govinfo:USCOURTS-pawd-3_26-cv-00785-0

1 
 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
 
ARMANDO JOSE LOPEZ YOC, ) 
 ) 
 Petitioner, ) 
 ) 
 v. ) Civil Action No. 3:26-cv-785 
 ) 
LEONARD ODDO et al., ) 
 ) 
 Respondents. ) 
 
MEMORANDUM ORDER 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Presently pending before the Court is a counseled Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (the “Petition”) (Docket No. 1). Petitioner Armando Jose Lopez Yoc 
(“Petitioner”) is a native and citizen of Guatemala who crossed the border into the United States 
without inspection at an unknown time and place and who was not admitted or paroled by an 
Immigration Officer. (Docket Nos. 1, ¶ 44; 5-1). Petitioner is currently detained in the custody of 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) at Moshannon Valley Processing Center after 
initially having been detained in West Virginia during a traffic stop conducted by a local sheriff. 
(Docket No. 1, ¶¶ 18, 43). Petitioner has been detained as such since January 9, 2026, without 
being provided a bond hearing. ( Id. ¶ 46). For the reasons set forth herein, the Petition shall be 
granted in part and denied in part . The Writ shall issue and Petitioner shall be afforded a bond 
hearing. 
II. ADMINISTRATIVE EXHAUSTION 
 
As a threshold matter, the Court finds that administrative exhaustion is unnecessary 
because it would be futile given the recent decisions issued by the Board of Immigration Appeals 

2 
 
(“BIA”). See Matter of Q. Li, 29 I. & N. Dec. 66 (BIA 2025) , and Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 
I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). 
III. DISCUSSION 
 
In 1996, Congress enacted the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility 
Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”) to amend the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). IIRIRA, Pub. L. 
No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996). Thereunder, two different statutory provisions govern the 
detention of aliens pending completion of removal proceedings.1 Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225, an 
alien “present in the United States who has not been admitted2 or who arrives in the United States 
. . . shall be deemed for purposes of this chapter an applicant for admission.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). 
Furthermore, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) provides in part t hat “in the case of an alien who is an 
applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking 
admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for 
a proceeding under [§ 1229a] .” The Supreme Court determined that the plain meaning of this 
statutory provision is that detention must continue until removal proceedings have been concluded. 
See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 299 (2018). Comparatively, 8 U.S.C. § 1226 applies to 
 
1 Before enactment of IIRIRA in 1996, the INA distinguished between aliens who presented themselves at the 
border for inspection and those who “entered the United States without inspection.” 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1)(B) (1994). 
Those in the former group were d eemed “excludable aliens” triggering exclusion proceedings pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 
§§ 1182(a), 1225-26 (1994), while those in the latter group were deemed “deportable aliens” triggering deportation 
proceedings pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §§ 1251(a)(1)(B), 1252 (1994). See Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, Nos. 25-1965, 25-
1969, 25-1978, 25-1982, __ F. 4 th __, 2026 WL 1283891, at *15 (6 th Cir. May 11, 2026) (Murphy, J., dissenting) 
(stating that the IIRIRA reduced the emphasis on the term “entry” in favor of “admission” and jettisoned the phrase 
“excludable aliens” in favor of “inadmissible aliens,” and noting that before 1996, “the INA relied on the word ‘entry’ 
to distinguish between excludable and deportable immigrants. Immigrants who had not entered were subject to 
exclusion proceedings while those who had [entered] were subject to deportation proceedings ,” and that the 
“distinction created an anomaly ” in which “[i]mmigrants who lawfully presented themselves at a port of entry had 
fewer procedural and substantive rights than those who unlawfully snuck in,” such that those “immigrants who evaded 
detection could seek release on bond while those who presented themselves at the border faced mandatory detention.” 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). 
 
2 The terms “admission” and “admitted” are defined statutorily to mean, “with respect to an alien, the lawful 
entry of the alien into the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” 8 U.SC. 
§ 1101(a)(13). 

