govinfo:USCOURTS-dcd-1_22-cv-03711-0

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
 
 
AMERICAN CENTER FOR LAW AND 
JUSTICE, 
 
 Plaintiff, 
 
 v. 
 
FEDERAL BUREAU OF 
INVESTIGATION, 
 
 Defendant. 
 
Civil Action No. 22 - 3711 (SLS) 
Judge Sparkle L. Sooknanan 
 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
The American Center for Law and Justice (ACLJ) is a nonprofit organization that promotes 
government transparency and accountability. In August 2022, ACLJ submitted a Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA) request to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) seeking record s 
relating to the FBI’s interactions with social media and news platforms to “censor” or “be on high 
alert for” information in connection with the 2020 election. After ACLJ filed this lawsuit, the FBI 
provided many of the records that ACLJ requested. But it withheld certain pieces of information 
that it claims would reveal the agency’s internal deliberations or its investigatory techniques and 
procedures. The FBI now moves for summary judgment, asserting that its withholdings are 
supported by FOIA Exemptions 5 and 7(E). ACL J disagrees and cross -moves for summary 
judgment. For the reasons explained below, the Court grants summary judgment in the FBI’s favor 
and denies ACLJ’s cross-motion. 

2 
BACKGROUND 
A. Statutory Background 
“FOIA ‘implement[s] a general philosophy of full agency disclosure.’” Informed Consent 
Action Network (ICAN) v. NIH, No. 23-cv-926, 2026 WL 585104, at *1 (D.D.C. Mar. 3, 2026) 
(alteration in original) (quoting DOJ v. Reps. Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 754 
(1989)). The statute “requires every federal agency, upon request, to make ‘promptly available to 
any person’ any ‘records’ so long as the request ‘reasonably describes such records.’” 
Assassination Archives & Rsch. Ctr. v. CIA , 334 F.3d 55, 57 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (quoting 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552(a)(3)). “Agencies must construe FOIA requests liberally and can only withhold or redact 
documents if the information requested ‘ falls within one of nine statutory exemptions.’” ICAN, 
2026 WL 585104, at *1 (quoting People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) v. NIH, 745 
F.3d 535, 540 (D.C. Cir. 2014)); see 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)–(9). These exemptions demonstrate that 
the public’s right to information is “not absolute and that disclosure of certain information ‘may 
harm legitimate governmental or private interests.’” Martin v. DOJ, 488 F.3d 446, 453 (D.C. Cir. 
2007) (quoting Summers v. DOJ , 140 F.3d 1077, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ). The agency bears the 
burden of establishing that an exemption applies and ordinarily “must disclose all reasonably 
segregable, nonexempt portions of the requested record(s).” PETA, 745 F.3d at 540 (cleaned up). 
B. Factual & Procedural Background 
The Court draws the facts from the Statement s of Material Facts submitted by the Parties 
and the underlying materials referenced in those statements. See Def.’s Statement of Material Facts 
(DSOF), ECF No. 30- 1; Pl.’s Statement of Material Facts (PSOF), ECF No. 32- 4. The Court 
assumes the facts in those statements to be true unless they have been specifically disputed, and it 

