govinfo:USCOURTS-tned-3_18-cr-00036-20

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 
 ) 
 Plaintiff, ) 
 ) 
v. ) No.: 3:18 -CR-36-TAV-DCP-2 
 ) 
DERRICK S. SEALS, ) 
 ) 
 Defendant. ) 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 
 
 This criminal case is before the Court on defendant’s pro se motion for a sentence 
reduction [Doc. 915]. Defendant requests th at the Court resentence him (i) due to 
extraordinary and compelling reasons; and (ii) pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and in 
accordance with Amendment 821 to the United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual. The 
Federal Defender Services of Eastern Tennessee filed a notice of no intention to 
supplement defendant’s mo tion [Doc. 916]. The governme nt responded in opposition 
[Doc. 922]. For the following reasons, defendant’s motion for a sentence reduction [Doc. 
915] will be DENIED. 
I. Factual Background 
On August 15, 2018, defendant pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute 50 grams or 
more of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A) 
(Count 1), possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense, in violation 

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of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) 1 (Count 5), and conspiracy to commit money laundering, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(h), 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) (Count 25) [Doc. 156, 164]. 
 In calculating defendant’s guideline range , the revised presentence investigation 
report (“RPSR”) calculated a total of seven cr iminal history points based on defendant’s 
prior convictions and then added two “status points” be cause defendant committed the 
instant offense while on probation in Calibor ne County General Sessions Court [PSR 
¶¶ 104–05]. Based on a total criminal histor y score of nine, defendant was assigned a 
criminal history category of IV [ Id. ¶ 106]. Based on a total offense level of 39 and a 
criminal history category of IV, his guideline range was calculated as 360 months to life 
[Id. ¶ 124]. However, based on the Sentencing Commission’s definition of “life” as 470 
months, and the 60-month mandatory consecutive sentence for Count 5, 2 the RPSR 
calculated the effective guideline range as 420 to 530 months [Id.]. 
The Court ultimately sentenced defendant to 240 months’ imprisonment, consisting 
of 180 months as to Count 1, 60 months as to Count 25, to run concurrently, and 60 months 
as to Count 5, to run consecutively [Doc. 54 6]. According to the Bureau of Prisons’ 
website, defendant is presently scheduled for release on June 20, 2035. Inmate Locator, 
Federal Bureau of Prisons, available at https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (accessed June 2, 
2026). 
 
1 The second amended plea agreement appears to contain a typographical error, indicating 
that this offense occurred in violation of “18 21 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)” [Doc. 156, p. 1]. 
 
2 The RPSR appears to contain a typographical error reflecting that Count 25, rather than 
Count 5, was the § 924(c) conviction, which carries a mandatory 60-month consecutive sentence. 

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II. Compassionate Release 
A. Standard of Review 
A court generally lacks “the authority to change or modify [a sentence, once 
imposed,] unless such authority is expressly granted by statute.” United States v. 
Thompson, 714 F.3d 946, 948 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing United States v. Curry, 606 F.3d 323, 
326 (6th Cir. 2010)). “O ne exception—commonly referred to as ‘compassionate 
release’—permits the court to reduce a term of imprisonment if it finds, among other 
things, that ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction.’” Rutherford 
v. United States, 608 U.S. ___, slip op. at 1 (2026) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i)). 
The First Step Act of 2018’s amendment of § 3582(c)(1)(A) revised this exception. First 
Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, 5239 (2018); Rutherford, slip op. 
at 4. Prior to the First Step Act, a distri ct court could grant relie f under § 3582(c)(1)(A) 
only on motion of the Director of the Bur eau of Prisons. Now a court may modify a 
defendant’s sentence upon a mo tion by a defendant if the defendant has exhausted all 
administrative rights to appeal a failure of th e Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the 
defendant’s behalf or after the lapse of 30 da ys from the receipt of such a request by the 
warden of the defendant’s facility, whichever is earlier. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). 
If the defendant surmounts this preliminary hurdle, the Court may grant a sentence 
reduction “after considering the factors set forth in § 3553(a) to the ex tent that they are 
applicable” if it finds: 
(i) extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction; or 
 

