govinfo:USCOURTS-dcd-1_26-cv-00369-0

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
 
 Plaintiff, 
 
 v. 
 
SUIRUI GROUP CO., LTD., et al., 
 
 Defendants. 
 
Civil Action No. 26-00369 (AHA) 
 
 
 
Memorandum Opinion 
Congress has authorized the President to block a foreign person from buying an American 
company upon finding the transaction “threatens to impair the national security of the United 
States.” 50 U.S.C. § 4565(d)(1). If the transaction has already happened, the President can order 
the foreign purchaser to divest its interests in the American company. Id. The executive branch 
regularly reviews these transactions, and Presidents have , infrequently, ordered divestment 
because a transaction poses national security risks that cannot otherwise be mitigated . ECF No. 
35-2 ¶ 11; ECF No. 44 at 9. 
Here, the President found that Suirui Group, a Chinese compan y, and its subsidiary, 
through their purchase of Jupiter Systems —an American company that makes processors and 
displays used by U.S. government defense and military institutions, and by other domestic entities 
that operate critical infrastructure—“ might take action that threatens to impair the national security 
of the United States.” Regarding the Acquisition of Jupiter Systems, LLC by Suirui International 
Co., Limited, 90 Fed. Reg. 31125, 31125 (July 11, 2025). The President ordered Suirui Group and 
its subsidiary to divest all interests and rights in Jupiter Systems by November 5, 2025. Id. at 

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31125–26. The companies did not comply with the President’s order by divesting from Jupiter 
Systems, despite asking for and getting multiple extensions. See ECF No. 35- 2 ¶¶ 24, 28. The 
government filed this suit against Suirui Group, its subsidiary, and Jupiter Systems to enforce the 
President’s order and now moves for a preliminary injunction, asking the court to appoint a 
receiver to manage Jupiter Systems, to mitigate the national security risk the President identified 
pending litigation of an order requiring full divestment. See ECF No. 6; 50 U.S.C. § 4565(d)(3). 
Given Suirui’s past and continued noncompliance with the President’s order and failure to make 
meaningful efforts to divest, the continuing national security risks posed by Suirui’s control of 
Jupiter Systems , and the strong public interest in addressing those risks, the court finds the 
government has satisfied its burden for a preliminary injunction and that appointing a receiver is 
the appropriate relief. 
I. Background 
A. The CFIUS Review Process A nd Presidential Prohibition Of Foreign Purchases 
Of American Companies 
Section 721 of t he Defense Production Act of 1950, codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. 
§ 4565, authorizes the President, acting through the Committee on Foreign Investment in the 
United States (“CFIUS”), to review and investigate certain “covered transactions ,” including 
“[a]ny merger, acquisition, or takeover ... by or with any foreign person that could result in 
foreign control of any United States business.” 50 U.S.C. § 4565(a)(4)(A)(i), (B)(i). The Act also 
authorizes the President to “take such action for such time as the President considers appropriate 
to suspend or prohibit any covered transaction that threatens to impair the national security of the 
United States.” Id. § 4565(d)(1). 
CFIUS, an interagency committee chaired by the Secretary of the Treasury and made up 
of members from several other agencies, initiates the review of a covered transaction in one of two 

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ways. See id. § 4565(k)(1)–(3). First, a party to the transaction can voluntarily give written notice 
of the transaction to CFIUS; second, CFIUS can unilaterally initiate review of a covered 
transaction it learns of . Id. § 4565(b)(1)(C)–(D). During its review of a transaction, CFIUS is 
tasked with determining “the effects of the transaction on the national security of the United 
States.” Id. § 4565(b)(1)(A)(i). To make its determination, CFIUS considers various factors, such 
as “the potential national security-related effects on United States critical infrastructure” and “the 
control of domestic industries and commercial activity by foreign citizens as it affects the 
capability and capacity of the United States to meet the requirements of nati onal security.” Id. 
§ 4565(b)(1)(A)(ii), (f). If, upon review of the transaction , CFIUS determines the transaction 
“threatens to impair the national security of the United States and the risk has not been mitigated 
during or prior to the review,” it must then “immediately conduct an investigation of the effects of 
[the] covered transaction on the national security of the United States, and take any necessary 
actions in connection with the transaction to protect the national security of the United States.” Id. 
§ 4565(b)(2)(A), (B)(i)(I). This may, and often does, inclu de negotiating voluntary mitigation 
measures to reduce the risk posed. Id. § 4565(l)(3); see also ECF No. 44 at 10. CFIUS may, “ at 
any time during the review or investigation of a covered transaction . . . refer the transaction to the 
President for action.” 50 U.S.C. § 4565(l)(2). 
Before referring any transaction to the President for divestment , CFIUS must conduct “a 
risk-based analysis” of the transaction’s “effects on the national security of the United States ,” 
including an “assessment of the threat, vulnerabilities, and consequences to national security 
related to the transaction.” Id. § 4565(l)(4)(A). The risk-based analysis sets forth the information 
CFIUS relies on in making its determination to refer a transaction to the President, and it generally 
includes both classified and unclassified information . Id.; ECF No. 35 -1 ¶ 13. When CFIUS is 

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considering referral to the President to prohibit a transaction, it sends the parties to the transaction 
a separate letter that notifies them of CFIUS’s national security concerns and plans for referral , 
provides the unclassified information that CFIUS relied on, and invite s the parties to provide 
additional information for CFIUS’s consideration. ECF No. 35-1 ¶ 15; ECF No. 44 at 32–33. 
After the President receives a referral from CFIUS, he may “take such action for such time 
as the President considers appropriate to suspend or prohibit any covered transaction that threatens 
to impair the national security of the United States.” 50 U.S.C. § 4565(d)(1). The President may 
exercise this authority if he finds both “credible evidence that leads the President to believe that a 
foreign person that would acquire an interest in a United States business or its assets as a result of 
the covered transaction might take action that threatens to impair the national security” and that 
“provisions of law, other than this section and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 
do not, in the judgment of the President, provide adequate and appropriate authority for the 
President to protect the national security.” Id. § 4565(d)(4). 
The President, acting through CFIUS, reviews a large volume of transactions each year . 
ECF No. 35- 2 ¶ 11. Typically, if national security risks are identified, CFIUS works with the 
parties to negotiate a voluntary mitigation agreement or a voluntary divestment. ECF No. 44 at 
10–11. Because most national security risks are resolved voluntarily, Presidents have exercised 
their authority to order divestment only seven times. Id. at 9, 69. This case marks the first time the 
government has filed a lawsuit to enforce such an order. Id. at 28–29. 

