govinfo:USCOURTS-dcd-1_16-cv-00232-13

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
 
 
TIMOTHY KARCHER, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, 
Defendant. 
Civil Action No. 16-232 (CKK) 
 
 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
(June 3, 2026) 
 
Pursuant to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”), on February 12, 2016, over 
300 Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit against Defendant Islamic Republic of Iran (“Iran”) . The three-
count Amended Complaint in this action seeks relief with reference to United States nationals 
and/or United States servicemembers who were injured or killed by Iran and/or its agents in Iraq, 
during the period of 2004 through 2011. Such relief is sought on behalf of surviving victims, the 
estates of victims who were killed, an d the family members of both. See Am. Compl., ECF No. 
8, ¶¶ 1161–74. 
The Court previously held a bench trial addressing Iran’s liability for some of Plaintiffs’ 
claims derived from seven “bellwether” attacks involving Iran , where six such attacks involved 
Iranian-manufactured explosively formed penetrators (“EFPs”) . Following th at bench trial, on 
August 26, 2019, this Court made findings of fact and conclusions of law pertaining to Iran’s 
liability arising out of these bellwether attacks, which included a template for the future assessment 
of Plaintiffs’ remaining claims , i ncluding those attacks involving EFPs . Karcher v. Islamic 
Republic of Iran , 396 F. Supp. 3d 12 (D.D.C. 2019). Then, on September 9, 2019, t he Court 
appointed Special Master Alan Balaran to administer damages proceedings for the bellwether 
Plaintiffs. Order and Administrative Plan, ECF No. 102. 

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 On January 14, 2021, this Court found Iran responsible for an additional 73 EFP attacks, 
which implicated the claims of: (1) eight Plaintiffs who were personally injured in one of the 
attacks, (2) thirty-four Plaintiffs representing the estates of individuals killed in one of the attacks, 
and (3) two -hundred and twenty -seven (227) Plaintiffs seeking solatium damages as a family 
member of a victim of one of the attacks. Karcher v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Civil Action No. 
16-232, 2021 WL 133507 (D.D.C. Jan. 14, 2021). The Court granted default judgment on liability 
against Iran on the claims of the eight Plaintiffs personally injured in one of the non-bellwether 
attacks, and the thirty-four Plaintiffs representing the estates of individuals killed by one of those 
attacks but did not – at that time – make any ruling regarding the damage claims of the 227 “family-
member” Plaintiffs, which arose out of the seventy-three non-bellwether attacks. On January 14, 
2021, the Court issued an Order broadening the scope of Special Master Balaran’s appointment to 
include recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding non -economic damages 
for the eight Plaintiffs injured in the non-bellwether EFP attacks. Order, ECF No. 125. 
 Special Master Balaran’s recommended damages were largely adopted by this Court in its 
December 7, 2023 Memorandum Opinion , which incorporated the Plaintiff’s amendments and 
corrections to the Special Master’s Report and Recommendation. Those damages related to four 
Plaintiffs who were injured in attacks not involving EFPs, as well as damages for conscious pain 
and suffering for three estate Plaintiffs, economic damages, and solatium damages. Memorandum 
Opinion, ECF No. 159; Order and Judgment, ECF No. 160. Separately thereafter, Special Master 
Balaran developed – and this Court approved – a modified template for the award of damages in 
cases in which EFPs were utilized. See generally June 7, 2024 Memorandum Opinion, ECF No. 
171 (addressing the damages in the modified Report and Recommendation, to which Plaintiffs did 

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not object, and adopting the analysis and damage calculation for the five Plaintiffs addressed 
therein); Order and Judgment, ECF No. 172. 
Subsequently, the Court referred the remaining claims by Plaintiffs – for whom a liability 
determination had been made and the Borochov “standard” was met – and by Plaintiff family 
members – who were claiming a loss of solatium – for determination of damages by four additional 
Special Masters. See Order and Administrative Plan Governing Four Additional Special Masters, 
ECF No. 179 (indicating that the Special Master would also address Plaintiffs’ statutory standing 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c)). The Borochov “standard” refers to a March 2024 decision by t he 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (the “D.C. Circuit”) , in an 
FSIA case, whereby the D.C. Circuit concluded that there was no subject matter jurisdiction , 
pursuant to Section 1605A, where “the perpetrator did not kill anyone in the attack that injured the 
[Plaintiffs], [and therefore] no extrajudi cial killing occurred .” Borochov v. Islamic Republic of 
Iran, 94 F.4th 1053 , 1060 (D.C. Cir. 2024). Furthermore, the D.C. Circuit opined that “Section 
1605A’s test does not support expanding the material -support provision to cover attempted but 
uncompleted extrajudicial killings,” id. at 1063.1 
Following rolling receipt and review by the Court o f multiple Reports and 
Recommendations submitted by those four Special Masters, this Court adopted those Reports and 
Recommendations in a multitude of opinions and issued Orders and Judgments on damages. See 
generally ECF Nos. 197, 205, 225, 237, 242, 245, 254, and 281 (Orders and Judgments). 
 Now pending before this Court is Plaintiffs’ [142] Submission of Eleven Attacks Not Yet 
Adjudicated (“Submission”). Plaintiffs request that this Court find Iran responsible for an 
additional ten attacks, which implicate the claims of: (1) two Plaintiffs who were personally injured 
 
1 This ruling contrasted with the approach taken previously by judges from this District. 

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in one of the attacks (2) two Plaintiffs representing the estates of individuals killed in one of the 
attacks, and (3) thirty-five Plaintiffs seeking solatium damages as a family member of a victim of 
one of the attacks. See Status Report, ECF No. 141; see also List of the 41 Plaintiffs in Response 
to the Court’s February 21, 2025 Minute Order (“List”), ECF No. 202 .2 Plaintiffs’ Submission 
initially addressed eleven attacks and forty -one Plaintiffs ; however, after filing it, Plaintiffs 
requested that this Court hold in abeyance a liability ruling regarding the March 30, 2008 attack 
[which implicates claims by two Plaintiffs]. . . until further legal and factual issues resulting from 
the Borochov decision are resolved.” See Plaintiffs’ Notice of New Authority, ECF No. 165, at 5. 
Accordingly, this Memorandum Opinion addresses Iran’s liability for ten attacks, which 
implicates claims by thirty -nine Plaintiffs. Consistent with prior procedures in this case, once 
liability is established, the damage determinations for these Plaintiffs shall be handled by the 
appointed Special Masters. 
 I. BACKGROUND 
This Court incorporates by reference its prior opinions on liability . I n summarizing 
proceedings leading up to the present decision , the Court will reiterate extensively from those 
 
2 The two Plaintiffs who were injured are George D. White and John McCulley. The estate claims 
relate to Plaintiff Estate of Steven Vincent and Plaintiff Estate of Jeffery Hartley. Others killed in 
action were Robert Arsiaga, Blake Harris, Emanuel Pickett, Stephen Scott, Stuart Wolfer, Adam 
Marion, Mark Stone, Cody Eggleston ; and Daniel Drevnick . The Plaintiffs claiming solatium 
damages are as follows : Tracie Arsiaga; Sylvia Macias; Gilbert Arsiaga, Jr.; George Arsiaga; 
Matthew Arsiaga; Angel Munoz; Robi Ann Galindo; the Estate of Jeremy Arsiaga (brother of 
Robert Arsiaga); Lisa Ramaci; Isabell Vincent; Charles Vincent; Anne F. Harris; Paul D. Harris; 
Merlese Pickett; Harry Cromity; Rachel M. Gillette; Rebekah Scott; Leonard Wolfer; Esther 
Wolfer; David Hartley; Pam Marion; Donnie Marion; Adrian McCann; Don Jason Stone; Angie 
Jackson; Kaytrina Jackson; Shilyn Jackson; Kenneth J. Drevnick; Natalia White; Kristin White 
(identified previously as K.W.); George J. White; Edna Luz Burgos; Stephanie McCulley; Tarron 
McCulley (identified previously as T.M.); and Ryan McCulley (identified previously as R.M.) 

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opinions, with minor modifications to avoid disclosing the small amount of information that was 
redacted in the public version. 
 
 
 
 
A. Service and Entry of Default 
 
Plaintiffs purported to effectuate service on Iran via diplomatic channels , pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1608(a)(4). After Iran failed to respond, they sought entry of default, which was entered 
by the Clerk’s Office. See ECF Nos. 16-18. Plaintiffs thereafter moved for default judgment, but 
the Court denied that motion without prejudice to permit Plaintiffs to demonstrate the grounds for 
proper service. Nov. 15, 2016 Order, ECF No. 22. 
Plaintiffs supplied further justification for their attempt to serve Iran under Section 
1608(a)(4), while also asking the Clerk of Court to facilitate service on Iran’s Minister of Foreign 
Affairs under Section 1608(a)(3). See generally ECF Nos. 23-27. At Plaintiff’s request, the Clerk 
again entered a default against Iran once proof of service under Section 1608(a)(3) was returned 
and Iran failed to respond within the statutory time. See ECF Nos. 27-30; 28 U.S.C. § 1608(c)(2), 
(d). The Court determined subsequently that Plaintiffs had properly effectuated service. Apr. 19, 
2017 Mem. Op. and Order, ECF No. 31. 
B. Pretrial Proceedings 
Through a series of Orders, the Court elicited Plaintiffs’ views regarding facilitation of 
proceedings in the default setting. See id. at 4; Scheduling and Procedures Order, ECF No. 32; 
Min. Order of May 15, 2017; Pretrial Scheduling and Procedures Order, ECF No. 39. Based on 
that briefing, and discussion on the record with Plaintiffs, the Court decided to hold a three -day 
bench trial regarding a subset of attacks that Plaintiffs proposed as “bellwethers.” In the Court’s 
Phase I bellwether proceedings, Plaintiffs presented evidence as to jurisdiction, liability, and at 

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least an aspect of damages. See Min. Orders of June 18, 2018, and July 17, 2018. After liability 
was established, one or more Special Masters would conduct Phase II bellwether proceedings to 
complete damages determinations and make reports and recommendations to the Court. See Min. 
Orders of June 18, 2018, and July 17, 2018. Thereafter, the Court would issue further instructions 
regarding non-bellwether proceedings. See Min. Order of July 17, 2018. 
C. Bench Trial 
The Court held a bench trial on December 3, 4, and 6, 2018. During the three-day trial, 
Plaintiffs presented evidence regarding seven bellwether attacks - six attacks in Baghdad or the 
vicinity, which allegedly involved EFPs, and a seventh attack—on the PJCC in Karbala —which 
involved more conventional weapons. Plaintiffs put on a total of 19 witnesses, consisting of 8 fact 
witnesses and 11 expert witnesses. The fact witnesses consisted of the following five military 
servicemember Plaintiffs who were injured in the bellwether attacks: Robert Bartlett , Robert 
Canine, David Haines, Chris Levi, and Wesley Williamson. The other fact witnesses were Kelli 
Hake, a Plaintiff and the widow of servicemember Christopher Hake, who was killed in a 
bellwether attack; Colonel (Ret.) Kevin Farrell, a non -Plaintiff witness of the attack that injured 
Mr. Bartlett; and then-First Lieutenant Rusty Mason, a non -Plaintiff witness of the attack that 
killed Mr. Hake. 
Of the expert witnesses, seven spoke to liability issues consisting generally of Iran’s role 
in Iraq, Iran’s relationship with its Lebanese and Iraqi proxies, the weapons they used in Iraq, and 
the U.S. military’s efforts to respond. The liability experts were Captain (Ret.) Donald Wade 
Barker; Colonel (Ret.) Leo E. Bradley III; Dr. Matthew Levitt; Colonel (Ret.) Kevin Lutz; Russell 
McIntyre; Lieutenant General (Ret.) Michael L. Oates; and Michael P. Pregent. Because the Court 
cites extensively herein to expert testimony, the Court shall reiterate its summary of some relevant 