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(ii) the defendant is at least 70 years of age, has served at least 30 years in 
prison, pursuant to a sentence imposed under section 3559(c), for the offense 
or offenses for which the defendant is currently imprisoned, and a 
determination has been made by the Dire ctor of the Bureau of Prisons that 
the defendant is not a danger to the safety of any other person or the 
community, as provided under section 3142(g); 
 
and that such a reduction is consiste nt with applicable policy statements 
issued by the Sentencing Commission . . . . 
 
Id. Defendant seeks relief under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) [Doc. 239]. 
If the exhaustion requirement is satisfied, courts must then follow the statute’s 
three-step test: 
At step one, a court must “find[ ]” whether “extraordi nary and compelling 
reasons warrant” a sentence reduction. At step two, a court must “find[ ]” 
whether “such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements 
issued by the Sentencing Commission.” The Commission’s policy statement 
on compassionate release resides in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. Thus, if § 1B1.13 is 
still “applicable,” courts must “fo llow the Commission’s instructions in 
[§ 1B1.13] to determine the prisoner's eligibility for a sentence modification 
and the extent of the reduction authorized.” At step three, “§ 3582(c)[(1)(A)] 
instructs a court to consider any app licable § 3553(a) factors and determine 
whether, in its discretion, the reduction authorized by [steps one and two] is 
warranted in whole or in part under the particular circumstances of the case.” 
 
United States v. Jones, 980 F.3d 1098, 1107–08 (6th Cir. 2020) (internal citations omitted). 
In considering a compassionate release moti on, “district courts may deny compassionate 
release motions when any of the three prerequisites listed in § 3582(c)(1)(A) is lacking and 
do not need to address the others” but must “address all three steps” if granting such a 
motion. United States v. Elias, 984 F.3d 516, 519 (6th Cir. 2021). 
 
 

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B. Analysis 
1. Exhaustion 
The Court first examines whether defe ndant has satisfied § 3582(c)(1)(A)’s 
exhaustion requirement, which is a mandatory prerequisite to consideration of a 
compassionate release request on the merits. United States v. Alam, 960 F.3d 831, 833–34 
(6th Cir. 2020). “When ‘prope rly invoked,’ mandatory claim-processing rules ‘must be 
enforced.’” Id. at 834 (quoting Hamer v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of Chi. , 138 S. Ct. 
13, 17 (2017)). The only exceptions to such a mandatory claim-processing rule are waiver 
and forfeiture. Id. (citing United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002)). 
In this case, the government concedes that the exhaustion requirement has been 
satisfied [Doc. 922, p. 2]. Accordingly, the Court will proc eed to evaluate defendant’s 
compassionate release request according to the three-step test explained above. 
2. Extraordinary a nd Compelling Reasons 
 
Turning to whether defendant has set fo rth extraordinary and compelling grounds 
for relief, the Court first notes that the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
previously held that “[i]n cases where incarcerated persons file motions for compassionate 
release, federal judges may skip step two of the § 3582(c)(1)(A) inquiry and have full 
discretion to define ‘extraordinary and compelling’ without consulting the policy statement 
of § 1B1.13.” United States v. Jones, 980 F.3d 1098, 1111 (6th Cir. 2020). This was so 
because the applicable policy statement, United States Sentencing Guideline § 1B1.13, as 
written at the time, did not contemplate inma te-filed motions for compassionate release, 

