govinfo:USCOURTS-njd-2_25-cv-16371-0

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 
 
 
COREY MORRIS, 
 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
MARC SIM, et al., 
 
 Defendants. 
 
 
No. 2:25-cv-16371 
(MEF)(JSA) 
 
OPINION and ORDER 
 
* * * 
For the purposes of this brief Opinion and Order, the Court 
largely assumes familiarity with the facts and procedural 
history of this case. 
* * * 
The Plaintiff1 is a state prison inmate. 
His basic allegations: (i) that he has filed various New Jersey 
lawsuits;
2 (ii) that during 2024, he was transferred to a “close 
supervision [housing] unit,” where he had “very limited access 
to the [prison’s] law library,” and “no direct hands on access 
to . . . law books”;
3 (iii) that he needed certain “law books”4 
to “do legal research and properly and effectively prepare . . . 
 
1 Corey Morris. 
2 See Complaint (ECF 1-2) at 13-14; see also id. at 27 (listing 
cases). 
3 Complaint at 18-19, 23. 
4 The 2024 Edition of the New Jersey Criminal Code Annotated 
(Title 2C), and the 2024 Edition of the Rules Governing the 
Courts of the State of New Jersey. See Complaint at 19. PageID:
<pageID>
2 
 
for his cases”;5 and (iv) that when he ordered the books, certain 
prison administrators did not allow him to put hands on one of 
them, because the book was “too big or too heavy,” and was 
“reject[ed]” based on “[s]afety,” “security,” and “space 
concerns.”6 
* * * 
In light of the above, the Plaintiff sued various prison 
officials, among others, alleging violations of his federal 
Constitutional rights,
7 see Complaint at 34-38, and seeking 
declaratory and injunctive relief, plus damages.8 
Some of the prison officials (from here, “the Defendants”) have 
now moved to dismiss. See Notice of Motion to Dismiss (ECF 4) 
(Defendants Calicchio, Berryman, Gray, Iacobucci, Crowell, 
Shakir, Griffin, Bobien, and Sim).9 
 
5 Complaint at 28; see also id. at 19. 
6 See Exhibit 10 to Complaint (ECF 1-2) at 55; see also 
Complaint at 20-22, 24-25. The copy of the Rules Governing the 
Courts of the State of New Jersey was allegedly rejected. But 
the Plaintiff asserts that he received the New Jersey Criminal 
Code Annotated. See Complaint at 21-22. 
7 Per the Plaintiff, the Defendants violated his right to free 
speech (Count I) and access to the courts (Count II), each under 
the First Amendment. See Complaint at 33-35. Interfered with 
his Sixth Amendment right to counsel (Count III). See id. at 
35-36. Breached his “administrative appeal rights” under the 
Fourteenth Amendment (Count IV). See id. at 36-37. And 
“conspired” and “abused the process . . . in violation of [his 
rights under the] First, Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments” 
(Counts V and VI). See id. at 37-38. The Plaintiff’s complaint 
also refers once to the New Jersey State Constitution, see id. 
at 12, but does not seem to press any state-law claims. Cf. id. 
at 34-38. 
8 See Complaint at 39, 42 (describing the injunctive and 
declaratory relief sought); see id. at 12 (explaining that the 
Plaintiff seeks damages). 
9 In addition to the moving Defendants, the Plaintiff pressed 
claims against four other people and two institutions. But none PageID:
<pageID>
3 
 
Their motion is granted in part and denied in part. 
* * * 
First, the motion is granted as to (i) the Plaintiff’s federal 
claims against the Defendants in their official capacities, (ii) 
the Plaintiff’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment claims, and (iii) any 
claims the Plaintiff may potentially have raised here10 under 
state law. 
The Plaintiff has conceded that these claims do not work. See 
Brief in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 
(“Plaintiff’s Brief”) (ECF 8) at 1, 8-9. 
So they are dismissed. See Hollister v. U.S. Postal Serv., 142 
F. App’x 576, at *1 (3d Cir. 2005). 
* * * 
Second, and as to what remains, the motion is granted to the 
extent the Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages for alleged 
violations of federal law. 
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, “[n]o Federal civil 
action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a . . . prison . 
. . for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody 
without a prior showing of physical injury or the commission of 
a sexual act.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). 
Here, the Plaintiff alleges that he suffered “physical injury.” 
See Complaint at 34-38. 
But the physical-injury allegation is not backed up by any 
factual information. Nothing in the complaint as to what the 
alleged physical injury is. When and where it happened. Or how 
it came about. 
This is not enough. Here, physical injury is an element of a 
Prison Litigation Reform Act compensatory damages claim. But 
just alleging an element does not, standing alone, check the 
box. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (holding 
that “bare assertions [that] amount to nothing more than a 
‘formulaic recitation of the elements’” are insufficient to 
 
