govinfo:USCOURTS-mdd-1_25-cv-03617-0

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND 
 
BERNICE OKONIHA, et al., 
 
 Plaintiffs, 
 
v. 
 
UPSCALE MANAGEMENT 
SERVICES, LLC, et al., 
 
 Defendants. 
* 
 
* 
 
* 
 
* 
 
* 
 
 
 
 
 
Civil Action No. GLR-25-3617 
 
 
 *** 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Plaintiffs Bernice Okoniha, Dianne Ouzts, 
Fatmata Koroma, Hannah Prempeh, and Kelley Little’s (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) Motion 
for Default Judgment (ECF No. 18) and Motion for Attorney s’ Fees and Costs (ECF No. 
19). The Motion s are ripe for disposition, and no hearing is necessary. See Local Rule 
105.6 (D.Md. 2025). For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant the Motion for 
Default Judgment and grant in part and deny in part the Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and 
Costs. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Factual Background 
Defendants Upscale Management Services, LLC (“Upscale”) and Oyindamola 
Cole—the owner, operator, and manager of Upscale —(together, “Defendants”) hired 
Plaintiffs to work as healthcare aides at various assisted living facilities in Maryland. 
(Compl. ¶¶ 1, 15, 17, ECF No. 1). Plaintiffs all worked for Defendants from mid - to late-
2024 until early 2025: Okoniha from about July 2024 to May 2025; Little from January 

2 
2025 to May 2025; Ouzts from January 2025 to May 2025; Prempeh from the summer of 
2024 to May 2025; and Koroma from March 2025 to May 2025. ( Id. ¶¶ 4, 6, 8, 10, 11). 
Plaintiffs all worked for $45 an hour and, as non-salaried employees, they were eligible to 
receive time-and-a-half pay for every hour worked beyond forty hours per week. (Pl s.’ 
Mem. Supp. Mot. Default J. Against All Defs. [“Mot. Default J.”] at 3, ECF No. 18-1).1 
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants have failed to pay them for all their “straight time” 
hours (i.e., standard hours worked up to forty hours per week) and overtime hours worked. 
(Compl. ¶¶ 41–60, 78 –117). Plaintiffs allege that Defendants have access to their 
timesheets and, therefore, know the hours that Plaintiffs worked; that Defendants have 
failed to pay Plaintiffs accordingly; that Plaintiffs have made demands for payment of owed 
wages to no avail; and that Defendants have “no lawful reason or lawful excuse” for failing 
to pay Plaintiffs what they are owed. (Id. ¶¶ 40–45, 51; Mot. Default J. at 3) 
B. Procedural History 
Plaintiffs filed a Complaint in this Court on November 4, 2025, alleging violations 
of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § § 206, 207 (Counts I and II); the 
Maryland Wage and Hour Law (“MWHL”), Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. §§ 3-401, et 
seq. (Counts III and IV); and the Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law 
(“MWPCL”), Md. Code Ann., Lab. Empl. §§ 3-502, 3-507.2(a) (Count V). (Compl. ¶¶ 78–
117). Plaintiffs also allege breach of contract (Count V I) and unjust enrichment (Count 
VII). (Id. ¶¶ 118–35). Defendants did not file a timely response to the Complaint. 
 
1 Unless otherwise noted, citations to page numbers refer to the pagination assigned 
by the Court’s Case Management/Electronic Files (“CM/ECF”) system. 

3 
On December 17, 2025 and January 7, 2026, Plaintiffs filed Motions for Clerk’s 
Entry of Default as to Upscale and Cole, respectively. (ECF Nos. 10, 11). The Clerk issued 
Orders and Notices of Default as to each Defendant on January 28, 2026. (ECF Nos. 12 –
15). The Court then ordered Plaintiffs to file a motion for default judgment or show cause 
why such motion would be inappropriate. (ECF No. 16). Plaintiffs filed the instant Motion 
for Default Judgment Against All Defendants on February 10, 2026. (ECF No. 1 8). 
Plaintiffs also filed a Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs on April 1, 2026. (ECF No. 
19). To date, Defendants have not responded to either Motion. 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. Motion for Default Judgment 
Turning first to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Default Judgment, Rule 55(a) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure provides that, “[w]hen a party against whom a judgment for 
affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown 
by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter the party’s default.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(a). 
According to Rule 55(b), the court may enter a default judgment against the defendant if, 
after entry of default, the plaintiff’s complaint does not specify a “sum certain” amount of 
damages. Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(b) (1)–(2). In considering a motion for default judgment, the 
court accepts as true the well -pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as to liability. 
See Ryan v. Homecomings Fin. Network , 253 F.3d 778, 780 –81 (4th Cir. 2001). But 
“[l]iability is not deemed established simply because of the default . . . [and] the court, in 
its discretion, may require some proof of the facts that must be established in order to 