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qualifications of those liability experts and identify the topics as to which the Court found them to 
be qualified. See Fed. R. Evid. 702.3 
Liability Experts 
• Captain (Ret.) Donald Wade Barker performed counter -IED research and 
development at Georgia Tech after leading counter-IED units of the U.S. Army in 
Iraq, Afghanistan, and the United States. Expert Rep. of Capt. (Ret.) Donald Wade 
Barker, PX-158 (“Barker Rep.”), Ex. 1; see also Barker T3-6:19-10:7.4 The Court 
qualified Mr. Barker as an expert in “ [improvised explosive devices (“IEDs”)] , 
EFPs and counter-IED technology.” Barker T3-10:8-12. 
• Colonel (Ret.) Leo E. Bradley III commanded U.S. Army units in Iraq, 
Afghanistan, and the United States that were responsible for explosive ordnance 
disposal (“EOD”) and/or counter-IED initiatives. Expert Rep. of Colonial Leo E. 
Bradley III, U.S. Army (Retired), PX -156 (“Bradley Rep.”), Ex. A; Bradley T2 -
7:14-9:24. The Court found Mr. Bradley qualified to serve as an expert as to “U.S. 
military EOD operations and IED investigations.” Bradley T2-12:9-13. 
• Dr. Matthew Levitt directs a counterterrorism and intelligence program at the 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy and previously served in related roles at 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the U.S. Departments of State and the 
Treasury. Expert Rep. of Dr. Matthew Levitt, PX -154 (“Levitt Rep.”), Ex. A; see 
also Levitt T1-15:5-26:5. The Court found Dr. Levitt qualified to address “Iran’s 
role as a state sponsor of terrorism, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, or 
IRGC; the Islamic Revolut ionary Guard Corps Qods Force, or IRGC -QF; 
Hezbollah; and those entities’ support and training of the Special Groups in Iraq.” 
Levitt T1-26:6-14. 
• Colonel (Ret.) Kevin Lutz established and commanded the U.S. military’s 
Combined Joint Task Force Troy (“Task Force Troy”) in Iraq and led other counter-
IED and EOD units of the U.S. Army. Expert Rep. of Col. (Ret.) Kevin Lutz, PX-
159 (“First Lutz Rep.”), Ex. A; see also Lutz T5-6:18-15:2. The Court found Mr. 
Lutz qualified to a ddress “the use of explosive devices, including IEDs and other 
ordnance, by transnational terrorist organizations and specifically the tactics, 
 
3 Certain subjects that the experts discussed appeared to be “common knowledge” amongst those who study 
recent conflicts involving Iran and Iraq. For example, several of the experts discussed Iranian proxies in 
Iraq. However, the Court found their reports and/or testimony to be credible as to any such topics 
for which it cited them. 
4 Citations to testimony from the bench trial shall use the following format: “name T# -
page(s):line(s),” i.e., witness name, transcript volume, and then page number(s) and line(s) 
thereon. 

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techniques and procedures used by terrorist groups in Iraq between 2003 and 2011.” 
Lutz T5-15:4-11. 
• Russell McIntyre has held intelligence roles that include but are not limited to 
serving with Multi -National Corps -Iraq in a counter -IED cell. Expert Rep. of 
Russell L. McIntyre, PX-157 (“McIntyre Rep.”), at 2 & Ex. A; see also McIntyre 
T5-59:10-64:15. The Court recognized Mr. McIntyre as an expert regarding “IED 
threats to [U.S.] forces, specifically in Iraq between 2003 and 2011, and with an 
additional focus on explosively formed projectiles or penetrators.” McIntyre T5-
64:16-22. 
• Lieutenant General (Ret.) Michael L. Oate s directed the U.S. military’s Joint 
Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (“JIEDDO”) and served in 
several U.S. Army leadership roles in, or concerning, Iraq during the relevant 
period. Expert Rep. of Lt. Gen. Michael L. Oates, United States Army (Ret.), PX-
153 (“Oates Rep.”), at 2; see also Oates T1 -81:2-9, 81:25 -86:8. The Court 
recognized Mr. Oates as an expert in “tactical and strategic threats faced by US and 
Coalition Forces in Iraq [from] 2003 to 2008 and including the specific threat to 
US military forces from IEDs and other ordn ance, including EFPs.” Oates T1 -
86:15-22. 
• Michael P. Pregent performed intelligence roles for the United States Central 
Command Intelligence Directorate, Defense Intelligence Agency, and U.S. Army 
and currently serves as a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, where he focuses 
on, among other things, counter-Iranian policy proposals. Expert Rep. of Michael 
P. Pregent, PX -155 (“Pregent Rep.”), at 1 -2; see also Pregent T5-165:15-173:2. 
The Court found that Mr. Pregent was qualified to testify regarding “intelligence 
matters, including attribution of terror attacks and also evidence collection and 
analysis in the intelligence field.” Pregent T5-173:3-7. 
In addition to the nearly one hundred pre-admitted exhibits, the Court admitted twenty-five 
more based on the witnesses’ testimony. See generally Ex. List, ECF No. 68. Those exhibits 
consisted largely of the expert reports, as well as audiovisual and photographic evidence. 
Demonstrative exhibits also were used at trial but were not offered into evidence. 
D. August 26, 2019 Ruling & Post-Trial Proceedings 
 
On August 26, 2019, the Court entered an order granting default judgment on liability 
against Iran as to the claims of certain Plaintiffs representing individuals killed or injured in the 
six bellwether EFP attacks addressed during the bench trial and one bellwether attack not involving 

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an EFP. See Aug. 26, 2019 Order, ECF No. 93. 5 In support of its August 26, 2019 Order, the 
Court made extensive findings of fact based on testimony presented at the bench trial, as well as a 
substantial amount of evidence submitted before and after the trial. See Aug. 26, 2019 Mem. Op., 
ECF No. 94. A portion of the Court’s August 26, 2019 Findings of Fact were specific to Iran’s 
material support for the six individual bellwether EFP attacks at issue during bench trial. See id. 
at 27–54 (addressing the six bellwether EFP attacks in Baghdad). The Court, however, also made 
detailed findings of fact re garding “Iran’s relationship with Hezbollah and other proxy groups 
operating in Iraq” and “the nature and use in the Iraqi theater of EFPs, as an Iranian signature 
weapon.” Id. at 12 (quotation omitted). The Court intended these findings of fact to provide a 
foundation for forthcoming liability analyses pertaining to the remaining non-bellwether attacks 
raised in Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint. 
On August 30, 2019, the Court held a teleconference on the record, and Plaintiffs addressed 
the future proceedings for the non-bellwether attacks raised in the Amended Complaint . To 
facilitate the Court’s liability analysis for the remaining EFP attacks, Plaintiffs first submitted a 
sample expert report from Col. Kevin Lutz, opining on Iran’s liability for one of the non-bellwether 
EFP attacks. See Pls.’ Sept. 5, 2019 Rep., ECF No. 100. As noted above, the Court had previously 
found Col. Lutz qualified as an expert to address “the use of explosive devices, including IEDs 
and other ordnance, by transnational terrorist organizations and specifically the tactics, techniques 
and procedures used by terrorist groups in Iraq between 2003 and 2011.” Lutz T5 -15:4-11. 
Accordingly, upon review of Plaintiffs’ sample expert report from Col. Lutz, the Court permitted 
 
5 As noted previously, the Court appointed Special Master Balaran to administer damages 
proceedings for the bellwether Plaintiffs. See Sept. 9, 2019 Order, ECF No. 102. 

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Plaintiffs to file additional expert reports regarding the remaining non-bellwether EFP attacks 
alleged in the Amended Complaint. Min. Order of Nov. 15, 2019. 
Thereafter, Plaintiffs submitted a consolidated expert report from Col. Lutz addressing an 
additional seventy-two (72) of the non -bellwether EFP attacks in the Amended Complaint . See 
Dec. 11, 2019 Consolidated Expert Rep. of Col. (Ret.) Kevin Lutz (“Lutz Rep.”), ECF No. 109 –
1. Plaintiffs also submitted to the Court an Evidentiary Appendix under seal containing the records 
considered and relied upon by Col. Lutz in arriving at the opinions set forth in his consolidated 
expert report. See Dec. 11, 2019, Pls.’ Submission of Lutz Rep., ECF No. 109 , at 1–2. Finally, 
Plaintiffs also filed a stand-alone “Section 1605A(c) Appendix ” to accompany the Col. Lutz’s 
consolidated expert report. See id. at 2.6 
 In assessing the seventy-three non-bellwether EFP attacks, the Court relied in part on its 
August 26, 2019 findings of fact regarding Iran’s use of EFPs in Iraq, but the Court also made new 
findings of fact specific to Iran’s role in each of the attacks in question, including whether an EFP 
was in fact responsible for each attack. The Court determined that Iran was liable under the FSIA 
for Plaintiffs’ claims arising from the seventy-three non-bellwether attacks. 
 
6 Under the public records exception to the hearsay rule, “a record or statement of a public office” is 
admissible if it contains “a matter observed while under a legal duty to report” or “factual findings . . . from 
a legally authorized investigation” and does not “indicate a lack of trustworthiness.” Fed. R. Evid. 803(8). 
“Pursuant to the ‘broad approach to admissibility’ under Rule 803(8), a court may also admit ‘conclusion[s] 
or opinion[s]’ contained within a public record ’ and ‘[o]nce proffered, a public record is presumptively 
admissible, and the opponent bears the burden of showing it is unreliable. ’” Fritz v. Islamic Republic of 
Iran, 320 F. Supp. 3d 48, 61 n.6 (D.D.C. 2018) (quoting Owens v. Republic of Sudan, 864 F.3d 751, 792 
(D.C. Cir. 2017) ). Upon review, t he Court finds that the each of the military records included within 
Plaintiffs’ Section 1605A(c) Appendix is admissible under the Rule 803(8) public records exception. So 
too are those public records referenced in Col. Lutz’s expert report and cited by this Court in its Findings 
of Fact below. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(8). The Court also makes these evidentiary findings in view of the 
D.C. Circuit’s instruction that “courts have the authority—indeed . . . the obligation—to adjust evidentiary 
requirements to . . . differing situations,” particularly in the context of FSIA default proceedings. Kim v. 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 774 F.3d 1044, 1048 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (quotations omitted). 

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 The Court proceeds in the same manner here in addressing Plaintiffs’ [142] Submission 
relating to the remaining ten attacks , which consists of: (1) the consolidated expert report of Col 
(Ret.) Kevin Lutz, attached as Exhibit A; (2) the consolidated expert report of Russell L. McIntyre, 
attached as Exhibit B; (3) the expert report of Col. (Ret.) Joel Rayburn, attached as Exhibit C; (4) 
the expert declaration of Col. (Ret.) Nichoel “Nycki” Brooks, attached as Exhibit D; (5) a sealed 
Evidentiary Appendix containing the records considered and relied upon by the experts in arriving 
at the opinions set forth in the expert reports and declaration referenced above; and (6) a sealed 
“Section 1605A(c) Appendix” containing a small subset of documents to establish that a “victim” 
in each attack was a national of the United States or a member of the armed forces, attached as Ex. 
E. 
The Court notes that Col. Kevin Lutz and Russell McIntyre have been previously qualified 
as liability experts, and their qualifications have been discussed in Section I.C. above. Referencing 
their ex pert reports, t he Court now briefly summariz es the qualifications of Plaintiffs’ two 
additional proffered liability experts, Col.(Ret.) Joel Rayburn and Col. (Ret.) Nichoel Brooks. The 
Court notes also the topics on which they have expertise. 
• Col. (Ret.) Joel Rayburn served as a U.S. Army strategic intelligence officer on 
multiple deployments to Iraq from 2006 -2008. Rayburn Expert Report 
(Professional Background), Ex. C ¶2. Col. Rayburn continued to work on Iraqi 
issues after his 2008 redeployment to the United States, deploying to Iraq briefly 
in fall 2009 and again in September-October 2015 to lead a campaign assessment 
team for the then-commander of Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent 
Resolve. ¶3. Col. Rayburn also served as director of the U.S. Army’s Operation 
Iraqi Freedom Study Group, which assessed the Army’s involvement in Iraq from 
2003-2011. ¶ 4. From January 2017 through July 2018, Col. Rayburn was on the 
National Security Council staff as the Senior Director for Iran, Iraq, Syria, and 
Lebanon, where he oversaw implementation of the U.S. government’s policy 
concerning those countries. ¶ 5. From July 2018 through January 2021, he served 
as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern affairs, where he was 
responsible for Levant Affairs and served as the U.S. Special Envoy for Syria, 
with both roles requiring him to closely follo w affairs in Iraq, engage with Iraqi 
counterparts, and travel to Iraq for diplomatic assignments. ¶ 6. 

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• Col. (Ret.) Nichoel “Nycki” Brooks served as an Intelligence Officer for the U.S. 
Army for 32 years, and after retiring from the Army in 2019, he joined Deloitte 
U.S. as a Specialist Leader in Strategy and Analytics. Brooks Decl., E x. D ¶ 2. 
During his time with the Army, he served as Executive Officer to the J-2 Senior 
Intelligence Officer for the Multi -National Forces -Iraq from 2003 -2005; as 
Director of the Analytic Center for MNF -1 from 2006 -2007; and as Special 
Advisor to Commanding General, MNF-1 from 2007 to 2009. ¶ 4. Col. Brooks 
was one of the U.S. Army’s leading subject matter experts on Shi’a militant 
groups that operated in Iraq between 2003 and 2011. Id. In 2009, Col. Brooks 
served as Commander of the 310th Military Intelligence Battalion, and after a 
fellowship, he was promoted in 2012 to the position of Executive Director of the 
Defense Intelligence Agency for the Director of National Intelligence . ¶ 5. 
Between 2013 -2015, Col. Brooks served as the Commander of the National 
Ground Intelligence Center, and as J-2 Director of Intelligence for the Combined 
Joint Special Operations Command in Afghanistan. Id. In 2016, after returning 
stateside, he jointed the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command – which 
conducts intelligence, security and information operations for U.S. Army 
commanders and partners in the Intelligence Community – in the position of 
Deputy Commander. ¶ 6. 
 
