govinfo:USCOURTS-kywd-4_26-cv-00227-0

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY 
OWENSBORO DIVISION 
 
 
LUCIA PREGO QUINTERO, Petitioner 
 
v. Civil Action No. 4:26-cv-227-RGJ 
 
JASON WOOSLEY, et al., Respondents. 
 
* * * * * 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 
 
 This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Lucia Prego Quintero’s Writ of Habeas 
Corpus. [DE 1]. Respondents responded on April 10, 2026. [DE 9]. Petitioner replied on April 24, 
2026. [DE 13]. The parties agree that no evidentiary hearing is necessary. [DE 10; DE 11]. This 
matter is ripe for adjudication. For the reasons below, this Court GRANTS the Petition for Writ 
of Habeas Corpus. [DE 1]. 
I. Background 
Petitioner Lucia Prego Quintero (“Quintero”) is a 27-year-old native and citizen of Cuba. 
[DE 9-1 at 38]. Quintero has been present in the United States since February 2024. [DE 1 at 4]. 
Quintero was served a Notice to Appear and paroled into the interior of the United States. [DE 9 
at 33-34]. On June 18, 2025, Quintero was served with an I -200 Warrant for Arrest and detained 
by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). [Id.]. Upon her detention, she was transported 
to Grayson County Jail in the Western District of Kentucky. [Id.]. Upon her arrest and detention, 
Quintero was placed into immigration proceedings before the Immigration Court in Cleveland, 
Ohio. [ DE 1 at 3 -4]. During these proceedings, Quintero requested a custody redetermination 
hearing, also known as a bond hearing , before an Immigration Judge (“IJ”). [Id.]. The IJ denied 
this request based upon a lack of jurisdiction, not on the merits of her claim. [DE 13 at 66]. Later PageID #:
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in her immigration proceedings, the IJ also denied Quintero’s application for asylum, withholding 
of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture and ordered Quintero to be 
removed from the United States. [Id.]. 
Quintero alleges that she timely appealed the IJ’s merits decision to the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), and therefore, her order of removal is not final . [Id.]. The United 
States contends that Quintero attempted to file an appeal, but the appeal was rejected, and thus 
Quintero’s order of removal is final. [DE 9 at 34]. Therefore, based upon the final order of removal, 
the United States argues that Quintero’s detention is governed by 8 U.S.C. 1231(a) instead 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1226(a). [Id.]. In her Reply, Quintero provided a re-filed Notice of Appeal that was accepted by 
the BIA. [DE 13-1 at 72]. And because of the proper appeal, Quintero contends that her detention 
is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). [DE 13 at 66-67]. 
Accordingly, Quintero seeks release from her detention, or in the alternative, to hold a bond 
hearing before a neutral IJ to determine whether she should remain in custody. [Id.]. 
II. DISCUSSION1 
A. Section 1231(a) vs. Section 1226 
Before reaching Quintero’s due process claim, the Court must first determine the statutory 
basis for Quintero’s detention. 
As it relates to detention under Section 1231, the Sixth Circuit has stated: 
Under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2), the Attorney General has the authority to detain an 
alien during the removal period. The removal period is the period of 90 days after 
an alien is ordered removed. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A). Under 8 U.S.C. § 
 
1 Neither party asserted any jurisdiction-related arguments. However, the Court has analyzed jurisdiction 
of remedies in similar circumstances, such as Edahi v. Lewis, 2025 WL 3466682, at *2-3 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 
27, 2025) and incorporates its reasoning into this opinion. Neither party asserted any exhaustion -related 
arguments and no applicable statute or rule mandates exhaustion. However, because many decisions in 
similar cases by district courts within the Sixth Circuit discuss this principal, the Court incorporates its 
analysis on exhaustion of remedies from a previous case, Edahi, 2025 WL 3466682, at *3, and the Court 
waives the exhaustion requirement for the same reasons. PageID #:
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1231(a)(1)(B), however, the removal period does not begin until the latest of: (i) 
the date the order of removal becomes administratively final; (ii) if the removal 
order is judicially reviewed and if a court orders a stay of the removal of the alien, 
the date of the court's final order; or (iii) if the alien is detained or confined (except 
under an immigration process), the date the alien is released from detention or 
confinement. 
 