4 
determine liability.” 10A Wright & Miller’s Federal Practice and Procedure § 2688.1 (4th 
ed. 2025); see also Ryan, 253 F.3d at 780–81. 
If the court finds that liability is established, then it must turn to the determination 
of damages. See Ryan, 253 F.3d at 780 –81. “The court must make an independent 
determination regarding damages and cannot accept as true factual allegation of damages.” 
Int’l Painters & Allied Trades Indus. Pension Fund v. Cap. Restoration & Painting Co. , 
919 F.Supp.2d 680, 684 (D.Md 2013). Rule 54(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
limits the type and amount of damages that may be entered because of a party’s de fault. 
See Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(c). Where a complaint does not specify an amount, “the court is 
required to make an independent determination of the sum to be awarded.” Adkins v. 
Teseo, 180 F.Supp.2d 15, 17 (D.D.C. 2001). In doing so, “[i]t is a familiar practice and an 
exercise of judicial power for a court upon default, by taking evidence when necessary or 
by computation from facts of record, to fix the amount which the Plaintiff is l awfully 
entitled to recover and to give judgment accordingly.” Pope v. United States, 323 U.S. 1, 
12 (1944). 
For the reasons stated below, Plaintiffs are entitled to default judgment. The Court 
first reviews the allegations supporting the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims and then determines 
the appropriate damages. In determining damages, this Court finds that no evi dentiary 
hearing is necessary and instead relies on the declarations and other evidence in the record 
to determine the appropriate sum. See e.g., Monge v. Portofino Ristorante, 751 F.Supp.2d 
789, 795 (D.Md. 2010) (“[T]he Court may only award damages withou t a hearing if the 
record supports the damages requested.”). 

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1. Liability2 
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants are liable for violations of the FLSA, MWHL, and 
MWPCL for failing to pay them straight time and overtime wages.3 (Mot. Default J. at 1). 
For the reasons stated below, the Court agrees that Defendants are liable for these 
violations. 
The FLSA provides that, for any hours worked more than forty hours per week, an 
employee shall “receive[ ] compensation for his employment . . . at a rate not less than one 
and one -half times the regular rate at which he is employed.” 29 U.S.C. § 207 (a)(1). 
Similarly, the MWHL requires employers to pay their employees an overtime wage of at 
least one-and-half times their usual hourly wage for work they perform more than forty 
hours per week. Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. §§ 3 -415(a), 3-420(a). “The requirements 
of the MWHL ‘mirror’ those of the FLSA and claims under both statutes therefore stand 
or fall together.” Orellana v. Cienna Props., LLC, No. JKB-11-2515, 2012 WL 203421, at 
 
2 “Defendants were served with the Complaint but have not responded. Accordingly, 
all of Plaintiffs’ allegations as to liability are deemed admitted. ” Castillo v. D & P Pro. 
Servs., Inc., No. DKC-14-1992, 2015 WL 4068531, at *3 (D.Md. July 2, 2015). 
3 Plaintiffs do not argue for default judgment as to the breach of contract and unjust 
enrichment claims. (See generally Mot. Default J.). Plaintiffs also mention in the Motion 
for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs that they pleaded the breach of contract and unjust 
enrichment claims in the alternative and that damages awarded under the FLSA, MWHL, 
and MWPCL claims “meet or exceed those available to Plaintiffs under” the breach of 
contract and unjust enrichment counts. (Mem. Supp. Mot. Att’ys’ Fees & Costs at 10 n.3, 
ECF No. 19 -1). The Court, therefore, will deem the breach of contract and unjust 
enrichment claims abandoned. See Glob. One Fin., Inc. v. Back Pain Inst. of Cleveland, 
LLC, No. 1:07 -CV-1004-JOF, 2008 WL 11417110 , at *1 n.1 (N.D.Ga. June 10, 2008) 
(finding claims not addressed in motion for default judgment to be abandoned); Muppets 
Studio, LLC v. Pacheco, No. CV 12-7303 JGB (FFMx), 2013 WL 2456617, at *2 (C.D.Cal. 
June 6, 2013) (same). 