3 
assumes the truth of other undisputed statements in the record. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2); see 
also LCvR 7(h)(1).1 
On August 31, 2022, ACLJ submitted a FOIA request for “records pertaining to the [FBI’s] 
interactions with and requests to social media and news platforms, including Facebook, to censor 
or ‘be on high alert for’ information in connection with the then-upcoming [2020] election.” DSOF 
¶ 1 (first alteration in original); see also Napier Decl., Ex. A, ECF No. 31-1; id., Ex. D at 4, ECF 
No. 31-4. This included interactions regarding the “distribution of . . . stories or information about 
Hunter Biden.” Napier Decl., Ex. A at 3–5. On October 3, 2022, the FBI informed ACLJ that 
ACLJ had “requested information on one or more third party individuals and the FBI would neither 
confirm nor deny the existence of such records pursuant to FOIA exemptions 6 and 7(C).” Napier 
Decl. ¶ 8, ECF No. 31; see also id., Ex. C, ECF No. 31-3. 
ACLJ administratively appealed the FBI’s decision. Napier Decl. ¶ 9; id., Ex. D. And 
shortly thereafter, on December 13, 2022, ACLJ filed this lawsuit alleging that the FBI was 
improperly withholding documents responsive to its request. Compl., ECF No. 1. On January 20, 
2023, the Department of Justice’s Office of Information Policy affirmed the FBI’s earlier response 
to ACLJ’s request but clarified that the response “only pertained to subpart 10” of the request. 
Napier Decl. ¶ 12 n.4. For the remaining subparts, the FBI conducted a search for potentially 
responsive documents and made monthly interim releases to ACLJ. Id. ¶ 13. The FBI completed 
its production in September 2025 and provided a draft Vaughn index to ACLJ shortly thereafter. 
DSOF ¶¶ 3–4. In response, ACLJ stated an intent to challenge certain withholdings under FOIA 
Exemptions 5, 6, 7(C), and 7(E). DSOF ¶ 5. 
 
1 Local Rule 7(h) provides that “the Court may assume that facts identified by the moving party in 
its statement of material facts are admitted, unless such a fact is controverted in the statement of 
genuine issues filed in opposition to the motion.” LCvR 7(h)(1). 

4 
The FBI moved for summary judgment on March 4, 2026, asserting that all the withheld 
information was exempt from disclosure. Def .’s Mot., ECF No. 30. ACLJ opposed and cross -
moved for summary judgment on April 1, 2026. Pl.’s Mot., ECF No. 32; Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 33. 
Both motions are ripe for decision. Def.’s Opp’n & Reply, ECF No. 34; Pl.’s Reply, ECF No. 36. 
LEGAL STANDARD 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 requires a court to “grant summary judgment if the 
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In a FOIA suit, a n agency is entitled to 
summary judgment if it establishes that “no material facts are in dispute” and that all information 
subject to a request has either “been produced or is wholly exempt from the Act’s inspection 
requirements.” Students Against Genocide v. Dep ’t of State, 257 F.3d 828, 833 (D.C. Cir. 2001) 
(cleaned up). 
Typically, an “agency demonstrates the applicability of a FOIA exemption by providing 
affidavits regarding the claimed exemptions.” Shapiro v. DOJ, 893 F.3d 796, 799 (D.C. Cir. 2018). 
“If an agency’s affidavit describes the justifications for withholding the information with specific 
detail, demonstrates that the information withheld logically falls within the claimed exemption, 
and is not contradicted by contrary evidence in the record or by evidence of the agency’s bad faith, 
then summary judgment is warr anted on the basis of the affidavit alone.” ACLU v. U.S. Dep’ t of 
Def., 628 F.3d 612, 619 (D.C. Cir. 2011). “ [A]n agency’s justification for invoking a FOIA 
exemption is sufficient if it appears ‘logical’ or ‘plausible.’” Wolf v. CIA, 473 F.3d 370, 374–75 
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting Gardels v. CIA, 689 F.2d 1100, 1105 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). 

5 
DISCUSSION 
The records at issue are approximately 120 pages of email communications . And t he 
Parties’ dispute centers on the FBI’s invocation of FOIA Exemptions 5 and 7(E) to redact certain 
portions of those emails. The Court addresses each exemption in turn.2 
A. Exemption 5 
FOIA Exemption 5 protects from disclosure “inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums 
or letters that would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the 
agency.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5). “To qualify under this exemption, a document must ‘ satisfy two 
conditions: its source must be a Government agency, and it must fall within the ambit of a privilege 
against discovery under judicial standards that would govern litigation against the agency that 
holds it.’” Welter v. U.S. Dep’t of the Air Force, No. 22-cv-3738, 2026 WL 1243400, at *3 (D.D.C. 
May 6, 2026) (quoting Dep’t of the Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n, 532 U.S. 1, 
8 (2001)); see also Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. DOJ, 235 F.3d 598, 606 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“The test 
under Exemption 5 is whether the documents would be routinely or normally disclosed upon a 
showing of relevance by a party in litigation with the agency.” (cleaned up)). 
Relevant here, Exemption 5 includes the deliberative -
 process privilege. Klamath Water 
Users, 532 U.S. at 8. “To carry its burden at summary judgment, the government must demonstrate 
that (A) the materials at issue are covered by the deliberative process privilege, and (B) it is 
reasonably foreseeable that the release of those materials would cause harm to an interest protected 
 