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but instead, was limited to circumstances where the Bureau of Prisons filed a motion on an 
inmate’s behalf. Id. at 1109–10; see also U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.13 
(U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018). 
However, the Sentencing Commission amende d the policy statement in § 1B1.13, 
effective November 1, 2023, to encompass inmate-filed motions for compassionate release. 
U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.13 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2023). It thus appears 
that the Sixth Circuit’s prior ru ling that § 1B1.13 is not an applicable policy statement to 
inmate-filed motions for compassionate release is no longer consistent with the Guidelines. 
See United States v. Nash, No. 23-3635, 2024 WL 1979067, at *3 (6th Cir. Apr. 30, 2024) 
(noting the amendment to § 1B1.13 and stating that “prior to [the date of amendment], no 
guideline policy statement applied to comp assionate-release mo tions brought by 
defendants, and a district cour t could deny a defendant-filed motion without reference to 
any policy statement”); see also United States v. Ringgold , No. ELH-17-232, 2023 WL 
7410895, at *5–6 (D. Md. Nov. 8, 2023) (“[I]t appears that the Fourth Circuit’s conclusion 
in McCoy, 981 F.3d at 281, to th e effect that ‘§ 1B1.13 is not an ‘applicable’ policy 
statement,’ is no longer consistent with th e Guidelines. This is because the Policy 
Statement is now expressly applicable to de fendant-filed motions pur suant to 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3582(c)(1)(A).”). However, “[t]he new policy statement largely preserves the discretion 
district courts held to consider any extr aordinary and compelling reason for release.” 
United States v. Davis, No. 3:20-cr-16, 2023 WL 7356579, at *2 (W.D. N.C. Nov. 7, 2023). 

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As amended, § 1B1.13(b) states that “[e]xtraordinary and compelling reasons exist 
under any of the following circumstances or a combination thereof,” and discusses when 
the medical circumstances of the defendant , the age of the defe ndant, the family 
circumstances of the defendant, the defendant’s victimization in custody, and other reasons 
may constitute extraordin ary circumstances. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL 
§ 1B1.13(b)(1)–(6). 
Recently, the Supreme Court provided some guidance as to the meaning of the term 
“extraordinary and compelling.” “The term ‘extraordinary’ means ‘most unusual,’ ‘far 
from common,’ or ‘having little or no precedent.’” Rutherford, slip op. at 8. 
“‘Compelling,’ meanwhile, means ‘tending to convince or convert by or as if by 
forcefulness of evidence.’” Id. “Putting these definitions together ‘extraordinary and 
compelling’ reasons for compa ssionate release are those that are especially unusual and 
convincing.” Id. at 8–9. Thus “[w]hile the terms ‘extraordinary’ and ‘compelling’ leave 
room for judgment, they are not so flexible as to encompass any consideration.” Id. at 11. 
Rather, “[t]heir meaning depends on context: A reason is ‘extraordinary’ and ‘compelling’ 
only if it is sufficiently unusual and convincing to ‘warrant’ compassionate release.” Id. 
Defendant raises two argume nts as “extraordinary a nd compelling” grounds for 
compassionate release: (1) th e recognition by some courts of a policy disagreement with 
the Sentencing Guidelines’ treatment of me thamphetamine purity; and (2) a generalized 
shift in the treatment of simple possession of marijuana cases, and the possibility of 
granting a downward variance on the basis that his criminal history, including two simple 

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possession of marijuana convictions, is overstated [Doc. 915, pp. 2–5]. But neither of these 
arguments fall within the Guidelines’ policy statement regarding circumstances that could 
be deemed extraordinary and compelling for purposes of compassionate release. Nor does 
the Court find that either of these argum ents could be deemed extraordinary and 
compelling. 
First, as to the fact that some courts have expressed disagreement with the 
Guidelines based on methamphetamine purity, such argument is proper at sentencing, and 
is does not rise to the level of an “extraordinary” or “compelling” ground for compassionate 
release. Indeed, the Guid elines’ distinction between “actual” methamphetamine and 
“mixture” methamphetamine is regularly applied by this Court, and courts across the 
country. And such an ordinary practic e cannot be deemed “extraordinary.” See 
Rutherford, slip op. at 9. Moreover, while a dist rict court may disagree with a guideline 
for policy reasons, it does not follow that a district court must disagree with the applicable 
guideline range or reject that range based on such disagreement. United States v. Kamper, 
758 F.3d 728, 742 (6th Cir. 2014). This Co urt regularly rejects requests for downward 
variances at sentencing based on this methamphetamine purity argument. See, e.g., United 
States v. Bryan Cornelius, No. 3:19-cr-220, United States v. Mahlon Prater, No. 3:19-cr-
151. Thus, the Court does not find that such argument is extraordinary or compelling. 
Second, defendant’s suggestion that a downward variance could be warranted based 
on the fact that he received two criminal history points for simple possession of marijuana 
convictions is, once again, an argument that sh ould have been raised at sentencing, not in 