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B. The CFIUS Review And Presidential Order Relating To Suirui ’s Purchase Of 
Jupiter Systems1 
Suirui Group is a privately owned Chinese company subject to laws requiring information 
and intelligence sharing with the Chinese government , and its voting shareholders include a 
Chinese state- owned enterprise that the U.S. Department of Defense classifies as a Chinese 
military company operating in the United States. ECF No. 35-2 ¶ 18; ECF No. 38-10 at 1–4; ECF 
No. 44 at 12–13. In February 2020, Suirui Group, acting through its subsidiary Suirui International 
(referred to together as “Suirui” throughout this opinion), bought Jupiter Systems, a U.S. company 
that makes display wall processors, displays, and related software that it sells to commercial and 
U.S. government customers, including all branches of the military, components or customers of 
the U.S. Department of Energy and the Department of Defense, state and local governments, and 
private transportation and telecommunications companies. ECF No. 31-2 ¶ 4; ECF No. 35-2 ¶¶ 14, 
16; ECF No. 35-4 at 1. Jupiter Systems provides remote and in-person support, as well as software 
and firmware updates, for its products, including those used by government customers. ECF No. 
31-2 ¶ 11; ECF No. 35-2 ¶ 16; ECF No. 44 at 15–16. 
When Suirui bought Jupiter Systems, it did not send voluntary notice of the transaction to 
CFIUS. See ECF No. 35- 2 ¶ 14; ECF No. 31- 3 ¶¶ 6–7. Since then, Suirui has exercised control 
over Jupiter Systems, including by appointing Suirui employees to serve on Jupiter Systems’ board 
and by appointing a Suirui employee, Jay Xia, as CEO of Jupiter Systems. ECF No. 38-10 at 3–4; 
ECF No. 35-2 ¶ 17; ECF No. 31-3 ¶ 1; ECF No. 44 at 14–15. Jupiter Systems has also increased 
the number of parts sourced from China and the number of employees located in China. ECF No. 
44 at 17–18. 
 
1 The facts described reflect the court’s findings based on the testimony and evidence presented 
at the court’s evidentiary hearing and with accompanying briefing. 

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In March 2024, CFIUS initiated an inquiry into the transactio n and, about a month later, 
asked the defendants to file a notice regarding the transaction. ECF No. 38-10 at 16–17. After the 
defendants twice submitted incomplete notices, CFIUS had regular conversations with the 
defendants and requested various additional information to allow CFIUS to conduct due diligence 
regarding the relationship between the Chinese government and Suirui and potential national 
security risks arising from the transaction . ECF No. 38-10 at 16–27; ECF No. 44 at 18–19. Over 
the course of CFIUS’s review and investigation of the transaction, the defendants’ responses to 
requests for information were often untimely, incomplete, contained conflicting information, or 
were not submitted at all. ECF No. 38 -10 at 16–27; ECF No. 44 at 19. By the end of the review 
and investigation period, CFIUS identified national security risks arising from the potential 
compromise of products integrated into military and critical infrastructure systems, which could 
enable unauthorized access to data or disablement of those systems. ECF No. 35- 5 at 2. On a 
December 2024 phone call and in a January 2025 letter, CFIUS told Suirui and Jupiter Systems 
that it had identified national security risks. Id. at 1; ECF No. 44 at 20–21. 
The defendants then withdrew from engagement with CFIUS, and CFIUS initiated further 
review and concluded no mitigation short of divestment would address the national security risks 
posed by the transaction. ECF No. 35- 2 ¶ 20; ECF No. 44 at 20–21; ECF No. 38- 10 at 14, 16. 
CFIUS prepared a risk-based analysis of the transaction for referral to the President and, on April 
30, 2025, sent the defendants a letter describing CFIUS’s national security concerns and the 
unclassified evidence on which it relied. ECF No. 44 at 32–34; see ECF No. 38-10. The letter also 
informed the defendants that CFIUS anticipated referring the matter to the President with a 
recommendation to prohibit the transaction if the defendants did not negotiate a plan for voluntary 
divestment that would address the national security concerns . ECF No. 38- 10 at 14. The letter 

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invited the defendants to provide additional relevant information and discuss the matter further 
with CFIUS. Id. at 14–15. In the months that followed, Suirui rejected any possibility of voluntary 
divestment and instead proposed less restrictive mitigation measures that CFIUS had already found 
insufficient. ECF No. 35-4 at 1–5; ECF No. 44 at 11–12. 
On July 7, 2025, CFIUS sent another letter to the defendants, supplementing the April letter 
with additional information, including a summary of CFIUS’s engagement with the defendants 
since April. See ECF No. 35- 4. The July letter also informed the defendants that “CFIUS is 
referring the matter to the President for decision.” Id. at 5. 
The next day, the President issued an order saying there is credible evidence that Suirui, 
through its acquisition of Jupiter Systems, “might take action that threatens to impair the national 
security of the United States.” 90 Fed. Reg. at 31125. The order further said the transaction “is 
hereby prohibited” and that Suirui’s ownership of any interest in Jupiter Systems or its assets “is 
also prohibited.” Id. The President ordered Suirui to divest all interests and rights in Jupiter 
Systems within 120 days unless extended by CFIUS. Id. at 31125–26. 
After the President’s order, the Departments of Defense and the Treasury closely engaged 
with the defendants to oversee the implementation of interim security measures and divestment 
efforts. ECF No. 44 at 21–25; ECF No. 35- 2 ¶ 23. The security measures included protocols to 
limit access to Jupiter Systems’ properties and systems. ECF No. 44 at 24–25. The measures were 
intended to be temporary and were not capable of addressing the national security threat in the 
long term. Id. at 24–25, 80. The agencies also had legitimate concerns that Jupiter Systems, as a 
small company, would not be able to properly implement the controls. Id. at 80; ECF No. 35 -2 
¶ 26. 

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In the months that followed, Suirui twice asked for extensions of the divestment deadline. 
ECF No. 44 at 28–31. In each instance, CFIUS granted an extension—in one instance allowing an 
extension that was more abbreviated than what was sought and in the other instance conditioning 
any further extensions on production of a term sheet by the deadline . Id. Throughout this period, 
Suirui multiple times committed to providing term sheets for sales of Jupiter Systems, but missed 
the deadlines, only to later provide no term sheet or provide a term sheet that did not comply with 
the President’s order. Id. at 22–23, 30–32. In addition, w hen U.S.- based employees of Jupiter 
Systems sought out a buyer to comply with the President’s divestment order, Suirui resisted the 
efforts and indicated the Chinese government would not allow the company to be sold to a North 
American buyer. Id. at 106–07, 114–15, 132, 136–37. At the court’s evidentiary hearing, Suirui 
employee and Jupiter Systems CEO Jay Xia testified that Suirui’s efforts to divest its interests in 
Jupiter Systems following the President’s order had proceeded slowly, in part because Suirui was 
communicating with and seeking the approval of the Chinese government for any sale. Id. at 132–
36, 139–40, 145–46. 
After Suirui failed to meet the second exten ded deadline, the government sued to enforce 
the President’s order. ECF No. 1; see 50 U.S.C. § 4565(d)(3). The government has moved for a 
preliminary injunction , asking the court to appoint a receiver to manage Jupiter Systems’ 
operations pending litigation of its request for an order requiring complete divestment under the 
President’s order. ECF No. 6. After receiving briefing from the parties, the court held an 
evidentiary hearing, at which it heard testimony from a Treasury Department official concerning 
the national security review and risks posed by the transaction, a n employee of Jupiter Systems 
who discussed Jupiter Systems’ efforts to respond to CFIUS’s inquiries and comply with interim 
security measures, as well as Suirui employee a nd Jupiter Systems CEO Jay Xia who discussed 

