govinfo:USCOURTS-kywd-4_26-cv-00216-0

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY 
OWENSBORO DIVISION 
 
RUI QING HE, Petitioner, 
 
v. Civil Action No. 4:26-cv-216-RGJ 
 
JASON WOOSLEY, et al., Respondents. 
 
* * * * * 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 
 
 This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Rui Qing He’s Writ of Habeas Corpus. [DE 
1]. Respondents responded on April 7, 2026. [DE 9]. Petitioner replied on April 8, 2026. [DE 11]. 
The parties agreed that no evidentiary hearing is necessary. [DE 8; DE 10]. This matter is ripe for 
adjudication. For the reasons below, this Court DENIES the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. 
[DE 1]. 
I. Background 
Petitioner Rui Qing He (“He”) is a 45-year-old native and citizen of China. [DE 1 at 4]. In 
December 2000, He entered the United States without inspection. [Id.]. In 2005, He was issued an 
in absentia removal order by an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) as He was not present at the hearing . 
[Id.]. He did not appeal the order. [Id.]. On September 3, 2025, He was arrested by Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) at an ICE check -in appointment . [Id.]. The same day , ICE 
initiated a warrant of removal against He. [DE 9 -1 at 34]. Upon arrest, He was transported to 
Grayson County Jail in the Western District of Kentucky. He has remained in detention at Grayson 
County Jail since September 3, 2025. [DE 9 at 26]. 
On October 8, 2025, the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) 
sent a formal request for travel documents for He to the Chinese Government. [DE 9-4 at 42]. 
USCIS sent another request on February 12, 2026. [DE 9 at 26]. Also in October 2025, He moved 
to stay her immigration proceedings. [DE 1 at 4]. The motion to stay is currently pending. [Id.]. PageID #:
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He seeks a Writ of Habeas Corpus alleging that her current detention is in violation of 
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 690 (2001). [DE 1 at 5]. And that her detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231 
without a bond hearing violates her due process rights. [ Id.]. The United States contends that He 
is properly detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1231 , without a bond hearing , pursuant to the Zadyvdas 
standard. [DE 9 at 27-30]. As of today, He has been for approximately nine months. 
II. Discussion1 
A. Relevant Immigration Framework 
8 U.S.C. § 1231 controls the detention of non-citizens “during” and “beyond” “removal.” 
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2) -(6). The “removal period” begins once a noncitizen ’s removal order 
“becomes administratively final.” 8 U.S.C. § 123l(a)(l)(B). The removal period lasts for 90 days, 
during which ICE “shall remove the [non-citizen] from the United States.” And ICE “shall detain 
the [non-citizen]” as it carries out the remov al. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(l)-(2). After the initial 90-day 
detention period, a noncitizen “ordered removed. . . as inadmissible under section 1182 of this title. 
. . may be detained beyond the removal period” or “released” subject to terms of supervision. 8 
U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6); Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 683. For post-removal detention to be permissible, the 
removal must be reasonably foreseeable. Id. at 699. What constitutes reasonable foreseeability is 
determined using a case-by-case inquiry, with no specific point in time where the detention 
becomes constitutionally impermissible. Id. However, the Supreme Court held that a period of 
detention under six months is a “ presumptively reasonable period of detention. ” Id. at 701. This 
does not mean that any detention longer than six months is unreasonable. Id. After six months, the 
 