Bejjani v. I.N.S., 271 F.3d 670, 689 (6th Cir. 2001), abrogated on other grounds by Fernandez -
Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30 (2006). 
 In contrast, “ Section 1226(a) [] differs from 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a), which governs the 
detention, release, and removal of ‘aliens ordered removed. ’” Alabdulaziz v. Tindall, 2026 WL 
973278, *5 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 10, 2026) ( quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) ). “In other words, ‘[o]nce an 
alien has a final removal order that is not subject to a judicial stay, detention authority shifts to’ § 
1231(a).” Id. (quoting Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1197 (9th Cir. 2022)). 
 Pursuant to Section 1231, a removal order becomes administratively final “upon the earlier 
of (i) a determination by the [BIA] affirming such an order; or (ii) the expiration of the period in 
which the alien is permitted to seek review of such order by the [BIA].” Al-Sadoon v. Lynch, 586 
F. Supp. 3d 713, 722 (E.D. Mich. 2022) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(B)). When an appeal is 
filed, and throughout the duration of the appeal, the “ removal order is not yet administratively 
final.” Alabdulaziz, 2026 WL 973278 at *5. Therefore, if Quintero’s appeal is pending, she is “not 
yet subject to 8 U.S.C. § 1231 and instead remains detained under § 1226(a).” Id. 
As noted, in Quintero’s Petition, she stated that she appealed the IJ’s final order of removal 
to the BIA. [DE 1 at 3]. Respondents’ responded stating that was mistaken, and although she did 
file an appeal to the BIA, the appeal was rejected as improperly filed. [DE 9 at 34]. However, in 
Quintero’s reply she provided an exhibit of the accepted filing to the BIA. [DE 13-1 at 72]. Upon 
the Court’s own review, Quintero’s appeal was properly filed and is currently pending before the 
BIA. EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMGR. REV., https://acis.eoir.justice.gov/en/caseInformation, (last visited PageID #:
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May 28, 2026). Therefore, her order of removal is not yet final and Quintero’s detention is 
controlled by Section 1226(a), not Section 1231(a). Alabdulaziz, 2026 WL 973278 at *5. 
B. Lawfulness of Current Detention 
Because the Court found that Quintero' detention is guided by Section 1226, the Court must 
determine whether the continued detention pursuant to Section 1226 is in violation of her Due 
Process. Singh v. Mullin, 2026 WL 1413154, *2 (D. N.M. May 20, 2026) (stating that although 
“Section 1226 empowers Respondents to detain Petitioner, [] it must do so within the Fifth 
Amendment's confines”). In Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, 2026 WL 1283891, at *4–9 (6th Cir. May 
11, 2026) the Sixth Circuit held that that the detention of noncitizens like Lopez -Campos, non-
citizens who have “passed through our gates,” without a bond hearing violates the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at *13. As stated, it is uncontested that Quintero has been 
detained for more than eight months without a merits bond hearing, [DE 1 at 3; DE 9-6 at 51], and 
a published decision of the Sixth Circuit binds th e Court. Wright v. Spalding, 939 F.3d 695, 700 
(6th Cir. 2019). 
The Sixth Circuit’s opinion is in line with other circuits, such as the Second, Seventh, and 
Eleventh, Cunha v. Freden, --- F.4th --- 2026 WL 1146044 , *4 -*23 (2d Cir. Apr. 28, 2026); 
Castañon-Nava v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., --- F.4th --- 2026 WL 1223250, *9-*21 (7th Cir. 
May 5, 2026); Alvarez v. Warden, --- F.4th --- 2026 WL 1243395, *1-*22 (11th Cir. May 6, 2026), 
as well as this Court’s previous opinions Edahi v. Lewis, 2025 WL 3466682, at *5-*13 (W.D. Ky. 
Nov. 27, 2025) and Vicen v. Lewis, 2026 WL 541171, *2 –*9 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 26, 2026). The 
reasonings of all these decisions are incorporated here by reference. For all the reasons set forth in 
Lopez-Campos, the other Circuit Court opinions, and this Court’s previous opinions, the United 
States has violated the due process rights of the Petitioner. PageID #:
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For the above reasons, the Court ORDERS the following:
I. The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is GRANTED. 
II. The United States is directed to release the Petitioner immediately because of the
unlawful detention in violation of their due process rights. 
III. The United States must provide Petitioner with a bond hearing before a neutral IJ
pursuant to Section 1226. 
IV. The United States must certify compliance with the Court’s order by a filing on the 
docket by June 4, 2026.
June 3, 2026 PageID #:
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