govinfo:USCOURTS-njd-2_21-cv-20231-2

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Not for Publication 
 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 
 
BRIDGET A. MONROE, 
 
 Plaintiff, 
 
 v. 
 
KENNETH W. SIECZKOWSKI, 
 
 Defendant. 
 
 
 
Civil Action No. 21-20231 (ES) (MAH) 
 
ORDER
 
 
 
S
ALAS, DISTRICT JUDGE 
 
Before the Court is Kenneth W. Sieczkowski’s (“Defendant”) motion to dismiss, (D.E. No. 
52 (“Mot.”); D.E. No. 5-1 (“Mov. Br.”)), Bridget A. Monroe’s (“Plaintiff”) amended complaint, 
(D.E. No. 47 (“Am. Compl.”)). The Court resolves Defendant’s motion without oral argument. 
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); L. Civ. R. 78.1(b). For the reasons set forth below, that motion is 
DENIED. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Factual Allegations 
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant sexually assaulted her on July 19, 1988, when she was 
sixteen years -old and Defendant was an adult. (Am. Compl. ¶ ¶ 4–5). Following the assault, 
Plaintiff “pursued criminal charges.” (Id. ¶ 7). On September 16, 1991, “Defendant pled guilty 
in the Superior Court of New Jersey to lesser charges arising out of the sexual assault.” ( Id. ¶ 8). 
Plaintiff alleges that, by way of a letter dated September 25, 1991, the Middlesex County 
Prosecutor’s Office confirmed the plea and advised her that “Defendant would be sentenced to PageID:
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probation and that no trial would occur.” ( Id. ¶ 9). Plaintiff’s aunt attended the sentencing. (Id. 
¶ 10). 
While the state prosecuted Defendant criminally, “Plaintiff also filed a civil action in the 
Superior Court of New Jersey in 1991, arising out of the same assault.” ( Id. ¶ 11). That year , 
Plaintiff underwent “ intensive psychiatric treatment at the Austen Riggs Center in 
Massachusetts[,]” where she was admitted for long- term residential care. ( Id. ¶¶ 19–20). 
Psychotherapy notes from that institution reveal that Plaintiff suffered from “depression, anxiety, 
suicidal ideation, dissociation, and inability to cope with the stress of litigation .” ( Id. ¶ 21). 
Because of her psychiatric condition, Plaintiff ultimately “deci[ded] to dismiss” her civil case. 
(Id.). Plaintiff alleges that her family members state that she “dropped the case . . . only because 
it was too painful and overwhelming for her to continue, and never because of any settlement or 
resolution.” (Id. ¶ 23). Plaintiff further alleges that psychotherapy notes from her treatment at the 
Austen Riggs Center “confirm that her decision to dismiss was driven entirely by her psychiatric 
condition, not because of nay adjudication or settlement.” (Id. ¶ 22). Her “inability to pursue the 
case deeply affected Plaintiff’s mental health, and . . . in 1996[,] she attempted suicide by 
overdosing on [her then-husband’s] prescription medication.” (Id.). 
The docket for that prior civil matter “ reflects that the case was marked ‘ settled – not 
scheduled for trial’ on July 6, 1993.” (Id. ¶ 12). Plaintiff, however, alleges that “[n]o settlement 
agreement, stipulation of dismissal with prejudice, release, or judgment has ever been produced 
by Defendant or located in any court records.” (Id. ¶ 13). Plaintiff further claims that she “never 
received any settlement or compensation from Defendant or anyone else in connection with the 
1991 action.” ( Id. ¶ 15). Indeed, she “remained dependent on student aid and family support” 
while a student at Smith College. ( Id. ¶ 16). She maintains that she voluntarily dismissed the PageID:
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matter “solely because of her mental health.” (Id. ¶ 23). Plaintiff alleges that “[n]o discovery was 
completed, no dispositive motions were decided, and no trial occurred.” ( Id. ¶ 25). Indeed, in 
1996, after Plaintiff’s mental health stabilized, she contacted her prior attorney to resume the civil 
action. (Id. ¶ 28). That attorney, however, informed her that the statute of limitations had expired. 
(Id. ¶ 28). 
“In 2019, the New Jersey Legislature enacted the Child Victims Act ( ‘NJCVA’), which 
revived for a two-year window previously time-barred claims of child sexual abuse” and provided 
Plaintiff with a potential avenue to revive her previously time -barred case. (Id. ¶ 29).1 In 2021, 
Plaintiff spoke to Middlesex County Civil Division Manager Ian Ratzlaff, who told her that “ the 
case file [from her 1991 civil case] had been destroyed ‘ because the case did not end in a 
judgment.’” (Id. ¶ 14). She has also spoken with the law firm that represented her in 1991 “ and 
was told . . . that no case records remain in their possession.” (Id. ¶ 28). 
B. Procedural History 
On November 29, 2021, Plaintiff filed this action against Defendant. (D.E. No. 1). 2 
Defendant then filed a motion to dismiss and a “motion for sanctions” on November 26, 2024. 
(D.E. Nos. 31 & 32). This Court issued an order to show cause, requiring Plaintiff to “show cause 
 
