govinfo:USCOURTS-kyed-3_25-cr-00004-1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
FRANKFORT 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
 
Plaintiff, 
 
v. 
 
DANIEL LEE FRANTZ, 
 
Defendant. 
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MEMORANDUM OPINION 
& 
ORDER 
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This matter is before the Court on Defendant Daniel Frantz’s Motion for Judgment of 
Acquittal or, in the Alternative, a New Trial. [R. 93]. For the following reasons, the Court 
DENIES Frantz’s motion. 
I 
On January 17, 2024, members of the Frankfort Police Department received information 
from a confidential informant that the defendant, Daniel Frantz, planned to travel to Louisville to 
purchase narcotics. [R. 89 at 130]. In addition to this information, the informant told officers that 
Frantz would be in a “tannish-colored van,” consistent with police surveillance showing that 
Frantz drove a tan-colored van. [Id.] The informant gave specific information that Frantz would 
be meeting a female in Louisville at a halfway house. [Id.] At this point, the police decided to set 
up a surveillance plan to follow Frantz’s actions that day. [Id. at 130–33]. 
Just before nightfall, officers observed Frantz leaving his place of employment in the van 
and driving onto I-64 in the direction of Louisville. [R. 90 at 117]. The officers observed Frantz 
stop at a residence—the suspected halfway house—and pick up a female companion. [ Id. at 
118]. Frantz and the woman left and drove to a location on Slevin Street in Louisville. [Id.] 
There, officers observed Frantz exit the car and enter the Slevin Street house, welcomed in by a 
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“black male.” [Id.] Frantz stayed inside for about 20 minutes before returning to the van. [Id.] 
Frantz then drove to a second residence, where he and the female entered and remained inside 
for about 45 minutes to an hour. [Id. at 119]. Frantz and his companion then exited and returned 
to the car. 
After leaving the second residence, Frantz returned to the halfway house and dropped off 
his female companion. [R. 89 at 137]. Frantz then drove to what Detective Brett Blanton 
described as a “church parking lot,” where Frantz remained for approximately 20 minutes. [R. 90 
at 120]. Detective Blanton testified that he saw “the reflection of the lights, like the hood being 
raised, and you could see the lights moving as if the hood was being raised. And then a short 
time after, it appeared the hood went back down.” [Id. at 120]. Officer Joshua McConnell also 
testified that he saw a figure open and close the hood of the vehicle in the parking lot. [R. 89 at 
137–38]. Both Blanton and McConnell testified that their efforts to remain concealed and the 
nighttime darkness made it difficult to get a crystal-clear view of what transpired, but both 
testified that they saw someone open and close the hood. [Id. at 138; R. 90 at 120]. McConnell 
testified that he inferred that Frantz opened and closed the hood because he was, at that point, the 
only individual remaining in the van. [Id.] 
After this parking lot rendezvous, Frantz began his return trip to the Frankfort area. By 
this point, as many as four or five vehicles assisted in surveilling Frantz’s return. [Id.] 
McConnell testified that Frantz deviated from the normal route back to Frankfort in effort to do a 
“heat check,” which in McConnell’s experience refers to when people traveling with narcotics 
take back roads to “see if somebody’s following them, or if a car is tailing them.” [Id. at 139]. 
McConnell testified that at this point he stopped tailing Frantz and began driving to the garage 
where Frantz left from earlier in the day, thinking that Frantz might head that way. [Id. at 140–
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41]. His instincts were correct, and he ended up encountering “the tan van” on the road. [Id. at 
141]. McConnell testified that Frantz was driving on the opposite side of the road and that 
McConnell had to swerve to avoid hitting the van. [Id.] At this point, McConnell radioed to 
marked units to inform them of the reckless driving. [Id. at 141–42]. 
Frankfort police officer Anthony Catania responded to the call. Catania was part of a 
group of officers “staged at different areas” to intercept Frantz once he arrived back in Frankfort. 
[R. 90 at 66]. Catania was the closest to Frantz and McConnell at the time that McConnell called 
in Frantz’s erratic driving. McConnell’s call witnessing erratic driving gave Catania probable 
cause to initiate the traffic stop. [Id. at 67]. Catania initiated the traffic stop and engaged with 
Frantz. Catania testified that Frantz was “evasive and not cooperative,” and that in his experience 
as a police officer Frantz’s “deceptive behavior and being . . . uncooperative is an indicator for 
me that he’s trying to conceal something.” [Id. at 71]. Catania’s body-worn camera captured this 
interaction, and the United States played that video for the jury during the course of Catania’s 
testimony. 