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the defendants’ engagement with CFIUS and Suirui’s divestment efforts following the President’s 
order. See ECF No. 44. The court also gave the parties a n opportunity to submit post-hearing 
briefing on the relevant issues, including application of the preliminary injunction factors , 
appropriate relief, and consolidation with the merits. See ECF Nos. 41, 43. 
II. Discussion 
To prevail on its motion for preliminary injunction, the government must show it is likely 
to succeed on the merits, it will likely suffer irreparable harm without preliminary relief, the 
balance of equities tips in its favor, and the injunction is in the public interest. Winter v. Nat. Res. 
Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). The court accordingly considers these factors, mindful 
that “[a] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy” and “may only be awarded upon a 
clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Id. at 22, 24. Because the court concludes 
the government has satisfied this stringent burden, it also carefully considers the appropriate scope 
of preliminary relief and next steps. 
A. The Government Is Likely To Succeed On The Merits 
The government has made a strong showing it will likely succeed on its claim to enforce 
the President’s order requiring Suirui to divest its interests in Jupiter Systems. 
Congress authorized the President to order a foreign purchaser to divest its interest s in an 
American company upon finding “there is credible evidence that leads the President to believe that 
a foreign person that would acquire an interest in a United States business or its assets as a result 
of the covered transaction might take action that threatens to impair the national security ” and 
“provisions of law, other than this section and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 
do not, in the judgment of the President, provide adequate and appropriate authority for the 
President to protect the national security in the matter before the President. ” 50 U.S.C. 
§ 4565(d)(4). There is no dispute that, here, the President made those findings when he ordered 

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Suirui to divest its interests in Jupiter Systems. See 90 Fed. Reg. at 31125. There is no dispute that 
the President’s findings and action to prohibit the transaction are not themselves subject to judicial 
review. See 50 U.S.C. § 4565(e)(1). And there is no dispute the government can, upon 
noncompliance, sue to enforce the order. See id. § 4565(d)(3). 
It is also undisputed that Suirui has not complied with the President’s order: it has not 
divested from Jupiter Systems. See ECF No. 35-2 ¶ 24; ECF No. 31-3 ¶¶ 18, 21. Indeed, based on 
the live testimony at the court’s evidentiary hearing and other evidence proffered by the parties at 
this stage, the court finds that despite the President’s order, Suirui has not made meaningful efforts 
to divest its interests in Jupiter Systems. See ECF No. 44 at 21–24, 29–32 , 105; ECF No. 35- 2 
¶¶ 24–25, 28–29. To the contrary, the record shows that Suirui repeatedly delayed compliance with 
the President’s order, seeking extensions, only to then blow the extended deadlines and not deliver 
plausible terms for a sale. ECF No. 44 at 23–24, 29–32; ECF No. 35-2 ¶ 28. The court also finds 
based on the current record that Suirui took affirmative actions to impede its compliance with the 
order. This includes contacting the Chinese government to complain about the President’s 
divestment order and limiting the universe of potential buyers to those the Chinese government 
would approve. ECF No. 44 at 132–34, 139–40, 145–46. And it includes impeding U.S.- based 
employees of Jupiter Systems when they sought out potential buyers, initially resisting their efforts 
to hire a broker and then refusing their efforts to pursue the sale of Jupiter Systems to a North 
American company. Id. at 106–08, 114–15, 132, 136–37. The government is accordingly likely to 
succeed on its claim to enforce the President’s order, resulting in a court order of divestment. See 
50 U.S.C. § 4565(d)(3) (authorizing a court to enforce a presidential order by providing 
“appropriate relief, including divestment relief”). 

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The defendants argue the government is unlikely to succeed in enforcing the President’s 
divestment order because the order violated procedural due process. ECF No. 31 at 22–30. In 
particular, they say CFIUS did not adequately disclose the unclassified record it relied on to refer 
the transaction to the President and therefore deprived the defendants of “t he right to know the 
factual basis for the action and the opportunity to rebut the evidence supporting that action.” Ralls 
Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv. in U.S., 758 F.3d 296, 318 (D.C. Cir. 2014). Based on the record 
before the court at this stage, the court disagrees. 
In Ralls, the D.C. Circuit recognized that when the President issues an order requiring a 
foreign purchaser to divest its interests in an American company, an affected party has the right to 
“be informed of the official action, be given access to the unclassified evidence on which the 
official actor relied and be afforded an opportunity to rebut that evidence.” Id. at 319. There, Ralls, 
a company owned by two Chinese nationals, challenged the President’s order requiring it to divest 
its interests in American windfarm companies. Id. at 304–06. During the review process, CFIUS 
asked Ralls to respond to questions and Ralls gave a presentation to CFIUS, but “CFIUS did not 
apprise Ralls of the gravamen of its concern with the transaction and did not, during the 
presentation or at any other time, disclose to Ralls the information it reviewed.” Id. at 305. The 
D.C. Circuit held that Ralls had a property interest protected by due process and that the Defense 
Production Act’s bar on judicial review of the President’s actions and findings did not preclude 
judicial review of a due process challenge. Id . at 311, 316–17. Recognizing that “due process is 
flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands,” the court 
held that “a substantial interest in national security” allows the government to withhold classified 
information relied upon, but affected parties are entitled to “ notice of, and access to, the 
unclassified information used to prohibit the transaction.” Id. at 317, 320. The circuit explained 

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that, although Ralls had the opportunity to present evidence to CFIUS, it “ never had the 
opportunity to tailor its submission to the [government’s] concerns or rebut the factual premises 
underlying the President’s action.” Id. at 320. 
The parties here do not dispute that the President’s divestment order implicates a property 
interest protected by due process, and they do not dispute that CFIUS had no obligation to share 
classified information it relied on in referring the transaction to the President with a 
recommendation to prohibit the transaction. See ECF No. 31 at 25; ECF No. 35 at 11; ECF No. 44 
at 167. The court concludes the government is likely to succeed in also showing that CFIUS 
provided the requisite process, including notice of its concerns and its plan to refer the transaction 
to the President, the unclassified evidence it relied on, and the opportunity to rebut the evidence. 
See Ralls, 758 F.3d at 319. CFIUS’s April 30, 2025, letter told the defendants it planned to refer 
the transaction to the President with a recommendation to prohibit the transaction if the y were 
unable to negotiate a voluntary divestment. ECF No. 38-10 at 14. The letter explained that CFIUS 
had concerns about “ the potential compromise of Jupiter Systems’ technology that is integrated 
into military and critical infrastructure systems, which could enable unauthorized access to data or 
disablement of critical systems.” Id. at 2. The July 7, 2025, letter reiterated those concerns. ECF 
No. 35-4 at 1. 
The letters also told the defendants the information CFIUS relied on to refer the transaction 
to the President. After Ralls , Congress amended § 4565 to provide that CFIUS’s referral of a 
transaction to the President for action “shall be based on a risk -based analysis, conducted by the 
Committee, of the effects on the national security of the United States of the covered transaction.” 
50 U.S.C. § 4565(l)(4)(A); see Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018, Pub. 
L. No. 115-232, § 1718, 132 Stat. 1636, 2194–95 (2018). At the court’s evidentiary hearing, Sarah 

