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govinfo:USCOURTS-laed-2_26-cv-00645-0

U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana · 2026-05-21

· GavelSight synced 2026-09-06 03:47:56

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA 
 
CURT FELIX DUFRENE, JR., 
 Plaintiff 
CIVIL ACTION 
 
 
VERSUS NO. 26-645 
 
PINNACLE ENERGY, LLC., 
 Defendant 
SECTION: “E” (3) 
 
ORDER AND REASONS 
 Before the Court is a motion to remand filed by Plaintiff Curt Felix Dufrene, Jr. 
(“Plaintiff”).1 Defendant Pinnacle Energy, LLC (“Defendant”) filed a response. 2 Plaintiff 
filed a reply.3 
BACKGROUND 
 This case arises out of an allision that occurred on a waterway in Plaquemines 
Parish.4 On February 13, 2026, Plaintiff filed an action against Defendant in the 25 th 
Judicial District Court for the Parish of Plaquemines.5 In his state court petition, Plaintiff 
alleges he was navigating hi s fishing vessel on a waterway when an allision occurred 
between his vessel and an “unmarked un it wellhead and/or platform” owned and 
operated by Defendant. 6 Plaintiff alleges Defendant negligently failed to mark and light 
the wellhead/platform in violation of Title 33 of the United States Code of Federal 
Regulations.7 Plaintiff brings negligence claims under Louisiana state law and general 
maritime law.8 Plaintiff alleges Defendant’s negligence proximately caused this accident, 
 
1 R. Doc. 6. 
2 R. Doc. 7. 
3 R. Doc. 9. 
4 R. Doc. 1-1 at ¶ 8. 
5 Id. at p. 1. 
6 Id. at ¶ 8. 
7 Id. at ¶ 6. 
8 Id. at ¶ 5. 

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which caused him serious bodily injuries, along with damages to his vessel and his fishing 
business.9 Plaintiff seeks damages for lost wa ges, medical expenses, and pain and 
suffering.10 Plaintiff specified in his petition that he is bringing an admiralty/maritime 
claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1333.11 
On March 26, 2026, Defendants filed a Noti ce of Removal, removing the case to 
this Court. 12 Defendant asserts this Court has original jurisdiction over the action 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § § 1331 and 1333.13 
On April 16, 2026, Plaintiff filed a motion to remand. 14 Plaintiff argues this Court 
should remand this matter to state court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.15 Plaintiff 
argues the saving to suitors clause in 28 U.S.C. § 1333 preserves Plaintiff’s right to litigate 
his claims in state court. 16 Plaintiff argues his claims arise under Louisiana law and 
general maritime law and are not removable to federal court absent an independent basis 
for subject matter jurisdiction, such as di versity jurisdiction or federal question 
jurisdiction,17 and that no such independent basis exists.18 
Defendant argues the saving to suitors cl ause does not override federal question 
jurisdiction in this matter. 19 Defendant argues that, because Plaintiff specifically alleges 
Defendant violated Title 33 of the United Stat es Code of Federal Regulations, Plaintiff’s 
claims arise under a law of the United States. 20 As a result, Defendant argues this Court 
 
9 Id. at ¶ 8. 
10 Id. at ¶ 12. 
11 Id. at ¶ 4. 
12 R. Doc. 1. at p. 1. 
13 Id. at ¶ 5. 
14 R. Doc. 6. 
15 R. Doc. 6-1 at pp. 2-3. 
16 Id. at p. 4. 
17 Id. at pp. 4-5. 
18 Id. at p. 9. 
19 R. Doc. 7 at p. 4. 
20 Id. at p. 3. 

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has federal question jurisdiction over this matter, and that the matter should not be 
remanded to state court.21 
LAW AND ANALYSIS 
Federal courts are courts of limited juri sdiction and possess only the authority 
conferred upon them by the United States Constitution or by Congress. 22 The party 
asserting jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing the district court possesses subject-
matter jurisdiction.23 A district court must remand a case to state court if, at any time 
before final judgment, it appears that th e court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. 24 The 
removal statute is strictly construed. 25 Doubts concerning removal are to be construed 
against removal and in favor of remand to state court.26 
Federal law allows for state civil suits to be removed to federal courts in certain 
instances.27 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), as amended, currently states: 
Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought 
in a State court of which the district cou rts of the United States have original 
jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district 
court of the United States for the distri ct and division embracing the place where 
such action is pending. 
 
