govinfo:USCOURTS-njd-1_17-cv-08567-0

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 
 
TRUSTEES OF INTERNATIONAL 
UNION OF OPERATING ENGINEERS 
LOCAL 825 WELFARE FUND, et 
al., 
 Plaintiffs, 
 
v. 
 
DELAWARE VALLEY CRANE RENTAL, 
INC. and J.L. DOBBS, INC., 
 
 Defendants. 
 
 
 
No. 1:17-cv-08567-NLH-SAK 
 
 
 
 
OPINION 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEARANCES: 
VINCENT M. GIBLIN, ESQ. 
VIPIN P. VARGHESE, ESQ. 
DECOTIIS, FITZPATRICK, COLE & GIBLIN LLP 
500 FRANK W. BURR BLVD. 
TEANECK, NJ 07666 
 
ALEXANDER HEMSLEY, III, ESQ. 
DECOTIIS, FITZPATRICK, COLE & GIBLIN, LLP 
61 SOUTH PARAMUS ROAD, SUITE 250 
PARAMUS, NJ 07652 
 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs. 
 
ERIC B. MEYER, ESQ. 
DILWORTH PAXSON LLP 
1500 MARKET STREET, SUITE 3500E 
PHILADELPHIA, PA 19102 
 
Attorney for Defendants. 
 
HILLMAN, District Judge 
This matter comes before the Court by way of Defendants 
Delaware Crane Rental, Inc.’s (“DVCR”), and J.L. Dobbs, Inc.’s PageID:
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(“JLDI”), (collectively, “Defendants”), Motion for 
Reconsideration pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7.1(i) ((“L. Rule 
7.1(i)”). (ECF No. 94). This matter is decided without oral 
argument pursuant to Rule 78 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. For the reasons discussed below, the Motion for 
Reconsideration will be denied. 
BACKGROUND 
 Plaintiffs are a group of jointly administered, multi-
employer, labor-management trust funds, and their Board of 
Trustees
1 that allege Defendants are operating its two 
businesses, JLDI and DVCR, in such a way that they constitute 
both a “single employer” and “alter egos” of each other for the 
purposes of labor law and the collective bargaining agreement 
(“CBA”) at issue in this case, making JLDI a party to the CBA 
and alleging that JLDI failed to make the required contributions 
to the Funds and violated the Employment Retirement Income 
Security Act (“ERISA”) during the Audit Period.
2 Plaintiffs 
 
1 More specifically, Plaintiffs consist of the Board of Trustees 
of the International Union of Operating Engineers Local 825 
Pension Fund, Operating Engineers Local 825 Welfare Fund, 
Operating Engineers Local 825 Apprenticeship Training & Re-
Training Fund, Operating Engineers Local 825 Supplemental 
Unemployment Benefit Fund, Operating Engineers Local 825 Saving 
Fund, and Operating Engineers Local 825 Profit Sharing Fund. 
 
2 The Court assumes the Parties’ familiarity with the underlying 
facts of the case and will only restate those facts necessary 
for the resolution of the present motion. For a fulsome review 
of the underlying factual history of the case, refer to the PageID:
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filed their initial Complaint against both Defendants on October 
18, 2017, (ECF No. 1), and amended their Complaint on April 29, 
2019 (ECF No. 46), to which Defendants answered on May 13, 2019. 
(ECF No. 47). On July 10, 2020, Defendants filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment on all claims, (ECF No. 75), Plaintiffs filed a 
cross-motion for partial summary judgment on the single employer 
and alter ego questions. (ECF No. 77). On August 28, 2020 
Defendants filed a Motion to Strike the Declaration of Terrence 
Mooney, filed in support of Plaintiffs’ cross-motion. (ECF No. 
86). In the Court’s February 17, 2021 Opinion, both Plaintiffs’ 
and Defendants’ motions for summary judgment were denied because 
there remained a genuine dispute of material fact regarding the 
extent of personnel sharing and overlapping work forces, among 
other pertinent facts, that are necessary to the determination 
of whether, as a matter of law, the Defendants have been 
operating as a “single employer” or as “alter egos.” 
Defendants’ Motion to Strike was granted in part and denied in 
part. (ECF No. 91). 
 On February 22, 2021, Defendants filed a Motion for 
Reconsideration, asserting that the Court overlooked their 
contract claim in their summary judgment briefing. (ECF No. 
94). The motion was stayed on March 1, 2021, (ECF No. 96), and 
 