3 
 
aliens “arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the 
United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Under this provision, the Attorney General may continue to 
detain the arrested alien or may release the alien o n bond or conditional parole , except for those 
who fall into one of certain enumerated categories involving specified criminal offenses and 
terrorist activities. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) , (c). In 2025, Congress amended § 1226 with the 
Laken Riley Act, excluding from this permissive detention scheme aliens who are inadmissible 
under § 1182(a)(6)(A), (6)(C), or (7), or are charged with certain crimes. See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1226(c)(1)(E)(i) - (ii); Laken Riley Act, Pub. L. No. 119-1, 139 Stat. 3 (2025). Such aliens must 
be detained subject to an exception to protect witnesses in ongoing criminal investigations under 
§ 1226(c)(4). See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(4). 
The parties here disagree over the proper interpretation of § 1225 and §1226, and whether 
one or the other of these statutory provisions applies to Petitioner’s detention. Petitioner asserts 
that he is entitled to a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), and is not subject to mandatory 
detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), because he was already present in the United States when 
he was taken into custody and thus was not an “applicant for admission” “seeking admission” at 
or near the border or at a port of entry. (Docket No. 1, ¶ 49). Respondents, by contrast, assert that 
an individual who “arrives in the United States,” or is “present” here but “has not been admitted” 
to the United States and is “not clearly and beyond doubt entitled to be admitted,” is considered 
an “applicant for admission” under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1) who is necessarily “seeking admission” 
pursuant to § 1225(b)(2)(A), such that Petitioner falls within this category of persons and thus is 
subject to mandatory detention without entitlement to a bond hearing. (Docket No. 5). 
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has not yet addressed this seminal legal issue. 
Other circuit courts have addressed this issue but have arrived at different conclusions. The Fifth 

4 
 
and Eighth Circuits have rendered decisions that support Respondents’ position. See Avila v. 
Bondi, 170 F.4th 1128 (8th Cir. 2026); Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026). 
The Second, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits have rendered decisions supporting Petitioner’s position. 
See Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, Nos. 25-1965, 25-1969, 25-1978, 25-1982, __ F. 4th __, 2026 WL 
1283891 (6th Cir. May 11, 2026); Hernandez Alvarez v. Warden, Fed. Det. Ctr. Miami , Nos. 25-
14065, 25-14075, __ F.4th __, 2026 WL 1243395 (11 th Cir. May 6, 2026); Barbosa da Cunha v. 
Freden, 175 F.4th 61 (2nd Cir. 2026). 
This judicial officer also acknowledges that all judges in this District having considered 
this issue thus far, and many more elsewhere, have determined that § 1225(b)(2)(A) requires that 
an “applicant for admission” be actively “seeking” admission at or near the border or port of entry 
to fall within its scope. See, e.g., Calzado Diaz v. Noem , No. 3:25- cv-458, 2025 WL 3628480 
(W.D. Pa. Dec. 15, 2025) (Haines, J.) (holding that “ § 1225(b)(2) is tethered more closely to the 
border and speaks to the potential detention of aliens there, whereas § 1226(a) applies more readily 
to the potential deten tion of aliens who have been living within the country”); Alvarez v. Noem , 
No. 3:26-cv-73, 2026 WL 545382 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 26, 2026) (Ranjan, J.) (same) ; Silva Cova v. 
Rose, No. 3:26-cv-101, 2026 WL 376921 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 11, 2026) ( (Stickman, J.) (same). 
While receptive to certain reasoning applied by the Fifth and Eighth Circuits, as well as 
that of Sixth Circuit Judge Murphy in his dissent, this judicial officer is nonetheless mindful of the 
interpretive canon of constitutional avoidance 3 and is constrained by what is believed to be 
 
