c37:Nos. 1740, 1741

ANDERSON, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
As set forth in Judge Morton’s unpublished opinion in tbe District Court, tbe two applicants and their alleged father and three apparently disinterested parties (six in all) testified positively that tbe applicants were sons of an admitted citizen of tbe United States. There was no room for mistake; their testimony was either intentionally and absolutely false, or tbe applicants were entitled to admission.
Fully agreeing that all substantial questions as to tbe weight and credibility of testimony are for tbe immigration tribunals, and not for tbe courts on habeas corpus proceedings, I am constrained to tbe same result reached by Judge Morton — that in these cases there was no such showing of discrepancy as to any material fact, or indication of mendacity, as to warrant any competent and fair-minded tribunal in finding that tbe applicants’ cases were grounded on tbe perjured testimony of six witnesses.
I concur in Judge Morton’s view: “A study of tbe record leaves tbe impression that tbe immigration tribunals were at that stage of tbe proceedings trying to justify a position against tbe applicants rather than considering the case on its merits.”
Tbe gist of tbe case was whether tbe immigration authorities bad any jurisdiction to exclude tbe applicants as aliens. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U. S. 276, 284, 42 S. Ct. 492, 66 L. Ed. 938; Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U. S. 149, 153, 44 S. Ct. 54, 68 L. Ed. 221.
Tbe legal issue is precisely tbe same as would be presented if a foreign-born son of an American ambassador or of an American missionary tried to come home. If accorded tbe treatment given sons of Chinese citizens, be would be held at tbe port, incommunicado, and then by tbe immigration authorities subjected to “third degree” inquisitorial examination in an endeavor to catch him in such discrepancies as to trifling facts in bis early history' and environment, or as to statements made by relatives, as might ground a finding that be was only a pretended, and not a real, son of tbe American ambassador or missionary.
Recognizing that tbe Supreme Court has made a distinction between deportation proceedings and exclusion proceedings (259 U. S. 281, 42 S. Ct. 492, 66 L. Ed. 938; 263 U. S. 152, 44 S. Ct. 54, 68 L. Ed. 221), it seems to me clear that on such an issue as that of jurisdiction to try tbe citizenship of an alleged American citizen, knocking at tbe gate, we ought not to scant tbe meaning of tbe phrase “due process of law.” Tbe right of citizenship is at least as important as any property right. I cannot concur in proceedings which deal with it flippantly or unfairly. I think these applicants- were deprived of due process of law, and that a wrong decision was reached by proceedings “manifestly unfair.” Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253 U. S. 454, 40 S. Ct. 566, 64 L. Ed. 1010; Tang Tun v. Edsell, 223 U. S. 673, 681, 32 S. Ct. 359, 56 L. Ed. 606.

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