Court’s February 17, 2021 Opinion. (ECF No. 91). PageID:
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following an attempt at mediation, the motion was placed back on 
the docket on November 10, 2022 (ECF No. 132). Plaintiffs 
submitted their Opposition brief on December 5, 2022, (ECF No. 
133), and on December 12, 2022, Defendants filed their Reply. 
(ECF No. 136). Therefore, the Motion for Reconsideration is 
ripe for adjudication. 
DISCUSSION 
I. Standard for a Motion for Reconsideration under Local 
Civil Rule 7.1(i) 
 
In the District of New Jersey, Local Civil Rule 7.1(i) 
governs motions for reconsideration, allowing a party to file a 
motion requesting the Court to reconsider the “matter or 
controlling decisions which the party believes the Judge or 
Magistrate Judge has overlooked.” L. Civ. R. 7.1(i); see also 
Flores v. Predco Servs. Corp., No. 10-1320, 2011 WL 3273573, at 
*1 (D.N.J. Jul. 29, 2011). The Third Circuit has held that a L. 
Rule 7.1(i) motion may be granted only if: (1) there has been an 
intervening change in the controlling law; (2) evidence not 
available when the Court issued the subject order has become 
available; or (3) it is necessary to correct a clear error of 
law or fact to prevent manifest injustice. Max’s Seafood Café 
ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 
1999) (internal citations omitted). These motions must be made 
within 14 days after the entry of the order or judgment on the PageID:
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original motion by the Judge or Magistrate Judge. L. Civ. R. 
7.1(i). 
Motions under L. Rule 7.1(i) are to be granted sparingly. 
Brackett v. Ashcroft, No. 03-3988, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21312, 
at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 7, 2003) (internal citations omitted) 
(“[r]econsideration is an extraordinary remedy that is granted 
very sparingly.”); see also L. Civ. R. 7.1(i), cmt. 6(d). A 
mere disagreement with the Court will not suffice to show that 
the Court overlooked relevant facts or controlling law. United 
States v. Compaction Sys. Corp., 88 F. Supp. 2d 339, 345 (D.N.J. 
1999). The burden is on the moving party to demonstrate the 
existence of clear error or manifest injustice. Andreyko v. 
Sunrise Sr. Living, Inc., 993 F. Supp. 2d 475, 478 (D.N.J. 2014) 
(citations omitted). In doing so, the moving party must show 
the “‘dispositive factual matter or controlling decisions of 
law’” it believes the court overlooked in its initial decision. 
Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 215 F. Supp. 2d 
482, 507 (D.N.J. 2002). 
II. Analysis 
Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration was filed within the 
14-day limitations period following the Court’s February 17, 
2021 Opinion pursuant to L. Rule 7.1(i) and is therefore timely. 
According to Third Circuit precedent, the Court can only 
grant a L. Rule 7.1(i) motion if: (1) there has been an PageID:
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intervening change in the controlling law; (2) evidence not 
available when the Court issued the subject order has become 
available; or (3) it is necessary to correct a clear error of 
law or fact to prevent manifest injustice. Max’s Seafood Café, 
176 F.3d at 677. Parties agree that the instant motion is 
brought under the third category; i.e., where Courts have 
overlooked dispositive factual matters or controlling legal 
authority. See Flores, 2011 WL 3273573, at *1; (ECF Nos. 94, 
133). Defendants assert that the Court overlooked dispositive 
factual matters in its February 17, 2021 Opinion with regards to 
its breach of contract claim in Point III of their Motion for 
Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 94 at 1). Defendants argue that 
there are no material facts in dispute that prevented the Court 
from entering summary judgment in their favor on the breach of 
contract claim on “solely” contract law grounds, and that 
despite the Court’s exhaustive analysis of the labor law claims, 
the contract claims required a “unique, distinct analysis” to be 
fully adjudicated. (ECF Nos. 94 at 4, 136 at 3-4). 
Plaintiffs argue that Defendants are simply rehashing their 
contract claim arguments that have already been presented, 
considered, and addressed by the Court in its February 17, 2021 
Opinion. (ECF No. 133 at 3-4). Plaintiffs point to this quote 
in the Opinion to illustrate that the Court, while ruling that 
