govinfo:USCOURTS-ilsd-3_25-cv-01718-0

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 
 
RUSSELL ALLEN BROWN, ) 
 ) 
 Plaintiff, ) 
 ) 
vs. ) 
 ) 
SEAN FEATHERSTUN, ) 
BLAKE JENNINGS, ) 
BRIAN MERRELL, ) 
GRACE GRAY, ) 
RANDY POLLARD, ) Case No. 25-cv-1718-DWD 
JUDGE JERRY E. CRISEL, ) 
JUDGE JOHANNA BETH WEBBER, ) 
TROY HAILS, ) 
AARON JOHNSON, ) 
JOHN MARTIN KEOUGHAN, ) 
JASON HERZIG, ) 
SCOTT ROSENBLUM, ) 
BENEDICT SONG, ) 
THOMAS M. MAAG, ) 
 ) 
 Defendants. ) 
 
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 
 
DUGAN, District Judge: 
Plaintiff Russell Allen Brown, an individual seeking to proceed in forma pauperis, 
brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged deprivations of his 
constitutional rights. (Doc. 1). Plaintiff challenges an ongoing criminal prosecution. 
Plaintiff’s initial complaint and amended complaint were dismissed as insufficient to 
state a claim and he has filed a timely second amended complaint (Docs. 8, 10, 11). Under 
28 U.S.C. § 1915, an indigent party may commence a federal court action without paying 
required costs and fees upon submission of an affidavit asserting the inability to pay such Page ID
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fees or give security therefore and stating, the nature of the action, defense or appeal and 
the affiant’s belief that he is entitled to redress. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Under § 1915(e)(2), 
the Court is also required to consider if a party has presented plausible claims for relief 
before granting pauper status. The Court may dismiss a case or deny a party’s IFP 
application if the action is clearly frivolous or maliciou s, fails to state a claim, or seeks 
monetary damages from a defendant who is immune. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). 
The Second Amended Complaint 
 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Randy Pollard, a Circuit Clerk of Court in Illinois 
state court, violated his rights b y maintaining incorrect judicial records. (Doc. 11 at 1). 
Specifically, he alleges that a 2005 conviction occurred while he was a minor and should 
not have been considered in subsequent actions. He alleges that on March 5, 2024, 
Defendants Hails, Keoughan, and Johnson carried out an improper search warrant that 
was issued by Defendant Judge Crisel despite knowledge that it was based on fraudulent 
information. (Id. at 1-2). He further alleges Defendant Featherstun improperly allowed 
the search and implemented an eavesdropping device in his home at that point. 
 Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Rosenblum, Song, and Maag, acted as an 
“attorney blockade” and did not file motions despite knowing of fraud and corruption. 
(Doc. 11 at 2). He further alleges Defendant Heflin was an appointed public defender 
who did n ot adequately represent his interests. ( Id.). He claims that Defendant Judge 
Crisel is now attempting to hide fraud by pursuing a fitness evaluation to silence him. 
(Id.). Page ID
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 Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Judge Webber, prosecutor Jennings, and FBI 
agent Herzig conducted a secret hearing that improperly led to the seizure of over 
$12,000. (Doc. 11 at 2). Finally, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Gray, a law student, 
worked with Defendants Jennings and Merrell to file inaccurate documents to hide the 
length of the prosecution. (Id.). Plaintiff seeks monetary damages, a declaration that his 
ongoing criminal prosecution, 2005 conviction, and the seizure of money are invalid, and 
a return of his money. (Doc. 11 at 2-3). 
 In support of the second amended complaint, Plaintiff filed a handful of 
documents from his state court criminal proceedings in Jefferson County, Illinois. (Doc. 
12). A review of the publicly available docket sheet shows that the matter is ongoing, 
with a bench trial set for July 9, 2026.1 
Discussion 
 Plaintiff’s second amended complaint suffers from multiple defects, and for 
reasons explained below, he has failed to state a valid claim. First, many of the named 
defendants are immune for acts taken in association with their traditional functions. 
Specifically, Featherstun, Jennings, Merrell, and Gray enjoy prosecutorial immunity. See 
Smith v. Power , 346 F.3d 740, 742 (7th Cir. 2003) (describing absolute prosecutorial 
immunity). Defendants Heflin, Rosenblum, Maag, and Song enjoy immunity as defense 
attorneys. Polk County v. Dodson , 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981) (“A public defender does not 
act under color of state law when performing a lawyer's traditional functions as counsel 
 