of these has yet appeared. 
10 See footnote 7. PageID:
<pageID>
4 
 
survive a motion to dismiss) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 
It is not sufficient to simply say in the complaint that there 
has been physical injury. At least some underlying 
who/what/when/where/how information must be alleged --- to put 
meat on the bones, and by doing so to plausibly show that there 
was, in fact, a physical injury. See Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 
523, 535-36 (3d Cir. 2003) (explaining that a plaintiff subject 
to the PLRA must “describe the extent of his physical injuries” 
with enough specificity “to determine whether his injuries are 
more than de minimis”). 
In a notice-pleading regime, stating the legal theory under 
which a person seeks to recover might be enough to survive a 
motion to dismiss. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. But in our 
current pleading regime, some factual allegations are needed. 
See id. at 555-56. And as to physical injury, there are none. 
This means that under the Prison Litigation Reform Act the 
Plaintiff cannot seek compensatory damages based on any “mental 
or emotional” distress he has allegedly suffered. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1997e(e). 
And here, that marks the end of the road as to compensatory 
damages. As the Court “read[s] his complaint, the only actual 
injury that could form the basis for the award [of compensatory 
damages the Plaintiff] seeks would be mental and/or emotional 
injury” --- because under Third Circuit law “the abstract value 
of a constitutional right” cannot itself be the basis for 
compensatory damages. Allah v. Al-Hafeez, 226 F.3d 247, 250-51 
(3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 
477 U.S. 299, 307 (1986)); see also Doe v. Delie, 257 F.3d 309, 
314 n.3.11 
* * * 
Third, and as to the Plaintiff’s remaining First Amendment 
claims, the Defendants’ motion is denied. 
 
11 The Prison Litigation Reform Act does not limit the 
Plaintiff’s claims to the extent he seeks injunctive or 
declaratory relief, or nominal and punitive damages. See 
Mitchell, 318 F.3d at 533-34. PageID:
<pageID>
5 
 
Under Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987), “when a prison 
regulation [allegedly] impinges on inmates’ constitutional 
rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to 
legitimate penological interests.” Id. at 89. 
There are four key Turner factors for “determining the 
reasonableness of [a] regulation.” Id. “First, there must be a 
‘valid, rational connection’ between the prison regulation and 
the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it.” 
Id. Second, courts must inquire into “whether there are 
alternative means of exercising the right [at issue] that remain 
open to prison inmates.” Id. at 90. Third, courts must 
evaluate “the impact accommodation of the asserted 
constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates.” 
Id. And fourth, courts must ask there are “ready alternatives” 
to the regulation. Id. 
For the reasons laid out by the Plaintiff, see Plaintiff’s Brief 
at 2-6, the Turner factors cannot be properly evaluated here 
without some factual development. 
For example, it is all-but impossible to assess the third 
“impact” factor, see Turner, 482 U.S. at 90, without at least a 
modest understanding of the facility where the Plaintiff is held 
and its security needs.12 
Similarly, it is difficult to tackle the fourth “ready 
alternatives” factor, id. at 90, without some fact-based sense 
of the other channels that may have been available to the 
Plaintiff for consulting law books.
13 
And the somewhat fuller factual picture that is necessary to 
perform a meaningful Turner analysis here also precludes, for 
 
12 And note that, as to the cases cited by the Defendants, a 
particular weight limit on books may pass muster at one facility 
but not another, given the facilities’ operational needs, 
populations, etc. 
13 The Plaintiff acknowledges that, in some circumstances, 
“prisoners may read [certain materials] in the law library.” 
Complaint at 25. But he also alleges that he was told by a 
prison official that “[b]ooks” were “no longer authorized” in 
his housing unit. See Exhibit 5 to Complaint at 50. PageID:
<pageID> PageID:
<pageID>

Passage view · GavelSight