govinfo:USCOURTS-flsd-0_26-cv-60867-0

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
 

 
JOSE EDUARDO MEJIA TIU, 
 
Petitioner, 
v. 
 
WARDEN, BROWARD TRANSITIONAL 
CENTER, et al., 
 
Respondents. 
__________________________________________/ 
ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 
 This matter is before the Court upon Petitioner’s pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 [DE 1]. Upon consideration of the parties’ submissions, the pertinent 
portions of the record, and the applicable law, the Court finds that Petitioner is being unlawfully 
detained due to his improper classification as “an alien who is an applicant for admission” pursuant 
to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). The Court finds that Petitioner’s proper classification is as a detainee 
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). See Castañon-Nava v. U.S. Dep ’t of Homeland Sec. , 161 F.4th 
1048, 1062 n.13 (7th Cir. 2025) (noting that “ Defendants’ recent reliance on § 1225(b)(2)(A) to 
detain noncitizens discovered within the United States upends decades of practice. Before July 8, 
2025, DHS ’s long -standing interpretation had been that § 1226(a) applied to those who have 
crossed the border between ports of entry and are shortly thereafter apprehended.” (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted)). Mandatory detention of all persons illegally in the United 
States only became official DHS policy when Acting Director of ICE Todd M. Lyons issued an 
internal memorandum on July 8, 2025 (the “ICE Internal Memo”) , explaining that the agency 
“revisited its legal position” on the applicability of §§ 1225(b) and 1226(a). Castañon-Nava, 161 
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F.4th at 1062 n.13 (citation omitted); see also Gonzalez v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 2:25-
CV-1047-KCD-DNF, 2025 WL 3677101 , at *1 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 18, 2025) (finding that f ederal 
regulations provide that aliens detained within the United States who have been here for years 
before their detention are entitled under § 1226(a) to receive a bond hearing at the outset of their 
detention). 
Respondents argue that (1) Petitioner has failed to fully exhaust his administrative 
remedies and (2) this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the Petition . (Resp. 12–17; see 
Santiago-Lugo v. Warden, 785 F.3d 467, 475 (11th Cir. 2015) (holding that courts reviewing § 2241 
petitions may not “disregard a failure to exhaust and grant relief on the merits if the respondent 
properly asserts the defense” (citation omitted).) However, neither argument is persuasive. 
To begin, courts in this circuit have recognized that “exhaustion in the § 2241 context can 
be excused” if a petitioner can demonstrate that “pursuing such remedies would be futile or unable 
to afford the petitioner the relief he seeks.” Alarcon v. Gallagher, No. 19 -cv-04447, 2021 WL 
9385236, at *3 (N.D. Ga. 2011) (collecting cases); see also Castro v. Parra, et al., 26-cv-20422-
BLOOM, 2026 WL 788019, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 20, 2026) (recognizing that “any request for a 
bond hearing would have been futile given the B oard of Immigration Appeals’ (‘BIA’) recent 
decision in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (B.I.A. 2025)”) . And courts across the 
nation have ruled that (1) an “administrative appellate record is not necessary to resolve the purely 
legal question” “of whether a non-citizen is entitled to a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a),” 
Jose J.O.E. v. Bondi, 797 F. Supp. 3d 957, 966–67 (D. Minn. 2025) (alterations adopted), and 
(2) the text of § 2241 does not mandate exhaustion, leaving “the decision to req uire 
exhaustion . . . within the sound discretion of the court,” Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, 797 F. Supp. 
3d 771, 778 (E.D. Mich. 2025) (citations omitted ). Respondents’ claim that immigration judges 
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and the BIA “can consider constitutional challenges to the INA” is insufficient to show that the 
administrative process could afford Petitioner the relief he seeks, as the existence of the ICE 
Internal Memo indicates that “administrative review is not likely to change Respondents’ position 
that Section 1225(b)(2)(A) applies in this context.” Lopez-Campos, 797 F. Supp. 3d at 778. The 
Court thus concludes that any attempt at exhaustion by Petitioner would be “futile.” Castro, 2026 
WL 788019, at *2; Alarcon, 2021 WL 9385236 at *3. Therefore, Petitioner’s alleged failure to 
exhaust is excused in this matter. 
Additionally, Respondent s argue that two statutes —8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) and 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1225(b)(2)—deprive this Court of jurisdiction. However, neither statute applies here. 
