govinfo:USCOURTS-tned-3_11-cr-00113-8

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 
 ) 
 Plaintiff, ) 
 ) 
v. ) No.: 3:11-CR-113-TAV-JEM-1 
 ) 
DANIEL COLE, ) 
 ) 
 Defendant. ) 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 
This matter is before the Court on defe ndant’s pro se motion for a compassionate 
release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) [Doc. 239]. The Court appointed attorney Laura 
Davis to represent defendant for purposes of such motion [Doc. 242], and attorney Davis 
later filed a notice of no intent to suppl ement the pro se motion [Doc. 256]. The 
government responded in oppos ition [Doc. 257], and defendant replied [Doc. 258]. For 
the reasons set forth more fully below, de fendant’s motions for compassionate release 
under § 3582(c)(1)(A) [Doc. 239] is DENIED. 
I. Background 
On October 17, 2011, defendant pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess 
with intent to distribute oxycodone and meth amphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 
§§ 846, 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(C) (Count 1), possession of firearms in furtherance of a drug 
trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c) and 2 (Counts 2 and 11), distribution 
of oxycodone, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(C) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 
(Counts 3, 5, and 8), distribution of oxycod one, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), PageID
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841(b)(1)(C) (Count 4), distri bution of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 
§§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(C), and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (Counts 6, 7, and 9), and possession with 
intent to distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(C), 
and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (Count 10) [Docs. 31, 36]. The Court ultimately sentenced defendant to 
a total term of 495 months’ imprisonment, consisting of 135 months as to Counts 1 and 3 
through 10, to be served concurrently, 60 months as to Count 2, to be served consecutively, 
and 300 months as to Count 11, to be served consecutively to all other terms imposed [Doc. 
99]. Defendant’s sentence was later reduced to 468 months’ imprisonment, consisting of 
108 months as to Counts 1 and 3 through 10, to be served concurrently, 60 months as to 
Count 2, to be served consecutively, and 30 0 months as to Count 11, to be served 
consecutively to all other terms [Doc. 191]. According to the Bureau of Prisons’ website, 
defendant is presently scheduled for releas e on November 6, 2044. I n m a t e L o c a t o r , 
Federal Bureau of Prisons, available at https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (accessed June 2, 
2026). 
II. Legal Standard 
A court generally lacks “the authority to change or modify [a sentence, once 
imposed,] unless such authority is expressly granted by statute.” United States v. 
Thompson, 714 F.3d 946, 948 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing United States v. Curry, 606 F.3d 323, 
326 (6th Cir. 2010)). “O ne exception—commonly referred to as ‘compassionate 
release’—permits the court to reduce a term of imprisonment if it finds, among other 
things, that ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction.’” Rutherford PageID
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v. United States, 608 U.S. ___, slip op. at 1 (2026) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i)). 
The First Step Act of 2018’s amendment of § 3582(c)(1)(A) revised this exception. First 
Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, 5239 (2018); Rutherford, slip op. 
at 4. Prior to the First Step Act, a distri ct court could grant relie f under § 3582(c)(1)(A) 
only on motion of the Director of the Bur eau of Prisons. Now a court may modify a 
defendant’s sentence upon a mo tion by a defendant if the defendant has exhausted all 
administrative rights to appeal a failure of th e Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the 
defendant’s behalf or after the lapse of 30 da ys from the receipt of such a request by the 
warden of the defendant’s facility, whichever is earlier. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). 
If the defendant surmounts this preliminary hurdle, the Court may grant a sentence 
reduction “after considering the factors set forth in § 3553(a) to the ex tent that they are 
applicable” if it finds: 
(i) extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction; or 
 
(ii) the defendant is at least 70 years of age, has served at least 30 years in 
prison, pursuant to a sentence imposed under section 3559(c), for the offense 
or offenses for which the defendant is currently imprisoned, and a 
determination has been made by the Dire ctor of the Bureau of Prisons that 
the defendant is not a danger to the safety of any other person or the 
community, as provided under section 3142(g); 
 
and that such a reduction is consiste nt with applicable policy statements 
issued by the Sentencing Commission . . . . 
 
Id. Defendant seeks relief under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) [Doc. 239]. 
If the exhaustion requirement is satisfied, courts must then follow the statute’s 
three-step test: PageID
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At step one, a court must “find[ ]” whether “extraordinary and compelling 
reasons warrant” a sentence reduction. At step two, a court must “find[ ]” 
whether “such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements 
issued by the Sentencing Commission.” The Commission’s policy statement 
on compassionate release resides in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. Thus, if § 1B1.13 is 
still “applicable,” courts must “fo llow the Commission’s instructions in 
[§ 1B1.13] to determine the prisoner's eligibility for a sentence modification 
and the extent of the reduction authorized.” At step three, “§ 3582(c)[(1)(A)] 
instructs a court to consider any app licable § 3553(a) factors and determine 
whether, in its discretion, the reduction authorized by [steps one and two] is 
warranted in whole or in part under the particular circumstances of the case.” 
 
