govinfo:USCOURTS-ncmd-1_25-cv-00967-3

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
 
JENNIFER JEAN COSSIO, ) 
 ) 
 Plaintiff, ) 
 ) 
v. ) 1:25CV967 
 ) 
RAY ARMINI, et al., ) 
 ) 
 Defendants. ) 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 
THOMAS D. SCHROEDER, District Judge. 
 This employment case is before the court on the second motion 
to dismiss by Defendant Starmount Forest Country Club, Inc. 
(“Starmount”). (Docs. 21, 22.) Plaintiff Jennifer Jean Cossio 
brings her claims pursuant to the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (“ADEA”) and the Americans 
with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (“ADA”). 
(Docs. 2, 11.) Cossio has filed a response in opposition (Doc. 
24), to which Starmount never replied. For the reasons set forth 
below, Starmount’s motion to dismiss will be granted. 
I. BACKGROUND 
 The facts, as alleged in Cossio’s complaint, amended 
complaint, supplement, and attached exhibits and taken as true for 
purposes of Starmount’s motion, show the following:1 
 
1 On a motion to dismiss, a court may properly “consider documents that 
are explicitly incorporated into the complaint by reference and those 
attached to the complaint as exhibits.” Goines v. Valley Cmty. Servs. 
Bd., 822 F.3d 159, 166 (4th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). 

2 
 Cossio worked as an event manager at Starmount from April 17, 
2022, to October 3, 2024. (Doc. 2 at 14.) Throughout her 
employment, she experienced “constant bullying,” harassment, and 
other “rude, condescending, [and] demeaning” behavior from several 
of her colleagues, especially Sanja Vujinovic. (Doc. 2-4 at 1-
2.) Cossio alleges that Starmount failed to adequately address 
her complaints regarding her treatment by these colleagues. (Id.) 
She further alleges that, in July 2024, her general manager learned 
she had a disability that left her “unable to lift some of the 
heavy tables and stacks of chairs” at times required by her event 
manager position. (Doc. 2 at 14.) Starmount terminated Cossio’s 
employment in October 2024, and she later discovered that it had 
replaced her with “three much younger employees.” (Id.) According 
to Cossio, she had received positive evaluations throughout her 
employment and even “received a raise as recently as two months 
prior to [her] discharge.” (Id.) 
 Cossio filed her pro se complaint in October 2025, alleging 
various federal and state law claims related to her employment 
with Starmount. (See Doc. 2.) The court dismissed most of the 
claims for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1915(e)(2)(B) on November 26, 2025, leaving only her claims 
against Starmount for discriminatory discharge in violation of the 
ADEA and the ADA. (Doc. 11 at 1-2.) About two weeks later, Cossio 
timely filed an amended complaint and supplement as a matter of 

3 
course pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) in 
response to Starmount’s first motion to dismiss. (Docs. 18, 19; 
see Docs. 15, 16.) Starmount then filed its second motion to 
dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on 
December 29, 2025. (Docs. 21, 22.) The motion is now fully 
briefed and ready for decision. 
II. ANALYSIS 
 A. Standard of Review 
 Cossio proceeds pro se. Thus, her complaint is 
“not . . . scrutinized with such technical nicety that a 
meritorious claim should be defeated.” Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 
1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). But the liberal construction of a pro 
se litigant’s filing does not require the court to ignore clear 
defects in it, Bustos v. Chamberlain, No. 09-1760, 2009 WL 2782238, 
at *2 (D.S.C. Aug. 27, 2009), or to become an advocate for the pro 
se party, Weller v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th 
Cir. 1990); see also Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 
1278 (4th Cir. 1985) (noting that “[d]istrict judges are not mind 
readers”). Moreover, pro se parties are expected to comply with 
applicable procedural rules. See Chrisp v. Univ. of N.C.-Chapel 
Hill, 471 F. Supp. 3d 713, 715-16 (M.D.N.C. 2020) (requiring pro 
se plaintiff to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). 
 A pleading must contain “a short and plain statement of the 
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. 