1 The NJCVA “provided a two-year revival window for victims to file otherwise time-barred claims for sexual 
crimes committed against them while minors. This statute of limitations expanded the time for filing claims for ‘certain 
sexual crimes,’ permitting minor victims to file claims ‘within [thirty-seven] years after the minor reaches the age of 
majority, or within seven years from the date of reasonable discovery of the injury ... whichever date is later.’ The 
statute[] similarly permits actions arising from sexual crimes committed against minors, including: ‘sexual assault, 
any other crime of a sexual nature, a prohibited sexual act ..., or sexual abuse as defined in [the Child Sexual Abuse 
Act (or “CSAA”)].’ ‘The CVA also supplemented the CSAA discovery period provision, providing that it is subject 
to N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2(a).’” C.P. v. Governing Body of Jehovah's Witnesses , 304 A.3d 695, 698 ( N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 2023) (first citing N.J.S.A. 2A:14 -2(b); then N.J.S.A. 2A:14- 2(a); Doe v. The Estate of C.V.O ., 303 A.3d 678 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2023)). 
 
2 On August 13, 2024, Plaintiff requested the Clerk of Court enter default against Defendant. (D.E. No. 23). 
On September 23, 2024, she filed a motion for the same. On October 18, 2024—after Defendant appeared and filed 
his own motion to set aside default—the Honorable Michael A. Hammer, U.S.M.J. vacated default. (D.E. No. 29). PageID:
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in writing why her [c] omplaint should not be dismissed with prejudice, based on res judicata , 
collateral estoppel, and/or the entire controversy doctrine .” (D.E. No. 39). Plaintiff responded 
accordingly. (D.E. No. 40). 
Upon careful consideration of the parties ’ submissions, ( see D.E. Nos. 1 , 31, 32, 36 –
38, 40 & 43–45), the Court held that Plaintiff’s complaint did “not set forth sufficient facts to 
plausibly allege a non-barred claim against Defendant under the New Jersey Child Sexual Abuse 
Act and/or the New Jersey Child Victims Act.” (D.E. No. 46). The Undersigned thus dismissed 
Plaintiff’s complaint with leave to amend. (Id.). 
On September 11, 2025, Plaintiff filed the Amended Complaint, and Defendant again 
moved to dismiss and for sanctions. (D.E. Nos. 52 & 53). Plaintiff opposed, (D.E. No. 58 (“Opp. 
Br.”)), and Defendant filed a reply, (D.E. No. 62 (“Reply Br.”)). The Court further permitted 
Plaintiff to file a sur -reply, (D.E. No. 68), which she did on December 9, 2025, (D.E. No. 69).
3 
On December 16, 2025, Defendant filed a response. (D.E. No. 71). 
II. LEGAL STANDARD 
In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) , a district court is “required to 
accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and draw all inferences in the facts alleged in 
the light most favorable to the [plaintiff].” Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d 
Cir. 2008). “[A] complaint attacked by a . . . motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual 
allegations.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) . However, the plaintiff's 
“obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and 
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not 
 
3 The parties also filed separate briefing in connection with Defendant’s motion for sanctions. (D.E. Nos. 
53-1, 59, 63, 70). PageID:
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do.” Id. (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). A court is “not bound to accept as 
true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Papasan, 478 U.S. at 286. Instead, 
assuming the factual allegations in the complaint are true, those “[f]actual allegations must be 
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 560 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the 
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. This “plausibility standard” requires the 
complaint to allege “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully,” but it “is 
not akin to a ‘probability requirement.’” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Detailed factual 
allegations” are not required, but “more than an unadorned, the defendant-harmed-me accusation” 
must be pled; a complaint must include “factual enhancements” and not just conclusory statements 
or a recitation of the elements of a cause of action. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557). 
Moreover, “[d]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a 
context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and 
common sense.” Id. “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than 
the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the 
pleader is entitled to relief.’” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).4 
 