3 In addition to his statutory arguments, Petitioner also asserts alleged constitutional violations of the Due 
Process Clause as additional bases in support of his Petition. ( Docket No. 1). Respondents acknowledge that “there 
may come a time when mandatory civil detention without a bond hearing becomes unreasonable” and thus 
unconstitutional, citing German Santos v. Warden Pike Cnty. Corr. Facility , 965 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2020) 
(analyzing detention and Due Process Clause limits under §1226(c)). ( Docket No. 5 at 11). However, Respondents 
also cite to Demore v. Kim , 538 U.S. 510, 531 (2003), which held that detention during removal proceedings is a 
constitutionally permissible part of that process. See also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001) (holding that 
detention beyond the removal period per 8 U.S.C. § 1231 for a period of less than six months pending removal is 
presumed constitutional). As noted above, the parties (and other courts) have sparred over competing interpretations 

5 
 
controlling authority on this issue. Notably, in Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018) (Alito, 
J.), the Supreme Court stated, albeit in apparent dicta, that: 
U.S. immigration law authorizes the Government to deta in certain 
aliens seeking admission into the country under §§ 1225(b)(1) and 
(b)(2). It also authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens 
already in the country pending the outcome of removal proceedings 
under §§ 1226(a) and (c). 
 
Id. at 289 (emphasis added) . Absent authority from the Supreme Court or the Third Circuit 
instructing a different interpretation, this judicial officer follows Jennings
4 and joins my colleagues 
in this District in holding that § 1226(a), rather than the mandatory detention provision of 
§ 1225(b), applies to aliens such as Petitioner who are already present in the United States ( even 
if illegally) when detained and thus not “seeking” admission. Accordingly, Petitioner has a 
statutory right to a bond hearing because his detention is governed by §1226(a). 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that Petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing 
because his detention is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Therefore, Petitioner’s Petition for Writ 
of Habeas Corpus is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, as set forth in the Order below. 
 
of §§ 1225 and 1226, thus part of the Court’s consideration when interpreting these statutory provisions is whether a 
particular interpretation would avoid implicating a constitutional concern . See Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 380-
82 (2005); Ndiaye v. Jamison , No. 25 -6007, 2025 WL 3229307 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 19, 2025). The Court’s conclusion 
that § 1226 applies here, and that Petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing thereunder, is based in part upon this canon 
of constitutional avoidance. Consequently, the Court need not address Petitioner’s constitutional bases in order to 
grant his Petition. 
 
4 See In re McDonald , 205 F.3d 606, 612 (3d Cir. 2000) (stating that “we should not idly ignore considered 
statements the Supreme Court makes in dicta”); see also Alvarez, 2026 WL 545382, at *1 (stating that “dicta from the 
Supreme Court still matters”); Calzado Diaz, 2025 WL 3628480, at *6 (stating that the Supreme Court’s presumptive 
dicta in Jennings has “weight” that “tips the scale . . . heavily in favor of finding that § 1226(a) applies” (emphasis in 
original)). The Court notes that the majority opinions of the Fifth and Eighth Circuits, as well as the dissenting opinion 
in the Sixth Circuit, present persuasive reasons why Jennings does not undermine their statutory interpretations 
concluding that § 1225(b) is applicable and necessitates mandatory detention. See Lopez-Campos, 2026 WL 1283891, 
at *32 (Murphy, J., dissenting); Avila, 170 F.4th at 1136; Buenrostro-Mendez, 166 F.4th at 505-06. However, it would 
not be proper for the Court to disregard Jennings without instruction to do so from the Supreme Court or the Third 
Circuit. 
 

6 
 
Accordingly, the Court enters the following Order: 
 
 AND NOW, this 3 rd day of June, 2026, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner 
Armando Jose Lopez Yoc’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Docket No. 1) is GRANTED IN 
PART and DENIED IN PART. 
The Petition is GRANTED to the extent that the Writ shall issue on the following terms: 
1. Within ten days of this Order, Petitioner must receive an individualized bond hearing 
conducted by an immigration judge pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226. 
2. Within seven days of the immigration judge’s decision, the parties shall provide a joint 
notice on the docket advising the Court of the outcome of the bond hearing. 
The Petition is DENIED in all other respects. 
The Clerk of Court shall mark this case closed. 
 
/s/ W. Scott Hardy 
W. Scott Hardy 
United States District Judge 
 
cc/ecf: All counsel of record 
 

Passage view · GavelSight