2 At the outset of summary judgment briefing, ACLJ also disputed the FBI’s withholding of 
information under FOIA Exemptions 6 and 7(C). The FBI has since reprocessed certain documents 
and provided a supplemental declaration further supporting its withholdings. Second Napier Decl., 
ECF No. 34-2; id., Exs. A–C, ECF Nos. 34- 3, 34-4, 34-5. Through those actions and others, the 
Parties were able to narrow their disputes. See Second Napier Decl. ¶ 6 (withdrawing application 
of Exemption 5 to disputed redaction); Pl.’s Reply 4 (withdrawing challenge to redactions made 
under Exemption 6 and 7(C)). 

6 
by that privilege.” Reps. Comm. for Freedom of the Press v. FBI , 3 F.4th 350, 361 (D.C. Cir. 
2021); see 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(8)(A)(i)(I). ACLJ does not dispute that the source of the emails at 
issue is a government agency, “ so the remaining questions are whether the FBI has proven 
entitlement to the privilege as well as reasonably foreseeable harm. ” Welter, 2026 WL 1243400, 
at *3. As explained below, the FBI has cleared both hurdles. 
1. Deliberative Process Privilege 
“[T]o be covered by the deliberative process privilege, [a] document must be ‘ both 
predecisional and deliberative.’” Id. at *4 (quoting Reps. Comm., 3 F.4th at 362). “A document is 
predecisional if it was ‘generated before the agency’s final decision on the matter[.]’” Reps. 
Comm., 3 F.4th at 362 (quoting U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv. v. Sierra Club, Inc., 592 U.S. 261, 268 
(2021)). And it “is deliberative” if it was “prepared to help the agency formulate its position and 
it reflects the give - and-take of the consultative process.” Id. (cleaned up). “In practice, these 
requirements ‘tend to merge.’” Hall & Assocs. v. EPA , 633 F. Supp. 3d 35, 52 (D.D.C. 2022) 
(quoting Access Reps. v. DOJ, 926 F.2d 1192, 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1991)). 
The FBI has withheld portions of email chains from three different dates under the 
deliberative process privilege . To support those withholdings, the FBI has submitted two 
declarations from Amie Marie Napier, the Section Chief of the FBI’s Record/Information 
Dissemination Section, to justify its withholdings . Napier Decl.; Second Napier Decl., ECF 
No. 34-2. Ms. Napier attests that the “portions . . . of email communications” withheld under 
Exemption 5 “reflect deliberations” between FBI personnel as they “work [ed] to come to a 
consensus on final agency decisions about assessing the overall threat of malign influence on 
United States’ social media companies and specific actions that should be taken to alert [those] 
companies.” Napier Decl. ¶¶ 30–31. According to Ms. Napier, these deliberations were “based on 

7 
specific selected facts and details exchanged and debated amongst the[] employees.” Id. ¶ 30. And 
Ms. Napier goes further to detail the nature of the withholdings for the email communications on 
each date. Id. ¶¶ 32–34 ( explaining that the October 26, 2020, email communication was “the 
primary vehicle enabling FBI personnel to discuss whether or not to share information the FBI 
collected with a social media company” and involves “subject-matter experts attempting to reach 
a consensus on final agency decisions about assessing the overall threat to malign foreign influence 
on United States’ social media companies and specific actions that should be taken to alert social 
media companies of those threats”); id. ¶¶ 35–37 (explaining that the October 28, 2020, email 
communication “allow[ed] FBI employees to articulate the pros and cons of how to proceed with 
media engagement and future interaction with social media companies” involving “unrefined 
recommendations and analysis” ); id. ¶¶ 3 8–40 ( explaining that the June 2, 2020, email 
communication involved FBI personnel “attempting to reach consensus on recommendations and 
feedback on the notification process and associated investigative strategy of referring posts to 
Twitter”). The Court concludes that the FBI has adequately justified these withholdings under 
Exemption 5. See Napier Decl. ¶ 25 (identifying all challenged withholdings). 
ACLJ contests the FBI’s justifications for its Exemption 5 withholdings on two primary 
grounds. It argue s that portions of the redacted materials do not appear to be covered by the 
deliberative process privilege because they either describe post-decisional acts or provide factual 
summary. Pl.’s Mot. 4–7; Pl.’s Reply 1–4. Specifically, ACLJ points to two email chains that it 
claims contain information that was improperly withheld. The Court has reviewed the email chains 
and is not convinced. 

