govinfo:USCOURTS-caed-2_24-cv-02505-5

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
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ESTATE OF JEREMIAH WRIGHT, A.W., 
RODNEY WRIGHT, and ELLEN WRIGHT, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
COUNTY OF STANISLAUS, STANISLAUS 
COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT, 
JEFF DIRKSE, GURWINDER SINGH, 
JAVIER GOMEZ, COLTON DUTEY, 
CHRISTOPHER GALLO, VICTOR 
SANTOYO, CALIFORNIA FORENSIC 
MEDICAL GROUP, INC., WELLPATH 
LLC, WELLPATH MANAGEMENT, INC., 
SUNNY BASSI, IRENE GARRAD, 
PHAJIKARN TSE, HARPREET BOPARAI-
SEKHON, KATHLEEN GARCIA, and DOE 
1 to 20, 
Defendants. 
No. 2:24-cv-02505 WBS AC 
 
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 
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 In an opinion issued earlier this year, the Ninth 
Circuit explicated upon the nature of and problems caused by so-
called “shotgun pleadings.” In that opinion, the Ninth Circuit 

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first defined a “shotgun pleading” as “one where a party 
indiscriminately incorporates assertions from one count to 
another, for example, by incorporating all facts or defenses from 
all previous counts into each successive count ... prevent[ing] 
the opposing party from reasonably being able to prepare a 
response or simply mak[ing] the burden of doing so more 
difficult.” Gibson v. City of Portland, 165 F.4th 1265, 1288 
(9th Cir. 2026) (alterations in original). 
 The Ninth Circuit clarified that while “[i]ncorporation 
by reference is permitted by [Federal] Rule[s of Civil Procedure] 
10(b) and (c), . . . when it is used indiscriminately, it becomes 
a shortcut by counsel that violates [Federal] Rule [of Civil 
Procedure] 8.” Id. The court went on to emphasize that 
“district courts do not have to accept such shotgun pleadings” 
because “[i]t is not the job of the district courts to make sense 
of the pleading, to supply facts to support the claim, or to 
imagine the claims that might fit the facts.” Id. at 1289. 
 Plaintiffs’ 74-page second amended complaint, 
consisting of some fifty-two pages of factual allegations, 
followed by eleven claims that span the remaining twenty-three 
pages of the complaint constitutes a classic example of textbook 
shotgun pleading. That it is structured as a mass of over two 
hundred factual allegations followed by conclusorily-pled legal 
claims strongly suggests that the second amended complaint 
“seek[s] to overwhelm defendants . . . and make it difficult to 
impossible for [them] to make informed responses to the 
plaintiff[s’] allegations.” A.B. v. Hilton Worldwide Holdings 

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Inc., 484 F. Supp. 3d 921, 943 (D. Or. 2020). 
 Critically, the second amended complaint “fails to 
connect its factual allegations to the elements comprising 
plaintiff[s’] claims such that it denies the parties adequate 
notice of the allegations supporting each cause of action.” Id. 
(collecting cases); see also Gibson, 165 F. 4th at 1290 (“Shotgun 
pleading undermines a fundamental purpose of Rule 8, which is to 
provide defendants with adequate notice of the plaintiff's 
claims, including the facts and the legal basis for relief.”); 
Deerpoint Grp., Inc. v. Agrigenix, LLC, 345 F. Supp. 3d 1207, 
1234 n.15 (E.D. Cal. 2018). As such, plaintiffs’ second amended 
complaint fails to comply with the pleading requirements of Rule 
8.1 
 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants’ motions to 
dismiss (Docket Nos. 77, 89) be, and the same hereby are, 
GRANTED. 
 Plaintiffs have twenty-one (21) days to amend their 
complaint if they can do so consistent with this Order. 
Dated: June 3, 2026 
 
 
1 Although not all defendants raise the issue of whether 
plaintiffs’ second amended complaint should be dismissed because 
it is a shotgun pleading (see Docket Nos. 77-1, 89), “the 
district court has inherent authority to control its docket and 
ensure the prompt resolution of lawsuits, which in some 
circumstances includes the power to dismiss a complaint for 
failure to comply with Rule 8(a)(2) and Rule 10(b).” Gibson, 165 
F. 4th at 1289 (quotations omitted). 
 

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