6 
*5 (D.Md. Jan. 23, 2012) (quoting Turner v. Human Genome Sc i., Inc., 292 F.Supp.2d 
738, 744 (D.Md. 2003)). Additionally, the MWPCL “requires an employer to pay its 
employees regularly while employed , and in full at the termination of employment. ” 
Castillo v. D & P Pro. Servs., Inc. , No. DKC-14-1992, 2015 WL 4068531, at *4 (D.Md. 
2015) (quoting Peters v. Early Healthcare Giver, Inc., 97 A.3d 621, 624–25 (Md. 2014)). 
Liability under the FLSA, MWHL, and MWPCL turns on whether the defendant is 
an “employer” as defined by those statutes. Avila v. Caring Hearts & Hands Assisted 
Living & Elder Care, LLC , No. TDC-15-3943, 2016 WL 4083365, at *3 (D.Md. Aug. 1, 
2016). The definition of an employer is functionally identical under these three statutes . 
Id.; see also 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (FLSA defining employer as “any person acting directly 
or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee”); Md. Code Ann., 
Lab. & Empl. § 3-401 (MWHL defining employer as any “person who acts directly or 
indirectly in the interest of another employer with an employee”); id. § 3-501(b) (MWPCL 
defining employer as “any person who employs an individual in the State or a successor of 
the person”). T o determine whether an individual defendant is an employer under the 
FLSA, MWHL, and MWPCL , courts apply the “economic reality ” test. Avila, 2016 WL 
4083365, at *3 (citations omitted). With this test, “courts consider whether the employer 
(1) had the power to hire and fire the employees, (2) supervised and controlled employee 
work schedules or conditions of employment, (3) determined the rate and method of 
payment, and (4) maintained employment records.” Id. But “[n]o one factor is dispositive.” 
Id. 

7 
Here, accepting the allegations as true, Plaintiffs’ have established that both 
Defendants were Plaintiffs’ employers within the meaning of the FLSA, MWHL, and 
MWPCL. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that, as a condition to their employment, they 
signed multiple documents that identified them as “employees” and Upscale as their 
“employer”; that Cole is the sole owner, operator, and manager of Upscale; that Cole hired 
Plaintiffs, set the terms and conditions of their employment and the work they performed, 
and set their schedules; and that Cole “was responsible for paying or not paying Plaintiffs.” 
(Compl. ¶¶ 17–35). Based on these allegations, Plaintiffs have established that both 
Defendants were their employers under the FLSA, MWHL, and MWPCL and, as a result, 
are jointly and severally liable for any damages awarded to Plaintiffs. See, e.g., Sanabria 
v. Cocody, Inc. , No. DKC -16-0365, 2017 WL 3022990, at *3 (D.Md. July 17, 2017) 
(finding corporate and individual defendants jointly and severally liable as employers 
under FLSA, MWHL, and MWPCL); Cruz v. Home & Garden Concepts, LLC, No. GJH-
15-204, 2016 WL 3679139, at *7, 9 (D.Md. July 12, 2016) (same). 
As to any wages owed, an employee bears “the burden of establishing the hours he 
claims to have worked . . . .” McLaughlin v. Murphy , 436 F.Supp.2d 732, 737 (D.Md. 
2005). If the defendant -employer does not produce time sheets, the employee may prove 
hours worked by “produc[ing] sufficient evidence to show the amount and extent of that 
work as a matter of just and reasonable inference.” Butler v. DirectSAT USA, LLC , 47 
F.Supp.3d 300, 309 (D.Md. 2014). Thus, in the absence of an exact record of hours “a 
prima facie case can be made through an employee’s testimony giving his recollection of 
hours worked.” Hurd v. NDL, Inc. , No. CCB -11-1944, 2012 WL 642425, at *4 (D.Md. 

8 
Feb. 27, 2012) (citation modified) (quoting Donovan v. Kentwood Dev. Co., Inc. , 549 
F.Supp. 480, 485 (D.Md. 1982)). 
Here, Plaintiffs have established through their uncontested allegations in the 
Complaint, their declarations, and their timesheets that they were employees of 
Defendants, that they worked for $45 an hour, and that they were non-salaried employees 
who were eligible to receive overtime pay under the FLSA and MWHL . (Mot. Default J. 
at 3, 12). Plaintiffs allege that they “were not paid at all by Defendants for several pay 
periods” and that they “regularly worked more than 40 hours in a week” but have not 
received overtime wages for all overtime hours worked. (Compl. ¶¶ 51–52, 88; Mot. 
Default J. at 3). Based on the allegations in the Complaint, Plaintiffs’ declarations, and the 
attached timesheet exhibits, Plaintiffs have established that they each worked the following 
hours for which they have yet to be paid: 
• Okoniha – 344 hours between April 13, 2025 and May 18, 2025 
• Little – 213 hours between April 13, 2025 and May 23, 20254 
• Ouzts – 55.5 hours between April 6, 2025 and April 12, 2025 
• Prempeh – 120.5 hours between April 10, 2025 and May 9, 2025 
• Koroma – 124.75 hours between April 9, 2025 and May 15, 20255 
 
