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govinfo:USCOURTS-njd-1_25-cv-16338-2

U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey · 2026-06-03

· GavelSight synced 2026-09-06 03:51:13

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 
 
 
FREDERICK BANKS, 
 
 Petitioner, 
 
 v. 
 
WARDEN R. THOMPSON, 
 
 Respondent. 
 
 
Civil Action 
No. 25-16338 (CPO) 
 
AMENDED 
OPINION & ORDER 
 
 
 
O’HEARN, District Judge. 
Before the Court is Petitioner ’s motion for reconsideration of the Court ’s May 26, 2026, 
Opinion and Order. (ECF Nos. 40, 41). For the following reasons, the Court will deny Petitioner’s 
motion. 
Local Civil Rule 7.1(i) governs motions for reconsideration and allows parties to seek 
reconsideration of what they believe are “overlooked” matters. See e.g., Carney v. Pennsauken 
Twp. Police Dep ’t, No. 11 -7366, 2013 WL 4501454, at *1 (D.N.J. Aug. 21, 2013). To be 
successful on a motion for reconsideration, the moving party must demonstrate: “(1) an intervening 
change in the controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence that was not available when the 
court [issued its order]; or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or fact or to prevent manifest 
injustice.” E.g., Max’s Seafood Café ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 
1999). 
For substantially the same reasons set forth in the Court’s prior Opinion, Petitioner has not 
met that standard. First, Petitioner argues that he “exhausted his available remedies all the way to 
the central office” and that to the extent any are incomplete, “it is because the central office failed 
to provide a timely response.” (ECF No. 42, at 1 (cleaned up)). As discussed in the Court’s prior 
Opinion, Petitioner had to exhaust Grounds Two, Three, and Four before filing his § 2241 petition. PageID: <pageID>
 
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(ECF No. 40, at 2–3, 8–9). His appeals to the central office and related issues did not start until 
after he filed his Petition. (See id.). 
Next, Petitioner argues that this Court has jurisdiction over Ground One because his 
sentencing court, the Western District of Pennsylvania, held that it should be addressed in a § 2241 
petition. (ECF No. 42, at 2, 10)). First, Petitioner’s argument mischaracterizes the sentencing 
court’s brief text order. The sentencing court held that Petitioner ’s challenge “to the current 
legality of his confinement” should “be addressed either in one of the many direct appeals the 
[Petitioner] has pending, or via petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255/2241.” (ECF No. 42, at 10 
(emphasis added)). This Court’s decision that it lacks jurisdiction under § 2241 to consider Ground 
One, and that it should have been presented in a § 2255 motion does not necessarily conflict with 
the sentencing court’s order. (See ECF No. 40, at 4–6). 
In any event, “[t]he law of the case doctrine is not a restriction on the court’s power, but is 
a discretionary doctrine.” See, e.g., Speeney v. Rutgers, The State Univ. , 369 F. App ’x 357, 359 
(3d Cir. 2010); In re City of Philadelphia Litig., 158 F.3d 711, 718 (3d Cir. 1998) (“[T]he law of 
the case doctrine does not restrict a court ’s power but rather governs its exercise of discretion. ”); 
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Shreveport v. Coca-Cola Co., 988 F.2d 414, 429 (3d Cir. 1993) (“[T]he 
law of the case doctrine is a rule that is subject to the discretion of the court applying it. ”); In re 
Insulin Pricing Litig., No. 17-699, 2025 WL 2717592, at *3 (D.N.J. Sept. 24, 2025) (citing cases); 
In re Celgene Corp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 747 F. Supp. 3d 748, 761 (D.N.J. 2024) (explaining that the 
law of the case doctrine “is a discretionary rule, not a mandatory one”). 
 Further, the doctrine presupposes the existence of subject matter jurisdiction , it cannot 
create jurisdiction. Thus, even if the sentencing court suggested that Ground One is cognizable 
under § 2241, that decision would not require this Court to exercise jurisdiction if § 2241 does not, PageID: <pageID>
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in fact, authorize review. This Court has an independent obligation to conduct its own 
jurisdictional analysis to determine whether Ground One falls within the scope of § 2241, see, e.g., 
Hartig Drug Co. Inc. v. Senju Pharm. Co., 836 F.3d 261, 267 (3d Cir. 2016), and as explained in 
the Court’s prior Opinion, it does not. (ECF No. 40, at 4–6). Accordingly, 
IT IS, on this 3rd day of June 2026, 
ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall reopen this case for consideration of 
Petitioner’s latest submissions; and it is further 
ORDERED that Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration is DENIED; and it is further 
ORDERED that Petitioner’s access to the Alternate Document Submission (“ADS”) 
system is REVOKED; the Clerk of the Court SHALL NO LONGER ACCEPT any electronic 
filings from Petitioner while he remains incarcerated and proceeding pro se1; and it is further 
ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall serve a copy of this Opinion and Order upon 
Petitioner by regular U.S. mail and once again CLOSE this case. 
/s/ Christine P. O’Hearn____ 
Christine P. O’Hearn 
United States District Judge 
1 Petitioner filed the instant motion electronically. As explained in another of Petitioner’s cases, 
Civ. No. 26-5287, under the Local Rules, an incarcerated pro se party, like Petitioner, may only 
file documents through paper filings. L. Civ. R. 5.2(4) (stating that: “[a] party who is not 
represented by counsel must file documents with the Clerk as a Paper Filing” and that “[a] Pro Se 
party who is not incarcerated may request to receive filed documents electronically upon 
completion of a ‘Consent & Registration Form to Receive Documents Electronically.’” (emphasis 
added)). PageID: <pageID>

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