4 
Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is meant to 
“test[] the sufficiency of a complaint” and not to “resolve 
contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the 
applicability of defenses.” Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 
980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992). To survive such a motion, “a 
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as 
true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. 
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 
 In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court “must accept 
as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint,” 
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam), and all 
reasonable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party’s 
favor, Ibarra v. United States, 120 F.3d 472, 474 (4th Cir. 1997). 
But the court “need not accept as true unwarranted inferences, 
unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.” E. Shore Mkts., Inc. v. 
J.D. Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 213 F.3d 175, 180 (4th Cir. 2000). Rule 
12(b)(6) protects against meritless litigation by requiring 
sufficient factual allegations “to raise a right to relief above 
the speculative level” so as to “nudge[] the[] claims across the 
line from conceivable to plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 
570; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Thus, mere legal conclusions 
should not be accepted as true, and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the 

5 
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 
statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 
 B. Whether Cossio Has Properly Alleged Plausible Title VII 
 Claims in the Amended Complaint and Supplement 
 
 Starmount contends that the court’s prior dismissal of her 
claims based on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”), preclude her from reasserting 
claims for discrimination, hostile work environment, and 
retaliation based on Title VII in her amended complaint and 
supplement. (Doc. 22 at 4.) It also argues that Cossio’s amended 
complaint supersedes her original complaint and so, because the 
amended complaint fails to reallege her ADA and ADEA claims, she 
has waived the ADA and ADEA claims. (Id. at 5.) In response, 
Cossio fails to address the preclusive effect of the court’s prior 
Order on her Title VII claims, but she asserts that the court 
should construe her amended complaint as a supplemental pleading 
and permit the ADA and ADEA claims to proceed in light of her pro 
se status.
2 (Doc. 24 at 1.) 
 As an initial matter, Cossio is correct in that her original 
and amended complaints will be considered together such that she 
 
2 In addition to failing to respond to Starmount’s argument regarding 
the already dismissed claims, Cossio’s response brief runs afoul of Local 
Rule 7.2(a), which requires that response briefs contain a concise 
statement of the facts, “supported by reference to a part of the official 
record,” and an argument, “which shall refer to all statutes, rules and 
authorities relied upon.” In fact, the response brief does not contain 
a single citation to any authority, pleading, or exhibit. 

6 
has not waived her ADEA and ADA claims. See May v. Martin Fein 
Int. Ltd., No. 21-CV-00083, 2023 WL 6295125, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 
27, 2023) (“[C]ourts in this circuit regularly consider factual 
allegations in a pro se plaintiff’s original and amended complaint, 
and liberally construe filings associated with an amended 
complaint.”). 
 The Title VII claims present a different story, however. An 
unqualified dismissal for failure to state a claim operates “‘as 
an adjudication on the merits’ – meaning a dismissal with 
prejudice.” Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez, 140 S. Ct. 1721, 1725 (2020) 
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b)). And here, in a Text 
Recommendation dated October 30, 2025, the Magistrate Judge found 
that Cossio failed to “allege facts that could support a claim 
under Title VII or a claim under any statute for retaliation or 
harassment.” The Recommendation was adopted and all of Cossio’s 
claims were dismissed, except for those against Starmount for 
discriminatory discharge in violation of the ADEA and the ADA. 
(Doc. 11 at 1-2.) 
 Moreover, even if not barred by this court’s prior dismissal, 
Cossio still has not sufficiently alleged facts to support the 
Title VII claims in the amended complaint and supplement. “Title 
VII renders it ‘an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer . . . to discriminate against any individual with respect 
to [her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 

7 
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin.” Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 
786 F.3d 264, 276-77 (4th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (alterations in 
original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)). Title VII also 
“proscribes discrimination against an employee because, in 
relevant part, she ‘has opposed any practice made an unlawful 
employment practice by [Title VII].’” Id. at 281 (quoting 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)). But here, the amended complaint and 
supplement conspicuously fail to even identify which protected 
characteristic would form the basis for her alleged claims. 
 Cossio alleges, for example, that she received “disparate 
treatment compared to similarly situated employees,” she “was 
excluded from meetings, denied resources, and spoken to in a 
demeaning manner,” and she “made good-faith complaints about 
mistreatment and discriminatory conduct” before experiencing 
“sudden increases in scrutiny, changes in her duties, and a hostile 
shift in management behavior.” (Doc. 19 at 1-2.) She further 
alleges that one colleague frequently “fail[ed] to acknowledge” 
her and left work “without notifying her,” and Starmount repeatedly 
informed her “at the last minute” that she would have to train 
newly hired staff “during her scheduled events” but never subjected 
other employees to a similar burden. (Id. at 2.) She also includes 
conclusory and vague allegations of “discriminatory treatment 
based on protected characteristics” and “undermining, exclusion, 