4 In the straight time hours chart that Little includes in her declaration, she alleges 
that she worked 9 hours on April 21, 2025, (Little Decl. ¶ 35), but the timesheets she 
provides show that she worked 8 hours, ( id. at 23). The Court, therefore, will reduce 
Ouzts’s straight time hours from 214 to 213. 
5 In the straight time hours chart that Koroma includes in her declaration, she alleges 
that she worked 9.5 hours on April 9, 2025; 10.5 hours on April 18, 2025; 6.5 hours on 
April 29, 2025; 8 hours on May 7, 2025; and 8 hours on May 14, 2025. (Koroma Decl. 
¶ 35). The timesheets she provides, however, show that she worked 10, 10, 7, and 8.5 hours 

9 
(Compl. ¶¶ 46–50; Okoniha Decl. ¶ 35, ECF No. 18 -2; Ouzts Decl. ¶ 35, ECF No. 18 -3; 
Koroma Decl. ¶ 35, ECF No. 18-4; Prempeh Decl. ¶ 35, ECF No. 18-5; Little Decl. ¶ 35, 
ECF No. 18 -6). Plaintiffs also have established that they worked the following overtime 
hours for which they have yet to be paid: 
• Okoniha – 368 hours between January 12, 2024 and May 18, 20256 
• Little – 128 hours between April 9, 2025 and May 17, 20257 
• Ouzts – 87 hours between February 9, 2025 and July 13, 2025 
• Prempeh – 51.75 hours between October 13, 2024 and March 9, 20258 
• Koroma – 1.75 hours between April 13, 2025 and April 19, 2025 
(Okoniha Decl. ¶ 36; Ouzts Decl. ¶ 36; Koroma Decl. ¶ 36; Prempeh Decl. ¶ 36; Little 
Decl. ¶ 36). 
 
on April 9, 18, 29, and May 7 . (Id. at 13, 19, 24, 28). For May 14, the timesheet says , “2 
hour cancellation fee,” but no hours worked. ( Id. at 31). The Court, therefore, will reduce 
Koroma’s straight time hours from 131.75 to 124.75. 
6 Rather than 64 hours between April 13 and 19, 2025, Okoniha’s timesheets show 
48 hours of overtime work. (Okoniha Decl. ¶ 36; id. at 24). Between May 12 and 18, 2025, 
rather than 40 hours, Okoniha’s timesheets show 56 hours of overtime work. (Id. ¶ 36; id. 
at 31). These errors cancel each other out , though, so the total hours reported remains the 
same. 
7 Little’s timesheets contradict her allegations as to the overtime hours she worked 
between February 9, 2025 and May 17, 2025 ; it appears that her 30 -minute breaks were 
double-counted. (Little Decl. ¶ 36; id. at 10–27). The Court, therefore, will increase Little’s 
total overtime hours from 92.5 to 128. 
8 Prempeh’s timesheets contradict her allegations that she worked 7 and 9 overtime 
hours for the December 29, 2024 to January 4, 2025 and the February 23, 2025 to March 
1, 2025 pay periods, respectively. (Prempeh Decl. ¶ 36). The records indicate that she 
worked 9.5 and 11.5 overtime hours during those periods. ( Id. at 27, 36 ). The Court, 
therefore, will increase Prempeh’s overtime hours from 46.75 to 51.75. 