8 
The first email chain is from October 26, 2020, and begins as follows: 
Second Napier Decl., Ex . A, ECF 34- 3. ACLJ asserts that the redacted portion of the email at 
9:29 AM appears to be an FBI agent ’s summary of a publicly available “statement by a third 
party.” Pl.’s Mot. 5. That summary, according to ACLJ, is a factual statement that should be 
released. Id. And it contends that the same is true of “the names of the memoranda or other records” 
that are attached to the 9:44 AM email to the extent that they also contain “factual summaries.” Id. 
ACLJ is right that the deliberative process privilege generally does not “protect material 
that is purely factual.” In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 737 (D.C. Cir. 1997) . But the privilege 
does cover factual material when it is “so inextricably intertwined with the deliberative sections of 

9 
documents that its disclosure would inevitably reveal the government’s deliberations.” Id. This 
can occur, for example, when factual material has been “assembled through an exercise in 
judgment in extracting pertinent material from a vast number of documents for the benefit of an 
official called upon to take discretionary action.” Welter , 2026 WL 1243400, at *5 (quotation 
omitted). 
Here, the FBI has sufficiently demonstrated that information withheld in the October 26, 
2020, email was part of the deliberative process. The email at 9:44 AM makes clear that the 
personnel exchanging emails are considering further actions. See Second Napier Decl., Ex. A 
(“Wondering if we can/should [WITHHELD]. Let me know your thoughts.”). The open- source 
report shared in the 9:29 AM email appears to be “pertinent material” “assembled through an 
exercise in judgement” to inform that consideration. Welter , 2026 WL 1243400, at *5. And the 
same is true of the “names of memoranda or other records” attached to the 9:44 AM email. 
Ms. Napier attests that these redacted materials were part of “collected information” that FBI 
employees were weighing as they deliberated about “whether to advise, and how to effectively 
advise, social media company personnel about specific threats.” Second Napier Decl. ¶ 4. Viewing 
the email chain in context, Ms. Napier’s assertion that the withheld materials were predecisional 
and deliberative is plausible and sufficiently supports the FBI’s invocation of Exemption 5. 

10 
 The second email chain highlighted by ACLJ is from June 2, 2020, and reads as follows: 
 
Second Napier Decl., Ex. C, ECF 34- 5. ACLJ contends that the statement in the 1:30 PM email 
that there are “[n]o actions needed from EOC,” indicates that the emails are describing an “action 
already taken.” Pl.’s Reply 3. According to ACLJ, this suggests that the redactions cover “post-
decisional acts” or “factual summary” that are not part of the deliberative process. Pl.’s Mot. 7. 