4 In total, Defendant attached 21 individual exhibits to his Motion to Dismiss. (See D.E. Nos. 52-2–4). While 
the Court generally “may not consider matters extraneous to the pleadings” when deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, In 
re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997), an exception to this general rule provides 
that the Court may also consider “exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly 
authentic documents if the complainant’s claims are based upon these documents.” Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 
230 (3d Cir. 2010); see also Buck v. Hampton Twp. Sch. Dist., 452 F.3d 256, 260 (3d Cir. 2006). PageID:
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III. DISCUSSION 
Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed as barred by res judicata and 
the Entire Controversy Doctrine. Furthermore, Defendant contends that, even if those doctrines 
do not bar Plaintiff’s claims, the NJCVA does not revive the statute of limitations for her particular 
claim. The Court addresses each argument in turn. 
A. Res Judicata and The Entire Controversy Doctrine 
Res Judicata. Defendant first argues that Plaintiff’s claims are barred by res judicata. 
Defendant contends that “ [t]he Superior Court of New Jersey’s docket in Doe (Monroe) v. 
Sieczkowski, et al ., Docket No. MID -L-10246-91, reflects that the case was dismissed by order 
dated September 28, 1992, and subsequently marked ‘ Sett-Not Sched Trial ’ by a court -initiated 
Stipulation of Dismissal on July 6, 1993.” (Mov. Br. at 24 (citing Ex. 3 to D.E. No. 52-3)). This, 
Defendant argues, amounts “to a final judgment on the merits for res judicata purposes.” (Id.). In 
 
Here, Defendant attached to his sworn declaration (i) a copy of Plaintiff’s 1991 state court complaint, (D.E. 
No. 52-2 (“Exhibit A”)); (ii) a copy of the summons from that same matter, (D.E. No. 52-2 (“Exhibit B”)); (iii) 
correspondence between Defendant and his insurance company, indicating that the insurance company intended to 
assign Defendant and his mother counsel for the 1991 civil action, (D.E. No. 52 -2 (“Exhibit C”)); (iv) a copy of 
Defendant’s criminal judgment, (D.E. No. 52- 2 (“Exhibit D”)); and (v) a copy of Defendant’s expungement order, 
(D.E. No. 52 -2 (“Exhibit E”)). The Court considers Exhibits A and B as matters incorporated by reference to 
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint; the Court further considers Exhibits D and E as matters of public record. The Court 
does not consider Exhibit C, as it is a document extraneous to the Amended Complaint and does not appear to be a 
matter of public record. 
 
Defendant further submitted thirteen separate exhibits related to his counsel’s effort to determine the 
resolution of the 1991 civil action: (i) a copy of Plaintiff Amended Complaint in the instant matter, (D.E. No. 52- 3 
(“Exhibit 1”)); (ii) a copy of the Superior Court of New Jersey’s electronic case records listing for the 1991 civil 
action, (D.E. No. 52-3 (“Exhibit 2”)); (iii) screen shots from the docket for that matter, (D.E. No. 52-3 (“Exhibit 3”)); 
(iv) Defendant’s records request and the Superior Court Clerk’s Office’s written response, (D.E. No. 52 -3 (“Exhibit 
4”)); (v) an archive report, (D.E. No. 52 -3 (“Exhibit 5”)); (vi) a subpoena, (D.E. No. 52- 3 (“Exhibit 6”)); (vii) letter 
correspondence concerning this matter, (D.E. No. 52-3 (“Exhibit 7”)); (viii) a public inquiry access guide for the New 
Jersey Courts, (D.E. No. 52-3 (“Exhibit 8”)); (ix) a press release, (D.E. No. 52-3 (“Exhibit 10”)); and (x) bill texts for 
predecessor bills to the NJCVA (D.E. No. 52- 3 (“Exhibits 11–13”)). The Court considers Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 8, and 10 
through 13 under the same standards articulated above. The Court does not consider Exhibits 4, 5, 6, 7, or 9 pursuant 
to the same. 
 
