govinfo:USCOURTS-ksd-2_26-cv-02274-1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 
 
MICHELE BLAKELY, 
 
 Plaintiff,
 
 v.
 
TOBY CROUSE, 
 
 Defendant.
 
 
 
 
 

 
ORDER 
Plaintiff Michele Blakely1 filed this Bivens action against U.S. District Judge Toby Crouse. 
Plaintiff claims that Judge Crouse violated her constitutional right to due process when he decided 
her case in the absence of jurisdiction to do so. Plaintiff sought leave to proceed in forma pauperis 
(“IFP”). 
Judge Mitchell reviewed Plaintiff’s complaint and motion. She granted Plaintiff’s request 
to proceed IFP and recommended dismissal of the case in a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”). 
Doc. 5. Plaintiff objected. Doc. 6. Plaintiff also moved to supplement the record. Doc. 7. 
Judge Mitchell recommended dismissal based on lack of subject-mat ter jurisdiction and, 
to the extent any claim remains, as barred by absolute judicial immunity. Plaintiff objects that she 
is not seeking to collaterally at tack a prior judicial decision a nd that Judge Crouse acted without 
subject-matter jurisdiction, depriving him of judicial immunity. The Court adopts Judge Mitchell’s 
R&R and dismisses the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and based on judicial immunity. 
The Court further certifies any appeal of this decision as frivolous. 
 
1 Plaintiff proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis. The Court liberally construes Plaintiff’s pro se filings and holds 
them to a less stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers. See Hall v. Bellmon , 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th 
Cir. 1991). But the Court does not assume the role of advocate. Id. 

2 
 Standard of Review. Courts may screen the complaint of a plaintiff who proceeds in forma 
pauperis. A court may then dismiss the complaint if it determines that the action fails to state a 
claim on which relief may be granted.2 A magistrate judge who completes the initial review must 
issue a R&R for a decision by the district judge b ecause this is a dispositive matter. The district 
judge reviews de novo those portio ns of the magistrate judge’s R&R to which written objections 
have been made. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). If no specific objections are timely made, the district 
judge may review the R&R under any standard she finds appropriate. Price v. Kansas, 2016 WL 
4500910, at *1 (D. Kan. 2016) (citing Summers v. Utah, 927 F.2d 1165, 1167 (10th Cir. 1991)). 
“The district judge may accept, reject, or modi fy the recommended disposition; receive further 
evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). 
 Plaintiff’s Complaint, Factual Alle gations, and Procedural History. Plaintiff brings 
this case because she is unhappy with the ruling s of Judge Crouse in a prior case, Case No. 
2:23-cv-02272-TC-ADM. In that case, Plaintiff sued American Credit Acceptance, LLC (“ACA”) 
and CarMax Auto Superstores, Inc. (“CarMax”). Plaintiff originally brought the case in state court. 
ACA removed. Judge Crouse dismissed the federal case. In doing so, he confirmed an arbitration 
award in favor of ACA and held that Plainti ff’s claims against CarMax were barred by the 
doctrines of claim and issue preclusion. Plaint iff now asks this Cour t to award her $250,000 in 
damages and punitive damages against Judge Crouse in his individual capacity because he entered 
a void judgment that violates Pl aintiff’s constitutional rights. She contends that removal was 
improper in the prior action, that Judge Crouse denied her due pr ocess, and that he lacked a 
statutory basis to confirm the arbitration award. 
 