8 
disrespect, and targeted mistreatment, creating a hostile work 
environment.” (Id.) None of these allegations plausibly suggests 
that she experienced discrimination because of a protected 
characteristic or because she complained of suspected violations 
of Title VII, however. The court will not scour the 56 pages of 
emails and notes attached to the original complaint, or the 60 
pages of personal checks, text messages, and notes attached to the 
amended complaint, to further develop these claims on her behalf. 
See Gautier v. Tams Mgmt., Inc., 163 F.4th 786, 792 (4th Cir. 2026) 
(“Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in the 
record . . . .” (quoting Murthy v. Missouri, 603 U.S. 43, 67 n.7 
(2024))). Thus, the claims set forth in Cossio’s amended complaint 
and supplement will be dismissed based on claim preclusion and 
failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 
 C. Whether Cossio Has Sufficiently Alleged an ADA Claim 
 Starmount next argues that the ADA excludes and exempts 
private membership clubs from its provisions. (Doc. 22 at 6.) It 
contends that the complaint and attached exhibits admit that 
Starmount is a “private country club” that is “member owned” and 
“tax exempt pursu[ant] to section 501(c)(7)” of the Internal 
Revenue Code. (Id. at 6-7 (citing Doc. 2-4 at 5, 15, 31-32).) 
Cossio counters that whether Starmount qualifies as a private 
membership club presents a question of fact to be resolved through 
discovery. (Doc. 24 at 2.) She asserts that she has sufficiently 

9 
alleged that Starmount operates as a commercial enterprise by 
providing commercial banquet and event services to non-members. 
(Id.) 
 “To establish a claim for disability discrimination under the 
ADA, a plaintiff must prove ‘(1) that she has a disability, (2) 
that she is a “qualified individual” for the employment in 
question, and (3) that [her employer] discharged her (or took other 
adverse employment action) because of her disability.’” Jacobs v. 
N.C. Admin. Off. of the Cts., 780 F.3d 562, 572 (4th Cir. 2015) 
(alteration in original) (quoting EEOC v. Stowe-Pharr Mills, Inc., 
216 F.3d 373, 377 (4th Cir. 2000)). Within the meaning of the 
ADA, “[t]he term ‘employer’ does not include . . . (ii) a bona 
fide private membership club (other than a labor organization) 
that is exempt from taxation under section 501(c) of Title 26.” 
42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(B). 
 Starmount cites Hudson v. Charlotte Country Club, Inc., 535 
F. Supp. 313, 315 (W.D.N.C. 1982), for the proposition that the 
court should dismiss Cossio’s ADA claim based on the statute’s 
private club exemption. (Doc. 22 at 7.) In Hudson, the court 
applied the private club exemption at the summary judgment stage 
where the defendant provided an affidavit from its club president, 
its articles of incorporation with the North Carolina Secretary of 
State, and a letter from the United States Internal Revenue Service 

10 
to demonstrate its status as a private membership club.3 Hudson, 
535 F. Supp. at 315. Here, on the other hand, Starmount only 
points to an email from Cossio attached to her original complaint 
where she acknowledges that the email’s recipient “reminded” her 
that Starmount is “a privately member owned country club that is 
tax exempt pursu[ant] to section 501(c)(7).” (See Doc. 2-4 at 
32.) In other emails, she describes Starmount as “a private 
country club” and “member owned,” noting that its status “should 
NEVER give the right to violate any American[’]s rights.” (See 
id. at 5, 15.) 
 At the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, these conclusory statements from 
Cossio, where she recites information she seems to have received 
from someone else, do not establish that Starmount falls within 
the ADA’s private club exemption. Nevertheless, Cossio’s ADA claim 
still warrants dismissal based on her failure to allege sufficient 
facts to state a plausible claim to relief. 
 In the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) 
Charge of Discrimination attached to her original complaint, 
Cossio states that she made Starmount aware of her disability and 
 
3 The court in Hudson applied the private club exemption to dismiss a 
Title VII claim. Hudson, 535 F. Supp. at 315. Title VII and the ADA 
contain nearly identical private club exemption provisions. Compare 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (excluding “a bona fide private membership 
club . . . which is exempt from taxation under section 501(c) of T itle 
26” from Title VII’s definition of “employer”), with 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12111(5)(B)(ii) (excluding “a bona fide private membership 
club . . . that is exempt from taxation under section 501(c) of Title 
26” from the ADA’s definition of “employer”). 

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that she was unable to lift some of the heavy tables and stacks of 
chairs. (Doc. 2 at 14.) She alleges that the general manager 
became aware of her disability in July 2024 and that Starmount 
terminated her employment for the stated reason of reconfiguring 
the special events department on October 3, 2024. (Id.) She 
further notes, however, that she “had received a raise as recently 
as two months prior to [her] discharge.” (Id.) The original 
complaint and EEOC charge provide no other facts to causally 
connect her discharge to her disability. 
 If the court “‘would have to “speculate” to “fill in the 
gaps”’ regarding the defendant’s motive, the circumstances do not 
warrant a reasonable inference of discrimination.” Kelly v. Town 
of Abingdon, 90 F.4th 158, 169 (4th Cir. 2024) (quoting Bing v. 
Brivo Sys., LLC, 959 F.3d 605, 618 (4th Cir. 2020)). And again, 
the court will not comb through Cossio’s 100-plus pages of 
attachments to decipher whether her allegations plausibly link her 
disability to her termination. Thus, Cossio cannot sustain an ADA 
claim on such sparse factual allegations where, as here, the few 
facts provided contradict any discriminatory animus in that she 
received a raise one month after the general manager learned of 
her disability. Cossio also never alleges that this raise served 
as part of a scheme to frustrate her ability to succeed in a future 
claim. Cf. EEOC v. Navy Fed. Credit Union, 424 F.3d 397, 402, 407 
(4th Cir. 2005) (holding that an employer’s scheme to give 

