govinfo:USCOURTS-txsd-4_25-cv-02608-5

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 
HOUSTON DIVISION 
 
HUMBERTO VERDE, 
  Plaintiff, 
 
 
 versus 
 
 
NATIONWIDE CAPITAL 
SERVICES, LLC, 
           Defendant. 
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CIVIL ACTION NUMBER  
4:25-cv-02608 
 
 
JUDGE CHARLES ESKRIDGE 
 
ORDER ADOPTING  
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION  
Plaintiff Humberto Verde proceeds here pro se . He 
brings claims under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 
15 USC §1692 against Defendant Nationwide Capital 
Services, LLC. Dkt 2 (complaint). Defendant failed to 
timely answer the complaint, and entry of default was 
entered against it. See Dkts 15 (request for entry of 
default), 19 (order entering default) & 20 (entry of default).  
Plaintiff then filed the present motion for default 
judgment, seeking  a total of  $6,943.00, comprised of 
statutory damages, emotional  distress damages, and 
various costs. Dkt 21. Defendant  then appeared and filed 
an opposition to the requested damages, arguing that any 
awarded damages should be significantly reduced. Dkt 22. 
This action was referred for disposition to Magistrate 
Judge Richard W. Bennett. Dkt 3. He issued a 
Memorandum and Recommendation recommending that 
the motion for default judgment be granted in part and 
denied in part. Dkt 27. Specifically, he recommends 
(i) entering default judgment in favor of Plaintiff on his 
FDCPA claims, (ii) awarding Plaintiff $600.00 in statutory 
damages, (iii) awarding Plaintiff $405 .00 in costs, and 
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
June 03, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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(iv) denying Plaintiff’s request for actual damages and all 
other relief. Id at 15. 
The district court reviews de novo those conclusions of 
a magistrate judge to which a party has specifically 
objected. See FRCP 72(b)(3) & 28 USC §636(b)(1)(C); see 
also United States v Wilson , 864 F2d 1219, 1221 (5th Cir 
1989, per curiam). The district court may accept any other 
portions to which there’s no objection if satisfied that no 
clear error appears on the face of the record. See Guillory v 
PPG Industries Inc, 434 F3d 303, 308 (5th Cir 2005), citing 
Douglass v United Services Automobile Association, 79 F3d 
1415, 1430 (5th Cir 1996,  en banc); see also FRCP 72(b) 
advisory committee note (1983). 
Plaintiff filed objections, arguing that (i) the maximum 
of $1,000.00 in statutory damages should be awarded based 
on “the volume and intentional nature” of Defendant’s 
conduct, (ii) actual damages for emotional distress should 
be awarded  based on hi s supplemental declaration , and 
(iii) additional costs should be awarded for private process 
service fee s and postage expenses . Dkt 28. Defendant 
opposed such objections. Dkt 29. 
Upon de novo  review and determination, Plaintiff’s 
objections lack merit.  
As to the first objection , the Magistrate Judge 
appropriately concluded that  the limited “frequency or 
persistence” of the communications at issue —including 
two phone calls and several letters, along with continued 
activity after Plaintiff sent a cease-communication letter—
didn’t warrant imposition of statutory maximum damages. 
See Dkt  27 at 11 . Relevant case law supports s uch 
determination. See Davis v JTM Capital Management, 
LLC, 2020 WL 7366352, *8 (ED Tex) (awarding maximum 
statutory damages where plaintiff alleged nine 
communications, including two phone calls and seven 
voicemails). Statutory damages of $600 thus fairly 
compensate Plaintiff for Defendant’s conduct in this action.  
As to the second objection, the Magistrate Judge finding 
found that the record lacked “ specific, non -conclusory 
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evidence demonstrating the extent of emotional harm” 
caused by Defendant’s conduct . Dkt 27 at 12.  Plaintiff 
submits a supplemental declaration in this respect to 
provide more specificity in that regard. Dkt 28 at 8–9.  
“While a court can consider new evidence presented in 
objections to a magistrate judge ’s memorandum and 
recommendation, it does not have to. ” AET Tankers 
(Suezmax) PTE, Ltd v Huff , 2026 WL 35978, *4 (SD Tex), 
citing Davis v Fernandez, 798 F3d 290, 292 (5th Cir 2015). 
“Rather, the  district court has discretion to determine 
whether, in light of all pertinent circumstances, the  new 
evidence should be accepted.” Davis, 798 F3d at 292.  
The declaration may properly be disregarded, as 
nothing prevented Plaintiff from submitting the se further 
allegations with his motion for default judgment. But even 
if considered , the supplemental declaration  largely 
concerns the contemporaneous passing of Plaintiff’s 
brother. Dkt 28 at 8. This is without doubt sympathetic, 
but it continues to lack the specificity necessary to 
establish that Defendant’s conduct caused a quantifiable 
amount of  emotional distress.  See Dkt 27 at 12. In 
particular, no amount is attributed to any interruption in 
work performance or daily routine , and Plaintiff concedes 
he sought no professional help. Dkt 28 at 9. 
The Magistrate Judge  thus appropriately concluded 
that Plaintiff’s allegations regarding emotional harm were 
too conclusory to support emotional -distress damages.  
Dkt 27 at 12–13. 
As to the third objection, the Magistrate Judge properly 
determined that no “exceptional circumstances”  justified 
awarding costs for the private process server . Id at 14, 
citing Zastrow v Houston Auto M. Imports Greenway, Ltd , 
695 F Appx 774, 780 (5th Cir 2017) : “[C]osts for private 
process servers are not recoverable, absent exceptional 
circumstances.” And as to postage, such expenses simply 
aren’t recoverable under 28 USC §1920. Id at 15 , citing 
Halliburton Energy Services, Inc v M-I, LLC, 244 FRD 369, 
372 (ED Tex 2007) : “Miscellaneous expenses such as 
postage, facsimiles, electronic legal research, and travel 
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expenses are not recoverable under  §1920.” This objection 
fails as well. 
The objections fail to otherwise demonstrate legal error 
on the part of the Magistrate Judge. 
The objections by Plaintiff to the Memorandum and 
Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge are OVERRULED. 
Dkt 28. 
No clear error otherwise appears upon review and 
consideration of the Memorandum and Recommendation, 
the record, and the applicable law. 
The Memorandum and Recommendation of the 
Magistrate Judge is ADOPTED as the Memorandum and 
Order of this Court. Dkt 27. 
The motion by Plaintiff Humberto Verde for default 
judgment is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Dkt 21. 
It is GRANTED that judgment by default be ENTERED in 
favor of Plaintiff Humberto Verde against Defendant 
Nationwide Capital Services, LLC, on all FDCPA claims. 
Defendant Nationwide Capital Services, LLC, is 
ORDERED to pay Plaintiff Humberto Verde $600.00 in 
statutory damages, together with  $405.00 in costs , for a 
total of $1,005.00. 
All other relief requested by Plaintiff is DENIED.  
A final judgment will enter separately. 
SO ORDERED. 
Signed on _______________, at Houston, Texas. 
 
 
    ___________________________ 
    Honorable Charles Eskridge 
    United States District Judge 
                                           
June 03, 2026
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