10 
The Court finds Plaintiffs uncontested allegation s and timesheets sufficient and 
credible for the purpose of establishing liability. See Turner v. Human Genome Science , 
292 F.Supp.2d 738, 748 (D.Md. 2003) (stating that a plaintiff’s testimony on unpaid wages 
is sufficient to make a prima facie showing of unpaid wages); Albanez v. Breeding Constr., 
Inc., No. DKC-14-1813, 2016 WL 894617, at *2, 4 (D.Md. Mar. 9, 2016) (finding plaintiff 
established through billing sheets and affidavit that defendants are liable to plaintiff under 
the FLSA, MWHL, and MWPCL); Villanueva v. D&JJ, Inc., No. PWG-20-556, 2022 WL 
4316655, at * 3 (D.Md. Sept. 19, 2022) ( finding plaintiff s declarations and Excel 
spreadsheets that defendants are liable to plaintiff s under the FLSA, MWHL, MWPCL , 
and MPWS). Thus, Plaintiffs have established that Defendants are liable under the FLSA, 
MWHL, and MWPCL. 
2. Damages 
The Court next turns to damages. Plaintiffs allege that they are entitled to unpaid 
straight time and overtime wages, and they seek treble damages under the MWPCL. (Mot. 
Default J. at 12–15). 
To calculate damages for “unpaid regular time recoverable under the MWPCL, the 
Court takes the hours worked without compensation and multiplies that figure by the 
employee’s base hourly rate.” Mata v. G.O. Contractors Grp., Ltd. , No. TDC -14-3287, 
2015 WL 6674650, at *5 (D.Md. Oct. 29, 2015). Here, Plaintiffs provide charts showing 
the hours they recall working multiplied by their straight time wage, $45 per hour. 
(Okoniha Decl. ¶ 35; Ouzts Decl. ¶ 35; Koroma Decl. ¶ 35; Prempeh Decl. ¶ 35; Little 
Decl. ¶ 35). Although Plaintiffs do not provide timesheets for every hour reported, th e 

11 
Court finds the declarations sufficient to award damages for the hours Plaintiffs claim to 
have worked, with some minor adjustments for any hours that differ from the timesheets 
provided. Thus, after considering Plaintiffs’ declarations and attached timesheets , and 
making a few minor adjustments to account for any errors, ( see footnotes 4–5 of this 
Opinion), the Court finds that Plaintiffs are entitled to the following amounts in unpaid 
straight time wages: 
• Okoniha – 344 hours x $45/hour = $15,480 
• Little – 213 hours x $45/hour = $9,585 
• Ouzts – 55.5 hours x $45/hour = $2,497.50 
• Prempeh – 120.5 hours x $45/hour = $5,422.50 
• Koroma – 124.75 hours x $45/hour = $5,613.75 
(Okoniha Decl. ¶ 35; Ouzts Decl. ¶ 35; Koroma Decl. ¶ 35; Prempeh Decl. ¶ 35; Little 
Decl. ¶ 35). 
To calculate unpaid overtime wages under the FLSA and the MWHL, the Court 
takes the undercompensated hours and multiplies that figure by one -half the employee ’s 
base hourly rate, the difference between the mandated overtime rate and the employee ’s 
regular rate. See 29 U.S.C. § 207; Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. § 3-427. Here, as with 
their straight time hours, Plaintiffs provide charts indicating the overtime hours they recall 
working multiplied by half their straight time wage, $22.50 per hour. (Okoniha Decl. ¶ 36; 
Ouzts Decl. ¶ 36; Koroma Decl. ¶ 36; Prempeh Decl. ¶ 36; Little Decl. ¶ 36). Again, the 
Court has made some adjustments to the overtime hours worked and resulting unpaid 
wages due to differences between Plaintiffs’ declarations and timesheets. ( See footnotes 

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6–8 of this Opinion). Overall, the Court finds that Plaintiffs are entitled to the following 
amounts in unpaid overtime wages: 
• Okoniha – 368 hours x $22.50/hour = $8,280 
• Little – 128 hours x $22.50/hour = $2,880 
• Ouzts – 87 hours x $22.50/hour = $1,957.509 
• Prempeh – 51.75 hours x $22.50/hour = $1,164.37 
• Koroma – 1.75 hours x $22.50/hour = $39.38 
(Okoniha Decl. ¶ 36; Ouzts Decl. ¶ 36; Koroma Decl. ¶ 36; Prempeh Decl. ¶ 36; Little 
Decl. ¶ 36); see Adkins, 180 F.Supp.2d at 17 (noting that except where the amount of 
damages is certain, the court must make an independent determination of damages in 
reviewing a motion for default judgment and may rely on detailed affidavits or 
documentary evidence to determin e the appropriate sum); Albanez, 2016 WL 894617, at 
*2 (“[I]f the employer does not successfully rebut the employee’s statement [regarding 
wages owed], ‘[t]he Court may award damages based on Plaintiffs’ testimony even though 
the amounts claimed are only approximated and not perfectly accurate.” (quoting Lopez v. 
Lawns ‘R’ Us, No. DKC-07-2979, 2008 WL 2227353, at *3 (D.Md. May 23, 2008))). 
Plaintiffs also seek treble damages under the MWPCL. (Mot. Default J. at 14 –15). 
The MWPCL states that if “a court finds that an employer withheld the wage of an 
employee in violation of this subtitle and not as a result of a bona fide dispute, the court 
may award the employee an amount not exceeding 3 times the wage . . . .” Md. Code. Ann., 
 