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Oldham, deputy director in the Office of Compliance and Enforcement under the Office of 
Investment Security at the U.S. Department of the Treasury, testified to how this process plays 
out, generally and in this particular case. First, when CFIUS plans to refer a matter to the President 
for action, it prepares the statutorily required risk-based analysis, a classified document. ECF No. 
44 at 32–33. The agency then pulls out all of the unclassified information from the risk- based 
analysis, putting it into a letter that can be shared with the parties. Id. at 33; see also ECF No. 35-
1 ¶ 15 (explaining that “CFIUS’s policy and practice for drafting a [letter for the parties] involves 
putting all unclassified information and sources relevant to the risk and the Committee’s 
determination from the [risk-based analysis] and [national security threat assessment] into a new 
document, in addition to providing contextual information regarding the Committee’s process and 
approach to risk- based analysis”). Oldham further te stified that CFIUS followed that process in 
this case: CFIUS began by “pulling out all of the unclassified information” and “controlled 
information” from the risk-based analysis and putting it into the April 30 letter to the defendants. 
ECF No. 44 at 33–34; see also ECF No. 35-1 ¶ 21 (affirming that “CFIUS followed its policy and 
practice here”). Oldham further testified that, in preparation for her testimony, the Department of 
the Treasury did “a side-by-side comparison of the risk-based analysis prepared for this transaction 
and the April 30 due process letter sent to Defendants” and “found that all unclassified information 
had been put into the April 30th due process letter with one exception.” ECF No. 44 at 33; see also 
ECF No. 35- 1 ¶¶ 20 –21 (confirming the letter sent to defendants included “the unclassified 
information upon which the Committee relied in deciding to refer the matter to the President” with 
“one minor exception”); ECF No. 41-1 ¶ 16 (Thomas Argall, deputy director for global investment 
in the Office of Global Investment and Economic Security under the Office of the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Industrial Base Policy, attesting that “[e]xcept for” information 

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“referencing active law enforcement investigations, the substance of all [controlled unclassified 
information] in the [risk -based analysis] regarding the national security risk was included in the 
Letters”).2 
CFIUS also provided the defendants with an opportunity to rebut its concerns and the 
unclassified evidence it relied on. In the April 30 letter to the defendants , CFIUS invited the 
defendants to “provide CFIUS with additional relevant information for its consideration” and 
engage in further conversations with CFIUS . ECF No. 38- 10 at 14–15. And thereafter, the 
defendants engaged in further back and forth regarding the April letter. ECF No. 44 at 81. Indeed, 
before referring the matter to the President for action, CFIUS issued a second letter on July 7, 
summarizing the additional correspondence between CFIUS and the defendants. ECF No. 44 at 
81; see ECF No. 35-4. 
The government is likely to succeed in showing CFIUS gave the defendants notice of its 
concerns, access to the unclassified evidence it relied on, and an opportunity to rebut the concerns 
and evidence. The defendants therefore had “ the opportunity to tailor [their] submission to 
[CFIUS’s] concerns” and “rebut the factual premises underlying the President’s action.” Ralls, 758 
F.3d at 320. That is what due process requires. 
 
2 According to Oldham’s testimony, which the court finds credible, CFIUS’s April 30 letter 
inadvertently omitted one of four examples of misrepresentations the defendants had made in 
response to a question from CFIUS, which had been included in the risk-based analysis and should 
have been included in the April 30 letter. ECF No. 44 at 33–34; see also ECF No. 35-1 ¶ 21; ECF 
No. 35 at 10 n.3. The defendants do not argue the omission was material. See ECF No. 44 at 194; 
ECF No. 43 at 11 n.6. The court finds this inadvertent omission was not material or prejudicial 
given that it was included as one of a series of misrepresentations and was premised on the 
defendants’ own responses to a question set. See Epsilon Elecs., Inc. v. U .S. Dep’t of Treasury, 
Off. of Foreign Assets Control, 857 F.3d 913, 931 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (rejecting due process challenge 
related to agency not disclosing two pieces of evidence underlying its decision because the 
challenger did not carry “its burden to demonstrate that it was prejudiced by this alleged error”). 

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The defendants do not contest that CFIUS gave them notice of its concerns and plan to 
refer the transaction to the President but say CFIUS did not adequately disclose the unclassified 
evidence it relied on or provide adequate opportunity to rebut its evidence. Neither argument is 
persuasive. First, the defendants speculate that CFIUS relied on unclassified information that was 
not included in the April 30 letter. See ECF No. 31 at 26–27, 29–30; ECF No. 43 at 10–11. The 
defendants characterize the April 30 l etter they received as just a “summary” of the unclassified 
information that CFIUS relied on and posit that CFIUS relied on underlying material that the 
defendants “would have wanted to examine during the CFIUS process.” ECF No. 31 at 26, 29; see 
also ECF No. 44 at 39– 41 (defendants’ counsel cross-examining government witness about the 
possibility CFIUS staff considered unclassified source materials in preparing the April 30 letter) . 
The defendants note, for example, that the April letter refers to “assessm ents of Department of 
Defense (‘DOD’), Department of Energy (‘DOE’), and Department of Homeland Security (‘DHS’) 
subject matter experts” and surmise there must be additional information that could have been 
turned over. ECF No. 31 at 29; see ECF No. 38 -10 at 2. But, at least on the current record, the 
court finds no basis to credit that speculation and, to the contrary, credits the government’s 
testimony that CFIUS relied on only the risk-based analysis it conducted, as required by statute, 
and provided all unclassified and uncontrolled information that was in the risk- based analysis to 
the defendants. See ECF No. 44 at 33, 40–41; ECF No. 41-1 ¶¶ 11–16; ECF No. 35-1 ¶¶ 13, 20–
21; see also 50 U.S.C. § 4565(l)(4)(A) (“ Any determination of the Committee . . . to refer a 
covered transaction to the President . . . shall be based on a risk- based analysis .”). Indeed, in 
response to the defendants’ argument, a Defense Department official attested that the only 
controlled unclassified information relating to the subject matter expert assessments that was not 
disclosed was the “identities of [DoD], DHS, and DOE subject matter experts whose analysis is 

16 
included in the [ risk-based analysis], and which are generally cited as U.S. Government subject 
matter experts throughout the April 30 Letter.” ECF No. 41-1 ¶ 14.3 
The defendants, second, argue they did not have an adequate opportunity to rebut CFIUS’s 
concerns. See ECF No. 31 at 28–29. According to the defendants, CFIUS’s April 30 letter was 
“argumentative” rather than “neutral.” Id. at 28. But, even accepting the defendants’ 
characterization of the April 30 letter, nothing in Ralls or the due process clause prevents CFIUS 
from forming, or requires it to hide, its subjective view of the evidence. To the contrary, Ralls 
requires CFIUS to provide notice of its concerns so that the parties may tailor their submission to 
CFIUS’s concerns and rebut the factual premises underlying the official action. Ralls, 758 F.3d at 
320. To the extent the defendants took issue with CFIUS’s characterizations of the evidence, they 
had the opportunity to rebut them. The defendants also argue that they did not have an adequate 
opportunity to rebut CFIUS’s second, July 7 letter because by that time “the decision to refer the 
 
3 In addition to excluding classified information, CFIUS excluded certain controlled unclassified 
information. ECF No. 41- 1 ¶¶ 13–16; ECF No. 44 at 34. Controlled unclassified information is 
information that, while not classified, is protected from disclosure by other laws, regulations, or 
government-wide policies. ECF No. 41-1 ¶ 7. A Defense Department official attest s that CFIUS 
excluded controlled unclassified information referencing active law enforcement investigations 
from the letters to the defendants . Id. ¶ 15. In addition, CFIUS generalized certain controlled 
unclassified information relating to the Department of Defense’s use of Jupiter Systems products, 
identities of agency subject matter experts, i nteractions with the parties , and U.S. government 
authorities CFIUS consider ed in determining no other legal authorities are available to mitigate 
the national security risk posed by the transaction. Id. ¶ 14. The defendants do not make entirely 
clear whether they believe they were entitled to any controlled unclassified information, and if so, 
what information. In any event, based on the current record, the court finds the exclusion and 
generalization of this information was not prejudicial , and the defendants have not argued 
otherwise. 
 The defendants also speculate that the President may have considered information that was not 
disclosed to them, noting that the Treasury Department official who testified could not rule it out. 
See ECF No. 43 at 11; ECF No. 44 at 83 (Oldham testifying that “I’m not in the President’s office, 
so I can’t say if he looked at other documents or not”). The court finds no basis to credit that 
speculation. In any event, the D.C. Circuit has said “[a]dequate process at the CFIUS stage ... 
would also satisfy the President’s due process obligation.” Ralls, 758 F.3d at 320. 