The Court finds that both Col. Rayburn and Col. Brooks are qualified to serve as liability 
experts in this FSIA case involving attacks that occurred in Iraq during the period of 2004 through 
2011. 
 II. LEGAL STANDARD 
Plaintiffs seek a default judgment against Iran for claims set forth in their Amended 
Complaint. The entry of default judgment is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55. 
Where the damages sought from a defaulting party are not for a sum certain or are not readily 
susceptible to computation, “the party must apply to the court for a default jud gment.” Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 55(b). But even then, “the entry of a default judgment is not automatic.” Mwani v. bin 
Laden, 417 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2005). In ordinary civil litigation, “[t]he determination of whether 
a default judgment is appropriate is committed to the discretion of the trial court.” Hanley-Wood 
LLC v. Hanley Wood LLC, 783 F. Supp. 2d 147, 150 (D.D.C. 2011) (citing Jackson v. Beech, 636 

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F.2d 831, 836 (D.C. Cir. 1980)); see also 10A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice & 
Procedure Civil § 2685 (4th ed.) (same). Because “strong policies favor resolution of disputes on 
their merits[,] ‘[t]he default judgment must normally be viewed as available only when the 
adversary process has been halted because of an essentially unresponsive party.’” Jackson, 636 
F.2d at 836 (quoting H.F. Livermore Corp. v. Aktiengesellschaft Gebruder Loepfe, 432 F.2d 689, 
691 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (per curiam)). 
A plaintiff seeking default judgment must persuade the trial court that subject -matter 
jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction over the defendant are satisfied. Thuneibat v. Syrian Arab 
Republic, 167 F. Supp. 3d 22, 33 (D.D.C. 2016) (citing Khadr v. United States , 529 F.3d 1112, 
1115 (D.C. Cir. 2008); FC Inv. Grp. LC v. IFX Mkts., Ltd., 529 F.3d 1087, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 2008)). 
Additionally, this Court cannot enter default judgment against a foreign state under the FSIA 
“unless the claimant establishes his claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the court.” 
28 U.S.C. § 1608(e); see Roeder v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 333 F.3d 228, 232 (D.C. Cir. 2003) 
(“The court . . . has an obligation to satisfy itself that plaintiffs have established a right to relief.”), 
cert. denied, 542 U.S. 915 (2004). “[T]he FSIA leaves it to the court to determine precisely how 
much and what kinds of evidence the plaintiff must provide,” Han Kim v. Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea , 774 F.3d at 1044, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 2014) , and “[u]ncontroverted factual 
allegations that are supported by admissible evidence are taken as true,” Thuneibat, 167 F. Supp. 
3d at 33. 
III. FINDINGS OF FACT 
 
This Court’s Findings of Fact in this Memorandum Opinion proceed in two principal parts. 
First, the Court will reiterate many of its prior factual findings from its August 26, 2019 
Memorandum Opinion, which recounted in detail the evidence proffered during a three-day bench 

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trial in this case. See Aug. 26, 2019 Mem. Op., ECF No. 94. These findings of fact address ed 
Iran’s relationship with Hezbollah and other proxy groups operating in Iraq as well as the nature 
and use in the Iraqi theater of EFPs, an Iranian “signature weapon.”7 
Second, the Court will address how Iran’s material support for its proxies and use of 
conventional weapons and EFPs resulted in injuries to George D. White and John McCulley, and 
the deaths of Robert Arsiaga, Steven Vincent, Blake Harris, Emanuel Pickett, Stephen Scott, Stuart 
Wolfer, Jeffery Hartley, Adam Marion, Mark Stone, Cody Eggleston, and Daniel Drevnick. In so 
doing, the Court will rely upon the entirety of the record evidence in this case, but with a focus on 
Plaintiffs’ evidence in support of its Submission. 
A. Iran’s Material Support for Hezbollah and Other Proxies in Iraq 
1. Iranian Interests in the Region 
 
Shortly after Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini came to power as Supreme Leader, he 
instituted what became known as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (“I RGC”) to forestall 
any “backsliding in implementing [his] vision for an Islamic theocratic government” in the Islamic 
Republic of Ir an. McIntyre Rep. at 4 –5; see also Levitt T1-27:9–12. While the Iranian armed 
forces would “protect the borders of Iran,” the IRGC with its “parallel” military structure was 
tasked with “protect[ing] the revolution.” Levitt T1 -28:3–8 (observing that IRGC has its own 
army, navy, and air force). A subsidiary of the IRGC —the Qods Force, or IRGC -QF—is 
responsible for its international operations, including training Muslim groups to support the 
revolution through insurgency and terrorism. McIntyre Rep. at 6; Levitt T1 -27:18–21, 33:6–16 
(likening the Qods Force to “the sharp end of [a] spear” when it comes to “Iran’s extraterritorial 
 
7 Because at least one of the attacks at issue in this Opinion involved the use of EFPs, the Court 
will recount part of its prior analysis regarding EFPs. 
 

15 
 
activities”). That subsidiary was led by General Qasem Soleimani, now deceased, who was a 
direct report to the second Supreme Leader of Iran, Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Hosseini Khamenei. 
McIntyre Rep. at 4–5; Oates Rep. at 11. 
As a result of Iran’s “support fo r acts of international terrorism,” the United States 
designated Iran as a state sponsor of terrorism on January 19, 1984. State Sponsors of Terrorism, 
U.S. Dep’t of State (Dec. 21, 2020), PX-1; see also McIntyre Rep. at 6 (attributing designation “in 
large part to the actions of the IRGC and later its Qods Force”); Levitt T1 -27:16–17 (observing 
that designation has not been discontinued). Similar ter rorism-related designations of the IRGC 
and IRGC-QF have followed more recently: the IRGC-QF on October 25, 2007, and the IRGC on 
October 13, 2017. See U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Fact Sheet: Designation of Iranian Entities and 
Individuals for Proliferation Activities and Support for Terrorism (Oct. 25, 2007), PX -5 (“IRGC-
QF Designation”), at 1, 3 (announcing designation of IRGC -QF under Executive Order (“E. O.”) 
13224 for supporting terrorist organizations); McIntyre Rep. at 3 n.1, 4 n.3 (recognizing this 
designation of IRGC -QF as “Specially Designated Global Terrorist”); U.S. Dep’ t of Treasury, 
Treasury Designates the IRGC Under Terrorism Authority and Targets IRGC and Military 
Supporters Under Counter-Proliferation Authority (Oct. 13, 2017), PX-6 (announcing designation 
of IRGC under E.O. 13224 for supporting IRGC -QF); McIntyre Re p. at 3 n.1 (recognizing this 
designation of IRGC as “Specially Designated Global Terrorist”); Levitt Rep. at 6 n.4 (same). 
 Dating at least to th e Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, the Shi’a Muslim regime in Iran sought 
to undermine Saddam Hussein’s largely Sunni Muslim government by supporting Shi’a political 
groups in Iraq. See McIntyre Rep. at 14; Levitt Rep. at 16. These efforts escalated after the United 
States’ Second Iraq War, opines Dr. Matthew Levitt, a former U.S. counterterrorism intelligence 
analyst: 

16 
 
By forcing the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime, Operation Iraqi Freedom 
removed Iran’s greatest enemy and longtime nemesis. The 2003 invasion therefore 
provided Iran with a historic opportunity to reshape its relationship with Iraq and, 
in the process, increase its influence in the region. To that end Iran employed an 
“all elements of national power” approach in exploiting the outcome of this seminal 
event. This included both soft and hard power, from the use of political, economic, 
religious, and cultural leverage to the support of militant proxies. 
 
Levitt Rep. at 7. The United States’ post-invasion presence in Iraq threatened Iran’s opportunities, 
however, only reinforcing “the long-held Iranian desire to push the United States out of the Gulf 
region.” Id. at 8. Iran accordingly pursued “a Shia-dominated and unified Iraq” while causing the 
United States “continued setbacks in [its] efforts to promote democracy and stability” there. 
Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence for the S enate Select Comm. 
on Intelligence (Feb. 2, 2006) (“Annual Threat Assessment”), PX-16, at 12. 
 Meanwhile, Iran had long exerted its influence in Lebanon, as well. Beginning in the early 
1980s, IRGC shaped the development and military capabilities of Lebanese Hezbollah (herein, 
“Hezbollah”),8 a militant Shi’a political party that wanted to oust Israeli forces from Southern 
Lebanon. McIntyre Rep. at 7 –8. As the relationship between IRGC and Hezbollah grew, 
Hezbollah reciprocated by executing terrorist missions against Israeli and American targets at 
Iran’s request, offering Iran “reasonable deniability” after the fact. Levitt T1 -30:10–19; see also 
McIntyre Rep. at 7 –8; Annual Threat Assessment at 13 (describing Hezbollah as “Iran’s main 
terrorist ally” and “capable of attacks against US interests if it feels its Iranian pa tron is 
threatened”). 
2. Iran’s Network of Influence in Post-Invasion Iraq 
 
In order to bolster its influence in Iraq, and counter American efforts there, Iran continued 
to sponsor Shi’a political movements—now vying for control of the post -Hussein government—
 
8 Elsewhere the Court shall distinguish an Iraqi Shi’a militia group known as Kata’ib Hezbollah. 

17 
 
while funding and facilitating the training of Shi’a militia groups, with Hezbollah’s help. See, e.g., 
Oates Rep. at 14–17. In the political sphere, the Da’wa Party, the Supreme Council for the Islamic 
Revolution in Iraq (“SCIRI”), and Muqtada al -Sadr’s Office of the Martyr Sadr (“OMS”) filled 
varying niches but each benefitted from Iranian support. See id. The armed wings of SCIRI and 
OMS—the Badr Corps and Jaysh al -Mahdi (“JAM”), respectively —were likewise closely 
affiliated with IRGC -QF. Id. at 14, 17. Among the downstream effects of that Iranian support 
was militia infiltration of the Iraqi police and security forces, resulting in widespread corruption 
and “death squads” targeting at least Sunnis, if not Western officials as well. See, e.g., McIntyre 
Rep. at 19 –21; Oates Rep. at 15 –16. Meanwhile, Ira nian arms, funding, and operatives flowed 
into Iraq through the Sheibani Netw ork and other smuggling operations, while some Iraqi allies 
made the reverse trip to Iran for training. McIntyre Rep. at 26. 
The fruits of Iran’s soft power are perhaps best demonstrated by Michael Pregent’s 
testimony. As a civilian intelligence officer with the Defense Intelligence Agency, Mr. Pregent 
was tasked with “curbing Iranian influence in the security ministries.” Pregent T5 -168:2–25, 
169:16–24. His undercover assignment in the Iraqi prime minister’s Office of the Commander in 
Chief gave him a unique vantage point. Id. at 169:24–170:2. He witnessed “the level of complicity 
with Iraqi ministers tied to the Shi’a Da’w a Party that went after American allies in the Sunni 
community and the Kurdish community and also Shi’a nationalists.” Id. at 170:7 –10. These 
connections benefitted Shi’a militia members, who gained access to “government vehicles, 
government waivers to travel during curfews,” and “official ministerial paperwork and 
permissions” that enabled them to “develop targeting packets against o pposition leaders and also 
Sunnis.” Id. at 170:11–16. Iranian allies threatened American military interests in Iraq in part 

18 
 
because they had “saturat[ed] . . . the security ministries and the intelligence apparatus.” Id. at 
170:17–21. 
As for the hard power, the IRGC-QF spearheaded a closely coordinated campaign to equip 
the Shi’a militia for proxy warfare. That campaign is well attested to in U.S. Government 
documents. In 2007, the Qods Force earned its Treasury Department designation under E.O. 
13224 in part be cause it “provides lethal support in the form of weapons, training, funding, and 
guidance to select groups of Iraqi Shi’a militants who target and kill Coalition and Iraqi forces and 
innocent Iraqi civilians.” IRGC-QF Designation, PX-5, at 3. The State Department found that in 
2011, 
Iran was responsible for the increase of lethal attacks on U.S. forces [in Iraq] and 
provided militants with the capability to assemble explosives designed to defeat 
armored vehicles. The IRGC -QF, in concert with Lebanese Hizballah, provided 
training outs ide of Iraq as well as advisors inside Iraq for Shia militants in the 
construction and use of sophisticated improvised explosive device technology and 
other advanced weaponry. 
 