9 This amount is one cent higher than that reported in Ouzts’ declaration due to a 
minor rounding error. (See Ouzts Decl. ¶ 36) 

13 
Lab. & Empl. § 3 -507.2(b). “These significantly enhanced damages serve a punitive 
purpose and also compensate plaintiffs for any consequential damages incurred as a result 
of being unpaid or underpaid.” Mata, 2015 WL 6674650, at *5. The employer has the 
burden of establishing that they withheld an employee’s wages based on a bona fide 
dispute, i.e., “a legitimate dispute over the validity of the claim or the amount that is owing 
where the employer has a good faith basis for refusing an employee ’s claim for unpaid 
wages.” Avila v. Marlin Lighting LLC, No. PWG-22-49, 2022 WL 17094583, at *4 (D.Md. 
Nov. 21, 2022) (citation modified). If a defendant fails to meet this burden, the Court then 
“may consider significant consequences of being underpaid, such as being unable to meet 
weekly or monthly obligatio ns, ranging from embarrassment, to late charges, to 
repossessions, and eviction,” to determine whether treble damages are appropriate. Id. 
(citation modified). 
Here, Plaintiffs allege that there is no bona fide dispute that they are owed the wages 
they seek to recover, and Defendants have not argued that such a dispute exists. (Compl. 
¶ 116; see Mot. Default. J. at 14). Plaintiffs further allege various “significant 
consequences” that flowed from their underpayment or lack of payment. All Plaintiffs 
report feeling stress and anxiety , and in one case insomnia, due to not being able to pay 
bills on time, and some were prescribed anti -anxiety and anti-depression medications as a 
result. (Okoniha Decl. ¶ 45; Ouzts Decl. ¶ 45; Koroma Decl. ¶ 44; Prempeh Decl. ¶ 45; 
Little Decl. ¶ 44). Multiple Plaintiffs also state that they have had to pay for bills and 
necessities with credit cards, loans, and cash advances that incur interest. (Ouzts Decl. ¶ 45; 
Koroma Decl. ¶¶ 44–48; Prempeh Decl. ¶ 45). 

14 
Plaintiffs also report individualized consequences. Defendants’ failure to pay 
Plaintiffs left Okoniha unable to fulfill her cultural duty of paying for her father’s burial 
after he passed. ( Okoniha Decl. ¶ 45). She had to use her savings and borrow money, 
causing guilt and embarrassment. ( Id.). Okoniha also owes college tuition and fees, 
including nearly $2,000 in late fees, and she is unable to re -enroll until those outstanding 
charges are paid. ( Id.). Ouzts was unable to pay her car payments, and her car was 
repossessed in December 2025. (Ouzts Decl. ¶ 45). Koroma has incurred significant 
overdraft and late fees. (Koroma Decl. ¶¶ 45–48). Prempeh was late on her rent payments 
and had to borrow money from family and friends. (Prempeh Decl. ¶ 45). Little also was 
late on her rent payments and was evicted in March 2025. (Little Decl. ¶ 44). She has 
accrued significant hotel bills while looking for a new home and has faced difficulties 
securing housing due to the eviction. ( Id.). Her bank also closed her accoun t due to late 
payments. (Id.). 
Based on Plaintiffs’ declarations of the consequences they have faced as a result of 
Defendants’ failure to pay them, the Court finds that Plaintiffs are entitled to recover treble 
damages under the MWPCL, resulting in total damages of: 
• Okoniha – ($15,480 + $8,280) x 3 = $71,280 
• Little – ($9,585 + $2,880) x 3 = $37,395 
• Ouzts – ($2,497.50 + $1,957.50) x 3 = $8,085 
• Prempeh – ($5,422.50 + $1,164.37) x 3 = $19,760.61 
• Koroma – ($5,613.75 + $39.38) x 3 = $16,959.39 