17 
matter to the President had already been made.” ECF No. 43 at 10. But CFIUS’s April 30 letter—
which provided the defendants with the unclassified and uncontrolled information it relied on , 
invited the defendants to provide any additional information, and was followed by substantial 
exchange between CFIUS and the defendants —and the July 7 letter — which summarized the 
parties’ additional back-and-forth and described any further, limited unclassified and uncontrolled 
information that CFIUS relied on—provided the defendants ample opportunity to rebut CFIUS’s 
concerns. ECF No. 44 at 32–33, 81; see also ECF Nos. 35-4, 38-10; ECF No. 44 at 53–54 (Oldham 
testifying the July 7 letter was intended “to provide any supplemental information on the process 
that had occurred and, again, reiterate to the parties that we were about to refer to the President”). 
It may well be true that CFIUS had all but made up its mind to refer the matter to the President 
after the April 30 letter, the exchange that followed it, and the July 7 follow-up letter, but that does 
not mean the defendants did not have the opportunity to rebut CFIUS’s concerns.4 
 
4 The government says Congress forbade the defendants from asserting their due process 
argument as a defense to enforcement of the President’s order and that they can raise the argument 
only in the D.C. Circuit. See ECF No. 35 at 8–9; ECF No. 41 at 9–13. This is a bad argument. To 
be sure, after the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Ralls, Congress amended the Defense Production Act 
to route suits challenging presidential findings and actions to the D.C. Circuit: “A civil action 
challenging an action or finding under this section may be brought only in the United States Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.” 50 U.S.C. § 4565(e)(2); see § 1715, 132 Stat. at 
2191. But that provision, by its plain text, does not apply here. The defendants did not bring any 
“civil action challenging an action or finding.” 50 U.S.C. § 4565(e)(2). They assert a defense in 
response to the government’s civil enforcement action. Here, Congress specified—and all agree—
that the President’s findings and actions are not subject to judicial review . Id. § 4565(e)(1); see 
Ralls, 758 F.3d at 307– 12 (rejecting the argument that the Defense Production Act’s judicial 
review bar encompasses constitutional claims). B ut nothing in the statute indicates Congress’s 
intent to foreclose a party from raising otherwise valid constitutional defenses . See McLaughlin 
Chiropractic Assocs., Inc. v. McKesson Corp., 606 U.S. 146, 157, 159 (2025) (explaining that 
“[w]hen Congress wants to preclude judicial review in enforcement proceedings, it can easily say 
so” and courts “do not presume that Congress silently intended to preclude judicial review in 
enforcement proceedings”). 
 The government cites Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944), in support of its argument, 
but that case establishes the same: Congress speaks clearly when it wants to foreclose a particular 
 

18 
The government is therefore likely to succeed in enforcing the President’s order to divest. 
B. The Government Has Shown Irreparable Harm 
The court also finds the government will be irreparably harmed absent preliminary relief. 
This requires the government to show it will suffer injury that is “both certain and great” and “of 
such imminence that there is a ‘clear and present’ need for equitable relief to prevent irreparable 
harm.” Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England, 454 F.3d 290, 297 (D.C. Cir. 2006) 
(quoting Wis. Gas Co. v. FERC , 758 F.2d 669, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ). The injury must also be 
“beyond remediation,” meaning that the possibility of corrective relief “at a later date . . . weighs 
heavily against a claim of irreparable harm.” Id. at 297–98 (citation omitted). 
The government has shown injury of that nature. The court finds that Suirui’s continued 
control of Jupiter Systems poses imminent national security risks. CFIUS made a finding that the 
transaction poses a risk to national security that would not adequately be addressed by mitigation 
measures short of divestment, and the President made a finding that Suirui might take action that 
threatens to impair the national security of the United States . ECF No. 38-10 at 2, 14; ECF No. 
35-4 at 1; 90 Fed. Reg. at 31125. And before this court, the government has proffered evidence 
that Jupiter Systems’ products—which include video communications hardware and software used 
by the Department of Defense and all branches of the military, as well as private entities that own 
or operate critical infrastructure— could potentially be accessed, and the data on those systems 
 
defense. See id. at 429–31 (concluding that Congress deprived a district court of jurisdiction to 
consider the validity of regulations as a defense where Congress stated not only that a specially 
created federal court possessed “exclusive jurisdiction to determine the validity of any regulation 
or order,” but also explicitly stated that “[e]xcept as provided in this section, no court ... shall 
have jurisdiction or power to consider the validity of any such regulation, order, or price 
schedule”); see also McLaughlin, 606 U.S. at 163–64 (recognizing that in Yakus, it was not enough 
that Congress routed challenges to a particular court: “The word ‘exclusive’ in the first sentence 
did not itself bar any subsequent review in enforcement proceedings. If it had, then the second 
sentence of the Emergency Price Control Act —barring any other consideration of the validity of 
the regulations—would have been unnecessary”). 

19 
exploited, by the introduction of hardware and software vulnerabilities. ECF No. 44 at 15–17; ECF 
No. 35- 2 ¶ 16. The record shows that Suirui has asserted control over Jupiter Systems since 
acquiring it, and that Suirui and its employees are subject to laws that allow the Chinese 
government to compel them to support government investigations, share information, and assist 
Chinese intelligence agencies. ECF No. 44 at 12– 15; ECF No. 35-2 ¶¶ 17–18; ECF No. 38-10 at 
3–4; ECF No. 35- 4 at 7 . The court also credit s the government’s evidence that the transaction 
continues to pose national security concerns. See ECF No. 44 at 32 (Oldham testifying that “the 
national security risks of Suirui’s continued ownership and control of Jupiter Systems” are “[v]ery 
much still present”); see also id. at 80; ECF No. 35-2 ¶¶ 25, 29. The court finds these concerns are 
heightened by Suirui’s failure to make meaningful efforts to comply with the President’s order to 
divest, which, as Suirui employee and Jupiter Systems CEO Jay Xia testified, is in part because it 
complained to, and will divest only as approved by, the Chinese government. See ECF No. 44 at 
13–14, 105, 133–34, 136–37, 140, 145–46; see also ECF No. 37-3 at 2 (stating that Suirui submits 
weekly reports to the Chinese government to provide “updates on the equity sale and forced 
divestiture of Jupiter” and reports the details of meetings with the U.S. government to the Chinese 
authorities). 
The court also finds that mitigation measures short of divestment are not sufficient to 
address the national security risks. The government has proffered evidence that access control 
measures cannot mitigate the national security risks because they rely on the defendants’ self -
policing. ECF No. 44 at 25, 80; ECF No. 35-2 ¶¶ 26–27. The court also credits the testimony that 
the agencies monitoring the defendants’ implementation of security measures have concerns about 
Jupiter Systems’ ability to maintain acce ss control measures because it is a small company with 
limited resources and experience implementing security measures. ECF No. 44 at 80; ECF No. 35-