United States v. Jones, 980 F.3d 1098, 1107–08 (6th Cir. 2020) (internal citations omitted). 
In considering a compassionate release moti on, “district courts may deny compassionate 
release motions when any of the three prerequisites listed in § 3582(c)(1)(A) is lacking and 
do not need to address the others” but must “address all three steps” if granting such a 
motion. United States v. Elias, 984 F.3d 516, 519 (6th Cir. 2021). 
III. Analysis 
A. Exhaustion 
The Court first examines whether defe ndant has satisfied § 3582(c)(1)(A)’s 
exhaustion requirement, which is a mandatory prerequisite to consideration of a 
compassionate release request on the merits. United States v. Alam, 960 F.3d 831, 833–34 
(6th Cir. 2020). “When ‘prope rly invoked,’ mandatory claim-processing rules ‘must be 
enforced.’” Id. at 834 (quoting Hamer v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of Chi. , 138 S. Ct. 
13, 17 (2017)). The only exceptions to such a mandatory claim-processing rule are waiver 
and forfeiture. Id. (citing United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002)). PageID
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In this case, the government concedes that the exhaustion requirement has been 
satisfied [Doc. 257, p. 3]. Accordingly, the Court will pro ceed to evaluate defendant’s 
compassionate release request according to the three-step test explained above. 
B. Extraordinary a nd Compelling Reasons 
 
Turning to whether defendant has set fo rth extraordinary and compelling grounds 
for relief, the Court first notes that the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
previously held that “[i]n cases where incarcerated persons file motions for compassionate 
release, federal judges may skip step two of the § 3582(c)(1)(A) inquiry and have full 
discretion to define ‘extraordinary and compelling’ without consulting the policy statement 
of § 1B1.13.” United States v. Jones, 980 F.3d 1098, 1111 (6th Cir. 2020). This was so 
because the applicable policy statement, United States Sentencing Guideline § 1B1.13, as 
written at the time, did not contemplate inma te-filed motions for compassionate release, 
but instead, was limited to circumstances where the Bureau of Prisons filed a motion on an 
inmate’s behalf. Id. at 1109–10; see also U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.13 
(U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018). 
However, the Sentencing Commission amende d the policy statement in § 1B1.13, 
effective November 1, 2023, to encompass inmate-filed motions for compassionate release. 
U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.13 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2023). It thus appears 
that the Sixth Circuit’s prior ru ling that § 1B1.13 is not an applicable policy statement to 
inmate-filed motions for compassionate release is no longer consistent with the Guidelines. 
See United States v. Nash, No. 23-3635, 2024 WL 1979067, at *3 (6th Cir. Apr. 30, 2024) PageID
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(noting the amendment to § 1B1.13 and stating that “prior to [the date of amendment], no 
guideline policy statement applied to comp assionate-release mo tions brought by 
defendants, and a district cour t could deny a defendant-filed motion without reference to 
any policy statement”); see also United States v. Ringgold , No. ELH-17-232, 2023 WL 
7410895, at *5–6 (D. Md. Nov. 8, 2023) (“[I]t appears that the Fourth Circuit’s conclusion 
in McCoy, 981 F.3d at 281, to th e effect that ‘§ 1B1.13 is not an ‘applicable’ policy 
statement,’ is no longer consistent with th e Guidelines. This is because the Policy 
Statement is now expressly applicable to de fendant-filed motions pur suant to 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3582(c)(1)(A).”). However, “[t]he new policy statement largely preserves the discretion 
district courts held to consider any extr aordinary and compelling reason for release.” 
United States v. Davis, No. 3:20-cr-16, 2023 WL 7356579, at *2 (W.D. N.C. Nov. 7, 2023). 
As amended, § 1B1.13(b) states that “[e]xtraordinary and compelling reasons exist 
under any of the following circumstances or a combination thereof,” and discusses when 
the medical circumstances of the defendant , the age of the defe ndant, the family 
circumstances of the defendant, the defendant’s victimization in custody, and other reasons 
may constitute extraordin ary circumstances. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL 
§ 1B1.13(b)(1)–(6). 
Recently, the Supreme Court provided some guidance as to the meaning of the term 
“extraordinary and compelling.” “The term ‘extraordinary’ means ‘most unusual,’ ‘far 
from common,’ or ‘having little or no precedent.’” Rutherford, slip op. at 8. 
“‘Compelling,’ meanwhile, means ‘tending to convince or convert by or as if by PageID
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forcefulness of evidence.’” Id. “Putting these definitions together ‘extraordinary and 
compelling’ reasons for compa ssionate release are those that are especially unusual and 
convincing.” Id. at 8–9. Thus “[w]hile the terms ‘extraordinary’ and ‘compelling’ leave 
room for judgment, they are not so flexible as to encompass any consideration.” Id. at 11. 
Rather, “[t]heir meaning depends on context: A reason is ‘extraordinary’ and ‘compelling’ 
only if it is sufficiently unusual and convincing to ‘warrant’ compassionate release.” Id. 
In his motion, defendant argues that th e altered sentencing scheme for § 924(c) 
offenses, which would result in a reduced sentence, if he were sentenced today, constitutes 
an extraordinary and compelling ground for relief [Doc. 239, p. 8]. Defendant explicitly 
relies on § 1B1.13(b)(6) of the Sentencing Guidelines [ Id. at 5]. That section of the 
amended policy statement provid es that non-retroactive change s in law can constitute an 
extraordinary and compelling reason for release under certain conditions. See U.S. SENT’G 
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.13(b)(6). However, in April 2025, the Sixth Circuit 
invalidated section 1B1.13(b)(6). United States v. Bricker , No. 24-3286, 2025 WL 
1166016, at *1 (6th Cir. Apr. 22, 2025). Ba sed in part on the United States Supreme 
Court’s decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo , 603 U.S. 369 (2024), which 
reduced the interpretive deference afforded to agencies, the Sixth Circuit determined that 
the Commission “overstepped its authority and i ssued a policy statement that is plainly 
unreasonable under the statute and in conf lict with the separation of powers.” Bricker, 
2025 WL 1166016, at *1; see also Moctezuma-Reyes v. Garland, 124 F.4th 416, 420 (6th 
Cir. 2024) (clarifying when courts should independently interpret statutes). PageID
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In reaching its conclusion, the Bricker majority clarified th at the Sixth Circuit’s 
decision in United States v. McCall , 56 F.4th 1048 (6th Ci r. 2022) (en banc), which 
predates the amended policy statement, remains the law of this Circuit. In contrast to the 
policy statement contained in § 1B1.13(b)(6) of the Guidelines, the McCall court held that 
the fact “that a defendant might receive a diffe rent sentence today than he received years 
ago represents the routine business of our legal system” and “cannot supply an 
extraordinary and compelling reason to reduce a lawful sentence whose term Congress 
enacted, and the President signed, into law.” Id. at 1065. In other words, because Loper 
Bright reduced courts’ deference to Co mmission policy statements, and the Bricker 
majority held that section 1B1.13(b)(6) is “plainly unre asonable,” “we [are] bound by 
McCall’s views on the plain meaning of ‘e xtraordinary and compelling.’” Bricker, 2025 
WL 1166016, at *1–*9 (citing United States v. Ferguson , 868 F.3d 514, 515 (6th Cir. 
2017)). 
More recently,1 the Supreme Court addressed this issue, and held that “Congress’s 
nonretroactive change to §924(c)—considered by itself or in combination with other 
factors—cannot make a prisoner eligible for compassionate release.” Rutherford, slip op. 
at 16. The Court stated that , to the extent the Sentenci ng Guidelines’ policy statement 
counsels otherwise, “the Commission’s policy statement is invalid.” Id. The Court 
specifically concluded that the disparity creat ed by the amendment of § 924(c) does not 
 