Finally, Defendant attached three exhibits to his attorney, Ms. Vladyka’s, declaration. (See D.E. No. 52-4). 
The Court considers none of these documents, as again they fall under none of the exceptions to the general rule that 
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opposition, Plaintiff contends that “[t]he Amended Complaint alleges the opposite of a final 
adjudication: Plaintiff brought a 1991 civil action but never obtained a judgment, never signed or 
received a settlement, and withdrew because her severe psychiatric crisis —unfolding in tandem 
with Defendant’s criminal case—deprived her of a meaningful opportunity to l itigate.” (Opp. Br. 
at 6). “At bottom,” Plaintiff argues, “the [res judicata] inquiry at this stage reduces to whether the 
prior disposition was with prejudice [,]” and “ Plaintiff pleads the opposite .” ( Id. at 6 –7). 
Furthermore, the docket Defendant points to “say[s] nothing about finality” or whether the 
Superior Court dismissed the matter with or without prejudice. ( Id. at 7). Plaintiff thus argues 
that, “[o]n this record, any inference of a final merits adjudication is conjectural” and therefore 
insufficient to dismiss her Amended Complaint at this stage. (Id.). In reply, Defendant maintains 
that “[t]he September 28, 1992 dismissal order and the July 6, 1993 court -initiated stipulation of 
dismissal each constitute final, non -appealable orders under New Jersey state court procedural 
rules.” (Id. at 11). 
The res judicata defense “may be raised and adjudicated on a motion to dismiss and the 
court can take notice of all facts necessary for the decision.” Toscano v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 
288 F. App'x 36, 38 (3d Cir. 2008). Res judicata, also known as claim preclusion, bars 
“‘repetitious suits involving the same cause of action’ once ‘a court of competent jurisdiction has 
entered a final judgment on the merits.’” United States v. Tohono O’Odham Nation, 563 U.S. 307, 
315 (2011) (quoting Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597 (1948)). It is founded on the 
general public policy that once a court has decided on a contested issue, litigation may not later be 
renewed in another court. Heiser v. Woodruff , 327 U.S. 726, 733 (1946); see also Purter v. 
Heckler, 771 F.2d 682, 690 (3d Cir. 1985). To successfully raise the defense of res judicata, the 
party asserting the defense must show that there has been a final judgment on the merits in a prior PageID:
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suit involving the same parties or their privies and a subsequent suit based on the same causes of 
action. United States v. Athlone Indus., Inc., 746 F.2d 977, 983 (3d Cir. 1984). The term “cause 
of action” does not necessarily rest on the specific legal theory invoked but turns on “the essential 
similarity of the underlying events giving rise to the various legal claims.” Davis v. U.S. Steel 
Supply, 688 F.2d 166, 171 (3d Cir. 1982). 
The parties here focus primarily on the first prong: whether the y litigated the 1991 civil 
action to a final judgment on the merits. A court renders a judgment “on the merits” when it 
“addresses the fundamental legal issues and facts of the case.” Vithanalange v. Hunaity , No. 22-
6248, 2025 WL 1766213, at *3 (D.N.J. June 25, 2025). For that reason, “ any dismissal with 
prejudice would be considered an adjudication on the merits.” Id. (citing Maiden v. N. Brunswick 
Twp. Sch. Dist., No. 19-18768, 2020 WL 3546809 at *4 (D.N.J. Jun. 30, 2020)) (emphasis added). 
On the other hand, when a c ourt dismisses a case without prejudice , “the matter is considered 
dismissed without getting to the merits of the case ” and therefore res judicata does not bar a 
subsequent action. Id. (citing N.J. Court Rules R 4:37-1 (providing for dismissal without prejudice 
by leave of court at a plaintiff’s request)); see also Williams v. Litton Loan Servicing, No. 16-5301, 
2018 WL 6600097, at *10 (D.N.J. Dec. 17, 2018), aff’d sub nom. Williams v. Litton Loan Servs., 
788 F. App’x 819 (3d Cir. 2019). In other words, the issue before the Court is thus: if the Superior 
Court dismissed the 1991 civil action with prejudice, the instant action is barred by res judicata; 
if, however, the Superior Court instead dismissed that action without prejudice, it is not. 