11 
ACLJ’s challenge to this email chain is also unavailing. In deed, the Court finds ACLJ’s 
contention that the redacted materials are not predecisional and deliberative to be strained at best. 
The two sentences in question read as follows. From the 1:30 PM email, “I’m in coordination with 
[WITHHELD] to determine [WITHHELD].” Second Napier Decl., Ex. C. And from the 1:23 PM 
email, “Do you want to loop in [WITHHELD].” Id. Ms. Napier attests that the redacted 
information reflects predecisional “deliberation” between FBI agents about the “notificatio n 
process and associated investigative strategy of referring posts to Twitter.” Second Napier Decl. 
¶ 7. Viewing the chain in context, this justification is eminently plausible. Both sentences plainly 
suggest ongoing coordination “to determine” the propriety of further action. The Court is satisfied 
that this information is predecisional and deliberative and is thus properly covered by Exemption 5. 
2. Foreseeable Harm 
Having concluded that the FBI properly invoked the deliberative process privilege for its 
challenged withholdings under Exemption 5, the Court turns next to whether “it is reasonably 
foreseeable that release of [the withheld] materials would cause harm to an interest protected by 
that privilege.” Reps. Comm., 3 F.4th at 361; see 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(8)(A)(i)(I). “In the context of 
withholdings made under the deliberative process privilege, the foreseeability requirement means 
that agencies must concretely explain how disclosure ‘would’ —not ‘could’ —adversely impair 
internal deliberations.” Reps. Comm., 3 F.4th at 369–70 (quoting Machado Amadis v. U.S. Dep’t 
of State , 971 F.3d 364, 371 (D.C. Cir. 2020)). “[W]hat is needed is a focused and concrete 
demonstration of why disclosure of the particular type of material at issue will, in the specific 
context of the agency action at issue, actually impede those same agency deliberations going 
forward.” Id. at 370. 

12 
Here, Ms. Napier attests that the email exchanges reflect an open dialogue between FBI 
personnel in which they share and debate “preliminary evaluation[s], opinions, suggestions, and 
recommendations” aimed at helping the agency reach the best possible decisions on significant 
issues (e.g., how best to work with social media companies to combat disinformation and “malign 
influence in the United States’ election process”). Napier Decl. ¶ 41. Ms. Napier says that releasing 
the withheld portions of the exchange s would cause various harms , which include creating a 
“chilling effect” on employees’ willingness to freely share their views and to “participate fully” in 
the deliberative process if they know that their comments may later “become subject to public 
disclosure.” Id. ¶ 42. This alleged harm “is within the core purpose of Exemption 5, which is ‘to 
preserve open and frank discussion among government officials in order to enhance the quality of 
agency decisions.’” Welter, 2026 WL 1243400, at *7 (quoting Inst. for Energy Rsch. v. FERC, No. 
22-cv-2114, 2023 WL 6121878, at *6 (D.D.C. Sept. 19, 2023)). Many “other courts in this District 
have concluded that similar interests are sufficient to support invoking Exemption 5.” Id. 
(collecting cases). And this Court finds Ms. Napier’s justification equally sufficient here to support 
the FBI’s invocation of Exemption 5. 
ACLJ’s arguments to the contrary are not compelling. It offers general assertions about the 
public’s interest in preventing the FBI from impermissibly suppressing free speech and about the 
dangers of courts allowing agencies to “over-apply exemptions” to avoid disclosing records. Pl.’s 
Mot. 8. The D.C. Circuit has explained, however, that no “balancing or consideration of public 
interest is called for under Exemption 5” in the same manner required by other FOIA exemptions. 
See Rudometkin v. United States , 140 F.4th 480, 492 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (cleaned up) (contrasting 
Exemption 5 to Exemption 7 under which disclosure of private information is balanced against 
public interests like exposing government misconduct). In apparent recognition of this authority, 

13 
ACLJ expressly disavowed in its reply that it seeks disclosure of the withheld material to reveal 
misconduct by FBI personnel. See Pl.’s Reply 5 n.4. While ACLJ is right to not rely on a 
misconduct exception, see Rudometkin, 140 F.4th at 492 (“[T]here is no controlling precedent 
recognizing a government misconduct exception to Exemption 5.”), its only alternative argument 
is that “no legitimate agency interest” would be harmed by release of the records in question, Pl.’s 
Reply 5. As explained above, the Court disagrees. Nor does the Court see reason to conclude, as 
ACLJ suggests, that the FBI’s approach to withholding in the specific records at issue is overbroad. 
* * * 
 In sum, the Court concludes that the FBI has properly invoked Exemption 5 to justify its 
withholdings with respect to the three days of email communications at issue. 
B. Exemption 7 
Turning next to the FBI’s challenged withholdings under FOIA Exemption 7(E), the Court 
concludes that these too are properly supported. 
FOIA Exemption 7(E) protects “records or information compiled for law enforcement 
purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information 
. . . would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, 
or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure 
could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7). While “[t]he 
exemption does not ordinarily protect routine techniques and procedures already well known to 
the public,” it does “protect confidential details of programs if only their general contours are 
publicly known.” Elec. Frontier Found. (EFF) v. DOJ, 384 F. Supp. 3d 1, 9–10 (D.D.C. 2019) 
(cleaned up). Exemption 7(E) also “sets a relatively low bar for the agency to justify withholding.” 
Blackwell v. FBI, 646 F.3d 37, 42 (D.C. Cir. 2011). “Rather than requiring a highly specific burden 