1 Neither party asserted any jurisdiction-related arguments. However, the Court has analyzed jurisdiction 
of remedies in similar circumstances, such as Edahi v. Lewis, 2025 WL 3466682, at *2-3 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 
27, 2025) and incorporates its reasoning into this opinion. Neither party asserted any exhaustion -related 
arguments and no applicable statute or rule mandates exhaustion. However, because many decisions in 
similar cases by district courts within the Sixth Circuit discuss this principal, the Court incorporates its 
analysis on exhaustion of remedies from a previous case, Edahi, 2025 WL 3466682, at *3, and the Court 
waives the exhaustion requirement for the same reasons. PageID #:
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detention of the noncitizen may continue to be constitutionally permissible according to a burden 
shifting framework. Id. First, the noncitizen must “ provide[] good reason to believe that there is 
no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Id. If this is met, the 
burden shifts to the United States. The United States must “ respond with evidence sufficient to 
rebut that showing.” Id. “And as the period of prior post-removal confinement grows, what counts 
as the ‘reasonably foreseeable future’ necessarily shrinks.” Lopez v. Raycraft, 2026 WL 1370583, 
at *12 (E.D. Mich. May 15, 2026) (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701). “Said differently: A person 
with a final removal order ‘may be held in confinement until it has been determined that there is 
no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.’” Id. 
B. Application to He 
Neither party contests that the Zadvydas period for He began on September 3, 2025 . [DE 
1 at 5; DE 9 at 27]. The United States concedes that her detention has passed the six months period 
for a presumption of reasonableness. [DE 9 at 27]. Still, this does not automatically permit He’s 
release. The Supreme Court stated the “6-month presumption, of course, does not mean that every 
alien not removed must be released after six months. To the contrary, an alien may be held in 
confinement until it has been determined that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the 
reasonably foreseeable future.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. “[S]uccessful petitioners under the 
Zadvydas framework prototypically include persons whom the government is ‘unable to remove’” 
Euceda v. Evans, 2017 WL 1534197, at *4 (E.D. Va. Apr. 24, 2017) (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. 
at 695). It also includes persons who are “left in [a] removable-but-unremoveable limbo.” Jama v. 
Immigr. Customs Enf’t, 543 U.S. 335, 347 (2005). According to the burden shifting framework, 
the initial burden is on He to demonstrate that she has “good reason to believe” her removal is not 
reasonably foreseeable. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. PageID #:
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He cannot meet her burden. He has been served a warrant of removal and the United States 
has submitted a request for travel documents to the Chinese Government. [DE 9 at 28]. He argues 
that because the Chinese embassy has not yet sent the materials to the United States, her removal 
is not reasonably foreseeable. [DE 1 at 4]. But allegations of a non-response by a foreign country 
are insufficient to demonstrate that removal is not reasonably foreseeable. Lu v. Immgr. Customs 
Enf’t, 22 F. Supp. 3d 839, 844 (N.D. Ohio 2014) (denying a habeas petitioner because Petitioner 
“has given no indication that China will refuse to issue travel documents and that his removal is 
no longer attainable”); Lin v. Warden, 2026 WL 412115, *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2026) (denying a 
habeas petition because “allegations that the relevant embassy or consulate will not issue a travel 
document in the foreseeable future are insufficient ”); see also, Estenor v. Holder , 2011 WL 
5572596, at *3 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 24, 2011), report and recommendation adopted, 2011 WL 
5589279 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 16, 2011) (“[m]ere delay by the foreign government in issuing travel 
documents, despite reasonable efforts by United States authorities to secure them, does not satisfy 
a detainee's burden under Zadvydas to provide good reason to believe that there is no significant 
likelihood of removal in the reason ably foreseeable future.” ). He has failed to allege that China 
will not provide the requisite materials, or that China is unsafe location for removal. He must “offer 
more than ‘conclusory statements’ suggesting [s]he will not be removed.” Esmaeili v. Noem, 2026 
WL 240661, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2026) (quoting Andrade v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 538, 543 (5th 
Cir. 2006)). And although He has been detained for nearly nine months, that fact, without more, is 