20 
2 ¶ 26. And the court finds that the defendants’ proposal that the government simply stop buying 
Jupiter Systems products is superficial, not a practical way to mitigate the national security risks. 
See ECF No. 43 at 19 n.12; ECF No. 38- 10 at 13–14. The proposal does not address national 
security risk s posed by the possible compromise of products already in use by the federal 
government, or by state, local, and private entities that operate critical infrastructure. See ECF No. 
38-10 at 6–9, 13–14; ECF No. 44 at 15–16; ECF No. 35-2 ¶¶ 15–16. Accordingly, the court finds, 
based on the hearing testimony and other evidence before it at this stage, that the national security 
concerns are bona fide and will persist as long as Suirui maintains control of Jupiter Systems. 
In reaching this conclusion, the court does not endorse the government’s argument that the 
“President’s finding of a national security threat is by itself enough to satisfy the irreparable harm 
standard.” ECF No. 41 at 19; see also ECF No. 35 at 3; ECF No. 44 at 150. To be sure, the 
President’s finding is not one this court can review . 50 U.S.C. § 4565(e)(1) . But e ven when the 
government asserts irreparable harm based on national security, it must show the harm is “both 
certain and great” and imminent so as to justify injunctive relief during the period sought—that is, 
pending litigation. Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches , 454 F.3d at 297 (citation omitted); see 
Fed. Educ. Ass’n v. Trump, No. 25- 5303, 2025 WL 2738626, at *3 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 25, 2025) 
(concluding that the government did not meet its burden to establish irreparable harm where it did 
not show that “the indirect effects on national security it posited” were “imminent”). Here, the 
court finds that the preliminary injunction record, which includes the President’s finding of a 
national security threat arising from the transaction, shows that the threat would remain present 
pending litigation absent preliminary relief. 
For similar reasons, the court also rejects the defendants’ argument that the government’s 
national security concerns are speculative and unsubstantiated. See ECF No. 31 at 15–19. The 

21 
government has provided ample support, through testimony and written evidence, for the national 
security harms that could occur absent preliminary relief. See TikTok Inc. v. Garland, 604 U.S. 56, 
83–84 (2025) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (concluding that “the record the government has amassed 
in these cases after years of study supplies compelling reason for concern” even though “assessing 
exactly what a foreign adversary may do in the future implicates ‘ delicate’ and ‘complex’ 
judgments about foreign affairs and requires ‘ large elements of prophecy ’” (citation omitted)). 
And its evaluation of the potential national security risks set forth in the President’s finding and in 
the testimony of national security officials in court is entitled to substantial deference. See id. at 
75 (rejecting argument that it was “unlikely” national security concerns would manifest and giving 
“substantial deference” to “the Government ’s informed judgment ” that China might seek to 
compel TikTok to turn over user data for intelligence-gathering purposes (cleaned up)); Holder v. 
Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 33–34 (2010) (recognizing deference must be given to the 
executive branch’s “evaluation of the facts” when the “sensitive and weighty interests of national 
security” are implicated); see also Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Trump, No. 25-5157, 2025 WL 
1441563, at *2 (D.C. Cir. May 16, 2025) (concluding that the government established irreparable 
harm where the President’s “national-security prerogatives, which were explicitly recognized by 
Congress,” were impeded); Am. Foreign Serv. Ass’n v. Trump, No. 25-5184, 2025 WL 1742853, 
at *3 (D.C. Cir. June 20, 2025) (same). 
The court also rejects the defendants’ argument that the government’s actions since Suirui 
acquired Jupiter Systems undermine any claim of imminent threat. ECF No. 31 at 19–22; ECF No. 
43 at 8–9. The defendants ask the court to infer there is no bona fide or imminent threat because 
the government initiated an inquiry into the transaction long after Suirui bought Jupiter Systems 
and sued only after engaging in months of discussions with the defendants and affording them 

22 
extensions for divestment. ECF No. 31 at 19–20; ECF No. 43 at 8–9. To the contrary, the court 
finds that CFIUS pursued an expeditious and orderly divestment. Before the President issued his 
order, CFIUS engaged in the review and investigation processes required by statute. See 50 U.S.C. 
§ 4565(b)(1)–(2). The government provided evidence that during these processes, Suirui 
frequently missed deadlines and provided incomplete responses to requests for information from 
CFIUS, making it challenging for CFIUS to complete a full review of the transaction and leading 
to some delays. See ECF No. 44 at 19–20; ECF No. 35-2 ¶ 19; ECF No. 38-10 at 16–26. Following 
the President’s order, the government sought to work with the defendants to effectuate divestment 
without litigation, which is typically “the fastest route to securing the divestment.” ECF No. 44 at 
28–29. And while it is true that the government granted Suirui two extensions after the divestment 
order, the fact that Suirui asked for extensions and then failed t o meaningfully comply with 
deadlines does not indicate lack of concern or urgency on the part of the government. See ECF No. 
35-2 ¶ 28; ECF No. 44 at 28–32. Indeed, the government filed this lawsuit just six days after Suirui 
failed to comply with the most recent divestment deadline, and it filed its preliminary injunction 
motion nine days after that. See ECF No. 44 at 29–31; ECF No. 35-2 ¶ 24; ECF Nos. 1, 6.
5 
 
5 The defendants devote significant briefing to whether two dual employees of Suirui and Jupiter 
Systems improperly accessed Jupiter Systems’ facility in violation of access control measures set 
by CFIUS. See ECF No. 31 at 15–17; ECF No. 43 at 5–6. The defendants maintain they repeatedly 
informed CFIUS that the employees had access, without objection from CFIUS. See ECF No. 44 
at 61–69, 93–100, 122–27; ECF No. 31-2 ¶¶ 25–30; ECF No. 31-3 ¶¶ 10–14; see, e.g., ECF No. 
38-13 at 3, 5; ECF No. 38- 4 at 2 . The government maintains that the employees continued to 
improperly access Jupiter Systems’ facility for several months despite failing to get a waiver to 
access the facility, although Oldham acknowledged that the government was concerned about such 
compliance risks given that Jupiter Systems was a small company and that the government should 
have been clearer to avoid misunderstanding. ECF No. 35- 2 ¶ 26; ECF No. 44 at 25–28, 62–63, 
80. The court does not rely on the alleged violation of access controls by the two dual employees 
as a basis for its finding that the government has shown irreparable harm. However, the court 
credits Oldham’s testimony regarding the risk that Jupiter S ystems is not positioned to monitor 
risks posed by Suirui’s control of the company. 