14 
of showing how the law will be circumvented, exemption 7(E) only requires that the [agency] 
demonstrate logically how the release of the requested information might create a risk of 
circumvention of the law.” Mayer Brown LLP v. IRS, 562 F.3d 1190, 1194 (D.C. Cir. 2009) 
(cleaned up). 
ACLJ challenges the FBI ’s invocation of Exemption 7(E) to withh old portions of 
approximately 116 pages of email communications. See Monaghan Decl. ¶ 2, ECF No. 32-5; id., 
Ex. 3, ECF No. 32- 3. Ms. Napier attests that the information withheld by the FBI under 
Exemption 7(E) relates to “non-public investigative techniques and procedures utilized by the FBI 
to pursue its law enforcement mission , and also . . . non- public details about techniques and 
procedures that are otherwise known to the public.” Napier Decl. ¶ 55. More specifically, she says 
that the FBI redacted information pertaining to: “ non-public, sensitive investigative methods the 
FBI uses to collect and analyze information,” id. ¶¶ 57–
 60; “the focuses of specific FBI 
counterintelligence investigative activities,” id. ¶¶ 61–63; and “non- public, investigative details 
pertaining to the coordination with Other Government Agencies,” id. ¶ 64. Ms. Napier asserts that 
release of this information could cause various harms, including enabling “subjects of FBI 
investigations and particularly[] foreign adversaries ” to better anticipate, respond to, and 
circumvent the FBI’s investigations and law enforcem ent efforts . Id. ¶¶ 59–60, 62. Having 
reviewed the challenged redactions under Exemption 7(E) and the FBI’s thorough declaration 
supporting the withholdings, Napier Decl. ¶¶ 53–64, the Court is satisfied that the FBI has carried 
its burden to justify those withholdings , see Napier Decl. ¶ 25 (identifying all challenged 
withholdings). 
The thrust of ACLJ’s challenge to the FBI’s withholdings under Exemption 7(E) is that the 
FBI’s surveillance of social media is well- known and revealing the facts gathered through that 

15 
surveillance would not necessarily reveal anything about the FBI’s surveillance techniques and 
procedures. Pl.’s Mot. 11–13. Based on this argument, ACLJ points to only two specific emails, 
both from October 26, 2020, that it contends have improperly withheld information. 
The first is the previously discussed email sent at 9:29 AM. Second Napier Decl., Ex. A. 
ACLJ contends that the “open-source report” mentioned in that email is by definition publicly 
available and revealing its name or contents would not “reveal ‘confidential details’ about [the 
FBI’s] ‘ordinary procedures.’” Pl.’s Reply 5. The FBI’s briefing does not specifically address this 
email in the context of Exemption 7(E), but the Court credits Ms. Napier’s earlier explanation that 
releasing the withheld information would compromise “non- public investigative techniques .” 
Napier Decl. ¶ ¶ 57–60. And in any event, the Court has already concluded that the redacted 
information about the “open-source report” was justifiably withheld under Exemption 5. 
The second email is from 6:28 PM, and reads as follows: 
 