U.S. Dep’t of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2011 (July 2012), PX-18, at 172.9 
 The threat from Shi’a militia continued to evolve under Iranian direction or support. After 
American and Iraqi forces inflicted tremendous casualties on JAM in the battle of Najaf in 2004, 
Mr. al-Sadr permitted the formation of JAM “Special Groups” with enhanced capabilities to attack 
American and Coalition forces, while the remainder of JAM would focus on anti -Sunni violence 
and other criminal activities. Oates Rep. at 22; McIntyre Rep. at 37. This resulted in a realignment 
 
9 The Court has no reason to believe that “Lebanese Hizballah” is not synonymous with Lebanese 
Hezbollah, to which the Court refers simply as Hezbollah. See Hezbollah, Oxford English Dictionary (2d 
ed. 1989) (identifying other transliterations of Arabic term for “Party of God”), available at 
https://www.oed.com/oed2/00105782 (last visited Aug. 12, 2019); Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran , 
515 F. Supp. 2d 25, 37 n.1 (D.D.C. 2007) (discussing some transliterations), abrogated on other grounds, 
Mohammadi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 782 F.3d 9 (D.C. Cir. 2015). Any other presumptive versions of 
that organization’s name that appear in the evidence shall be treated likewise. 

19 
 
of leadership, where local commanders of JAM Special Groups operated with some autonomy 
from Mr. al -Sadr and “received their training, weapons and operational direction directly from 
Hezbollah and the IRGC-QF.” Oates Rep. at 22-23. IRGC-QF funding and equipment for Special 
Groups reached an estimated $750,000 to $3 million per month by August 2007. Pregent Rep. at 
12 (reporting U.S. military estimate). 
Notably, Qais Khazali – who commanded one or more JAM Special Groups – traveled to 
Iran in 2006 and met with IRGC-QF leadership as well as Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. 
Declassified Detainee Document Regarding Qais Khazali, at 000324 (Aug. 13, 2007), PX -57; 
McIntyre T5-104:9–17; McIntyre Rep. at 25. Declassified military intelligence indicates that the 
Supreme Leader asked Mr. Khazali to start Asa’ib Ahl al -Haq (“AAH”) or the K2 network, a 
further special group outside of Mr. al -Sadr’s auspices and a wareness. Declassified Detainee 
Document Regarding Qais Khazali , at 000324 (Aug. 13, 2007), PX -57. The AAH initiative 
demonstrated Iran’s effort to foster dependenc e on its aid for Iraqi militia to carry out attacks on 
Coalition Forces. Pregent Rep. at 13. Although AAH was later deprived for some time of the 
leadership of Qais Khazali and his brother, Layth,10 during their detention by U.S. forces, the group 
“was able to maintain a fairly high -level offensive tempo” and “operated as Iran’s direct terror 
proxy targeting U.S. personnel at the direction of Hezbollah and the IRGC-QF” from 2006 through 
2011. Oates Rep. at 33; see also McIntyre Rep. at 39, 51 (discussing AAH’s successes with out 
the Khazalis, and identifying the release of Layth in June 2009 and Qais in January 2010); 11 
 
10 The record suggests that Layth Khazali’s first name is also transliterated “Laith.” But the Court shall use 
Layth uniformly, for simplicity. See supra note 9 (discussing transliterations of Hezbollah). 
11 In his testimony, Mr. Pregent identified the release date of Layth as 2008 and Qais as 2009, but the 
discrepancy is immaterial. Pregent T5 -180:112–14. Evidently the Khazali brothers and Mr. Daqduq had 
been turned over to the Iraqi government and subsequently released “at the request of Iran.” Pregent T5 -
179:5–180:14, 181:7–10. 

20 
 
Pregent T5-223:4–13 (stating that AAH “was funded, directed, trained and equipped by the IRGC-
Qods Force and Lebanese Hezbollah”). 
 Iran directed the formation of still another militia group —Kata’ib Hezbollah (“KH” or 
“Hezbollah Brigades”)—in 2007. Oates Rep. at 33; Oates T1 -123:24–25 (calling KH a “whole -
cloth creation of the IRGC”). This group would be led by Abu Mahdi al Muhandis, now deceased, 
who served as a senior advisor to the IRGC’s former leader Qasem Soleimani with both Da’wa 
Party and Badr Corps credentials. Oates Rep. at 33; McInt yre Rep. at 40. Since 2007, Kata’ib 
Hezbollah had been “responsible for numerous terrorist acts against Iraqi, U.S., and other targets 
in Iraq,” the U.S. Department of State noted when it designated the group as a Foreign Terrorist 
Organization in June 2009. U.S. Dep’t of State, Designation of Kata’ib Hizballah (June 26, 2009), 
PX-10. 
 In July 2008 Mr. al -Sadr announced the formation of the Promise[d] Day Brigades 
(“PDB”), which could be called a JAM Special Group of his own. Oates Rep. at 38; McIntyre 
Rep. at 46. This group too was supported by the IRGC -QF and Hezbollah, “in keeping wi th the 
IRGC’s long -time policy of investing in all Shi’a factions.” Oates Rep. at 38. And it was 
responsible for its own string of attacks on U.S. and Coalition forces. Oates Rep. at 38. 
B. Explosively Formed Penetrators as a Signature Weapon 
 
Plaintiffs’ evidence shows that Iran supplied or bankrolled several types of weapons used 
by Shi’a militia groups in Iraq. See, e.g., McIntyre Rep. at 41 (notin g that Iran provided Kata’ib 
Hezbollah with a certain type of rocket launcher). 
1. The Nature, Uses, and Deployment of EFPs 
The Court’s understanding of EFP design, construction, and detonation is aided by the 
report and trial testimony primarily of Wade Barker, an explosives expert. See Barker T3-13:3–
15:7; Barker Rep. at 5 –9; see also Lutz T5-17:8–18:19 (affirming Mr. Barker’s testimony and 

21 
 
describing EFP video admitted as PX-60). An EFP typically consists, in pertinent part, of a short 
metal pipe loaded with high-energy explosive (“HE” explosive) and capped with a concave copper 
disk. Barker Rep. at 6 –7 & n.13 (defining HE explosives in part as “chemical compounds or 
mixtures that are capable of supporting or sustaining a detonation wave”). Detonation of the EFP 
forces the inverted center of the disk outwards into a molten slug capable of traveling 2,000 meters 
per second or more.12 Id. Detonating an EFP relies on a “two-step arming and triggering process” 
akin to that of other explosive weapons. Barker Rep. at 10, 12. At least for EFPs in the Iraqi 
theater, the operator typically would arm the EFP using either a command wire (“CW”) or remote 
frequency (“RF”). Id. at 10. 
Mr. Barker confirmed at trial that making effective EFPs requires substantial technical 
expertise. He acknowledged that it had “taken [him] years to even understand how” to make an 
EFP, and that building the demonstrative EFP exhibit for trial involved two months of work by 
two electrical engineers and two mechanical engineers. Barker T3-19:2–10. Effectively deploying 
the EFP called for a further layer of technical know -how combined with substantial strategic 
planning. Identifying precisely the right directional focus, distance from the target, and timing of 
the PIR-enabled weapon would require an extensive “trial and error” process. Bradley T2-26:16–
27:15. The EFP emplacers were also adept, for example, at camouflaging the weapon to avoid 
tipping off U.S. forces. EFPs could be embedded in pile s of trash, trash barrels, concrete street 
curbing, or synthetic rocks made from foam and covered with dirt. Barker T3-26:4–12, 45:15–21; 
Lutz T 5-43:14–44:13 (discussing “rock” pictured in PX -65); McIntyre Rep. at 10. The 
 
12 Mr. Barker’s report states, in different places, that EFPs “typically” travel 2,000 meters per second but 
“up to” 5,000 meters per second. Barker Rep. at 7. Mr. Barker does not explain what might drive the wide 
variation between the typical and maximum speeds. 

22 
 
sophistication of EFP attacks also evolved in step with the U.S. military’s countermeasures, as 
explained below. 
 
2. The Sources of EFPs and the Training to Deploy Them 
Due to the unique components of the EFP, the tactics through which it is effectively 
deployed, and the extensive expertise necessary to overcome U.S. countermeasures , Plaintiffs’ 
experts have traced the EFPs encountered in Iraq to Iran and Hezbollah. Although Hezbollah 
appears to have developed the first EFPs, both Iran and Hezbollah were instrumental in their use 
in Iraq, beginning in 2004. See, e.g., Lutz T5-20:2–21:2 (identifying earliest reported EFP use in 
Iraq). The evidence shows that Iran supplied EFPs that were fired in Iraq. Mr. Oates, the former 
director of JIEDDO, said that the U.S. Department of Defense established JIEDDO to “coordinate 
all of the defense activities to understand” IEDs, including EFPs, “how [U.S. institutions] might 
mitigate the effects from a material[s] solution or from training and furthermore to understand the 
intelligence components associated with the networks that are being used against Coalition Forces 
with these devices.” Oates T1-85:18–86:8. While JIEDDO coordinated counter-IED efforts from 
Washington, D.C., Task Force Troy was “the operational force” on the ground in Iraq, bringing 
together “intelligence, explosive ordnance expertise and engineering expertise.” Oates T1 -95:1–
9. Task Force Troy and domestic U.S. intelligence conducted extensive forensic analysis after 
EFP attacks, as well as when EFP components were found in caches. See, e.g., Lutz T5-27:16–
25; Bradley T2 -43:25–44:16. When Mr. Oates was asked whether “Task Force Troy and/or 
JIEDDO ever reach[ed] any conclusion about th e source of the EFPs being used in Iraq,” he 
concluded unequivocally that “[t]he principal source of the materials and the completed munition, 
the EFP, was . . . Iran.” Oates T1-95:11–18; see also, e.g., Oates Rep. at 24–25 (“[O]ne of Iran’s 
primary forms of material support to the [JAM] Special Groups was financing, manufacturing and 

23 
 
deploying EFPs. . . . The U.S. military traced much of the machinery used to manufa cture the 
EFPs, high explosives and PIR devices deployed in Iraq to Iran and its illicit supply chain.”); U.S. 
Dep’t of Defense, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq (Mar. 2007), PX-35, at 17 (identifying 
Iranian origin of EFPs supplied to some Shi’a m ilitants, who in turn have attacked Coalition 
forces). At a minimum, the metal, the HE explosive, and some degree of EFP manufacturing have 
each been attributed to Iran. See Oates T1-95:19–25 (agreeing that “the actual metal,” as well as 
“the milling or the actual manufacture,” could be traced to Iran); Lutz T5-46:12–47:18 (ascribing 
HE explosive that looked like American C4 to non -U.S. origin, “most likely . . . Iran through the 
IRGC”); id. at 48:5–48:15 (indicating that “large shipments of steel [were] going into Iran to a 
specific manufacturing plant that had the capability to cut and mill the casings”). It appears that 
Iran facilitated the smuggling of these components into Iraq along well-established, yet clandestine 
supply lines for assembly into the finished weapons. See McIntyre T5-96:20–97:11 (discussing 
network of supply bases, weapons caches, and safe houses); Lutz T5 -47:19–48:4 (describing HE 
explosives disguised as American equivalent to pass though “logistic rat lines”). 
Meanwhile, IRGC -QF and Hezbollah conducted training operations in combination of 
Iraq, Iran, and Lebanon for Iraqi Shi’a militant leaders in the effective use of EFPs. See e.g., U.S. 
Dep’t of Defense, FY 2010 NDAA Conference Rep., PX -39, at 3; U.S. Dep’t of State, Country 
Reports on Terrorism 2008 (Apr. 2009), PX -18, at 183. The trainers offered critical assistance 
that, for example, enabled Shi’a militia groups to understand how to position EFPs’ PIR triggers 
based on the likely speed of a moving target vehicle. See Bradley T2-26:16–27:21 (indicating, 
inter alia , that substantial calculations were involved); Lutz T5 -36:11–37:24 (discussing 
Hezbollah’s characteristic use of PIR triggers). 

24 
 
As Mr. Oates testified, “the rapid capability development of the Shi’a militia in Iraq from 
a weapons training and tactics [ perspective], the speed with which they achieved this capability 
and their ability to adapt led me to believe that there was external assistance provided.” Oates T1-
97:23–98:10 (explaining his metaphor that a turtle found atop a fence post required some outside 
help to get there). And Mr. Lutz more pointedly identified that assistance when it came to 
surmounting U.S. countermeasures: 
In my professional opinion, the Special Groups and other local Shi’a terror cells 
could not have deployed and implemented throughout southern Iraq the 
sophisticated radio-frequency technology necessary to defeat our [systems] without 
the IRGC’s active involvement, training, equipment and support. 
 