15 
Compare Avila, 2022 WL 17094583, at *5 (awarding treble damages under MWPCL 
where plaintiffs provided declarations demonstrating consequential damages resulting 
from nonpayment of wages) , with Albanez, 2016 WL 894617, at *3 (declining to award 
damages under MWPCL because plaintiff put forth no evidence showing he suffered 
consequential damages). 
B. Motion for Attorneys’ Fees & Costs 
Turning next to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs, Plaintiffs assert 
that in litigating this case, they have incurred attorneys’ fees in the amount of $45,423 and 
costs totaling $654. (Mem. Supp. Mot. Att’ys’ Fees & Costs [“Mot. Att’ys’ Fees”] at 4, 
ECF No. 19-1). As support, Plaintiffs provide charts on counsels’ rates and hours worked 
on this case, (see id. at 4–6), and filed the declarations of (1) Stephen Lebau, a partner at 
Lebau & Neuworth, LLC (“L&N”); (2) Devan Wang, an associate at L&N; and (3) Andrew 
D. Freeman, a partner at Brown, Goldstein & Levy, (see ECF Nos. 19-2–19-4). 
The FLSA, MWHL, and MWPCL all allow a prevailing plaintiff to recover 
reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs from the defendant. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); Md. Code 
Ann., Lab. & Empl. §§ 3-427(d), 3-507.2(b). A plaintiff who obtains a default judgment is 
a “prevailing plaintiff” and is thus entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs under 
these statutes. See Aguirre-Amaya v. Medpacific Flavors, Inc. , No. DLB -21-2143, 2024 
WL 4732776, at *1 (D.Md. Nov. 8, 2024). 
The Supreme Court has established a method, commonly called the “lodestar,” for 
determining a reasonable fee. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983). The starting 
point in the lodestar calculation is “the number of hours reasonably expended on the 

16 
litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.” Id. In addition, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has directed courts to consider these twelve factors when 
calculating the lodestar amount: 
(1) the time and labor expended; (2) the novelty and difficulty 
of the questions raised; (3) the skill required to properly 
perform the legal services rendered; (4) the attorney ’s 
opportunity costs in pressing the instant litigation; (5) the 
customary fee for like work; (6) the attorney ’s expectations at 
the outset of the litigation; (7) the time limitations imposed by 
the client or circumstances; (8) the amount in controversy and 
the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation and ability 
of the attor ney; (10) the undesirability of the case within the 
legal community in which the suit arose; (11) the nature and 
length of the professional relationship between attorney and 
client; and (12) attorneys’ fees awards in similar cases. 
Robinson v. Equifax Info. Servs., 560 F.3d 235, 243–44 (4th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). 
The Court is not required to analyze each factor individually or even examine every factor 
but may instead consider the factors as a whole. See Martin v. Mecklenburg Cnty. , 151 
F.App’x. 275, 283 (4th Cir. 2005). “[T]rial courts need not, and indeed should not, become 
green-eyeshade accountants.” Fox v. Vice , 563 U.S. 826, 838 (2011). Instead of seeking 
“auditing perfection,” the essential goal of fee -shifting “is to do rough justice.” Id.; De 
Paredes v. Zen Nails Studio LLC , 134 F.4th 750, 753 (4th Cir. 2025). Therefore, a court 
“may take into account their overall sense of a suit , and may use estimates in calculating 
and allocating an attorney’s time.” Fox, 563 U.S. at 838. Ultimately, the plaintiff has the 
burden of demonstrating that the requested fees are reasonable. Jones v. Dancel, 792 F.3d 
395, 404 (4th Cir. 2015). 

17 
Here, the Court is satisfied that the number of billable hours that Plaintiffs’ counsel 
report for fee recovery is reasonable. Plaintiffs seek to recover fees for 68.1 hours of work 
on this litigation that involved unpaid straight time and overtime compensation over the 
course of several months and implicated both state and federal law. ( Mot. Att’ys’ Fees at 
4–6, 9; Compl. ¶¶ 46–50, 78 –135). While this matter did not proceed to discovery, 
counsels’ billing chart shows that the requested billable hours in th is case relate to the 
Complaint and Plaintiffs’ successful Motions : 29 hours on case development and the 
Complaint stage; 33.3 hours on the successful Motions for clerk’s entry of default and for 
default judgment, which involved preparing declarations and gathering timesheets for five 
Plaintiffs; and 5.8 hours on the Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs. (Mot. Att’ys’ Fees 
at 4 –6); see Henderson v. S & K Sec. Consultants, Inc. , No. LKG -21-2484, 2025 WL 
2444031 (D.Md. Aug. 25, 2025) (finding 111.2 hours reasonable in FLSA matter resolved 
through motion for default judgment). Additionally, the attorney with the lower hourly rate, 
Devan Wang, performed most of the work on the Motions, and the requested hours do not 
include work performed by counsels’ legal assistant, Brooks Feldman. (Mot. Att’ys’ Fees 
at 5–6, 9). 
The Court also is satisfied that the hourly rates sought in this case are reasonable. 
Plaintiffs state that “[t]he hourly rates charged by Plaintiffs’ attorneys are consistent with 
their customary fees and prevailing market rates for similar work in the District of 
Maryland.” (Id. at 7). In this regard, Stephen Lebau, a founding partner of L&N who has 
been practicing law for over thirty-five years, represents to the Court that L&N uses “the 
Guidelines Regarding Hourly Rates as stated in Appendix B to the Lo cal Rules and the 