While 28 U.S.C. § 1333 provides that federal district courts have original 
jurisdiction of admiralty or maritime cases, the “savings to suitors” clause in that statute 
“allows plaintiffs to ‘elect to bring such claims in state rather than federal court.” 28 
Removal of maritime cases filed in state court is permissible only if there is an 
 
21 Id. at p. 6. 
22 Howery v. Allstate Ins. Co., 243 F.3d 912, 916 (5th Cir. 2001). 
23 Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001). 
24 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). 
25 Sea Robin P i p e l i n e C o . v . N e w M e d i c o H e a d C l i n i c F a c i l i t y , No. 94–1450, 1995 WL 479719, at *2, 
(E.D.La. Aug. 14, 1995) (quoting York v. Horizon Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 712 F.Supp. 85, 87 (E.D.La. 1989). 
26 Manguno v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 276 F.3d 720, 723 (5th Cir.2002). 
27 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). 
28 Box v. Eco Servs. Operations Corp., 802 F. Supp. 3d 986, 989 (S.D. Tex. 2025). 

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independent basis for federal jurisdiction, such as federal question jurisdiction. 29 28 
U.S.C. § 1331 provides that federal question jurisdiction exists when a claim “aris[es] 
under the Constitution, laws, or tr eaties of the United States.” “A federal question exists 
“only [in] those cases in which a well-pleaded complaint establishes either [1] that federal 
law creates the cause of action or [2] that the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends 
on resolution of a substantial question of federal law.”30 
I. Federal law does not create Plaintiff’s causes of action. 
The Court will first analyze whether it may exercise federal question jurisdiction 
over this action because federal law creates Pl aintiff’s causes of action. Plaintiff asserts 
negligence claims under Louisiana state law and general maritime law. 31 Plaintiff’s state 
law negligence claim obviously does not arise under a law of the United States, and “[i]t 
is well established that [general] maritime [law] claims do not ‘arise under the 
Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States’ for purposes of federal question and 
removal jurisdiction.”32 While Defendant argues Plaintiff’s claims arise under a law of the 
United States because Plaintiff alleges Defend ant violated Title 33 of the United States 
Code of Federal Regulations, 33 “federal regulations themselves cannot create a cause of 
action; this is a job for the legislature.”34 Because Plaintiff’s negligence claims do not arise 
under the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States; and because a federal 
 
29 Par. v. Exxon Mobile Corp., No. CIV.A. 13-6717, 2015 WL 4097111, at *20 (E.D. La. July 7, 2015) (holding 
that, although maritime claims are within federal courts' original jurisdiction, they are not removable on 
that basis). While a minority of district courts in this circuit have found that maritime actions are removable 
solely because maritime claims are within the federal courts’ original jurisdiction, this Court sides with the 
majority of district courts which have found that a defendant may remove a maritime action only if an 
independent basis for federal jurisdiction exists. Sangha v. Navig8 ShipManagement Priv. Ltd., 882 F.3d 
96, 100 (5th Cir. 2018)( “[t]he vast majority of distri ct courts considering this question have maintained 
that [maritime] lawsuits are not removable [solely on the basis of original jurisdiction]”). 
30 Singh v. Duane Morris LLP, 538 F.3d 334, 337–38 (5th Cir. 2008). 
31 R. Doc. 1-1 at ¶ 5. 
32 Tennessee Gas Pipeline v. Houston Cas. Ins. Co., 87 F.3d 150, 153 (5th Cir. 1996)(quoting Romero v. Int'l 
Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 359–80 (1959)). 
33 R. Doc. 7 at p. 4. 
34 Stewart v. Bernstein, 769 F.2d 1088, 1093 n.6 (5th Cir. 1985). 

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regulation cannot itself create a cause of ac tion, federal law does not create Plaintiff’s 
causes of action. 
II. Plaintiff’s right to relief does not depend on resolution of a substantial 
question of federal law. 
 