12 
favorable performance evaluations established a prima facie case 
of unlawful retaliation where the employer intended the 
evaluations to insulate it from civil liability). The court will 
therefore grant Starmount’s motion to dismiss Cossio’s ADA claim. 
 D. Whether Cossio Has Sufficiently Alleged an ADEA Claim 
 Finally, Starmount argues that Cossio has failed to allege 
any facts to connect her age as a motivating factor, much less the 
but-for cause, of her termination. (Doc. 22 at 9.) According to 
Starmount, Cossio’s own statements belie any connection between 
her age and her termination. (Id.) Cossio responds that her 
allegations of her replacement by younger employees sufficiently 
state a plausible ADEA claim. (Doc. 24 at 2.) 
 The ADEA makes it unlawful for an employer to discharge any 
individual because of his or her age. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). 
“To prevail on an ADEA claim, a plaintiff must prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that age constituted the but-for 
cause of the adverse employment action.” Bandy v. City of Salem, 
59 F.4th 705, 710 (4th Cir. 2023). At the motion to dismiss stage, 
the plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to satisfy the elements 
of an ADEA cause of action. Tickles v. Johnson, 805 F. App’x 204, 
207 (4th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (quoting McCleary-Evans v. Md. 
Dep’t of Transp., State Highway Admin., 780 F.3d 582, 585 (4th 
Cir. 2015)). 
 Here, Cossio alleges that Starmount “hired three much younger 

13 
employees into [her] position.” (Doc. 2 at 14.) She also provides 
her date of birth. (Id. at 9.) But the complaint and attachments 
are otherwise devoid of facts related to her age. Tellingly, in 
one email from about a week after her termination, she states, “I 
feel like I have been discriminated against. I’m not sure in what 
way whether it be, my age, my nationality or my sex. I don’t 
understand how it’s ok, for over two years I complain over and 
over again regarding one particular employee . . . nothing ever 
changed.” (Doc. 2-4 at 17.) Cossio’s own uncertain speculation 
as to the reasons for her termination, coupled with her age and 
her allegations regarding “much younger” replacements, do not 
support a reasonable inference that her termination occurred 
because of her age. See Connelly v. Guilford Cnty. Schs., No. 
24cv492, 2025 WL 551896, at *6 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 19, 2025) (finding 
that conclusory claims of bullying, humiliation, scrutiny, and 
belittlement failed to plausibly allege an ADA discrimination 
claim where the complaint did not mention the plaintiff’s age 
“beyond checking a box . . . and providing her date of birth”). 
The court will thus grant Starmount’s motion to dismiss her ADEA 
claim. 
 E. Whether the Court Will Grant Cossio Leave to Amend 
 In her response brief, Cossio requests an opportunity to amend 
her pleadings in the event the court finds the pleadings deficient. 
(Doc. 24 at 3.) No motion to amend has been filed, however. 

14 
Absent an actual motion with proposed additional facts, the Fourth 
Circuit has declined to “find that requests made in opposition 
memoranda constitute a proper motion to amend.” ACA Fin. Guar. 
Corp. v. City of Buena Vista, 917 F.3d 206, 218 (4th Cir. 2019). 
Nevertheless, in deference to Cassio’s pro se status, the court’s 
dismissal will be without prejudice should she seek to reassert 
her claims. The court will therefore withhold entry of judgment 
for 21 days should Cassio wish to file a motion to amend her 
complaint with a proposed amended complaint that cures the 
deficiencies noted herein. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant Starmount’s motion to 
dismiss (Doc. 21) is GRANTED, and the remaining claims of Plaintiff 
Cossio’s complaint (Doc. 2) are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The 
claims in her amended complaint (Doc. 18), which were previously 
dismissed, are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The court will withhold 
entry of judgment for 21 days should Cassio wish to file a motion 
to file an amended complaint that cures the deficiencies noted 
herein. 
 
 /s/ Thomas D. Schroeder 
 United States District Judge 
 
June 4, 2026 

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