First Lutz Rep. at 4, 21. Moreover, the U.S. military determined that many thousands of copies of 
a device used to thwart U.S. countermeasure technologies had passed through Iran and thereafter 
into EFPs used in Iraq. Lutz T5-48:16–49:12. 
 Having reiterated its findings on Iran’s relationship with Hezbollah and other proxy groups 
operating in Iraq as well as the nature and use in the Iraqi theater of EFPs, the Court turns now to 
the ten attacks at issue in this Opinion. 
C. Ten Attacks in Iraq 
In analyzing these ten attacks, the Court will generally employ the template adopted during 
previous proceedings. As a threshold matter, the Court shall determine whether the victim of each 
attack was a United States servicemember or United States national at the time the attack occurred. 
Next, the Court shall summarize each attack and identify the harms inflicted on the respective 
Plaintiff(s) (or the decedent(s) represented by Plaintiff(s)) . The Court shall trace the attack’s 
connection to Iran, and w here applicable, the Court shall identify the key elements of the attack 
that persuade the Court that it is an EFP strike. For ease of reference, the Court cites to the expert 

25 
 
reports and declaration (produced in connection with the Plaintiffs’ Submission) without 
referencing the internal citations therein. 
1. April 4, 2004 - Baghdad - Robert Arsiaga (discussed in Rayburn Report, Ex. C) 
The record reflects that SPC [Specialist] Robert Arsiaga received a gunshot wound to the 
head on April 4, 2004, which resulted in his death. 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(ii) Appendix, Ex. 
E, Certificate of Death Overseas, Ex. 1. Col Rayburn provided the following background for the 
April 4, 2004 attack which killed Robert Arsiaga. Muqtada al -Sadr (“Sadr”) was the son of a 
popular Iraqi Shi’a cleric who preached during Sadam Hussein’s rule in Iraq and was assassinated 
in February 1999. After the assassination, Sadr “inherited a sizable infrastructure – a network of 
mosques and social institutions and a vast constituency of poor Shi’a with both religious and social 
loyalties” to his martyred father. Rayburn Report, ECF No. 142-3, at 5. Sadr visited Iran in June 
2003, shortly after the U.S. invasion of Iraq where General Abdul Reza Shahlai from the Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (“IRGCQF”) served as “chief of protocol” for the visit, 
and Sadr’s delegation was hosted by Qsem Soleimani, IRGC -QF Commander. Id. at 5-6. Sadr 
also met with Ayatollah Ali Khamenei during the visit and Sadr received assurances from General 
Shahlai of financial support for the Sadrist movement. Id. at 6. 
In the spring of 2004, Sadr and his organization were viewed “as the most significant threat 
to the planned transfer of sovereignty to an interim Iraqi Government in June [2004] .” Id. at 7. 
On March 28, 2004, after Sadr’s newspaper, Al Hawza, published an article that was critical of the 
Coalition Provisional Authority, [U.S.] Ambassador L. Paul Bremer ordered the Coalition Forces 
to close the newspaper, and that closure prompted a protest by approximately 20,000 Sadrists. Id. 
In the meantime, Navy SEALs arrested one of Sadr’s deputies, who headed the Najaf office. Id. 
These two events precipitated armed attacks throughout Iraq –by the IRGC proxy group JAM – 

26 
 
against the U.S. Coalition and Iraqi security forces . Id. This included the April 4, 2004 attack in 
issue. 
On April 4, 2004, a four -vehicle convoy of Humvees consisting of a platoon of about 18 
soldiers and an interpreter were providing security for sewage trucks in the Sadr City section of 
Baghdad, and on their way back to camp, they came under fire after passing the Sadr Bureau. Two 
of the Humvees became inoperable and the gunner in one was shot, so the platoon set up a 
defensive position until a rescue force could arrive. Id. at 8. A quick reaction force (“QRF”) 
attempted to reach the stranded platoon but came under heavy fire and was forced to head back. 
Additional forces were dispatched, but a report was received that Sadr’s militia had taken over the 
police stations in Sadr City, and the rescue convoy encountered a blockade, came under fire, and 
was forced to turn around. Id. at 9. Subsequently, a convoy of approximately eight vehicles 
joined the rescue mission, led by an unarmored M998 Humvee, driven by SPC Stephen Hiller, 
followed by a Bradley fighting vehicle, followed by a Light Medium Tactical Vehicle (“LMTV”), 
which did not provide protection to those in the rear of the vehicle. Id. One of the soldiers located 
in the rear of the LMTV was SPC Robert Arsiaga, who was seated immediately behind the cab of 
the vehicle. Following the LMTV in the convoy were several other vehicles. Id. at 10. The 
convoy took fire from rooftops on both sides of the street with rocket-propelled grenades and other 
explosives being detonated. As the convoy made its way through a gap in the barrier, the shooting 
got louder and heavier, as the convoy had “unwittingly driven straight into a three-hundred-yard-
long ambush, with hundreds if not thousands of unseen enemies poised and determined to kill 
them.” Id. at 10-11. While they were trying to get out of the kill zone, the lead vehicle came to a 
stop when the driver of the Humvee was killed; the Bradley pulled up alongside and the LMTV 
pulled up close behind. While stopped, the LMTV came under constant fire and several soldiers 

27 
 
in the back were hit, including SPC Arsiaga, who was shot “high on the center of his cheekbone, 
just below his right eye.” Id. at 11. Of the 16 soldiers in the back of the LMTVE, one was killed, 
another was in critical condition and all but one of the remaining 14 were wounded from gunfire 
or shrapnel. Id. 
Based on a review of official records and in the context of the political situation in Iraq (as 
described above), Col. Rayburn opined that “the [well-coordinated ambush] that caused the deaths 
of SPCs Arsiaga and Hiller and injured SPC Greenwood w as conducted by Jaysh al-Mahdi. Id. 
Relying on his own expertise as well as the description in Mr. McIntyre’s Expert Report, Col. 
Rayburn concluded also that JAM was “one of several proxy groups in Iraq that received training, 
weapons, financial support, and operational advice from the IRGC as well as training, financial 
support, technological assistance and operational advice from Lebanese Hezbollah.” Id. The 
Court finds Col. Rayburn’s expert analysis and opinion persuasive and concludes accordingly that 
Iran and its proxies bear responsibility for the April 4, 2004 a ttack in Baghdad, Iraq that caused 
SPC Robert Arsiaga’s death. 
2. August 2, 2005 – Basra- Steven Vincent (discussed in Brooks Decl., Ex. D) 
In early May 2005, Steven Vincent – a United States national and freelance journalist – 
traveled to Basra to report on student uprisings against Iraqi Shi’a cleric Sadr. Brooks Decl., ECF 
No. 142-4, ¶ 34. Sadr controlled the Office of Martyr Sadr (“OMS”) party, and “in response to 
the U .S. occupation of Iraq and with the goal of establishing [control of] an Iraqi Shi’a 
government,” in 2003, Sadr formed its military wing, J AM. Id. Col. Brooks discussed in detail 
Iran’s influence over Iraq, specifically Basra, Brooks Decl. ¶¶ 16-22, as well as the ways in which 
Iran supported JAM with assistance through its long-time proxy, Hezbollah. Id. at ¶¶ 25-28. He 

28 
 
notes that “almost from its inception, JAM was materially assisted by Hezbollah, at Iran’s 
direction” and he discusses Sadr’s visit to Iran in 2003. Brooks Decl. ¶ 26. 
While in Basra, Mr. Vincent reported on JAM’s corruption of the local government, and in 
a July 9, 2005 blog post, he critiqued Sadr and commented that Sadr’s picture was hanging in a 
local police station , and that most of Basra’s police supported Sadr . Brooks Decl. ¶¶ 35 -37. 
Furthermore, on July 31, 2005, Mr. Vincent authored an opinion piece for The New York Times 
called “Switched Off in Basra,” which described how 
Basra politics (and everyday life) is increasingly coming under the control of Shiite 
religious groups, from the relatively mainstream Supreme Council for the Islamic 
Revolution in Iraq to the bellicose followers of the rebel cleric Moktada al-Sadr. Recruited 
from the same population of undereducated, underemployed men who swell these 
organizations’ ranks, many of Basra’s rank-and-file police officers maintain dual loyalties 
to mosque and state. 
 
Brooks Decl. ¶¶ 38-39 (internal citation omitted). Mr. Vincent reported that between 50-75% of 
Basran Iraqi police were affiliated with religious parties, and some of them were perpetrating 
assassinations in Basra. Id. at ¶ 40. 
 On August 2, 2005, Mr. Vincent was abducted, and he died after receiving a perforating 
gunshot wound to his back. 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(ii) Appendix, Ex. E, Certificate of Death 
Overseas, Ex. 2. An investigation of Mr. Vincent’s abduction and murder was conducted by the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”). Id. at ¶ 41. Eyewitnesses reported that Mr. Vincent and 
his interpreter were at a money exchange in Basra, in a JAM-controlled area of the city, when they 
were confronted by four to six men armed with Glock pistols and AK rifles and forced into a white 
police vehicle. Id. The two were held for a few hours before being released from the vehicle and 
shot - Mr. Vincent died but his interpreter survived. Id. The interpreter described the men who 
kidnapped them as wearing police uniforms and stepping out of a police car. Id. at ¶ 42. 

29 
 
 The FBI investigation reflected that JAM claimed responsibility for the attack. Id. at ¶ 43 
(internal citation omitted). Col. Brooks opined that “this claim is accurate based on the significant 
predominance of JAM forces within Basra and the likelihood that JAM was unhappy with Mr. 
Vincent’s reporting about their illicit activities in Basra and their connections to Iran” and the fact 
that the “intelligence community has determined that JAM’s claims of responsibility are 
consistently credible.” Brooks Decl. ¶ 43. Col. Brooks engage d also in a discussion that rules 
out other responsible parties. Id. ¶¶ 47-50. 
 Col Brooks concluded that “based on [his] professional training and experience, including 
but not limited to his . . . expertise on Shi’a militant groups operating in Iraq between 2003 and 
2011, it is [his] professional opinion that Steven Vincent was abducted and murdered by Jaysh al-
Mahdi (“JAM”) operatives, possibly including JAM elements that infiltrated the Basra police 
force.” Brooks Decl. ¶ 11. Accordingly, the Court accepts Col. Brooks’ expert opinion and finds 
sufficient evidence in the record to demonstrate that Ir an and its proxies were responsible for 
Steven Vincent’s August 2, 2005 abduction and murder in Basra. 
3. March 15, 2007 – Baghdad- Blake Harris (discussed in Lutz Report, Ex. A) 
On March 15, 2007, a four-vehicle convoy was traveling down a road in Baghdad, when 
the Bradley Fighting Vehicle (“Bradley”) in the lead position was struck by an improvised 
explosive device (“ IED”), which caused moderate damage. Lutz Report, ECF No. 142 -1, at 4. 
After the Bradley stopped, soldiers from the other three vehicles in the convoy dismounted to 
conduct a battle damage assessment and sensitive site exploitation, and during that activity, a 
second IED located on the other side of the road explod ed, killing four of the soldiers, including 
SSG [Staff Sergeant] Blake Harris, and wounding two others who died later. See generally 28 
U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(ii) Appendix, Ex. E, Report of Causality, Ex. 3 (noting that Harris was 

30 
 
killed in action). A post-blast analysis of the scene revealed a third device, a 10 -inch anti-armor 
IED (“AAIED”) with a radio -controlled initiator, which was then [safely] detonated by the EOD 
[explosive ordinance disposal] unit. Id. at 5. 
Col. Lutz reviewed documents including SSG Harris’s death investigation, three incident 
reports produced in response to FOIA requests, and an event storyboard in support of his 
conclusion that the March 15, 2007 attack that killed SSG Blake Harris was a complex attack 
which involved the use of multiple IEDs including an AAIED and that it is “probabl e that the 
attack was committed by an IRGC and Hezbollah directed Special Group that was likely trained 
by Hezbollah and/or the IRGC-QF.” Id. at 4. Furthermore, Col. Lutz indicated that “the explosives 
used i n this attack can be understood as “area denial weapons’ or “Anti Access/Area Denial’ 
(“A2/AD”) weapons that were part of the IRGC and Hezbollah’s strategy to prevent U.S. and Iraqi 
forces from freely traversing Shia -dominated areas and effectively sealing off the IRGC’s main 
operational center in Sadr City.” Id. at 12. Considering this, in the context of the timing and 
location of the attack, Col. Lutz opined that “it is highly probabl e that the complex attack that 
killed SSG Harris, which involved the use of 3 separate IEDs including an unexploded AAIED 
(likely an EFP) was committed by an IRGC and Hezbollah proxy group linked to JAM.” Id. The 
Court finds Col. Lutz’s expert analysis of the reports and his conclusion to be persuasive. 
Accordingly, the Court concludes that Iran and its proxies were responsible for the March 15, 2007 
death of SSG Blake Harris in Baghdad. 
4. April 6, 2008 - Baghdad- Emanuel Pickett (discussed in McIntyre Report, Ex. B) 
On April 6, 2008, Emanuel Pickett died from blast injuries from a rocket and mortar attack. 
28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(ii) Appendix, Ex. E, Certificate of Death Overseas, Ex. 5. That 
afternoon – without any warning alarm sounding – a single round of indirect fire impacted a 