Plaintiff alleges that the “ action was never adjudicated on the merits, never resulted in a 
settlement or release, and never produced any judgment with prejudice.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 39). As 
described supra, for the purposes of a motion to dismiss, like this one, the Court accepts the factual 
allegations in the Amended Complaint as true and draws all inferences in the light most favorable PageID:
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to Plaintiff. See Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny , 515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008). Moreover, 
“[w]hile affirmative defenses, such as res judicata and the entire controversy doctrine, could be 
proper grounds for a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), they may not afford the basis for a dismissal 
if they are not ‘ apparent on the face of the complaint.’ ” Kisby Lees Mech. LLC v. Pinnacle 
Insulation, Inc., No. 11-5093, 2012 WL 3133681, at *4 (D.N.J. July 31, 2012) (quoting Rycoline 
Prods., Inc. v. C & W Unlimited, 109 F.3d 883, 886 (3d Cir. 1997). Accordingly, while the Court 
takes judicial notice of the existence of the docket sheet and screenshots Defendant provided from 
the 1991 civil action, (see generally Exs. 2 & 3), it does not—because it may not —examine those 
documents for the truth of the matters asserted therein. See Kellner v. Amazon, Officers, Directors, 
& S’holders, No. 22-01124, 2023 WL 6200031, at *4 (D.N.J. Feb. 23, 2023) (“[W]hile this Court 
may consider previous filings and opinions in related court proceedings, it may not do so for the 
truth of the matter.” (citing Werner v. Werner, 267 F.3d 288, 295 (3d Cir. 2001) (“Taking judicial 
notice of the truth of the contents of a filing from a related action could reach, and perhaps breach, 
the boundaries of proper judicial notice.”))). 
But even if the Court did examine those documents for their truth, it is not at all obvious 
that they establish that the Superior Court dismissed the 1991 civil action with prejudice, such that 
res judicata applies. As both parties agree, the “case disposition” is listed as “Sett -Not Sched 
Trial, Arbitr, Or Othr Cdr/Friend Hear Not Compl.” ( See Ex. 2 at 16 (ECF Pagination)). The 
docket further shows a “STPULTN DISMISL” entered on July 6, 1993. (Id.). The Court frankly 
cannot divine from any of that that this matter was dismiss ed with prejudice, particularly in view 
of Plaintiff’s allegations to the contrary —made under penalty of perjury and entitled to the PageID:
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presumption of truth at this stage. 5 And even if the Court credited Defendant’s assumption that 
the parties settled the matter, nothing in the record plausibly suggests to the Court that any such 
settlement occurred with prejudice . See, e.g., Pet Gifts USA, LLC v. Imagine This Co., No. 14-
03884, 2023 WL 7154120, at *2 (D.N.J. Aug. 30, 2023) (“Prior to trial, the matter settled, and on 
January 9, 2019, the parties submitted a Stipulation of Dismissal without prejudice as to the 
Defendants’ counterclaim. Because the Stipulation disposed of all parties’ claims, the Court 
directed the Clerk to close the file.”); Litgo New Jersey, Inc. v. Mauriello, No. 06-2891, 2009 WL 
10690452, at *10 (D.N.J. Dec. 31, 2009), amended and vacated in part on other grounds sub nom. 
Litgo New Jersey, Inc v. Mauriello , No. 06 -2891, 2010 WL 11570281 (D.N.J. Feb. 17, 2010) 
(discussing the application of preclusion doctrines to a matter previously settled without 
prejudice).
6 Put simply: this Court will not neglect its responsibility to draw all reasonable 
inferences in Plaintiff’s favor on this Motion to Dismiss. 
Nevertheless, Defendant argues that, even assuming the 1991 civil action was dismissed 
without prejudice, “[a] litigant’s failure to take timely corrective action can render a dismissal 
effectively final.” (Reply Br. at 12). But the case Defendant cites for this proposition, Hoffman v. 
Nordic Naturals, Inc ., involves an entirely different set of factual circumstances. There, the 
District Court dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint without prejudice and granted him 30 days’ leave 
 