2 There are also other grounds for dismissal. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). 

3 
 This is not Plaintiff’s first challenge to Judge Crouse’s decision. Plaintiff appealed Judge 
Crouse’s order in 2024. The Tenth Circuit affirmed. Blakely v. CarMax Auto Superstores, Inc. , 
2024 WL 4891269 (10th Cir. 2024). Plaintiff then file d a motion for relief from judgment at the 
district-court level and a petition for writ of certiorari with the Supr eme Court. Judge Crouse 
denied Plaintiff’s motion in April 2025 and the Supreme Court denied Plaintiff’s petition in June 
2025. Plaintiff again asked Judge Crouse for relief from judgment in February 2026. Judge Crouse 
denied Plaintiff relief, and Plaintiff appealed again in March 2026. This time, the Tenth Circuit 
dismissed for failure to prosecute on April 15, 2026. Plaintiff filed the instant case on May 7, 2026. 
 Subject-Matter Jurisdiction. The first question is whether this Court has subject-matter 
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s case. It does not. 
 Plaintiff seeks to collaterally attack the rulings of Judge Crouse (and, in effect, the decision 
of the Tenth Circuit). She contends that Judge Crouse’s rulings were erroneous and that he lacked 
jurisdiction to enter them. But this Court lacks jurisdiction to review another federal judge’s 
rulings. Wenger v. Severson, 2025 WL. 2576953, at *4 (D. Kan. 2025). The avenues to challenge 
prior rulings include motions to alter or amen d judgment (Rule 59), motions for relief from 
judgment (Rule 60), and an appeal. 
Plaintiff already tried these avenues and failed. Most sign ificantly, the Tenth Circuit 
already reviewed Judge Crouse’s decisions. Blakely, 2024 WL 4891269. The Tenth Circuit held 
that removal was proper and that the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the case. Id. 
at *2. The Tenth Circuit also held that it was not error for the district court to consider the 
arbitration proceedings even though Plaintiff did not mention the proceedings in her state-court 
petition. Id. at *3. It affirmed the district court’s confirmation of the arbitration award and rejected 

4 
Plaintiff’s argument that she was denied due process. Id. at *4-5. Plaintiff does not get another bite 
at the apple at the district court level. 
 To the extent Plaintiff is trying yet again to relitigate Judge Crous e’s judicial decisions, 
this Court lacks jurisdiction and dismisses her claim without prejudice. 
Plaintiff tries to avoid this outcome by rep ackaging her complaints as a constitutional 
violation. Her effort does not change the nature of her challenge. But to the extent that she asserts 
a claim independent of a challenge to Judge Crouse’s decision, the Court addresses an additional 
reason for dismissal next. 
 Absolute Judicial Immunity. Plaintiff seeks damages from Judge Crouse. Judges acting 
in their judicial capacity are generally immune for suit for money damages. Mireles v. Waco, 502 
U.S. 9, 9-10 (1991). This immunity may be overcom e if the allegations arise from acts not taken 
in the judge’s judicial capacity or if the judicial act s are “taken in the complete absence of all 
jurisdiction.” Id. at 11-12. 
Here, Plaintiff’s allegations make clear that the acts she complains of were taken by Judge 
Crouse in his judicial capacity. Her complaints a ll center on an order that he entered when she 
believes he lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. She alleges that Judge Crouse “ignored all evidence 
of his lack of authority and doubled down on the void judgment without a valid explanation.” Doc. 
1 at 6. She alleges that he “will fully, unlawfully, and consciously avoided his duty of mandatory 
adherence in strictly construing the removal statutes and conferred jurisdiction absent a statutory 
basis.” Id. at 7. 
Entering an order is a judicial act. Plaintiff disagrees with the reasons and motivations 
behind that action, but “judicial immunity is not overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice.” 
Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11. Plaintiff’s complaints a bout how Judge Crouse handled her case do not 

5 
change the judicial nature of th e acts she complains of in this case. And he r challenge to Judge 
Crouse’s jurisdiction is conclusory and has already been rejected by the Te nth Circuit. Plaintiff 
has asserted no valid basis to deny Judge Crouse judicial immunity. 
To the extent that Plaintiff asserts a claim independent of a direct challenge to Judge 
Crouse’s decision, her claim is dismissed with prejudice based on absolute judicial immunity. 
Plaintiff proceeds IFP. But the Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal 
of this order would not be in good faith. The Cour t therefore denies IFP status for the purpose of 
an appeal. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962). 
 THE COURT THEREFORE ORDERS that th e R&R (Doc. 5) is ADOPTED. The Court 
dismisses Plaintiff’s claim challenging ru lings from her prior fe deral action WITHOUT 
PREJUDICE. The Court dismisses any remaining claim WITH PREJUDICE. 
 THE COURT FURTHER OR DERS that Plaintiff’s motion to supplement the record (Doc. 
7) is DENIED. 
 The case is closed. 
 IT IS SO ORDERED. 
 
 Dated: June 3, 2026 /s/ Holly L. Teeter 
 HOLLY L. TEETER 
 U N I T E D S T A T E S D I S T R I C T J U D G E 

Passage view · GavelSight