23 
C. The Balance Of The Equities And The Public Interest Favor A Preliminary 
Injunction 
The equities and public interest also support the government’s request for injunctive relief. 
These two factors generally “merge” when the government is a party. Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 
418, 435 (2009); see Pursuing Am.’s Greatness v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 831 F.3d 500, 511 (D.C. 
Cir. 2016) (reasoning that the government’s “harm and the public interest are one and the same, 
because the government’s interest is the public interest”). 
There is undoubtedly a strong public interest in addressing national security risks—indeed, 
it is “an urgent objective of the highest order.” Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 582 U.S. 
571, 581 (2017) (citation omitted). In assessing the equities and public interest, the court is mindful 
that this is not only a circumstance in which the President has made a finding that there is a national 
security risk, but also one in which he did so pursuant to Congress’s express authorization. See 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer , 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) 
(“When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his 
authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he pos sesses in his own right plus all that 
Congress can delegate. ”); see also Nat ’l Treasury Emps. Union, 2025 WL 1441563, at *3 
(explaining that “preserving the President’s autonomy under a statute that expressly recognizes his 
national-security expertise is within the public interest”) . And the court has found, based on the 
record at this stage, that the government’s interest in protecting national security here is ongoing, 
will continue during the preliminary injunction period, and is not speculative. 
The defendants raise equities on the other side, including the possibility that the 
appointment of a receiver will disrupt Suirui’s and Jupiter Systems’ businesses, such as by making 
it more difficult for Jupiter Systems to compete or for Suirui to sell Jupiter Systems. ECF No. 31 
at 31–32; ECF No. 43 at 13–14. But the court finds that, to the extent interim appointment of a 

24 
receiver has consequences for Suirui’s or Jupiter Systems’ business, that is Suirui’s own doing. 
Suirui had extensive opportunit ies to divest its interests in Jupiter System s but did not ma ke 
meaningful efforts to do so. That includes the opportunity Suirui had to negotiate a voluntary 
divestment before the President issued the divestment order. ECF No. 44 at 11–12. Although 
CFIUS sought to work with the defendants to negotiate a voluntary divestment —an option many 
companies consider to be in their best interest to avoid the very risks the defendants complain of 
today—Suirui rejected CFIUS’s proposals and instead proposed less restrict ive mitigation 
measures that CFIUS had already found insufficient. Id. ; ECF No. 35 -4 at 1–5. And since the 
President’s order, Suirui has consistently delayed any meaningful effort to divest its interests in 
Jupiter Systems. See ECF No. 44 at 21–24, 29–32; ECF No. 35- 2 ¶¶ 24, 28. Indeed, the record 
shows that U.S.-based Jupiter Systems employees favored a quick divestment precisely to protect 
the business’s interest, but Suirui did not support those efforts. ECF No. 44 at 103–08, 114–15, 
132, 136–37. Having forgone every opportunity to divest its interests in Jupiter Systems in a way 
that would be less damaging, Suirui cannot now invoke its own or Jupiter Systems’ business as an 
interest. And even crediting the possible business risk to Suirui and Jupiter Systems, the equities 
and public interest tilt heavily in the government’s favor. See Winter, 555 U.S. at 25–26, 31 n.5 
(concluding that “documented risks to national security . . . clearly outweigh [ed]” scientific, 
recreational, and ecological interests).
6 
 
6 While the court finds Suirui did not make meaningful efforts to comply with the President’s 
order, the court does not attribute any bad faith to the defendants’ witnesses. Jupiter Systems 
employee Matthew Pestana testified candidly and admirably about the efforts of U.S.-based Jupiter 
Systems employees to try to find a potential buyer while looking out for the company’s best 
interests. See ECF No. 44 at 103–08, 114–15. Suirui employee and Jupiter Systems CEO Jay Xia 
also testified candidly and credibly, including about Suirui approaching and regularly engaging 
with the Chinese government , which slowed its progress toward divestment. See id. at 132–37, 
139–40, 145–46. 

25 
D. Scope of Relief 
Having concluded that all factors weigh in favor of a preliminary injunction, the court still 
pauses to consider and craft the interim relief tailored to the showing the government has made , 
including the particular claim likely to succeed, harm, equities , and public interest . See Int’l 
Refugee Assistance Project , 582 U.S. at 580 (acknowledging that the court “need not grant the 
total relief sought by the applicant but may mold its decree to meet the exigencies of the particular 
case” (citation omitted)). The government asks the court to appoint a receiver to manage Jupiter 
Systems during the pendency of this case and provides a detailed proposed order to that effect. 
ECF No. 6 at 16; see ECF No. 35-3. The defendants argue that even if the government is entitled 
to preliminary relief, the court should allow Suirui to maintain control over Jupiter Systems. ECF 
No. 43 at 16–19. As discussed below, the court finds that tailoring the relief to the particular claim, 
harms, equities, and public interest in this case necessitates the appointment of a receiver pending 
litigation of the government’s request for an order requiring full divestment. The court also notes 
at the outset that, despite having opportunities to address specific terms of a receivership, including 
those proposed by the government, the defendants have largely declined to do so and instead 
adhered to their frontline position that Suirui should maintain control of Jupiter Systems pending 
litigation or Suirui’s divestment of its interests in Jupiter. See id. at 16–19; see also ECF No. 34 at 
5, 11, 14–15. While tha t is the defendants’ prerogative, they have in doing so forfeited, and 
therefore left the court without, their position on many of the details proposed by the government. 
The defendants do not dispute that the court has discretion to appoint a receiver as interim 
relief. See N.Y. Cmty. Bank v. Sherman Ave. Assocs., LLC, 786 F. Supp. 2d 171, 175 (D.D.C. 2011) 
(recognizing “ the court has ‘ broad powers and wide discretion’ in determining whether a 
receivership is appropriate ” (citation omitted)); Fed. R. Civ. P. 66. They observe, however, that 
appointment of a receiver “ is an ‘extraordinary equitable remedy’ and should be granted with 

26 
‘caution.’” N.Y. Cmty. Bank , 786 F. Supp. 2d at 175 (quoting Canada Life Assur ance Co. v. 
LaPeter, 563 F.3d 837, 844 (9th Cir. 2009)); see ECF No. 31 at 31–34. The court agrees. 
The court finds that the circumstances of this case necessitate the extraordinary remedy of 
appointing a receiver, and no remedy short of transferring Suirui’s control of Jupiter Systems to a 
receiver will address the national security risks pending litigation. The court is mindful of the 
context in which this case arises. Congress has authorized the President to order divestment upon 
finding the foreign purchaser might take action that threatens to impair the national security and 
other provisions of law do not provide adequate and appropriate authority for the President to 
protect the national security, and there is no dispute the President made those findings and ordered 
divestment in this case. See 50 U.S.C. § 4565(d)(1), (4); 90 Fed. Reg. at 31125. The court has 
concluded the government is likely to succeed in enforcing that order. Thus, while the appointment 
of a receiver is no doubt an extraordinary remedy, here, the government’s request is made in a 
context where the President has ordered divestment, the court has found the government is likely 
to succeed on its claim for enforcement of the President’s order, and Congress expressly authorized 
the remedy of divestment for such a claim. See 50 U.S.C. § 4565(d)(3); 90 Fed. Reg. at 31125. 
The appointment of a receiver is therefore less drastic than the final injunctive relief the 
government seeks and is likely to obtain. And it is tailored to the national security risks posed by 
Suirui’s continued control of Jupiter Systems pending litigation , while also allowing Suirui to 
continue to hold its equity in Jupiter Systems until the case resolves. See ECF No. 44 at 176 (the 
government acknowledging that Suirui would continue to hold equity in the company during the 
receivership). 
The court also finds that no form of relief short of transferring Suirui’s control of Jupiter 
Systems would adequately respond to the government’s particular showing of harm, the equities, 

