govinfo:USCOURTS-pawd-3_26-cv-00752-0

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
 
MAMADOU MEGA BAH, ) 
 ) 
 Petitioner, ) 
 ) 
 v. ) Civil Action No. 3:26-cv-752 
 ) 
WARDEN, MOSHANNON VALLEY ICE ) 
PROCESSING CENTER et al., ) 
 ) 
 Respondents. ) 
 
MEMORANDUM ORDER 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Presently pending before the Court is a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (the “Petition”) (Docket No. 1). Petitioner Mamadou Mega Bah (“Petitioner”) 
is a native and citizen of Guinea who crossed the border into the United States without inspection 
on or about January 29, 2024, near Otay Mesa, California; he was detained without a warrant and 
then released into the interior of the country; after a passage of time, he was detained on or about 
September 11, 2025; and he was not admitted or paroled by an Immigration Officer. (Docket No. 
1 at 4, ¶¶ 1-2; Docket No. 1-1 at 11; Docket No. 1-2). On January 28, 2026, an Immigration Judge 
ordered Petitioner’s removal. (Docket No. 1 at 4, ¶ 3; Docket No. 1-2). On February 27, 2026, 
Petitioner timely filed an appeal of that decision with the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). 
(Docket No. 1 at 4, ¶ 4; Docket No. 1-2). 
Petitioner is currently detained in the custody of Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(“ICE”) at Moshannon Valley Processing Center. ( Docket No. 1 at 4, ¶ 6; Docket No. 1-2). 
Petitioner has been detained as such since January 9, 2026, without being provided a bond hearing. 
(Docket No. 1 at 4-5, ¶¶ 5, 11). For the reasons set forth herein, the Petition shall be granted in 
part and denied in part. The Writ shall issue and Petitioner shall be afforded a bond hearing. 

 
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II. DISCUSSION 
 
Petitioner asserts that he is subject to discretionary detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) 
and not mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), and, therefore, that he is entitled to a 
bond hearing. The Court agrees. In reaching this conclusion, this judicial officer is mindful of the 
interpretive canon of constitutional avoidance 1 and is constrained by what is believed to be 
controlling authority on this issue. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 289 (2018) (Alito, 
J.). Absent authority from the Supreme Court or the Third Circuit instructing a different 
interpretation, this judicial officer follows Jennings and joins the overwhelming majority of district 
court judges within the Third Circuit in holding that § 1226(a), rather than the mandatory detention 
provision of § 1225(b), applies to aliens such as Petitioner who are already present in the United 
States when detained and thus not “seeking” admission. See Lopez Yoc v. Oddo, No. 3:26-cv-785, 
2026 WL 1579816 (W.D. Pa. June 3, 2026) (Hardy, J.); see also, e.g., Calzado Diaz v. Noem, No. 
3:25-cv-458, 2025 WL 3628480 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 15, 2025) (Haines, J.) (holding that Ҥ 1225(b)(2) 
is tethered more closely to the border and speaks to the potential detention of aliens there, whereas 
§ 1226(a) applies more readily to the potential detention of aliens who have been living within the 
country”); Alvarez v. Noem, No. 3:26-cv-73, 2026 WL 545382 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 26, 2026) (Ranjan, 
 
1 In addition to his statutory arguments, Petitioner also asserts an alleged constitutional violation of the Due 
Process Clause as an additional basis in support of his Petition. Respondents acknowledge that there may come a time 
when mandatory civil detention without a bond hearing becomes unreasonable and thus unconstitutional. See German 
Santos v. Warden Pike Cnty. Corr. Facility , 965 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2020) (analyzing detention and Due Process 
Clause limits under §1226(c)). However, the Supreme Court has held that detention during removal proceedings is a 
constitutionally permissible part of that process. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 531 (2003); see also Zadvydas v. 
Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001) (holding that detention beyond the removal period per 8 U.S.C. § 1231 for a period 
of less than six months pending removal is presumed constitutional). As noted above, the parties (and other courts) 
have sparred over competing interpretations of §§ 1225 and 1226, thus part of the Court’s consideration when 
interpreting these statutory provisions is whether a particular interpretation would avoid implicating a constitutional 
concern. See Clark v. Martinez , 543 U.S. 371, 380 -82 (2005); Ndiaye v. Jamison , No. 25-6007, 2025 WL 3229307 
(E.D. Pa. Nov. 19, 2025). The Court’s conclusion that § 1226 applies here, and that Petitioner is entitled to a bond 
hearing thereunder, is based in part upon this canon of constitutional avoidance. Consequently, the Court need not 
address Petitioner’s constitutional basis in order to grant his Petition. 
 

 
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J.) (same); Silva Cova v. Rose , No. 3:26 -cv-101, 2026 WL 376921 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 11, 2026) 
(Stickman, J.) (same). Accordingly, the Court holds that Petitioner has a statutory right to an 
individualized bond hearing. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Therefore, for the reasons set forth, Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is 
GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. 
Accordingly, the Court enters the following Order: 
 
 AND NOW, this 4th day of June, 2026, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner 
Mamadou Mega Bah’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Docket No. 1) is GRANTED IN PART 
AND DENIED IN PART. 
The Petition is GRANTED to the extent that the Writ shall issue on the following terms: 
1. Within ten days of this Order, Petitioner must receive an individualized bond hearing 
conducted by an immigration judge pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226. 
2. Within seven days of the immigration judge’s decision, the parties shall provide a joint 
notice on the docket advising the Court of the outcome of the bond hearing. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner’s request for an award of attorney fees and 
expenses pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act ( the “EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) , is 
DENIED. Under the EAJA, a court may award fees and expenses to a prevailing party against the 
United States, “unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially 
justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). The 
key issue here is whether Petitioner is “an applicant for admissi on” who is “seeking admission” 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Respondents argue that an “applicant for admission” is 

 
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necessarily “seeking admission” until admitted or until removal proceedings are complete , 
including noncitizens such as Petitioner who h ave already been residing in the interior of the 
United States. The Court concludes that Respondents’ interpretation of §1225 is substantially 
justified. The Court is also mindful that the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
has not yet interpreted the meaning of the statutory phrases “applicant for admission” and “seeking 
admission,” and that two separate United States Courts of Appeals have rendered decisions that 
support Respondents’ position. See Avila v. Bondi , 170 F.4 th 1128 (8th Cir. 2026); Buenrostro-
Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026); see also Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, 175 F.4th 713, 
735-61 (6th Cir. 2026) (Murphy, J., dissenting). Therefo re, the Court holds that Petitioner is not 
entitled to attorney fees and expenses under the EAJA. 
The Petition is DENIED in all other respects. 
The Clerk of Court shall mark this case closed. 
 
/s/ W. Scott Hardy 
W. Scott Hardy 
United States District Judge 
 
cc/ecf: All counsel of record 
 
 
 

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