1 Notably, in his reply, defendant asks the C ourt to hold this matter in abeyance pending 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Rutherford [Doc. 258, p. 1]. However, because Rutherford has 
now been decided, such request is now moot. PageID
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satisfy § 3582(c)(1)(A)’s “extraordinary and compelling” requirement. Id. at 9. The Court 
reasoned that “[f]ar from ‘extraordinary,’ nonretroactive amendments to criminal penalties 
are the norm.” Id. Further, the Court stated that “[ i]t is hard to see how Congress’s 
deliberate decision not to extend newly reduced penalties to those already sentenced could 
be a convincing reason that ‘warrants’ a reduction.” Id. (emphasis in original) (alteration 
omitted). Further, the Court found that the nonretroactive change to § 924(c)’s sentencing 
scheme also “fall[s] well outside the heartla nd of compassionate re lease, which has long 
been defined by a prisoner’s personal circumstances.” Id. at 10. Accordingly, the Supreme 
Court concluded that the disparity that results from Congress’s decision to leave a sentence 
untouched cannot serve as an extraordinary and comp elling ground for relief under 
§ 3582(c)(1)(A). Id. at 17. 
In light of the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Bricker and the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Rutherford, it is clear that the Court is not to consider the non-retroactive amendment to 
§ 924(c)’s sentencing scheme as an extrao rdinary and compelling ground for relief under 
§ 3582(c)(1)(A). 
IV. Conclusion 
For the reasons set forth more fully abov e, defendant’s motion for compassionate 
release, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) [Doc. 239] is DENIED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
s/ Thomas A. Varlan 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE PageID
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