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a compassionate release request. And, rega rdless, the Court does not find that such 
suggestion that defendant “may ” qualify for a downward varian ce to amount to the high 
standard of an “extraordinary and compelling” ground warranting his release. 
 Given that the Court has re jected each of defendant’s extraordinary and compelling 
arguments, his motion [Doc. 915] is hereby DENIED insofar as he seeks compassionate 
release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). 
III. Amendment 821 
A. Standard of Review 
 “Federal courts are forbidden, as a gene ral matter, to modify a term of imprisonment 
once it has been imposed, but the rule of fina lity is subject to a few narrow exceptions.” 
Freeman v. United States, 564 U.S. 522, 526 (2011) (internal citation and quotation marks 
omitted). One exception is identified in 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2): 
[I]n the case of a defendant who ha s been sentenced to a term of 
imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been 
lowered by the Sentencing Commission . . . , the court may reduce the term 
of imprisonment, after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to 
the extent that they are applicable, if such a reduction is consistent with 
applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission. 
 
The United States Supreme Court has interp reted § 3582(c)(2) as setting forth two 
requirements for a sentence reduction. First, “the defendant [must] ha[ve] been sentenced 
to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered 
by the Sentencing Commission[.]” United States v. Riley , 726 F.3d 756, 758 (6th Cir. 
2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Second, “such reduction [must be] 
consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” Id. 

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(internal quotation marks omitted). If the reviewing court determines that the defendant is 
eligible for a sentence reduction, then “[t] he court may then ‘c onsider whether the 
authorized reduction is warranted, either in wh ole or in part, according to the factors set 
forth in § 3553(a).’” United States v. Thompson, 714 F.3d 946, 949 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting 
Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 826 (2010)). 
 In determining whether a defendant has be en sentenced to a term of imprisonment 
based on a sentencing range that has subs equently been lowere d by the Sentencing 
Commission, the Court must first determine “the amended guideline range that would have 
been applicable to the defendant had the relevant amendment been in effect at the time of 
the initial sentencing.” Dillon, 560 U.S. at 827 (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted); see also U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.10(b)(1) (U.S. SENT’G 
COMM’N 2023). Other than substituting Amendment 821 for the corresponding provision 
applicable when the defendant was originally sentenced, th e Court “shall leave all other 
guideline application decisions unaffected.” Id. And the Court “shall not” reduce a 
defendant’s term of imprisonment to a te rm “less than the mi nimum of the amended 
guideline range,” nor to a term “less than the term of imprisonment the defendant has 
already served.” Id.; U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.10(b)(2)(A), (C). 3 I n 
addition to these limits, section 1B1.10 states that a court must also consider the § 3553 
 
3 Section 1B1.10 provides one exception to th e rule that a defenda nt may not receive a 
sentence below the amended guide line range—namely, if the defe ndant originally received a 
below-guideline sentence “pursuant to a government motion to reflect the defendant’s substantial 
assistance to authorities.” U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES § 1B1.10(b)(2)(B). 