Catania had a narcotics dog available and had the dog sniff around the van. Catania 
testified that the dog’s change in behavior indicated a positive alert to the presence of narcotics 
in the van. [Id. at 78]. Catania and another officer, Sergeant Gonzales, began an exhaustive 
search of the van that lasted approximately 45 minutes. [Id. at 79]. The vehicle search netted 
drug paraphernalia including a scale with residual odor on it, several plastic bags concealed 
behind a car speaker, and a pipe. [Id. at 80]. During a search under the van’s hood, Catania and 
Gonzales located a bag that contained methamphetamine. [Id.] Throughout Catania’s testimony, 
the United States played the body-worn camera footage showing the hood search. 
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Officers arrested Frantz and transported him to the police department. Detective Blanton 
interviewed Frantz after Frantz signed a Miranda waiver form. [Id. at 125]. Blanton testified that 
Frantz “corroborated everything we saw on surveillance” and told the interviewing officers that 
“he was fronted one pound of meth” to sell. [Id. at 126]. Blanton further testified that Frantz 
provided information about his “plug” and showed officers his plug’s contact information from 
his phone. [Id. at 127]. Blanton testified that the seized methamphetamine was “significantly 
more” than 50 grams, and that the other drugs found on Frantz indicated “distribution amounts,” 
given that they were sorted into smaller bags and that officers found other items consistent with 
drug distribution in the van, such as the digital scale. [Id. at 129–31]. Blanton described the 
interview as laid back and conversational because the purpose of such interviews is to determine 
whether the suspect would be a good candidate to become a confidential informant. [Id. at 127–
28]. The officers determined that Frantz would not be a good candidate for a confidential 
informant role and ultimately patrol units transferred Frantz to jail. [Id. at 128, 132]. 
On April 3, 2025, a grand jury returned a one-count indictment charging Frantz with the 
knowing and intentional possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of 
methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). [R. 1]. Trial commenced on February 
17, 2026, and on February 19 the jury found Frantz guilty. [R. 79]. After granting two extensions 
of time to file post-trial motions, [Rs. 86, 88], Frantz filed the instant motion on April 10, 2026. 
[R. 93]. The government responded in opposition, [R. 99], and Frantz filed a reply brief in 
support. [R. 101]. The matter is thus ripe for adjudication. 
II 
Frantz, through counsel, filed a motion for judgment of acquittal or, in the alternative, a 
new trial, pursuant to Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 29 and 33, respectively. [R. 93]. 
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Frantz argues that the evidence at trial did not support his conviction. The Court addresses 
Frantz’s Rule 29 and Rule 33 motions in turn. 
A 
After the government closes its case, “the court on the defendant’s motion must enter a 
judgment of acquittal of any offense for which the evidence is insufficient to sustain a 
conviction.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(a). “After the jury has returned a guilty verdict, the court may 
set aside and enter an acquittal.” Id. 29(c)(2). On review of a Rule 29 motion, the Court may not 
“independently weigh the evidence, nor judge the credibility of witnesses.” United States v. 
Paulus, 894 F.3d 267, 275 (6th Cir. 2018). The Court views the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the prosecution and asks “whether . . . any reasonable trier of fact could have found 
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Emmons, 8 
F.4th 454, 477–78 (6th Cir. 2021) (citation modified). Accordingly, “the prosecution’s proof 
need not remove every reasonable hypothesis except guilty.” United States v. Wright, 16 F.3d 
1429, 1440 (6th Cir. 1994). “A defendant claiming insufficiency of the evidence bears a very 
heavy burden.” Emmons, 8 F.4th at 478 (quoting United States v. Abboud, 438 F.3d 554, 589 
(6th Cir. 2006)). Further, the Court draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the government, 
even where the evidence is circumstantial. United States v. Carter, 355 F.3d 920, 925 (6th Cir. 
2004). 
“The elements of a charge of possession with intent to distribute illegal drugs are: (1) the 
defendant knowingly, (2) possessed a controlled substance, (3) with intent to distribute.” United 
States v. Tatum, 462 F. App’x 602, 605 (6th Cir. 2012). To prove that the defendant “knowingly” 
possessed methamphetamine, the defendant simply had to know that he possessed a controlled 
substance. United States v. Stapleton, 297 F. App’x 413, 426 (6th Cir. 2008). “Possession can be 
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proven either by evidence of actual possession or constructive possession.” United States v. 