5 Defendant also argues that “[p]ursuant to [New] Jersey Court Rule 4:37(b)(2), once an answer has been filed, 
a plaintiff cannot voluntarily dismiss her case without a court order .” ( Id. (emphasis added) ). This, Defendant 
reasons, means “that the Superior Court formally disposed of the 1991 case by entering the September 28, 2022 order, 
which carries full preclusive effect for purposes of res judicata .” (Id. at 25). Defendant obfuscates the rules. Under 
Rule 4:37-1, if the court grants a plaintiff leave to voluntarily dismiss her action after a defendant has filed an answer, 
“[u]nless otherwise specified[,]” such dismissal is presumptively without prejudice . And, in any event, Defendant 
makes his argument based on the current New Jersey Court Rules, and thereby appears to assume that those Rules 
have not changed since 1991. 
 
6 Although these cases consider dismissals brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41, the New Jersey 
analogue ( New Jersey Court Rule 4:37) functions much the same, as relevant to this analysis . Discussed supra, 
however, neither party makes any argument as to whether the current version of the New Jersey Court Rules have 
been amended since the 1991 civil action in question here. PageID:
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to amend his complaint. When plaintiff failed to do so, he “elected to ‘stand on his complaint’” 
and thereby converted the District Court’s “dismissal into a final order.” Hoffman v. Nordic Nats., 
Inc., 837 F.3d 272 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Borelli v. City of Reading , 532 F.2d 950, 951–52 (3d 
Cir. 1976)). Here, Plaintiff alleges that the Superior Court never resolved any dispositive 
motions—like a motion to dismiss. (Am. Compl. ¶ 43). Defendant does not seem to dispute this, 
and cites no cases for the p roposition that a plaintiff who voluntarily dismisses her complaint 
without prejudice converts her voluntarily dismissal into one with prejudice by failing to file an 
amended complaint within a certain (and unspecified) period of time. Nor has Defendant cited 
any case law describing how the NJCVA might impact that analysis. 
Defendant also contends that “[o]nce the Superior Court dismissed Plaintiff’s 1991 case 
and she never sought to reinstate it, or appeal it, or seek relief under Rule 4:50- 1, the dismissal 
became final for preclusion purposes.” ( Id. at 12). New Jersey Court Rule 4:50- 1 provides the 
following: 
[T]he court may relieve a party or the party ’s legal representative 
from a final judgment or order for the following reasons: (a) 
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (b) newly 
discovered evidence which would probably alter the judgment or 
order and which by due diligence could not have been discovered in 
time to move for a new trial under [Rule] 4:49; (c) fraud (whether 
heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or 
other misconduct of an adverse party; (d) the judgment or order is 
void; (e) the judgment or order has been satisfied, released or 
discharged, or a prior judgment or order upon which it is based has 
been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that 
the judgment or order should have prospective application; or (f) any 
other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment or 
order. 
“A motion under Rule 4:50- 1 must be ‘made within a reasonable time;’ however, motions made 
under Rule 4:50-1(a), (b), or (c) must be made within one year of the judgment or order.” Diaz v. 
Bobadilla, No. A-3944-17T1, 2019 WL 1513807, at *4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Apr. 8, 2019) . PageID:
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Defendant’s argument regarding New Jersey Court Rule 4:50-1, however, presupposes (i) that the 
underlying dismissal order was “final,” and (ii) that the passage of the NJCVA and its application 
to Plaintiff’s specific set of factual circumstances does not constitute a “reason justifying relief 
from the operation of the judgment or order[,]” which would permit a plaintiff to file a motion for 
relief greater than one year following an order or judgment. N.J. Ct. R. 4:50-1–2; see also Diaz v. 
Bobadilla, No. A-3944-17T1, 2019 WL 1513807, at *4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Apr. 8, 2019) 
(“When deciding if a motion for relief under Rule 4:50-1 has been ‘made within a reasonable time,’ 
the court must consider ‘the surrounding circumstances including the length of time that has passed 
and a due consideration for competing rights and interests which have come to exist.’” (first 
quoting Friedman v. Monaco & Brown Corp., 258 N.J. Super. 539, 543 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div.1992); then citing City of Newark v. (497) Block 1854, 244 N.J. Super. 402 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1990))). For reasons discussed infra , the Court does not see fit to make any such 
determination regarding the application of the NJCVA at this stage. 
 Finally, Defendant argues that Plaintiff “deliberately failed to disclose that she possessed 
her late mother’s full litigation file from the 1991 action and that she had sought to obtain the 
Court’s file from the Superior Court Clerk in Middlesex County in October 2021.” (Mov. Br. at 
7). Defendant does not contend that the litigation file contains any record that the civil matter was 
dismissed with prejudice, nor does he explain why Plaintiff’s failure to disclose that she had sought 
to obtain the file supports dismissal at this juncture. ( See generally Mov. Br.). In any event, the 
Court again notes that, in deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a district court 
is “required to accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and draw all inferences in the 