it could not resolve the issue related to “single employer” or PageID:
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“alter ego” status of the Defendant companies, further could not 
reach the contract claims at issue due to the same underlying 
factual dispute: “… with these factual disputes still 
unresolved, the Court finds it would be inappropriate to attempt 
to reach a final conclusion at this stage regarding whether JLDI 
and DVCR constitute alter egos with each other. That being the 
case, the Court similarly cannot reach any conclusion as to 
whether JLDI is, or should be, liable for potentially delinquent 
contributions to the funds under the CBA.” (ECF No. 133 at 3-4, 
citing ECF No. 91 at 55). 
First, an argument is not deemed overlooked simply because 
it is not directly addressed in a court’s opinion. Eichorn v. 
AT&T Corp., No. 96-3587, 1999 WL 33471890 (D.N.J. Aug. 23, 
1999). An argument may be regarded as having been considered if 
it is presented to the court in written submissions and in oral 
argument. Id. It is clear from the Opinion that the Court did 
not overlook the contract claims. The Court explicitly 
addressed the facts related to the CBA, noting that JLDI has 
never been a signatory to any CBA with Local 825 and was 
effectively pulled into the ambit of the Funds due to an audit 
of DVCR, which was affirmatively identified as the entity that 
entered into a CBA with Local 825 after its formation. (ECF No. 
91 at 3-4, 7) (emphasis added). 
Second, the entire purpose of the matter at bar is to PageID:
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establish whether JLDI was legally required to contribute to the 
union funds despite not having been an explicit party to the CBA 
under two “labor law” legal theories. While the Defendants 
insist that the Court could have resolved this matter under 
“contract law,” the Court disagrees. While Defendants argue 
that its legal theories are distinct, the Court recognizes that 
these issues do not sit in neatly separate boxes. 
As Defendants note in their Opposition brief above and 
elsewhere, the outcome of the analysis relating to the “labor 
law” legal theories have an irrevocable impact on the 
understanding of the contract itself. (ECF Nos. 91 at 55, 133 
at 10). As the Court previously considered and explained in its 
Opinion, both “labor law” theories were created to hold 
businesses accountable to CBA obligations (and ERISA 
contributions under the single employer doctrine) by preventing 
companies using corporate formalities to evade the obligations 
of such contracts. (ECF No. 91 at 26-27, 37-38, 40-41). Thus, 
determining the outcome of the “labor law” theories must occur 
before analyzing the terms of the contract, i.e. these analyses 
cannot be done in parallel or independently, because in effect 
the outcome of the “labor law” theories would change who is 
included in the contract itself: if DVCR and JLDI are found to 
be “one” entity under the single employer theory, for the 
purposes of the CBA, every time DVCR signed that contract, JLDI PageID:
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did as well; if DVCR and JLDI are found to be alter egos, JLDI 
would be similarly responsible for DVCR’s contracts under the 
labor law, regardless which company name appears as the 
signatory. Stardyne, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 41 F.3d 144-45, 152 (3d 
Cir. 1994). Because the Court cannot reach the factual 
conclusion as to whether Defendants are alter egos or a single 
employer, the Court cannot appropriately analyze the contract 
for breach because the Court does not know whether JLDI is de 
facto a party to the contract in question. (ECF No. 91 at 55). 
Defendants have not met their burden to the Court for the 
Court to grant the extraordinary remedy of reconsideration. 
Defendants do not present any new facts, any change in 
controlling law, nor have they demonstrated any error, 
oversight, or manifest injustice promulgated from the Court’s 
February 17, 2021 Opinion and therefore their Motion for 
Reconsideration must be dismissed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ Motion for 
Reconsideration (ECF No. 94) will be denied. 
An appropriate Order consistent with this Opinion will be 
entered. 
 
Date: January 5, 2023_ _s/ Noel L. Hillman _____ 
At Camden, New Jersey NOEL.L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J. PageID:
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