31 
 
concrete pad in the 95th Military Police Battalion Motorpool on Forward Operating Base (“FOB”), 
in Baghdad. McIntyre Report, ECF No. 142-2, at 5. At the time of the attack, the 1st Squad, 2nd 
Platoon, 1132nd Military Police Company was conducting tower guard duty , and SSG Pickett, 
who was squad leader for 1st Squad, was in his living quarters. Id. The soldiers responded by 
proceeding to the nearest bunker for protection. Three additional rounds of indirect fire landed on 
the F OB, one of which impacted in front of the bunker where SSG Pickett was located. Id. 
Emanuel Pickett was mortally wounded ; he was evacuated while additional indirect fire was 
occurring, and he later died at the 86th Combat Hospital. Id. 
After review of the applicable reports and other documentation, Col. McIntyre concluded 
that it was “highly probable that the attack which killed SSG Pickett and injured 14 other soldiers 
involved the use of a 107mm Iranian rocket [Katyusha rocket] and 81 mm mortar rounds that 
struck FOB Rustamiyah.” Id. at 7. Col. McIntrye noted that the attack occurred during a “period 
of increased operational tempo by IFGC -directed Special Groups directed against Coalition 
Forces” and coincided with “significant confr ontation” between the Iraqi government and the 
movement headed by Sadr. Id. Col. McIntyre opined that, based on the timing of the attack and 
his review of the available information, “it is highly probable that the April 6, 2008 attack on FOB 
Rustamiyah that killed SSG Pickett was consistent with the types of attacks orchestrated by the 
IRGC and Hezbollah against U.S. and Coalition Forces operating in Iraq and was committed at 
the general direction of the IRGC by one of its Special Groups proxies us ing weapons provided 
by the IRGC and training provided by the IRGC and Hezbollah.” Id. at 8. The Court accepts Col. 
McIntyre’s expert opinion and finds Iran and its proxies liable for the death of SSG Emanuel 
Pickett. 
 

32 
 
5. April 6, 2008 - Baghdad- Stephen Scott and Stuart Wolfer (discussed in McIntyre 
Report, Ex. B) 
 
On April 6, 2008, in Baghdad, Colonel (“COL”) Stephen Scott was reportedly killed by 
blast and ballistic fragment injuries, 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(ii) Appendix, Ex. E, Certificate 
of Death Overseas, Ex. 6, and Major (“MAJ”) Stuart Wolfer was reportedly killed by blast injuries, 
id., Ex. E, Report of Casualty , Ex. 6. During the afternoon of April 6, 2008, Colonel Scott and 
Major Wolfer were at the gym of Phoenix Base when a 107mm Iranian rocket impacted the roof 
of the gym. McIntyre Report, ECF No. 142 -2, at 10. An alarm sounded at a nearby compound 
and an employee who heard the alarm ran into the gym to warn everyone to take cover. Id. Phoenix 
Base’s manual indirect fire alarm sounded almost sim ultaneously with the rocket impacting the 
roof of the gym. Id. The explosion sent shrapnel into the gym; both Scott and Wolfer were “nearly 
directly under the rocket detonation” and the y received multiple severe traumatic blast injuries. 
Id. Both were quickly evacuated to the 86th Support Hospital where both were pronounced dead. 
Id. 
Col. McIntyre examined the documentary and other evidence relating to this attack, and he 
concluded that it was “highly probable tha t the attack which killed COL Scott and MAJ Wolfer 
and injured 19 other soldiers involved the use of a 107mm Iranian rocket that struck Phoenix base 
gym.” Id. at 13. Col. McIntyre discussed the same surrounding circumstances as with the attack 
that killed Emanuel Pickett; i.e., “increased operational tempo by IRGC-directed Special Groups” 
and “significant confrontation” between the Iraqi government and the movement headed by Sadr, 
with attacks between March 23, 2008 -March 28, 2008 involving the launching of “91 separate 
barrages that dropped a total of 344 rockets and mortar rounds on the Green Zone in Baghdad.” 
Id. at 13-14. Col. McIntyre opined that “it is highly probable that the April 6, 2008 attack on 
Phoenix Base that killed COL Scott and MAJ Wolfer was consistent with the types of attacks 

33 
 
orchestrated by the IRGC and Hezbollah agains t the U.S. and Coalition Forces operating in Iraq 
and was committed at the general direction of the IRGC by one of its Special Groups proxies using 
weapons provided by the IRGC and training conducted by Hezbollah instructors.” Id. at 14. The 
Court accepts Col. McIntyre’s opinion as well -supported by the evidence and finds Iran and its 
proxies liable for the deaths of Stephen Scott and Stuart A. Wolfer. 
6. April 8, 2008 - Kharguliah - Jeffery Hartley (discussed in Lutz Report, Ex. A) 
On April 8, 2008, in Kharguliah, SSG Jeffrey Hartley was killed by blast injuries, 28 
U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(ii) Appendix, Ex. E, Report of Casualty, Ex. 7. On the evening of April 
8, 2008, a convoy of four vehicles departed FOB Rustamiyah heading towards FOB Hammer when 
the lead vehicle was struck by a 2 -array copper EFP, which was “concealed in a yellow burlap -
sack and placed 4 feet off the south side of the road next to a dirt mound with a light pole marker.” 
Lutz Report, ECF No. 142 -1, at 19. The vehicle was approximately 20 feet away from the 
detonation; the EFP was likely PIR [passive infrared sensor] initiated and it penetrated the right 
passenger door under the window and in between the front and rear passenger door causing the 
door to be removed. SSG Jeffery Hartley – one of three soldiers in the vehicle – was sitting in the 
right front passenger seat of the vehicle, and he was killed instantly. Id. at 20. In connection with 
his review of SSG Hartley’s death, Col. Lutz looked at the AR 15 -6 Investigative Report, the 
SIGACT report, the IED Report, the JTF Troy Report the Extended Casualty Report, and the Event 
Storyboard. Id. at 20-22. Based on the available information, Col. Lutz concluded that the attack 
that killed SSG Jeffery Hartley “was part of the EFP campaign orchestrated by the IRGC and 
Hezbollah that was conducted by one of the IRGC’s Hezbollah -trained Special Group proxies 
[and] the attack involved a multi-array copper-lined EFP.” Id. at 23. Furthermore, the damage to 
the vehicle “strongly indicate[d] that the multi-array EFP was precision manufactured and copper 

34 
 
lined,” as well as “the likely use of HE explosives in the construction of the multi-array EFP.” Id. 
Col. Lutz opined that an “IRGC-sponsored Special Group was likely involved in the assembly and 
emplacement of the multi-array EFP.” Id. 
 The Court accepts Col. Lutz’s expert opinion that Iran and its proxies were responsible for 
SSG Hartley’s death and further that the EFP used in the April 8, 2008 attack is linked to Iran and 
its proxies . Ac cordingly, the Court finds that Iran and its proxies are liable for SSG Jeffery 
Hartley’s death by means of a multi-array EFP. 
7. April 28, 2008 - Baghdad - Adam L. Marion and Mark Stone (discussed in Lutz 
Report, Ex. A) 
 
On April 28, 2008, Private First Class (“PFC”) Adam Lee Marion and SGT Mark Stone 
were killed in action in Baghdad. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(ii) Appendix, Ex. E, Reports 
of Casualty, Ex. 8. During the afternoon of April 28, 2008, in Baghdad, fourteen IRAMs 
[Improvised Rocket Assisted Munitions] were launched from a cargo truck that was used as a 
mobile launch platform located approximately 100 meters southwest of F OB Loyalty. Lutz 
Report, ECF No. 142-1, at 25. FOB Loyalty was “located in eastern Baghdad, south of Sadr City, 
the large Shi’a slum that was a key operations area for Iranian-sponsored Special Groups” and the 
weapons were confirmed to be IRAMs. Id. Col. Lutz describe d IRAMs as “rocket -launched 
Improvised Explosive Devices (“IEDs”) made from large metal canisters (usually propane gas 
tanks that have been drained of their contents and filled with high explosives – up to several 
hundred pounds), scrap metal, and ball bearings and typically initiated by an impact type fuze. Id. 
at 24-25. The IRAMs destroyed FOB Loyalty’s theater, damaged and destroyed several vehicles, 
and killed three U.S. soldiers including PFC Marion and SGT Stone and wounded sixteen soldiers. 
Id. at 26. At the time of the attack, PFC Marion had returned from a route clearance patrol and 
was standing near the rear of a Buffalo mine -protected clearance vehicle, offloading bags, when 

35 
 
one of the IRAMs landed between the Buffalo an d other vehicles, causing significant damage to 
the Buffalo and four other vehicles. Id. at 27. PFC Marion was found between the left rear tires 
of the Buffalo and was moved to the Aid Station, where he was pronounced killed in action due to 
a fatal shrapnel wound to the lower extremities. Id. at 27, 33. SGT Stone reportedly die d of a 
massive hemorrhage due to the enemy attack. Id. at 33. 
 Col. Lutz noted that the attack occurred during a period of “increased operational tempo 
by IRGC-directed Special Groups,” explaining that, between February and April 2008, EFP attacks 
against Coalition Forces increased by 40 percent, and furthermore, the re was significant 
confrontation between the Iraqi government and the movement headed by Sadr, with increased 
indirect-fire attacks at the end of March 2008. Id. at 35. These indirect -fire attacks “coincided 
with coordinated JAM Special Groups assaults against all 11 Iraqi Security Forces checkpoints 
around Sadr City.” Id. Moreover, in April 2008, U.S. Forces worked with Iraqi Special Forces to 
launch an offensive directed at JAM and JAM Special Groups based in and around Sadr City. Id. 
In the context of the intensified conflicts described above, and b ased on the reports and 
scene diagrams he reviewed, Col. Lutz opined that it is “highly probable that the April 28, 2008 
IRAM attack on FOB Loyalty that killed PFC Marion and SGT Stone was committed at the general 
direction of the IRGC and Hezbollah by their Special Groups proxies using weapons provided by 
the IRG and training pro vided by the IRGC and Hezbollah.” Id. at 35. The Court accepts Col. 
Lutz’s well-reasoned expert conclusion and finds that Iran and its proxies are responsible for the 
deaths of PFC Marion and SGT Stone 
8. October 16, 2008 - Baqubah - Cody J. Eggleston (discussed in McIntyre Report, 
Ex. B) 
 
PFC Cody Eggleston died on October 24, 2008, due to the head and neck wounds he 
received on October 16, 2008. 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(ii) Appendix, Ex. E, Report of 

36 
 
Casualty, Ex. 9; McIntyre Report, ECF No. 142 -2, at 18. On the afternoon of October 16, 2008, 
three 107mm rockets, which were identified by radar, were launched – from what was later 
identified as an abandoned house – against the FOB Warhorse, located in Baqubah, Iraq. McIntyre 
Report ECF No. 142-2, at 15. Mr. McIntyre noted that Baqubah, which is 31 miles northeast of 
Baghdad, “was a link in an IRGC directed and controlled arms smuggling route that ran from the 
Iraqi-Iranian border in the vicinity of t he Iraqi town of Mandali . . . with the ultimate destination 
for arms IRGC directed and controlled and affiliated militia groups operating in the northern 
suburbs of Baghdad.” Id. at 18. One of the tasks of the 2nd Cavalry Regiments, which was 
stationed at FOB Warhorse, was to “interdict that movement of IRGC provided arms and 
munitions to Special Groups operating in Diayala Governate and their further movement south to 
Baghdad.” Id. at 19. 
Considering the record evidence and the “threat picture existent at the time of the attack,” 
Mr. McIntyre opined that 107mm rockets were the weapon used to attack FOB Warhorse causing 
the death of PFC Eggleston, the rockets were likely supplied by the IRGC, and one of the IRGC’s 
proxy groups was likely responsible for the attack. Id. The Court accepts Mr. McIntyre’s expert 
opinion and finds that Iran and its proxies are liable for the death of PFC Eggleston. 
9. July 16, 2009 - Basra - Daniel P. Drevnick (discussed in McIntyre Report, Ex. B) 
 