First, Section 1252(g) states that “no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim 
by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to 
commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against a ny alien under this 
chapter,” “notwithstanding any other provision of law . . . or any other habeas corpus provision,” 
except as provided in § 1252. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). The United States Supreme Court has narrowly 
read § 1252(g), emphasizing that it does not apply to “all claims arising from deportation 
proceedings” or otherwise impose “a general jurisdictional limitation.” Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-
Discrimination Comm’n , 525 U.S. 471 , 482 –83 (1999). Instead, it was “directed against a 
particular evil: attempts to impose judicial constraints upon prosecutorial discretion.” Id. 
at 485 n.9. Further, the statute’s “arising from” language has also been interpreted narrowly. In 
Jennings v. Rodriguez, the Supreme Court cautioned that § 1252(g) does not “sweep in any claim 
that can technically be said to ‘arise from’ the three listed actions of the Attorney General.” 583 
U.S. 281, 294 (2018). Thus, to determine whether a claim “arise[s] from” one of the statutorily 
covered actions, courts in the Eleventh Circuits have “focus[ed] on” whether the “action being 
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challenged” fall within any of the “discrete actions” listed in the statute. Camarena v. Dir. Immig. 
& Customs Enf’t, 988 F.3d 1268, 1272 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting Canal A Media Holding, LLC v. 
U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 964 F.3d 1250, 1257–58 (11th Cir. 2020)). This case does not 
concern prosecutorial discretion, nor does it challenge one of the three discrete actions outlined in 
the statute; instead, it challenges the “statutory framework that permits [Petitioner’s] detention 
without bail.” See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003). Therefore, § 1252(g) does not apply 
in this case. 
Second, § 1252(b)(9) limits a court’s ability to “review all questions of law and 
fact . . . arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United 
States,” requiring that such claims be raise d only on “review of a final order.” 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(b)(9). “The language of section 1252(b)(9) unambiguously divests all courts of habeas 
jurisdiction over cases that fall within its purview.” Madu v. United States Att’y Gen. , 470 F.3d 
1362, 1367 (11th Cir. 2006). However, the statute “is equally clear that subsection (b)(9) appli es 
only ‘[w]ith respect to review of an order of removal.’” Id. (quoting INS v. St. Cyr., 533 U.S. 
289, 313 (2001) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b))) (emphasis added). As outlined by the United States 
Supreme Court, “§ 1252(b)(9) does not present a jurisdictional bar” where a respondent is “not 
challenging the decision to detain them in the first place.” See Jennings, 583 U.S. 294–95. 
Petitioner is not challenging a final order of removal; in fact, it is unclear on this record that he is 
even subject to a fin al order of removal . And despite Respondents’ argument otherwise, 
Petitioner’s challenge is more appropriately read as challenging the statutory framework on which 
Respondents’ rely pursuant to Petitioner’s detention. See Jennings, 583 U.S. at 294–95; Kim, 538 
U.S. at 517. Therefore, § 1252(b)(9) is similarly inapplicable in this case. 
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Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 2241 [DE 1] is GRANTED: 
1. Within 10 days of the date of this Order, Respondents shall provide Petitioner an 
individualized bond hearing consistent with 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). 
2. Respondents are enjoined from denying bond to Petitioner on the basis that he is 
detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). 
3. Respondents shall, within 24 hours of the bond hearing, file a status report 
indicating the outcome of the bond hearing and, if release on bond is denied, the reason(s) for the 
denial. 
4. All pending motions are DENIED as moot. 
5. This case is CLOSED. 
DONE and ORDERED in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, this 19th day of May, 2026. 
 
 _______________________________________ 
 RODNEY SMITH 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
cc: counsel of record 
 
 Jose Eduardo Mejia Tiu, pro se 
A# 246447508 
Broward Transitional Center 
Inmate Mail/Parcels 
3900 North Powerline Road 
Pompano Beach, FL 33073 
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