Russell, 595 F.3d 633, 645 (6th Cir. 2010). “To establish constructive possession, the evidence 
must indicate ownership, domain or control over the contraband itself or the premises or vehicle 
in which the contraband is concealed.” Id. (citation modified). “Physical proximity to drugs, or 
mere presence in an area where drugs are found, is not sufficient.” Id. The jury may find the 
defendant intended to distribute drugs by drawing inferences from the quantity and manner of 
packaging of the drugs, the presence of equipment such as a digital scale for the sale of drugs, 
drug purity, the presence of large amounts of cash, and the defendant’s own words and actions. 
See United States v. Coffee, 434 F.3d 887, 897 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v. Stewart, 69 F. 
App’x 213, 216 (6th Cir. 2003); see also Sixth Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions § 14.01 (2025), 
Committee Commentary Instruction 14.01. 
Frantz first argues that there is insufficient knowledge to support his conviction. [R. 93-1 
at 10]. In essence, Frantz argues that the government’s evidence did not prove that Frantz knew 
there was methamphetamine in the vehicle at the time of his arrest. In support of this argument, 
Frantz cites to United States v. Grogan, 133 F.4th 553 (6th Cir. 2025), for the position that an 
attenuated theory of constructive possession may be insufficient where the government cannot 
present evidence beyond mere proximity for the jury to infer constructive possession. [R. 93-1 at 
11]. Frantz argues that the government failed to establish constructive possession based on a 
number of alleged evidentiary deficiencies. First, that police did not perform fingerprint or DNA 
analysis on the seized methamphetamine. [Id. at 12]. Second, that Frantz did not own the van and 
that the government did not show whether Frantz was in exclusive possession of the vehicle. [Id. 
at 12–13]. Third, that the methamphetamine was not in plain view when the officers began their 
search. [Id. at 13]. Fourth, that police never saw the methamphetamine in Frantz’s hands. [Id. at 
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14]. Fifth, that officers could not definitively state that they saw Frantz placing 
methamphetamine under the hood of the van. [Id.] 
None of Frantz’s arguments are convincing when viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the prosecution. It is completely immaterial whether the drugs were in plain view. 
Indeed, the concealed location of the methamphetamine under the hood of the car—paired with 
testimony that Frantz had sole possession of the car when officers observed someone opening 
and closing its hood earlier in the evening—suggests that Frantz constructively possessed the 
drugs by exercising control over both the methamphetamine and the vehicle where the 
methamphetamine was concealed. United States v. London, 2026 U.S. App. KEXUS 13904, at 
*23–24 (6th Cir. May 14, 2026). The jury was free to infer from the officers’ testimony that 
Frantz, as the only remaining occupant of the vehicle, was in fact the person who opened the 
hood of the car in the parking lot before making his way back to Frankfort. Because officers later 
found the methamphetamine concealed under the hood, the jury was free to infer that Frantz 
himself had placed it there based off of the officers’ testimony. It is also immaterial whether 
Frantz’s fingerprints were on the methamphetamine packaging or whether officers saw him 
handle the packaging. On a theory of constructive possession, it is enough that he exercised 
control over the vehicle where the contraband was located. Id. at *24. 
Frantz raises the argument that the government did not conclusively show whether Frantz 
had “exclusive possession” of the vehicle. Indeed, this was an issue in Grogan. There, the Sixth 
Circuit found that insufficient evidence existed to independently convict the defendant of 
possession where the defendant had loaned his car to his friends, where the car had been in the 
shop for several days before his arrest, where the police did not see Grogan with the drugs, 
where no one could confirm when the drugs entered the vehicle, and where the drugs were not in 
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plain view but rather concealed in a box in the center console. 133 F.4th at 565. But Frantz’s 
reliance on Grogan is misplaced because the Sixth Circuit decided that case based on the fact 
that the government improperly relied on withdrawn proffer evidence during earlier plea 
negotiations. Id. (“Ultimately, we are assessing the impact of admitting what was essentially 
Grogan’s drug-ownership confession.”). The Court held that “even if the government’s 
remaining evidence makes it implausible that anyone else owned the drugs, its heavy reliance on 
the proffer—a confession in which Grogan admits the drugs were his—undermines our 
confidence that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error.” Id. (citation modified). 