SPC Daniel P. Drevnick died on July 17, 2009, due to wounds resulting from blast and 
blast fragmentation injuries received on July 16, 2009. 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(ii) Appendix, 
Ex. E, Report of Casualty, Ex. 10. On the evening of July 16, 2009, five 107mm rockets were 
launched against Contingency Operating Base (“COB”) Basra, with the point of origin determined 
to be along the riverbank of the Quarmat ’Ali River, where Improvised Rocket Launcher (“IRL”) 
rail systems were found. McIntyre Report, ECF N o. 142-2, at 21. One of the rockets detonated 

37 
 
fifteen feet from a designated smoking area within COB Basra, while another detonated near of 
Chevy Blazer, a third detonated upon impact with an outer perimeter wall, and the other two impact 
sites were found the next day . Id. Just prior to impact, SPC Drevnick had been in the smoking 
area, with three other soldiers, and when the siren went off to indicate an incoming indirect rocket 
attack, the soldiers moved to the Hesco barriers nearby but failed to make it there prior to the 
explosion. Id. at 21, 22 . SPC Drevnick was located 6-8 feet from the point of impact; he was 
mortally wounded in the attack and died approximately two and one-half hours later while en route 
to a higher-level hospital. Id. Two other soldiers close to the point of impact were also killed. Id. 
at 32. 
Mr. McIntyre noted that , through the period in question, Basra was a Shi’a -dominated 
province and city that was a significant entry point for IRGC weapons and personnel. During the 
early months of 2008, Hezbollah-trained JAM dominated much of that area, but Basra was also a 
site for significant IRGC-directed attacks against the Coalition Forces , with the Coalition Forces 
launching operations targeted against IRGC -sponsored and Hezbollah -trained Special Groups 
even a year prior to the July 16, 2009 attack . Id. On March 31, 2009, the British Multi-National 
division-Southeast (“MND-SE) departed Iraq and handed control of operations to then -Major 
General Michael Oates’s Multi -National Division -Center (“MND -C”), which would be later 
renamed MND-South. Id. During the first half of 2009, “Iranian-sponsored and Hezbollah -
trained Special groups and Kata’ib Hezbollah in particular marshalled indirect fire teams armed 
with 107mm rockets in Basra to target MND-South’s personnel.” Id. 
 Considering the aforementioned information, and upon review of the available evidence 
and information about the attack, Mr. McIntyre opined that the attack that caused the death of SPC 
Drevnick was “orchestrated by the IRGC -QF and was likely conducted by Kata’ib He zbollah, 

38 
 
though it could also have been conducted by one of the IRGC -QF’s other Hezbollah -trained 
Special Group proxies they supplied with munitions to include 107mm rockets.” Id. The Court 
finds M r. McIntyre’s expert opinion persuasive and concludes that Iran and its proxies were 
responsible for the July 16, 2009 attack that resulted in the death of SPC Drevnick. 
10. June 29, 2011 - Wasit Province - George D. White and John McCulley (addressed 
in Lutz Report, Ex. A) 
 
 John McCulley and SSG George D. White were wounded in action during an attack on 
June 29, 2011 in Wasit Province, Iraq. 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(ii) Appendix, Ex. E, Medical 
Records, Ex. 11. In the late afternoon of June 29, 2011, four IRAMs were launched from a dump 
truck used as a mobile launch platform against COB Shocker, located in the Wasit Province of 
Iraq. Lutz Report, ECF No. 142-1, at 37. In this instance, each IRAM contained about 300 pounds 
of an unknown bulk explosive. Id. at 36. Three IRAMs detonated and caused extensive damage 
to the tactical operations center and gym, killing three U.S. soldiers and wounding SSG George D. 
White, six additional soldiers, and one civilian, John McCulley - a contractor working for 
American Iraqi Solutions Group in Iraq. Id. at 36-37. The fourth IRAM penetrated the gym, but 
it did not detonate. Id. at 37-38. 
 Following the attack, Kata’ib Hezbollah (“KH”) , an IRGC proxy group, posted a video 
showing multiple IRAMs being fired at COB Shocker followed by several explosives. Id. at 43. 
In his expert report, Col. Lutz indicated that he agreed with the Department of Defense’s Joint 
improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization’s (“JIEDDO”) assessment that IRAMs – at 
least from 2007 -2011 – were a “signature weapon ‘used by Iranian -backed militias that operate 
with the aid of Ir an’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards G roup,’” including KH. Id. at 36, 43. He 
opined that – regarding the IRAM attack which injured SSG White and Mr. McCulley – it is 
“highly probable that the 240mm rockets used to perpetrate the attack were supplied by IRGC” 

39 
 
and “the attack itself was likely committed by KH at the direction of the IRGC and the (Lebanese) 
Hezbollah.” Id. at 43. 
 The Court finds that Col.’s Lutz’s expert opinion is well -supported by the record in this 
case, and accordingly, the Court concludes that Iran and its proxies were responsible for the June 
29, 2011 attack which injured SSG White and Mr. McCulley . In sum, the Court has found Iran 
and its proxies liable for all ten attacks at issue. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The Court’s Conclusions of Law proceed in three parts. First, the Court evaluates whether 
it has subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to the FSIA’s terrorism exception to foreign sovereign 
immunity over Plaintiffs’ claims arising from the ten non-bellwether attacks outlined above in the 
Court’s Findings of Fact. Next, the Court assesses whether Plaintiffs have satisfactorily 
established their claims for relief under the federal cause of action associated with the FSIA’s 
terrorism exception. Finally, the Court considers whether it has personal jurisdiction over Iran in 
this action. Where applicable, the Court reiterates in part some of its conclusions from its prior 
opinions. 
A. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction and Liability 
For the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes that it has subject -matter jurisdiction 
over Plaintiffs’ claims under 28 U.S.C. 1605A(a)(1) . The Court also finds that Plaintiffs have 
successfully established their right to relief under 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c) on some, but not all, of 
their individual claims. See Am. Compl., ECF No. 8, ¶¶ 1161 –74 (addressing Counts One and 

40 
 
Two relating to Plaintiffs who were wounded in action and the estates of Plaintiffs who were killed 
in action).13 
1. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction 
 
“The FSIA provides a basis for asserting jurisdiction over foreign nations in the United 
States.” Price v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya , 294 F.3d 82, 87 (D.C. Cir. 2002) 
(citing Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 443 (1989)). Pursuant 
to the FSIA, the Court has “original jurisdiction” over “nonjury civil action[s]” against foreign 
states “without regard to amount in controversy” if the claims seek “relief in personam with respect 
to which the foreign state is not entitled to immunity either under sections 1605 -1607 of this title 
or under any applicable international agreement.” 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a). Most of these elements 
are clearly satisfied in this case and require little discussion. Plaintiffs do not demand a jury trial, 
they assert civil causes of action and seek in personam relief against Defendant Islamic Republic 
of Iran, a foreign state. 
The question of Iran’s immunity is more involved. “[A] foreign state is presumptively 
immune from the jurisdiction of United States courts; unless a specified exception applies, a 
federal court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over a claim against a foreign state.” Saudi Arabia 
v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 355 (1993) (citing, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1604). “[E]ven if the foreign state 
does not enter an appearance to assert an immunity defense, a District Court still must determine 
that immunity is unavailable under the [FSIA].” Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 
480, 493 n.20 (1983); see also Gonzalez v. Thaler , 565 U.S. 134, 141 (2012) (recognizing that a 
court must consider, sua sponte, a potential defect in its subject -matter jurisdiction). Plaintiffs 
 
13 Count Three addresses solatium claims by Plaintiffs who are family-members of those 
wounded or deceased. 

41 
 
have not identified an international agreement that would abrogate Iran’s immunity , nor is the 
Court aware of any such agreement. 
Plaintiffs, in this case, have instead relied on the FSIA’s terrorism exception to foreign 
sovereign immunity. That exception states that: 
A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United 
States or of the States in any case not otherwise covered by this chapter in which 
money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death that 
was caus ed by an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage 
taking, or the provision of material support or resources for such an act if such act 
or provision of material support or resources is engaged in by an official, employee, 
or agent of such foreign state while acting within the scope of his or her office, 
employment, or agency. 
 
28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(1). Additionally, this exception generally applies only when the defendant 
was a designated state sponsor of terrorism when the act happened and at the time the claim was 
filed or in the preceding six months, id. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(i); the “claimant or the victim” in the 
case was “a national of the United States,” “a member of the armed forces,” or “otherwise an 
employee of the Government of the United States” when the act happened, id. 
§ 1605A(a)(2)(A)(ii); and “in a case in which the act occurred in the foreign state against which 
the claim has been brought, the claimant has afforded the foreign state a reasonable opportunity to 
arbitrate the claim in accordance with the accepted intern ational rules of arbitration,” id. 
§ 1605A(a)(2)(A)(iii). 
Some of these elements are clearly satisfied and require little discussion. To start, Iran has 
been a designated state sponsor of terrorism since 1984 and presently retains that designation. See 
U.S. Dep’t of State, State Sponsors of Terrorism (Dec. 21, 2020), PX-1; Levitt T1-27:16-17. Next, 
each of the victims in the ten non-bellwether attacks addressed in the Court’s Findings of Fact , 
with two exceptions, was a U.S. military servicemember at the time of their death or injury , see 
28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II). The two exceptions are Mr. Steven Vincent, a United States 

42 
 
national working as a journalist in Basra at the time of his death, and Mr. John McCulley, a United 
States national working as a civilian contractor, who, therefore, also satisf y the jurisdictional 
requirement set forth in 28 § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(ii)(I). Finally, none of the injuries or killings at issue 
in the ten non-bellwether attacks addressed in the Court’s Findings of Fact took place in Iran, but 
instead, each attack occurred in Iraq. Accordingly, Plaintiffs had no obligation to afford Iran an 
opportunity to arbitrate. See 28 § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(iii). 
Next, the Court concludes that each of the victims in the ten non-bellwether attacks 
addressed in the Court’s Findings of Fact was the victim of an attack involving an “extrajudicial 
killing.” 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(1). Under the FSIA, the term “extrajudicial killing” is defined 
consistently with Section 3 of the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (“TVPA”). 28 U.S.C. § 
1605A(h)(7). The TVPA states that: 
For the purposes of this Act, the term “extrajudicial killing” means a deliberated 
killing not authorized by a previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted 
court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by 
civilized peoples. Such term, however, does not include any such killing that, under 
international law, is lawfully carried out under the authority of a foreign nation. 
 
Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102 -256, § 3(a), 106 Stat. 73. The Court of 
Appeals recognizes “three elements” of this definition: “(1) a killing; (2) that is deliberated; and 
(3) is not authorized by a previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court.” Owens 
v. Republic of Sudan , 864 F.3d 751, 770 (D.C. Cir. 2017). Each element is satisfied here and 
accordingly, the Court concludes that each of the ten non-bellwether attacks constituted an 
“extrajudicial killing” within the meaning of the FSIA . 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(1). Importantly, 
this conclusion of law applies not only to the eleven victims who were killed in action but also to 
the two victims addressed in the Court’s Findings of Fact who were wounded in action because 

43 
 
each of the ten attacks involved an extrajudicial killing.14 See Lutz Report, ECF No. 142-1, at 37 
(noting that the June 29, 2011 attack that wounded SSG George D. White and civilian contractor 
John McCulley also “killed three U.S. Soldiers”). Accordingly, the Borochov “standard” has been 
met regarding all ten attacks discussed herein. 
Next, the Court concludes that Iran provided “material support or resources” for each of 
these ten non-bellwether attacks. 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(1) . The FSIA adopts the definition of 
“material support or resources” found in 18 U.S.C. § 2339A. 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(h)(3). That 
section broadly defines “material support or resources” to consist of 
any property, tangible or intangible, or service, including currency or monetary 
instruments or financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert 
advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or identification, 
communications equi pment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, 
personnel (1 or more individuals who may be or include oneself), and 
transportation, except medicine or religious materials[.] 
18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1). As set forth in the Court’s Findings of Fact , the IRGC , along with 
Hezbollah, provided expertise, financial support, and material resources to Iranian proxies in Iraq, 
specifically to facilitate the use of EFPs and other types of weaponry against U.S. military 
servicemembers in furtherance of Iranian strategic interests in the Iraqi theater. Moreover, the 
Court is satisfied that the IRGC is at least an agent of Iran, if not a part of the government itself, 
such that individuals wo rking for the IRGC would be officials or employees of Iran. Cf., e.g., 
Blais v. Islamic Republic of Iran , 459 F. Supp. 2d 40, 60 –61 (D.D.C. 2006) (finding that IRGC 
was governmental entity, rather than commercial agent). Lastly, the record evidence in this case 
demonstrates that each of the ten non-bellwether attacks addressed in the Court’s Findings of Fact 
was traceable to Iran, through the IRGC, Hezbollah, and their proxies. For these reasons, the Court 
 