facts alleged in the light most favorable to the [plaintiff].” Phillips v. County of Allegheny , 515 
F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008) . Furthermore, the Court generally “may not consider matters PageID:
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extraneous to the pleadings” when deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, or else risk converting the 
motion into one for summary judgment. In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 
1426 (3d Cir. 1997). To the extent Defendant seeks to dispute Plaintiff’s factual allegations or 
urge this Court to look beyond the four corners of the Amended Complaint, the Court reminds 
Defendant that such arguments are not appropriate at this stage of the litigation. See Cevdet Aksut 
Ogullari Koll. Sti v. Cavusoglu, No. 14-3362, 2018 WL 585542, at *3 (D.N.J. Jan. 29, 2018), aff’d 
sub nom. Cevdet Aksut Ve Ogullari Koll.Sti v. Cavusoglu, 756 F. App’x 119 (3d Cir. 2018) (“The 
inferences that the Court must make from allegations in a complaint at the Rule 12 stage are wholly 
separate from the inferences a court makes based on evidentiary support from the record at the 
Rule 56 stage.”); Kim v. Dongbu Tour & Travel, Inc., No. 12- 1136, 2012 WL 12903168, at *2 
(D.N.J. Oct. 9, 2012) (“‘[O]nce a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing 
any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint.’ For this reason, ‘when a complaint 
adequately states a claim, it may not be dismissed based on a district court’s assessment that the 
plaintiff will fail to find evidentiary support for his allegations or prove his claim to the satisfaction 
of the factfinder.’” (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 546) (citation modified)). Moreover, the Hon. 
Michael A. Hammer, U.S.M.J. stayed discovery in this matter at Defendant’s request (and with 
Plaintiff’s consent), such that the factual record is not sufficiently developed for summary 
judgment motion practice. (See D.E. Nos. 73–77). 
 In short, despite Defendant’s best efforts to argue the contrary, res judicata does not bar 
Plaintiff’s allegations at this stage. 
 The Entire Controversy Doctrine. Defendant argues next that Plaintiff’s claims are 
independently barred by the Entire Controversy Doctrine. The entire controversy doctrine “is 
New Jersey’s specific, idiosyncratic application of traditional res judicata principles.” Rycoline PageID:
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Prods., Inc., 109 F.3d at 886. The equitable doctrine “requires adversaries to join all possible 
claims stemming from an event or series of events in one suit[,]” Paramount Aviation Corp. v. 
Agusta, 178 F.3d 132, 135 (3d Cir. 1999), and is “intended to be applied to prevent a party from 
voluntarily electing to hold back a related component of the controversy in the first proceeding by 
precluding it from being raised in a subsequent proceeding thereafter[,]” Oltremare v. ESR Custom 
Rugs, Inc., 749 A .2d 862 ( N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000). At bottom, [t]he doctrine aims to 
“promote judicial efficiency, assure fairness to all parties with a material interest in an action, and 
encourage the conclusive determination of a legal controversy.” Olds v. Donnelly , 696 A.2d 633 
(N.J. 1997) (citing DiTrolio v. Antiles, 662 A.2d 494 (N.J. 1995)). For that reason, the doctrine 
“does not apply to claims that are unaccrued at the time of the underlying litigation[,]” id., and “a 
court must consider whether the party against whom the doctrine is sought to be invoked has had 
a fair and reasonable opportunity to litigate that claim[,]” Hillsborough Twp. Bd. of Educ. v. Faridy 
Thorne Frayta, 728 A.2d 857 (citing Hobart Bros. Co. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 806 A.2d 810, 
817 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002)). 
 Here, Plaintiff has not engaged in the kind of mischief that the Entire Controversy Doctrine 
aims to prevent. She has not withheld claims in an effort to snag two bites at the proverbial apple, 
nor has she sued a defendant previously excluded from the 1991 civil action. Moreover, Defendant 
cites no cases for the proposition that the Entire Controversy Doctrine bars a plaintiff who 
voluntarily dismissed her claims—without prejudice —from bringing those claims again within an 
appropriate time period, even when that dismissal required leave of court pursuant to Rule 4:37-
1(b). See Arena v. Borough of Jamesburg, Middlesex Cnty., 706 A.2d 790, 792 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1998) (“[T]he entire controversy doctrine bars a subsequent action only when a prior 
action based on the same transactional facts has been tried to judgment or settled. . . . Therefore, PageID:
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when a prior action has been dismissed without prejudice prior to trial, a plaintiff is not barred 
from filing a subsequent action based on the same transactional facts.”). In fact, upon an 
independent review of the caselaw, the Court has identified authority to the contrary. See Arena 
v. Borough of Jamesburg, Middlesex Cnty ., 706 A.2d 790, 792 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998) 
(“The entire controversy doctrine does not affect a plaintiff ’s right to file a new action based on 
the same factual allegations as a prior action which has been dismissed without prejudice pursuant 
to Rule 4:37–1(a).”); see also Assisted Living Assocs. of Moorestown, L.L.C. v. Moorestown Twp., 
996 F. Supp. 409, 430 (D.N.J. 1998) (“It appears Judge Bookbinder [in Arena] dismissed ALA’s 
claims pursuant to R. 4:37–1(a). Nonetheless, there would appear to be no significant distinction 
between the preclusive effect of a voluntary dismissal without prejudice by stipulation of an action 
before the service of an answer or a motion for summary judgment, and the preclusive effect of a 