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factors and the danger to the pu blic created by any reduction in a defendant’s sentence. 
U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.10 cmt. n.1(B)(ii). A court may further consider 
a defendant’s post-sentencing conduct. Id. at n.1(B)(iii). 
B. Analysis 
 Amendment 821 to the Guid elines, which became effective on November 1, 2023, 
has two relevant parts. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL Supp. to App. C, amend. 821. 
First, Amendment 821 revises section 4A1.1’s provision for the addition of “status points” 
to a defendant’s criminal history points if the defendant comm itted the offense of 
conviction while under a crim inal justice sentence. Id. Section 4A1.1(d) previously 
provided for two criminal history points to be added if the defendant committed the offense 
of conviction while under any criminal justice sentence. Id. Under Amendment 821, 
section 4A1.1(e) now provides for the additi on of one criminal history point “if the 
defendant: (1) receives 7 or more poin ts under subsections (a) through (d), and 
(2) committed the instant offe nse while under any criminal justice sentence, including 
probation, parole, supervised release, imprisonment, work re lease, or escape status.” Id. 
A defendant with less than seven criminal history points receives no additional “status 
points” under § 4A1.1. Id. 
 Secondly, Amendment 821 adds new se ction 4C1.1, which provides certain 
“zero-point offenders” with a two-level reduction to their offense level. Id. The two-level 
reduction applies if a defendant meets all of the following criteria: 
(1) the defendant did not receive any cr iminal history points from Chapter 
Four, Part A; 

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(2) the defendant did not receive an adjustment under §3A1.4 
(Terrorism); 
(3) the defendant did not use violence or credible threats of violence in 
connection with the offense; 
(4) the offense did not result in death or serious bodily injury; 
(5) the instant offense of conviction is not a sex offense; 
(6) the defendant did not personally ca use substantial financial hardship; 
(7) the defendant did not possess, rece ive, purchase, transport, transfer, 
sell, or otherwise dispose of a firearm or other dangerous weapon (or 
induce another participant to do so) in connection with the offense; 
(8) the instant offense of convicti on is not covered by §2H1.1 (Offenses 
Involving Individual Rights); 
(9) the defendant did not receive an adjustment under §3A1.1 (Hate 
Crime Motivation or Vulnerable Victim) or §3A1.5 (Serious Human 
Rights Offense); and 
(10) the defendant did not receive an adjustment under §3B1.1 
(Aggravating Role) and was not enga ged in a continuing criminal 
enterprise, as defined in 21 U.S.C. § 848[.] 
 
Id. Pursuant to Amendment 825, the Sentencing Commission amended section 1B1.10(d) 
to include these portions of Amendment 821 in the list of retroactive amendments. U.S.
 
SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL Supp. to App. C, amend. 825. The Sentencing Commission 
also amended section 1B1.10(e) to specify that “[t]he court shall not order a reduced term 
of imprisonment based on . . . Amendment 821 unless the effective date of the court’s order 
is February 1, 2024, or later.” Id. 
Here, defendant appears to seek a sentence reduction under § 4A1.1 of Amendment 
821, which reduced the “status points” added to defendant’s criminal history [Doc. 915, p. 
5]. Because defendant’s prior convictions yielded seven criminal history point, under 
§ 4A1.1, defendant only qualifies for one criminal history point, resulting in a total criminal 
history score of 8. But a criminal history scor e of 7, 8, or 9 results in a criminal history 
category of IV. See UNITED STATES SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL, Sentencing Table. 

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Accordingly, defendant’s guideline range is un changed by Amendment 821. As a result, 
defendant was not sentenced to at erm of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that 
has subsequently been lowe red by the Sentencing Commi ssion, and the Court lacks 
authority to reduce his sentence unde r § 3582(c)(2) and Amendment 821. U.S. SENT’G 
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.10(a)(2)(B). Defendant’s motion [Doc. 915] is thus 
DENIED insofar as he seeks compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). 
IV. Conclusion 
 For the reasons stated above, defendant ’s motion for a sentence reduction [Doc. 
915] is DENIED. 
 IT IS SO ORDERED. 
s/ Thomas A. Varlan 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
 
 
 
 

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