Frantz’s case is also distinguishable from Grogan on the facts. Here, officers testified that 
they witnessed Frantz manipulate the hood of the car in Louisville, allowing a permissible 
inference that Frantz placed something under the hood. Police found the methamphetamine 
concealed under the hood. The jury heard testimony that the amount of methamphetamine, the 
presence of a digital scale, and the presence of individual baggies was consistent with 
distribution, rather than personal use. In Grogan, there was a significant question about Grogan’s 
use of the vehicle: the drugs were found during an inventory search of the car, an officer saw 
Grogan use the vehicle on a single occasion, and Grogan’s ex-girlfriend told police that he used 
the car that day. Id. at 556–57. Here, the jury heard testimony that a confidential informant told 
police that Frantz would be driving to Louisville in a van to pick up drugs, corroborated by the 
fact that police surveilled Frantz driving that van to Louisville and back to Frankfort, consistent 
with the informant’s tip. Police found drugs in that van, corroborating the confidential 
informant’s detailed statements about Frantz’s planned activities that day. See United States v. 
Howard, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 28388, at *7 (6th Cir. Oct. 28, 2025) (“As a basis for 
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knowledge, we presume that informants know more about a suspect’s crimes when they provide 
detailed statements rather than conclusory accusations.”). 
And, of course, the jury heard testimony that Frantz made inculpatory statements to 
officers during his interview, whereas in Grogan the Court found that the government used 
improper proffer evidence to sway the jury’s decision. Frantz states that his “uncorroborated 
statement . . . is insufficient to sustain the conviction alone.” [R. 93-1 at 17]. But the government 
did not support the conviction based on the statement alone. Instead, the statement and the 
physical evidence, together, sustain the conviction. “All elements of the offense must be 
established by independent evidence or corroborated admissions, but one available mode of 
corroboration is for the independent evidence to bolster the confession itself and thereby prove 
the offense ‘through’ the statements of the accused.” Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 156 
(1954). In this case, the independent evidence—the confidential informant’s accurate tip, one 
pound of methamphetamine found in the van’s hood, the testimony about Frantz’s manipulation 
of the hood, and the assorted drug distribution paraphernalia— corroborates the statements that 
Frantz gave to the police. The Court instructed the jury that they could independently decide 
whether to credit the government’s claim that Frantz admitted certain facts. [R. 98 at 23]. 
Together, the independent evidence and Frantz’s statements gave the jury a sufficient basis on 
which to sustain their conviction. Smith, 348 U.S. at 156. 
Looking at the totality of the evidence, the jury had sufficient evidence to support its 
conclusion that Frantz knowingly possessed the methamphetamine with the intent to distribute it. 
The Court is satisfied that any reasonable trier of fact could find that the government proved the 
essential elements in this case. Frantz notes that alternative theories exist, such as the possibility 
that someone else put drugs in the car or that his confession to police may not have been related 
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to his January 17 trip to Louisville. But “the prosecution’s proof need not remove every 
reasonable hypothesis except guilty.” Wright, 16 F.3d at 1440. The evidence admitted at trial and 
considered by the jury supports the jury’s conclusion that the government met all of the 
necessary elements. For these reasons, the Court DENIES Frantz’s motion for a judgment of 
acquittal. 
B 
In the alternative, Frantz moves for a new trial pursuant to Rule 33. [R. 93-1 at 17]. 
“Upon the defendant’s motion, the court may vacate any judgment and grant a new trial if the 
interest of justice so requires.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(a). Rule 33 motions are ordinarily granted 
“only in the extraordinary circumstances where the evidence preponderates heavily against the 
verdict.” United States v. Hughes, 505 F.3d 578, 593 (6th Cir. 2007). Unlike a Rule 29 motion, 
on review of a Rule 33 motion the Court may “act as a thirteenth juror, assessing the credibility 
of witnesses and the weight of the evidence.” Id.; United States v. Lutz, 154 F.3d 581, 589 (6th 
Cir. 1998). Rule 33 is an extraordinary remedy, used sparingly and only where the Court has a 
firm conviction that a mistake has been made. United States v. Turner, 490 F. App’x 747, 754 
(6th Cir. 2012). Disagreement with the jury, or a judicial preference for a different outcome on 
the same facts, is not enough. Id. 