1 State v. Brown, Case No. 2024-CF-122 (Jeff. Cnty. Cir. Ct., Ill.), 
https://www.judici.com/courts/cases/case_history.jsp?court=IL041025J&ocl=IL041025J,2024CF122,IL041025JL20
24CF122D1, last accessed June 2, 2026. Page ID
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to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.” ). And Defendants Crisel and Webber enjoy 
judicial immunity. See Dawson v. Newman , 419 F.3d 656, 660- 61 (7th Cir. 2005) (absolute 
judicial immunity is a doctrine that has been embraced for centuries). 
 Defendant Pollard may also be entitled to immunity in his role as clerk of court. 
See Kincaid v. Vail, 969 F.2d 594, 600- 01 (7th Cir. 1992) (describing the long history of 
absolute judicial immunity for court clerks performing administrative functions of their 
job). Even if Pollard is not entitled to absolute immunity, it is not clear what Plaintiff 
alleges that Pollard actually did to cause him harm. At most, he suggests Pollard 
maintained incorrect records about a 2005 juvenile offense, but it is not as if Pollard 
independently brought this information to the forefront and initiated some kind of 
vindictive prosecution. Pollard’s mere role as an administrative employee of the Court, 
without more about his actions, is insufficient to state a claim. 
 This leaves Defendants Hails, Johnson, Keoughan, and Herzig for their alleged 
roles in a search and the forfeiture of cash. These alleged actions are intimately associated 
with the ongoing criminal proceedings, which might suggest that a stay of these 
proceedings is appropriate. However, even if the Court were to stay these proceedings, 
it is not clear at this point what Plaintiff alleges that these four personally did to harm 
him. The bald assertion that they conduct ed an improper search on false prete nses or 
seized cash without following appropriate due process protections is not enough to 
sustain a constitutional claim. The Court has given Plaintiff three opportunities to more 
clearly state his claims, and he has failed. Thus, the lawsuit will now be dismissed in full 
for failure to state a claim. Page ID
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 Finally, in earlier pleadings Plaintiff named Marty Keoghan, but Keoghan was not 
named in the Second Amended Complaint, so any claim against this individual is 
dismissed. 
 Since the filing of the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff has filed 12 additional 
motions, supplements, or documents. (Docs. 12-23). Document 12 is labeled as “exhibits” 
and purports to contain documents that demonstrate Defendant Gray (a law student) 
committed wrongdoings in her role as a student prosecutor on Plaintiff’s criminal case. 
Exhibit 13 is a collection of exhibits that purport to show the alleged mishandling of 
Plaintiff’s juvenile case that may be considered a predicate offense in his new 
proceedings. Document 14 is an emergency motion, alleging a variety of wrongs linked 
to Plaintiff’s belief that his criminal prosecution has not been timely and has involved 
constitutional wrongdoing. Documents 15 through 21 are all piecemeal supplements 
designed to elaborate upon allegations in the second amended complaint concerning 
Plaintiff’s ongoing criminal prosecution. Document 22 is labeled on the docket sheet as 
a motion for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, but in reality it appears to be an 
entirely new complaint concerning conduct by Defendant Crisel (a state cour t judge) in 
numerous criminal matters, filed without further leave of court. Finally, document 23 is 
a motion for leave to file an 86 -page supplement that alleges Plaintiff has uncovered a 
massive conspiracy he believes is linked to his ongoing criminal prosecution. None of 
the motions or supplemental documents alter the outcome of the substantive analysis 
above concerning Plaintiff’s second amended complaint. Page ID
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 As the Court previously indicated, piecemeal amendments to the operative 
pleading are not acceptable. (Doc. 10 at 7) (“The Court will not accept piecemeal 
amendments to the original Complaint); s ee Spreck v. U.S. Veterans Admin. , 67 F. App’x 
963, 964 (7th Cir. 2003) (stating a court is “not required to incorporate [a plaintiff’s] 
revised caption into an earlier submitted complaint and accept the complaint 
piecemeal”); see also Purnell v. Ill Dep’t of Corr., 2020 WL 5038589, at *1 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 26, 
2020) (citing Flannery v. Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., 354 F.3d 632, 638 n.1 (7th Cir. 2004)). 
In this case, Plaintiff has not just submitted one or two small amendments. Instead, he 
has flooded the Court with countless supplements all purporting to build upon 
allegations in the Second Amended Complaint. This influx of pleadings is not an 
appropriate way to amend allegations made in this case, and substantively, the assertions 
in the copious supplements do not strengthen Plaintiff’s underlying theories. 
Having reviewed Plaintiff’s allegations three times, the Court finds it unnecessary 
to invite further amendments. See e.g. Zimmerman v. Bornick , 25 F.4th 491, 494 (7th Cir. 
2022) (amendment would be futile if plaintiff already had multiple chances to cure 
deficiencies); Always Towing & Recovery, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 2 F.4
th 695, 707 (7th Cir. 
2021) (courts may deny leave to amend if an amendment would be futile); McCree v. 
Grissom, 657 F.3d 623, 624 (7th Cir. 2011) (leave to amend shall be granted where justice 
so requires, but leave to amend need not be given if an amendment to the complaint 
would be futile). As such, this case is now dismissed for failure to state a claim under 28 
U.S.C. § 1915e(2)(B)(ii). Page ID
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Disposition 
 Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint ( Doc. 11 ) is DISMISSED for failure to 
state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) . Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed In Forma 
Pauperis (Doc. 2) is DENIED because he has not pled any adequate claims. Plaintiff’s 
“Emergency Motion for a Status Update” (Doc. 14), his Motion for Declaratory and 
Injunctive Relief (Doc. 22), and his Motion for Leave to File Supplement (Doc. 23) are all 
DENIED. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment and close this case. 
If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this Order, he must file a notice of appeal with this 
Court within thirty days of the entry of judgment. F ED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1)(A). If Plaintiff 
chooses to appeal, he will be liable for the $605.00 filing fee irrespective of the outcome 
of the appeal. See F
ED. R. APP. P. 3(e); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Ammons v. Gerlinger, 547 F.3d 
724, 725-56 (7th Cir. 2008). Moreover, if the appeal is found to be nonmeritorious, Plaintiff 
may incur another “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). A proper and timely motion filed 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) may toll the 30 -day appeal deadline. 
F
ED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(4). A Rule 59(e) motion must be filed no later than 28 days after the 
entry of judgment, and this 28-day deadline cannot be extended. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated: June 3, 2026 
 ______________________________ 
 DAVID W. DUGAN 
 United States District Judge Page ID
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