insufficient to meet her burden. Smith v. Simon, 2019 WL 4143088, *4 (N.D. Ohio July 17, 2019) 
(holding that the “mere passage of time” is inadequate to obtain Zadvydas relief) (quoting Beckford 
v. Lynch, 168 F. Supp. 3d 533, 539 (W.D.N.Y. 2016) . Although the passage of time necessarily 
“shrinks” what is considered as the ‘reasonably foreseeable future,” the passage of time alone is 
insufficient. Lopez, 2026 WL 1370583, at *12. As a result, He has failed to meet her burden at this PageID #:
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stage “to come forward with evidence showing that removal is not significantly likely to occur 
sometime soon.” Wang v. Bondi, 2026 WL 1113519, at *3 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 24, 2026). See 
Abdalla v. Johnson, 2017 WL 345731, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 24, 2017) ( holding that Petitioner 
had not met his burden on a Zadvydas claim, even a year into detention, because petitioner 
“provide[d] no evidence” that removal was unlikely to occur in the near future) ; Lu, 22 F. Supp. 
3d at 844; Lin, 2026 WL 412115. In Jama, the Supreme Court held that petitioner had met this 
burden because the “petitioner had definitively established that no country would accept him .” 
Woldeghergish, 2025 WL 4648129, *10 (citing Jama, 543 U.S. at 347). The primary question the 
Court must address under the Zadvydas framework is whether removal is “(n)o longer practically 
attainable.” Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. at 510, 527 (2003); Miranda v. Garland, 34 F.4th 338, 361 
(4th Cir. 2022) (“ [Z]advydas should not be expanded beyond the context of [] indefinite and 
potentially permanent detention”). Thus, as the record currently stands, He has not demonstrated 
that she is facing a “potentially permanent detention” which Zadvydas, and the Fifth Amendment, 
prohibit. Miranda, 34 F.4th at 361; see Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699-701. As a result, He fails to 
meet her initial burden. Id. 
Moreover, ICE has demonstrated that He is likely to be removed in the reasonably 
foreseeable future. Medina, 794 F. Supp. 3d at 375. The United States has provided to the Court 
He’s notice of removal and it’s communications with the Chinese consult. [DE 9 -4 at 42]. And, 
ICE commonly removes noncitizens to China. [DE 9 at 30]. There is nothing in record, nor does 
He contend, that her case is uniquely different than recent deportations to China. As a result, the 
United States has provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate that He will be removed to China 
upon the receipt of He’s travel documents and that her removal is reasonably foreseeable. Lin, 
2026 WL 412115 (holding that the United States has provided sufficient evidence that removal to 
China was reasonably foreseeable and denying the habeas petition); Woldeghergish, 2025 WL PageID #:
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4648129, *10 (denying habeas petition while the United States was only waiting for travel 
documents prior to removal); Thai v. Hyde, 788 F. Supp. 3d 57, 61 (D. Mass. 2025) (holding that 
evidence of the United States’s removal efforts are “sufficient grounds for the Court to conclude 
that petitioner's removal is foreseeable”). 
B. Due Process
He also contends that her due process rights have been violated because she has not been 
provided a bond hearing under Section 1231(a)(6). [DE 1 at 6]. But in a unanimous opinion,
Supreme Court has expressly rejected the notion that bond hearings are required under Section 
1231(a)(6): 
[T]here is no plausible construction of the text of § 1231(a)(6) that require s the 
Government to provide bond hearings before immigration judges after six months 
of detention, with the Government bearing the burden of proving by clear and 
convincing evidence that a detained noncitizen poses a flight risk or a danger to the 
community. Section 1231(a)(6) provides only that a noncitizen ordered removed 
“may be detained beyond the removal period” and if released, “shall be subject to 
[certain] terms of supervision.” On its face, the statute says nothing about bond 
hearings before immigration judges or burdens of proof, nor does it provide any 
other indication that such procedures are required.
Johnson v. Arteaga-Martines, 596 U.S. 573, 581 (2022). And He provides no reasoning for why 
He is not bound by this decision. Therefore, the Court rejects He’s argument that she is entitled to 
a bond hearing.
III. Conclusion
Accordingly, He’s Zadvydas claim fails. He has not proven that she is unlikely to be 
removed in the near future. But “[s]hould the Government’s efforts to secure removal ultimately 
stall or fail to bear fruit, Petitioner remains free to file a new petition asserting that continued
detention is no longer reasonable.” Wang, 2026 WL 1113519, at *4. For the reasons stated above, 
the Court DENIES He’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [DE 1].
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