Because federal law does not create Plaint iff’s causes of action, this Court may 
exercise federal jurisdiction over this matter on ly if Plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily 
depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law. 35 The Supreme Court has 
elucidated a four part test, known as the Grable test, for determining whether a plaintiff’s 
right to relief depends on resolution of federal law. Under the Grable test, a cause of action 
depends on the resolution of a substantial question of federal law if a federal issue is: (1) 
necessarily raised; (2) actually disputed; (3) su bstantial; and (4) capable of resolution in 
federal court without disrupting the fede ral-state balance approved by Congress. 36 The 
only possible federal issue Plaintiff raises in his petition is whether or not Defendant 
complied with Title 33 of the United States Code of Federal Regulations. Although neither 
party in this matter addresses the Grable test, this is the proper analysis. 
A. Plaintiff’s petition does not raise a federal issue. 
The first element of the Grable test is not satisfied, as the Court finds Plaintiff’s 
petition fails to raise a federal issue. Whethe r a plaintiff raises a federal issue in a state 
law negligence claim by alleging a defendant violated a federal regulation depends on the 
nature of the claim the plaintiff asserts. In Ubaldo v. F&A Boarder Transport, LLC , the 
United States District Court for the Western District of Texas analyzed whether a 
plaintiff’s state law negligence claim raised a federal issue. 37 In that case, the plaintiff 
 
35 See Singh, 538 F.3d at 337–38. 
36 Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 258, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1065, 185 L. Ed. 2d 72 (2013)(citing Grable & Sons 
Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 313-14 (2005). 
37 No. EP-24-CV-47-KC, 2024 WL 1904545, at *5 (W.D. Tex. May 1, 2024). 

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alleged the defendant negligently caused a highway accident and violated various federal 
regulations in the process. 38 The district court held that state law claims that “merely 
implicate federal laws or regulations are ‘n ot sufficient to establish federal question 
jurisdiction.’”39 Applying the Grable test, that court found that the plaintiff’s reference to 
federal regulations as the basis of an elemen t of her negligence claim was insufficient to 
raise a federal issue.40 
On the other hand, in Rivera v. Orion Marine Group, the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of Texas foun d that an alleged violation of a federal 
regulation did raise a federal issue. 41 In that case, the plaintiffs brought claims against 
defendants who operated and owned a pipeline that exploded. 42 The plaintiffs brought a 
strict liability claim against one of the defendants “for failing to abide by its non-delegable 
duty to follow certain federal regulations.” 43 The Court found this allegation raised a 
federal issue, as the regulations implic ated an essential element of the claim. 44 In that 
case, plaintiffs could recover under their strict liability claim only if the defendant violated 
federal pipeline regulations.45 Similarly, in Ibarra Consulting Eng'rs Inc. v. Jacobs Eng'g 
Grp. Inc., the United States District Court for th e Northern District of Texas found that 
plaintiff’s reference to a federal regulation raised a federal issue because the federal 
regulation at issue provided the only basis for plaintiff’s recovery under one of his 
claims.46 
 
38 Id. at *1, 5. 
39 Id. at *5 (citing Longitude 150 LLC v. McGee, No. 22-cv-2181, 2022 WL 16942239, at *4–5 (W.D. La. Oct. 
27, 2022). 
40 Id. 
41 Rivera v. Orion Marine Grp. Inc., 509 F. Supp. 3d 926, 941 (S.D. Tex. 2020). 
42 Id. at 932. 
43 Id. at 941. 
44 Id. (citing White v. Scotty's Contracting & Stone, LLC, No. 21-cv-161, 2022 WL 4588417, at *3 (W.D. Ky. 
Sept. 29, 2022). 
45 See id. 
46 579 F. Supp. 3d 850, 856 (N.D. Tex. 2022) 

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Plaintiff does not raise a federal i ssue in his negligence claims. In Rivera and 
Ibarra, the defendant’s alleged violation of fede ral regulations was an essential element 
for Plaintiff’s recovery.47 In this matter, Plaintiff alleges Defendant violated Title 33 only 
as evidence that Defendant breached its duty of care under Louisiana and maritime law. 
However, the violation of Title 33 is not an essential element of his recovery. Like in 
Ubaldo, Plaintiff cites Title 33 only to establ ish the appropriate standard of care 
Defendant should have exercised. Defendant may be found to be negligent even if it 
adhered to the lighting and marking standard s for waterways under Title 33. Plaintiff’s 
petition does not raise a federal issue.48 
B. Even if Plaintiff raised a federal issue in his petition, the issue is 
not substantial. 
 