16 
Monaghan Decl., Ex. 3 at 4. ACLJ initially argued that the redacted information in the 6:28 PM 
email appeared to be a “summary of a press release.” Pl.’s Mot. 13. Ms. Napier explained in her 
second declaration, however, that the redacted information actually “concerns non- public 
investigative details that would not be included in forthcoming press releases, and the conclusions 
that members of the public might be able to draw from the details that would be released.” Second 
Napier Decl. ¶ 19. On reply, ACLJ asserts simply that even if the redacted facts are “non-public” 
they still may be subject to disclosure. Pl.’s Reply 5 (“It is clear that Facebook told the FBI 
something . . . and Plaintiff is entitled to see [it.]”). 
 But the FBI has cleared the low bar necessary to justify withholding under Exemption 7(E). 
See Blackwell, 646 F.3d at 42. Ms. Napier’s second declaration makes clear that the redacted 
information conveyed by Facebook to the FBI refers to “non-public investigative details.” Second 
Napier Decl. ¶ 19. And her first declaration adequately explains how releasing such information 
could help the subjects of FBI investigations better understand the FBI’s investigatory methods 
and capacities and thereby more easily circumvent the law. Napier Decl. ¶¶ 58–60; see also Mayer, 
562 F.3d at 1194. Under the circumstances, Ms. Napier’s attestations sufficiently justify the FBI’s 
invocation of Exemption 7(E) for the redactions at issue. 
Withholdings under Exemption 7(E), like any withholdings under 5 U.S.C. § 552, are 
subject to the requirement that an agency “reasonably foresee[] that disclosure would harm an 
interest protected by” the exemption invoked. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(8)(A)(i)(I). In the case of 
Exemption 7(E), however, the exemption itself only covers information that if disclosed “could 
reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(E). Accordingly, 
“[t]he proper assertion of 7(E) goes a long way to s how the risk of foreseeable harm from 
disclosure.” See Kendrick v. FBI , No. 20 -cv-2900, 2022 WL 4534627, at *10 (D.D.C. Sept. 28, 

17 
2022). Here, in light of Ms. Napier’s representations about how the withheld information could 
enable “[m]align foreign actors and adversaries” to evade the FBI’s enforcement efforts and reduce 
their effectiveness, Second Napier Decl. ¶¶ 18 –22, the FBI has adequately demonstrated 
foreseeable harm. 
* * * 
In sum, the Court concludes that the FBI has properly invoked Exemption 7(E) to justify 
the withholdings at issue. 
C. Segregability 
The final matter to address is segregability. “ When a FOIA requester ‘seeks a mixture of 
exempt and non-exempt records . . . an agency must segregate the non -exempt information from 
the exempt information, disclosing the former but not the latter.” EFF, 384 F. Supp. 3d at 14 
(quoting Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. IRS , 910 F.3d 1232, 1237 (D.C. Cir. 2018) ). “If, however, an 
agency adequately describes its segregability analysis and justifies its withholdings, ‘ a district 
court need not conduct its own in camera search for segregable non-exempt information unless the 
agency response is vague, its claims too sweeping, or there is a reason to suspect bad faith.’ ” Id. 
(quoting Mead Data Cent. v. U.S. Dep’t of Air Force, 566 F.2d 242, 262 (D.C. Cir. 1977)). 
Here, the Court is satisfied that the FBI has appropriately segregated protected information 
from non-exempt information. Ms. Napier’s declarations adequately explain the FBI’s efforts to 
segregate non-exempt information. See Napier Decl. ¶¶ 22, 24, 43, 66–67; Second Napier Decl. 
¶ 26. Those declarations, which span 44 pages, along with the Vaughn index, identify the specific 
documents that the FBI redacted in full or in part . Napier Decl. ¶ 25; id., Ex. O., ECF No. 31-15. 
And “[t]he record as a whole reveals that the FBI’s explanation was detailed and sufficiently 
tailored” and that “there is no reason to suspect bad faith.” EFF, 384 F. Supp. 3d at 15. 

18 
CONCLUSION 
For all the above reasons, the Court concludes that the disputed information withheld by 
the FBI is properly protected from disclosure by FOIA Exemptions 5 and 7(E). Accordingly, the 
Court grants the FBI’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 30, and denies ACLJ’s Motion 
for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 32. 
A separate order will issue. 
 
 
 
SPARKLE L. SOOKNANAN 
United States District Judge 
 
Date: June 3, 2026 

Passage view · GavelSight