Frantz argues that the government’s case heavily depended on the testimony of law 
enforcement and suggested that “insurmountable discrepancies” existed between the officers’ 
testimonies and their investigative reports. [R. 93-1 at 17]. Frantz nitpicks individual instances of 
supposed inconsistencies during testimony and suggests to the Court that this requires a new 
trial, citing no legal authority. The Court addresses these discrepancies in turn. 
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Frantz first faults the officers for testifying that they witnessed “someone under the hood 
of the vehicle prior to Daniel leaving Louisville,” a detail that they did not include in their 
investigative report. Defense counsel cross-examined the officers on this discrepancy at trial, so 
the jury was fully aware that this incongruity existed. See, e.g., [R. 90 at 148–49]. Detective 
Blanton testified that neglecting to include minute-by-minute information in an investigative 
report is common, testifying that “sometimes, you know, we just unfortunately forget to do a 
supplement about minor things like that.” [Id. at 149]. The Court is not convinced that the failure 
to include this detail in an investigative report warrants the extraordinary remedy of a new trial, 
particularly where defense counsel vigorously cross-examined the officers on this point in the 
presence of the jury. As with any witness, the jury could decide to credit the testimony or they 
could discredit it. That they apparently chose to credit it may not weigh in Frantz’s favor, but it 
does not warrant a new trial. 
Frantz next argues that the officers spoke to Louisville agents Ken Borders and Clayton 
Bunch, “a fact unknown until trial.” [R. 93-1 at 18]. Frantz argues that this nondisclosure robbed 
him of the ability to speak with this officer and otherwise build his defense. [Id.] At the 
conclusion of trial, the United States provided additional requested discovery to defense counsel 
containing the text messages between the investigating officers and Borders and Bunch. [R. 99 at 
11]. The text messages, attached to Frantz’s motion, show a conversation sending halfway 
house’s address and Google Maps location and then a separate thread asking Louisville officers 
to divert calls for suspicious vehicles because the officers were surveilling the area in unmarked 
cars. [R. 93-2]. 
Under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), criminal prosecutors have a 
constitutional duty to disclose material, exculpatory evidence. A Brady violation has three 
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elements: (1) the evidence at issue must favor the accused, (2) that evidence must have been 
suppressed by the state, either willfully or inadvertently, and (3) prejudice must have ensued. 
McNeil v. Bagley, 10 F.4th 588, 598 (6th Cir. 2021). Frantz does not argue how these messages 
favored him, why the government would have suppressed these messages, and whether any 
prejudice ensued. The government argues that the officers’ communications do not undermine or 
contradict their testimony, do not refute Frantz’s admissions, and do not provide any additional 
impeachment unaddressed at trial. [R. 99 at 12]. Frantz suggests that the messages show that 
Blanton “was well aware of the location and name of the residence of the unidentified female” 
without explaining what significance this has. [R. 93-1 at 18]. 
The Court does not find this “discrepancy” to be material and notes that the officers 
testified nearly two years to the date of the original investigation. See [R. 90 at 120] (“Again, this 
was two years ago, so I don’t recall the exact sequence of events[.]”) When presented with 
competing explanations, the simplest one is usually the correct one. It is more likely that the 
officers, testifying two years after the fact, could not remember the exact address of a location 
they surveilled one time than it is that the government concealed this evidence for some 
nefarious purpose. In any event, Frantz makes no attempt to run this discrepancy through the 
Brady test. It makes no material difference to the evidence whether the officers remembered the 
address of the halfway house in February 2026. 
This is not a case where “the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict.” 
Hughes, 505 F.3d at 593. The totality of the circumstances in this case supports the finding of 
constructive possession. Frantz’s own statements, coupled with constructive possession, more 
than demonstrate that the government met its burden at trial. The Court will not disturb the 
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jury’s verdict by granting a new trial. For these reasons, the Court DENIES Frantz’s motion for 
a new trial. 
III 
Accordingly, and the Court being sufficiently advised, it is hereby ORDERED as 
follows: 
1. Frantz’s Motion for Judgment of Acquittal or, in the Alternative, a New Trial [R. 
93] is DENIED. 
2. Sentencing in this matter remains scheduled for Wednesday, June 10, 2026, at 
1:30 p.m. at the United States Courthouse in Frankfort, Kentucky. 
This 4th day of June, 2026. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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