14 These two victims are: George D. White and John McCulley. 

44 
 
concludes that Iran, “by an official, employee, or agent,” provided “material resources or support” 
for each of the ten non-bellwether attacks. 
 Finally, the Court concludes that Iran’s material support for the ten non-bellwether attacks 
was the “proximate cause” of each victim’s death or personal injury in those attacks. Owens, 864 
F.3d at 794; see also Kilburn v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 376 F.3d 1123, 1128 
(D.C. Cir. 2004)) (clarifying that “jurisdictional causation” under Section 1605A(a) relies on same 
standard applicable to its predecessor, Section 1605(a)(7)). “Proximate cause requires ‘some 
reasonable connection between the act or omission of the defendant and the damage which the 
plaintiff has suffered.’” Owens, 864 F.3d at 794 (quoting Kilburn, 376 F.3d at 1128 (quoting 
Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts 263 (5th ed. 1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
The “two similar but distinct elements” to establish proximate cause are that 1) “the defendant’s 
actions [were] a ‘substantial factor’ in the sequence of events that led to the plaintiff’s injury,” and 
2) “the plaintiff’s injury [was] ‘reasonably foreseeable or anticipated as a natural consequence’ of 
the defendant’s conduct.” Id. (quoting Rothstein v. UBS AG, 708 F.3d 82, 91 (2d Cir. 2013)). 
 Under these elements of proximat e cause, there is more than a “reasonable connection” 
between Iran’s material support for its Iraqi proxies and the deaths and injuries suffered in each of 
the ten non-bellwether attacks addressed in the Court’s Findings of Fact. See Kilburn, 376 F.3d at 
1128–30. Iran, through the IRGC and/or Hezbollah, furnished EFPs or the components thereof as 
well as more conventional weapons, facilitated training of Shi’a militia groups, and supported their 
effective deployment of weaponry in the Iraqi theater. And, regarding the Iranian-backed EFPs, 
which were specifically designed to inflict maximum and lethal damage to U.S. military vehicles 
and servicemembers, the record evidence also demonstrates that Iranian expertise was necessary 
for the sophisticated manufacturing and deployment of EFPs. For these reasons, the Court 

45 
 
concludes that Iran’s “material support” proximately caused the deaths and injuries sustained in 
each of the ten non-bellwether attacks. See Owens v. Republic of Sudan , 374 F. Supp. 2d 1, 13 
(D.D.C. 2005) (“It is enough, the D.C. Circuit held [in Kilburn], to show that the material support 
or resources went to the terrorist organization that perpetrated the act, and that the support was a 
‘proximate cause’ of the terrorist act.” (citing Kilburn, 376 F.3d at 1127–30)). 
Having determined that Iran provided material support through IRGC to Hezbollah and 
other Shi’a proxies in Iraq, and that this support was for the purpose of extrajudicial killing in each 
of the ten non-bellwether attacks, the Court concludes that it has subject-matter jurisdiction under 
the FSIA’s terrorism exception over Plaintiffs’ claims arising from those attacks. 
2. Liability 
Plaintiffs assert private causes of action against Iran under 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c) for the 
personal injuries , deaths, and emotional distress caused by the ten non-bellwether attacks 
addressed in the Court’s Findings of Fact. See Am. Compl., ECF No. 8, ¶¶ 1161–74. Section 
1605A(c) of the FSIA provides that state sponsors of terrorism “shall be liable . . . for personal 
injury or death caused by acts described in subsection (a)(1) of that foreign state, or of an official, 
employee, or agent of that foreign state, for which the courts of the United States may maintain 
jurisdiction under this section for money damages,” in suits brought by four categories of 
individuals, including “member[s] of the armed forces” or their legal representatives. 28 U.S.C. § 
1605A(c); see also Opati v. Republic of Sudan, 140 S. Ct. 1601, 1606 (2020). In other words, this 
section creates a cause of action for the same conduct that gives rise to subject-matter jurisdiction 
under the terrorism exception to sovereign immunity. Importantly, Section 1605A(c) also creates 
vicarious liability “for the acts of [Iran’s] officials, employees, or agents,” in this case, the IRGC 
and its leadership, Hezbollah, and Iraqi proxies. 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c). 

46 
 
Plaintiffs’ § 1605A(c) claims arising from the ten non-bellwether attacks fall into three 
categories: the claims of (1) two U.S. soldiers and civilians injured in Iraq by terrorist acts that 
Iran materially supported; (2) two estates of U.S. soldiers and civilians killed in Iraq as a result of 
such acts; and (3) th irty-five immediate family members (or the estates of now -deceased 
immediate family members) of the injured and deceased U.S. soldiers and civilians. The first two 
categories comprise the § 1605A(c) claims of four Plaintiffs: 
Surviving Plaintiffs (see Am Compl. ¶¶ 1120-1131, 1132-1144): (1) George D. White 
and (2) John McCulley. 
 
Estates of Deceased Victims ( see Am Compl. ¶¶ 173-181, 906 -912): (1) Stephen 
Vincent and (2) Jeffery Hartley. 
 
Collectively, these Plaintiffs’ claims derive from the deaths of members of the U.S. armed 
forces, proximately caused by Iran’s material support for an attack in Iraq. See 28 U.S.C. § 
1605A(c); Roth v. Islamic Republic of Iran , 78 F. Supp. 3d 379, 398 (D.D.C. 2015) (discussing 
claim by legal representative of an estate). Given the factual and legal overlap, the Court’s finding 
of subject-matter jurisdiction over each of these Plaintiff’s claims also establishes their entitlement 
to relief under 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c). See, e.g., Force v. Islamic Republic of Iran , 464 F. Supp. 
3d 323, 369 (D.D.C. 2020); Allan v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Civil Case No. 17-338 (RJL), 2019 
WL 2185037, at *6 (D.D.C. May 21, 2019) (“[M]ost courts conduct the analysis together, since 
evidence sufficient to establish jurisdictional causation will almost always establish a theory of 
‘personal injury’ necessary to prevail under § 1605 A(c) [sic].”); Foley v. Syrian Arab Republic , 
249 F. Supp. 3d 186, 205 (D.D.C. 2017) (Kollar -Kotelly, J.) (discussing overlapping aspects of 
jurisdiction and liability). 
The remaining § 1605A(c) claims at issue, however, are those of thirty-five family 
members, or the estates of now-deceased family members, of the U.S. soldiers and civilians injured 

47 
 
or killed in the ten non-bellwether attacks. See Am. Compl., ECF No. 8, ¶¶ 1171–74. These 
Plaintiffs seek solatium damages under an intentional infliction of emotional distress theory of 
liability. See Pls.’ Tr. Br., ECF No. 43, at 20; Valore v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 700 F. Supp. 2d 
52, 78 (D.D.C. 2010) . Adhering to the common law of torts, courts in this jurisdiction have 
concluded that family-members may recover for emotional distress under § 1605A(c) if: “(1) they 
are members of a victim ’s immediate family,” and (2) if “the defendant’s conduct is sufficiently 
outrageous and intended to inflict severe emotional harm upon a person [who] is not present.” 
Rezaian v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 422 F. Supp. 3d 164, 179 (D.D.C. 2019) (cleaned up) (citing 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46); see also Braun v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 228 F. Supp. 3d 
64, 82 (D.D.C. 2017) . Additionally, § 1605A(c) still requires that these Plaintiffs individually 
demonstrate that they “ are themselves U.S. nationals, members of the armed services, or 
government employees.” Force, 464 F. Supp. 3d at 369.15 
Currently, these “family-member” Plaintiffs have not yet submitted satisfactory evidence 
establishing their individual right s to relief under § 1605A(c). See Am. Compl., ECF No. 8, ¶¶ 
1171–74. To start, e ach “family -member” Plaintiff may rely on the Findings of Fact in this 
Memorandum Opinion, which establish that Iran’s material support proximately caused the actual 
or attempted extrajudicial killing of each victim in the ten non-bellwether attacks. Moreover, the 
Court is satisfied that these acts of terrorism were “ sufficiently extreme and outrageous to 
demonstrate that” Iran’s intent was “to inflict severe emotional harm on even those not present at 
the site of the act .” Roth v. Islamic Republic of Ira n, 78 F. Supp. 3d 379, 400 (D.D.C. 2015) . 
 
15 “For jurisdictional purposes, this fact is non -consequential, because the waiver of foreign sovereign 
immunity applies so long as ‘the claimant or the victim was, at the time of the ’ terrorist attack, a U.S. 
national, member of the armed forces, or government employee.” Force, 464 F. Supp. 3d at 369 (emphasis 
in original) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(ii) ). As set forth in the Court’s Findings of Fact, each 
victim in the ten non-bellwether attacks was a U.S. servicemember, or, in the cases of Mr. Steven Vincent 
and Mr. John McCulley, U.S. nationals. 

48 
 
Nonetheless, the “family -member” Plaintiffs have not yet offered evidence proving their own 
qualifying statuses within the enumerated categories of permissible claimants under § 1605A(c). 
See 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c)(1)–(4); Force, 464 F. Supp. 3d at 369. Each “family-member” Plaintiff 
must also provide evidence satisfying the “immediate family” requirement , which “ is strictly 
construed in FSIA cases.” Roth, 78 F. Supp. 3d at 400. Without such evidence, the Court makes 
no finding as to the § 1605A(c) claims of the “family-member” Plaintiffs arising from the ten non-
bellwether attacks. See Am. Compl., ECF No. 8, ¶¶ 1171–74; 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e). 
B. Personal Jurisdiction 
Although a personal jurisdiction defense can be waived in certain circumstances, the Court 
has “an independent obligation . . . to satisfy itself of its personal jurisdiction before entering a 
default judgment against a missing party.” Kaplan v. Cent. Bank of Islamic Republic of Iran, 896 
F.3d 501, 511 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (citing Mwani v. bin Laden, 417 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2005) ; 10A 
Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2682 (3d ed. 1998)). “Personal 
jurisdiction over a foreign state shall exist as to every claim for relief over which the district courts 
have jurisdiction under subsection (a) [and] where service has been made under section 1608 of 
this title.” 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b). “In other words, ‘under the FSIA, subject matter jurisdiction plus 
service of process equals personal jurisdiction.’” GSS Grp. Ltd v. Nat’l Port Auth., 680 F.3d 805, 
811 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (quoting Price, 294 F.3d at 95). 
The Court has already concluded that it has subject -matter jurisdiction over the claims in 
this case. Moreover, service has been made under Section 1608(a)(3), as described above and in 
the Court’s [31] Memorandum Opinion and Order. The Court incorporates the analysis in that 
Memorandum Opinion and Order here and accordingly concludes that the Court has personal 
jurisdiction over Iran. There are no due process concerns raised by the Court’s exercise of personal 

49 
 
jurisdiction over Iran because “foreign states are not ‘persons’ protected by the Fifth Amendment.” 
Price, 294 F.3d at 96. 
V. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth in this Memorandum Opinion, and in an exercise of its discretion, 
the Court finds that Iran and its proxies were responsible for the ten attacks discussed herein, which 
resulted in death and injuries to U.S. servicemembers and U.S. nationals. Accordingly, the Court 
shall GRANT default judgment against Defendant Islamic Republic of Iran as to the Section 
1605A(c) claims of : (1) the two Plaintiffs personally injured in one of the ten non-bellwether 
attacks and (2) the two Plaintiffs representing the estates of individuals killed in one of those 
attacks. 
As noted in Section IV (A) (2) herein, the Court, however, does not make any liability 
ruling, currently, regarding the Section 1605A(c) claims for emotional distress by the thirty-five 
“family-member” Plaintiffs, arising out of the ten non-bellwether attacks. The Court has indicated 
that these “family-member” Plaintiffs may rely on the Findings of Fact herein, which establish that 
Iran’s material support proximately caused the actual or attempted extrajudicial killing of each 
victim in the ten non -bellwether attacks; and furthermore, that these acts of terrorism were 
sufficiently extreme and outrageous to demonstrate that Iran intended to inflict severe emotional 
harm on even those not present at the site of the act . The “family-member” Plaintiffs, however, 
must confirm that they are members of a victim’s immediate family, and that they are either U.S. 
nationals, members of the armed services, or government employees. As has been previously 
done, this information regarding the family-members should be included with the information on 
damages that is provided to the Special Master(s). 

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Furthermore, this Court makes no findings regarding the appropriate amount of damages 
for any of the 39 Plaintiffs and i nstead, the Court anticipates that a Special Master will make 
subsequent findings regarding the appropriate damages calculations for Plaintiffs who have 
established their right to relief under § 1605A(c) , upon the submission of supplemental damages 
evidence. 
An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion. 
 
Dated: June 3, 2026 
 /s/ 
COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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