voluntary dismissal without prejudice by order of the court.”). 
In short, Defendant’s arguments brought under both traditional res judicata principles and 
the equitable Entire Controversy Doctrine suffer from the same, fatal issue: lack of finality. See 
Rycoline Prods., 109 F.3d at 889 (“We have noted above the close relation between the Entire 
Controversy Doctrine and traditional res judicata principles. One of the prerequisites to the 
application of res judicata in New Jersey, as elsewhere, is the existence of a prior judgment that is 
final, valid, and on the merits .”) (collecting cases) . Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s 
claims on those grounds is therefore DENIED. 
B. The NJCVA 
Defendant next contends that, even if res judicata and the Entire Controversy Doctrine do 
not bar Plaintiff’s claims, the NJCVA does not revive the statute of limitations in this instance 
because the law’s “revival window targeted victims who could not connect their abuse to later PageID:
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trauma until years had passed[,]” and Plaintiff always remembered her abuse. (Mov. Br. at 19–
20). In support of his position, Defendant cites language from press releases published by the 
NJCVA’s legislative sponsors. ( Id.). The Legislature intended to exclude Plaintiff from the 
NJCVA, according to Defendant, because she “does not allege repressed memory,” and “she fully 
recognized the connection between the alleged abuse and her psychiatric distress.” (Id. at 20). 
The Court finds this argument unsupported by the law. Defendant cites no authority to 
support his argument that the NJCVA excludes victims who have been unable to repress the 
memories of the abuses that they suffered, and the Court finds none upon its own review. Indeed, 
Defendant’s interpretation of the law flatly contradicts the cases where New Jersey courts have 
permitted plaintiffs to bring claims newly -revived under the NJCVA despite not suffering from 
repressed memory. See, e.g., C.P. v. Governing Body of Jehovah’s Witnesses, 304 A.3d 695 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2023). This Court will not be the first to interpret the NJCVA in the sharply-
limited manner Defendant suggests, and particularly not when such an interpretation would stand 
in contravention to New Jersey courts’ application of the law thus far. 
Defendant next argues that the Legislature did not intend for the law to revive cases already 
brought and previously dismissed on any grounds other than the statute of limitations, and that the 
NJCVA’s “extension of limitations periods does not erase the preclusive effect of prior 
dismissals.” (Mov. Br. at 22). Defendant cites two “predecessor bills” to the NJCVA, which both 
apparently contained the following provision: “‘The bill would not revive any action previously 
dismissed on grounds other than the statute of limitations or revive any action that has been finally 
adjudicated.’” (Mov. Br. at 20–21). Defendant concedes, however, that this language “appeared 
in the Statements to those bills rather than the enacted text.” (Id.). 
In opposition, Plaintiff argues that “[t]he plain language of the [NJ]CVA contains no PageID:
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exception excluding claims that were the subject of prior litigation[,]” and Defendant’s argument 
“collapses entirely if, as Plaintiff alleges (and the public record corroborates), no adjudication 
occurred and no consideration changed hands. ” ( Opp. Br. at 9). Defendant replies that “the 
Appellate Division squarely rejected the proposition that the [NJ]CVA allows a second 
opportunity to litigate claims that were previously filed and dismissed.” (Reply Br. at 2). 
Defendant cites to Y.G. v. Bd. of Educ. for Twp. of Teaneck , No. A-3433-23, 2025 WL 2534928 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Sept. 4, 2025), cert. denied, 351 A.3d 624 (N.J. 2026) where the court 
“held that the CVA revival window did not apply because [the plaintiff’s] earlier case had been 
adjudicated and dismissed.” (Reply at 2). 
Defendant breezes by a key detail from Y.G .: there, the court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims 
brought before the enactment of the NJCVA with prejudice . As discussed extensively supra, at 
this early stage of the litigation, the Court declines to credit Defendant’s assumption that the same 
is true of the 1991 civil action at issue here. To be sure, discovery may reveal that the 1991 civil 
action was fully adjudicated on the merits and resulted in a dismissal with prejudice. In that event, 
Defendant may certainly file a motion for summary judgment, as appropriate. At this early stage 
of the litigation, however, and for all the reasons articulated herein, the Court finds that Plaintiff 
has levied sufficient allegations against Defendant to plausibly allege a claim unde r the NJCVA 
that is not barred by either res judicata or the Entire Controversy Doctrine.
7 
C. Motion for Sanctions 
Because this Court DENIES Defendant’s motion to dismiss, (D.E. No. 52), Defendant’s 
motion for sanctions, (D.E. No. 53), is likewise DENIED as moot, without prejudice to 
 
7 As Defendant does not appear to move for dismissal based on the merits of Plaintiff’s claims, (see generally 
Mov. Br.), the Court need not address those substantive allegations here. PageID:
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Defendant’s ability to re-raise his motion, as appropriate, and with leave of Court, at a later date. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Defendant’s Motions to Dismiss the Complaint and for Sanctions are DENIED. An 
appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion. 
s/ Esther Salas 
 Esther Salas, U.S.D.J. PageID:
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