27 
and the public interest . See Dixon v. Barry , 967 F. Supp. 535, 550 (D.D.C. 1997) (“The most 
significant factor in the propriety of appointing a receiver is whether any other remedy is likely to 
be successful.”). As set forth above, the court must give deference to the President’s finding that 
Suirui, through its ownership of Jupiter Systems, poses a national security threat, and the court 
credits the government’s evidence that this risk will continue pending litigation and cannot be 
adequately mitigated as long as Suirui maintains control. The defendants propose various 
alternative remedies: requiring the parties to provide regular status updates to the court, giving 
Suirui more time to divest its interests in Jupiter Systems, appointing a mediator to facilitate 
divestment, or appointing a monitor to undertake an assessment of current risks associated with 
Suirui’s continued control of Jupiter Systems. See ECF No. 43 at 18–19; ECF No. 44 at 204–05. 
But none of these proposed remedies address the core problem —reflected in the President’s 
findings and reiterated in the evidence before the court —that Suirui’s control of Jupiter Systems 
poses a national security risk. The court finds that status updates to the court, whether from the 
parties or from a third-party monitor, will not mitigate the national security risks described by the 
government. These include risks that technology used by the government , including all branches 
of the military, the Department of Defense, and entities that operate critical infrastructure , could 
be compromised. See ECF No. 44 at 15–17; ECF No. 35-2 ¶ 16; ECF No. 38-10 at 2, 14. And the 
court also finds that providing Suirui with more time to divest is an inappropriate remedy given 
Suirui’s failure to make meaningful efforts to divest despite having many opportunities to do so. 
See ECF No. 44 at 21–24, 29–32; ECF No. 35-2 ¶¶ 24, 28 
The government has proposed detailed terms to govern the receivership, which the court 
adopts in large part after its own review. See ECF No. 35-3. The defendants decline to engage with 
the details of the government’s proposal, offering only a few cursory objections. First, the 

28 
defendants question whether the government’s proposed receiver, Bradley Sharp, “has the 
experience necessary to run a company like Jupiter.” ECF No. 43 at 16. But aside from a 
conclusory assertion of “lack of experience,” the defendants do not say what the y mean. Id. The 
court also notes that, despite indicating they would want to be a part of the process of selecting a 
receiver, the defendants did not meaningfully engage in that process or propose any alternative 
receivers to the government or to the court , despite having the opportunity to do so after the 
government moved for a preliminary injunction. See ECF No. 27 at 6 (the government indicating 
it was setting up interviews for potential receivers during an early status conference); ECF No. 34 
at 5, 11 (the government stating that it had invited the defendants “to engage in a discussion about 
identifying a receiver” but “to date, defense counsel has not taken the government up on that 
invitation”); ECF No. 34 at 10–15 (the court directing the parties to confer regarding “the identity 
of a receiver” and the defendants’ engagement in the process of selecting a receiver); ECF No. 44 
at 5 (the government indicating that it “shared the resumes of three individuals it had interviewed 
and was pleased with and open to proposing” with the defendants, but the defendants “informed 
that their position was, at this time, they were not able to agree t o one of those individuals”) . In 
any event, the court finds that Sharp—who has significant experience acting as a fiduciar y, 
providing crisis management services across many industries, and serving as a receiver in prior 
cases—is qualified to serve as a receiver. See ECF No. 35-6.
7 
 
7 In a footnote, the defendants say they should have the opportunity to interview Sharp or 
propose alternative receivers. See ECF No. 43 at 16 n.10. But the court finds that, to the extent the 
defendants wish they had more involvement in the process of selecting a receiver, their lack of 
involvement was due to their own actions. Despite opportunities to do so—including at the 
encouragement of the court—the defendants have not made any meaningful effort to participate in 
the process of selecting a receiver, whether it be with the government or to rebut the government’s 
proposal in court. See ECF No. 34 at 5, 10–15; ECF No. 44 at 5. 

29 
Second, the defendants suggest that certain terms of the proposed receivership afford the 
receiver too much power to oversee and report on Jupiter Systems’ financial health, give the 
receiver too much protection from liability in carrying out his duties as receiver, and fail to limit 
the receiver’s compensation or ability to spend Jupiter System’s resources. ECF No. 43 at 17–18. 
But the court finds that the proposed order, including these provisions, strikes an appropriate 
balance of allowing the receiver t o carry out his dut y to take control of Jupiter Systems pending 
litigation, preserving Jupiter Systems’ ability to make business decisions during that period, and 
providing appropriate oversight and accountability. For example, contrary to the defendants’ 
assertions, the proposed terms require court approval for the receiver’s compensation and non-
routine expenses above a certain threshold. ECF No. 35- 3 ¶¶ 5, 43. The court also notes that the 
extent of the authority granted in the proposed receivership order is comparable to that granted by 
courts in other cases , even in cases that did not implicate national security. See, e.g. , Order 
Appointing a Receiver, Genesis Capital, LLC v. Lauravin Luxury Apartments Homes, LLC , No. 
23-cv-00795 (D.D.C. July 3, 2023), ECF No. 21; Order Appointing Receiver, Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n v. Legend Venture Partners LLC, No. 23-cv-05326 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2023), ECF No. 33. 
The court does, however, modify the proposed order in one way raised by the defendants, to 
remove a provision that would give the receiver authority to wind down business operations of the 
company. See ECF No. 43 at 17; ECF No. 35 -3 ¶ 21. The court finds that provision to be 
inconsistent with the purpose of the preliminary injunction to maintain the status quo. 
The defendants also argue that certain terms of the proposed receivership order, such as the 
requirement that the receiver notify officers, employees, and relevant third parties of the 
receivership, will be bad for Jupiter Systems’ business. See ECF No. 43 at 17. But, as the court 
has already found, to the extent there are any negative consequences to the defendants’ business 

30 
resulting from the position they find themselves in, it is the result of Suirui’s own actions, including 
its failure to make meaningful efforts to comply with the President’s divestment order. Indeed, the 
record supports that U.S.-based Jupiter Systems employees supported transfer of ownership, and 
one of the Jupiter Systems employees who testified for the defendants at the hearing acknowledged 
that having a receiver who could advance the company’s interests would be a positive development 
for the company. See ECF No. 44 at 104–08, 114–15, 132, 136–37.
8 
E. Consolidation With The Merits 
At the court’s preliminary injunction hearing, the court raised the question of whether the 
government’s preliminary injunction motion should be consolidated with the merits and asked the 
parties to further address the question in post-hearing briefs. ECF No. 44 at 5, 220; Minute Order 
(Mar. 11, 2026); s ee Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(2). The government responded that it supports 
consolidation with the merits. ECF No. 41 at 24. However, upon reviewing the parties’ arguments, 
the court agrees with the defendants that even if they do not prevail at the preliminary injunction 
stage, they should be provided the opportunity to more fully investigate and brief their defenses in 
this case. See ECF No. 43 at 19–23. 
III. Conclusion 
For these reasons, the court grants the government’s motion for preliminary injunction. A 
separate order accompanies this memorandum opinion. 
 
 
8 In a footnote, the defendants ask the court to stay any preliminary injunction pending appeal. 
See ECF No. 43 at 23 n.13. That request is denied as premature. If, after reviewing this opinion 
and order, the defendants decide to pursue an appeal, they may move for a stay pending appeal , 
and the court will consider it in the ordinary course. 

31 
 
 
AMIR H. ALI 
United States District Judge 
 
Date: May 26, 2026 

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