18 
Fitzpatrick Matrix.” (Lebau Decl. ¶ 13, ECF No. 19-2). Based on those Guidelines, Lebau 
charges an hourly rate of $726.30, and Wang, an associate at L&N who has been practicing 
law for thirteen years, charges an hourly rate of $598. ( Id.; Wang Decl. ¶ 8, ECF No. 19-
3). These rates are below the 202 3 rates in the Fitzpatrick Matrix for attorneys with over 
thirty-five and thirteen years of experience, respectively. 10 Lebau and Wang based their 
requested rates on the Fitzpatrick Matrix’s 2023 rates to account for inflation and reduced 
their hourly rates by 10% to account for the differences between the markets in 
Washington, D.C. and Maryland. (Mot. Att’y’s Fees at 7). 
Given these representations and the record before the Court, the Court is satisfied 
that the requested hourly rates in this case fall within the prevailing hourly rates for 
similarly qualified and experienced attorneys in the Maryland area. See Blum v. Stenson, 
465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984) (“The statute and legislative history establish that ‘reasonable 
fees’ under [42 U.S.C.] § 1988 are to be calculated according to the prevailing market rates 
in the relevant community, regardless of whether plaintiff is repre sented by private or 
nonprofit counsel.”). The Court also finds persuasive the declaration of Andrew D. 
Freeman, a partner at the Baltimore-based law firm of Brown, Goldstein & Levy, who 
attests that: 
I am familiar with Lebau & Neuworth’s reputation and 
experience in representing plaintiffs in seeking compensation 
for unpaid wages. Lebau & Neuworth is one of the top firms in 
the country in this field. Mr. Lebau and I have often consulted 
 
10 The Fitzpatrick Matrix , https://www.mdd.uscourts.gov/sites/mdd/files/fitzpatrick-matrix.pdf, 
(last visited June 21, 2026) (reporting hourly rates of $807 and $664 in 2023 for attorneys 
with over thirty-five and thirteen years of experience, respectively). 

19 
with each other regarding employment law litigation strategy 
and tactics. 
The Plaintiffs’ case here presented a variety of challenges, all 
of which Lebau & Neuworth handled skillfully and 
expeditiously, and the result they obtained for the Plaintiffs 
was superb. I have been informed that there were no 
contemporaneous time records of hours worked and there had 
been a change in the ownership of the direct employer. Lebau 
& Neuworth obtained the agreement of the employer to use a 
few GPS records as a basis for the calculation of the owed 
overtime. The Plaintiffs’ recovery of 2.75 times the amount of 
wages owed to them without any formal discovery was 
exceptional. 
Based upon my knowledge and expertise as described above, 
it is my opinion that the rates sought by Plaintiffs’ counsel in 
this case are reasonable, reflecting rates at or below the value 
of services by lawyers of their experience and caliber in the 
Baltimore market. 
(Freeman Decl. ¶¶ 11–13, ECF No. 19-4). 
 Lastly, Plaintiffs request $654 in costs for “filing the lawsuit, service of process, and 
legal research,” but they provide no documentation of such costs. (Mot. Att’ys’ Fees at 4). 
The Court, therefore, will deny this request. See Glen v. L. Off. of W.C. French, No. ELH-
11-927, 2012 WL 181496, at *6 (D.Md. Jan. 19, 2012) (declining to award costs because 
plaintiff provided no proof of costs), report and recommendation adopted , No. ELH-11-
00927, 2012 WL 425870 (D.Md. Feb. 8, 2012). 

20 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Plaintiffs’ Motion for Default 
Judgment (ECF No. 18) and grant in part and deny in part Plaintiffs’ Motion for Attorneys’ 
Fees and Costs (ECF No. 19). A separate Order follows. 
Entered this 3rd day of June, 2026. 
 
 
 /s/ 
 George L. Russell, III 
 Chief United States District Judge 

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