The second element of the Grable test is not satisfied because, even if Plaintiff had 
raised a federal issue with respect to Titl e 33 of the United States Code of Federal 
Regulations, he did not raise a substantial federal issue. A substantial federal issue 
“indicat[es] a serious federal interest in clai ming the advantages thought to be inherent 
in a federal forum.” 49 “[T]he presence of the federal issue as an element of [a] state tort 
[claim] is not the kind of adjudication for which jurisdiction would serve congressional 
purposes and the federal system.” 50 The Supreme Court found that a plaintiff’s claim 
presented no substantial federal issue when the analysis of the federal issue was “fact-
bound and situation specific.” 51 In Delgado v. M. Lipsitz & Company, Ltd. , the United 
States District Court in the Northern District of Texas analyzed whether a plaintiff raised 
a substantial federal issue in his negligence claim when he alleged the defendant failed to 
 
47 See id; Rivera, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 941. 
48 See id. 
49 Grable, 545 U.S. at 313. 
50 Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 817 (1986). 
51 Empire Healthchoice Assur., Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 700–01 (2006). 

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comply with the requirements of a federal regulation.52 The court found that, because the 
federal regulation supplied only the standard of care for a state law negligence claim, the 
claim failed to raise a substantial issue of federal law.53 
In this matter, Plaintiff alleges Defe ndant’s failure to light and mark the 
wellhead/platform, in violation of Title 33 of the United States Code of Federal 
Regulation, caused the allision and his resultant injuries. 54 In other words, Plaintiff’s 
reference to Title 33 only informs an elemen t of his negligence claims, whether or not 
Defendant breached its duty of care. In resolving this case, the Court would not be called 
on to interpret an unsettled question of federal law; rather, it would apply the negligence 
analysis that Louisiana state courts routine ly conduct. Any analysis of Defendant’s 
compliance with Title 33 would be fact intensive and unlikely to impact the application of 
federal law. Courts have found that in such a scenario, an ordinary negligence claim 
presents no substantial federal issue.55 As a result, Plaintiff’s claims present no substantial 
federal issue, and the Court does not have federal jurisdiction over this matter. 
C. The Court exercising jurisdiction over this matter would disrupt 
the balance of federal and state powers. 
 
Finally, even if Plaintiff raised a substa ntial federal issue by alleging Defendant 
violated Title 33 of the United States Code of Federal Regulations, the fourth element of 
the Grable test is not satisfied because this Court’s exercise of jurisdiction over this matter 
would disrupt the balance of federal and state juridical authority. In analyzing this factor, 
courts consider whether exercising subject matter jurisdiction w ould result in an 
 
52 No. 3:13-CV-4324-N, 2014 WL 11456820, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 28, 2014). 
53 Id. 
54 R. Doc. 1-1 at ¶ 6. 
55 See Delgado, 2014 WL 11456820, at *2. 

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“enormous shift of traditionally state cases into federal court.”56 “Tort law is traditionally 
within the domain of state courts.” 57 In Delgado, the district court found that exercising 
jurisdiction over a state law negligence claim based on the violation of a federal regulation 
would disturb the federal and state judicial balance of power. 58 This Court reaches the 
same conclusion. The alleged violation of Titl e 33 will serve as evidence for negligence 
claims of the type Louisiana state courts traditionally resolve. This Court will not intrude 
on the state court system’s authority to hand le such matters. Moreover, if federal courts 
exercised jurisdiction over negligence clai ms every time they implicated a federal 
regulation, there would be a massive shift of traditionally state law cases into federal 
court. Such a result would disrupt the balance of federal and state judicial authority. 
Because Plaintiff’s claim presents no substantial federal issue and this Court 
exercising jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s clai ms would disrupt the balance of federal and 
state judicial authority, the Court will remand this matter to state court. 
CONCLUSION 
 IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand is GRANTED.59 
 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this case is hereby remanded to the 25th 
Judicial District Court for the Parish of Plaquemines. 
 New Orleans, Louisiana, this 21st day of May, 2026. 
 
________________________________ 
SUSIE MORGAN 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
 
56 Ibarra Consulting Eng'rs Inc. v. Jacobs Eng'g Grp. Inc., 579 F. Supp. 3d 850, 857 (N.D. Tex. 2022)(citing 
Bd. of Commissioners of Se. Louisiana Flood Prot. Auth.-E. v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., L.L.C., 850 F.3d 
714, 725 (5th Cir. 2017)). 
57 Delgado, 2014 WL 11456820, at *2. 
58 Id. 
59 R. Doc. 6. 

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