward County, 
Florida, this 4th day of June, 2026. 
 
 
Copies provided to: 
United States Magistrate Judge Shaniek M. Maynard 
Counsel of record via CM/ECF 
Pro se parties via U.S. mail to address on file 
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