govinfo:USCOURTS-laed-2_26-cv-00123-0

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA 
 
 
STEPHANIE LICCIARDI ET AL. CIVIL ACTION 
 
VERSUS NO: 26-123 
 
SIG SAUER, INC. SECTION “H” 
 
 
ORDER AND REASONS 
 Before the Court is Defendant Sig Sauer, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 
6). For the following reasons, the Motion is GRANTED. 
 
BACKGROUND 
 Plaintiff Stephanie Lynn Licciardi alleges that she was working as a 
public safety officer at the LCMC hospital facility when the Sig Sauer Model 
P320 semi- automatic pistol that she was carrying unexpectedly discharged, 
resulting in a gunshot wound to her right thigh. Licciardi alleges that at the 
time of the discharge she was standing upright and placing the pistol into a 
holster. She alleges that the firearm discharged without any trigger p ull or 
intentional activation and that she did not manipulate the trigger in any 
manner at the time of discharge. Licciardi brings claims under the Louisiana 
Products Liability Act (“LPLA”) and state law negligence against Sig Sauer, 

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Inc., the manufacturer of the firearm. Licciardi’s spouse, Kerri Lopez, brings a 
claim for loss of consortium. 
 Defendant argues that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim and moves 
for dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims, or in the alternative, a more definite 
statement. Plaintiffs oppose. 
 
LEGAL STANDARD 
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead 
enough facts “to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.”1 A claim is 
“plausible on its face” when the pleaded facts allow the court to “draw the 
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”2 
A court must accept the complaint’s factual allegations as true and must “draw 
all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.”3 The court need not, however, 
accept as true legal conclusions couched as factual allegations. 4 To be legally 
sufficient, a complaint must establish more than a “sheer possibility” that the 
plaintiff’s claims are true.5 If it is apparent from the face of the complaint that 
an insurmountable bar to relief exists and the plaintiff is not entitled to relief, 
the court must dismiss the claim. 6 The court’s review is limited to the 
 
1 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 
U.S. 544, 547 (2007)). 
2 Id. 
3 Lormand v. U.S. Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 232 (5th Cir. 2009). 
4 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 
5 Id. 
6 Lormand, 565 F.3d at 255–57. 

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complaint and any documents attached to the motion to dismiss that are 
central to the claim and referenced by the complaint.7 
LAW AND ANALYSIS 
 Defendant moves for dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims under both state law 
negligence and the LPLA. 
A. Negligence Claims 
At the outset, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ negligence claims are 
barred by the exclusivity provision of the LPLA. It is well -settled that the 
LPLA “is the exclusive remedy against a manufacturer for damage caused by 
a defective product,”
8 and “a plaintiff who alleges that a product is defective 
may not recover for damage caused by the product on the basis of any theory 
of liability other than the LPLA.”9 Plaintiffs have alleged that Defendant is the 
manufacturer of the firearm that caused their damages. Therefore, the LPLA 
is their exclusive remedy. Plaintiffs respond, however, that their negligence 
claims are pled in the alternative and are directed at Defendant’s post-sale 
negligence. Plaintiffs do not, however, cite any law suggesting that a 
manufacturer’s post-sale conduct falls outside of the LPLA framework or that 
a negligence claim can be brought in the alternative. Indeed, “courts have 
consistently held that the LPLA subsumes all possible causes of action, with 
 
7 Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 2000). 
8 McCleary v. Elekta, Inc., No. CV 19-00052, 2019 WL 5295699, at *4 (W.D. La. Oct. 
18, 2019). 
9 Wornner v. Christian Home Health Care, Inc., No. 13-6416, 2014 WL 130331, at *4 
(E.D. La. Jan. 14, 2014). 

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the exception of a claim in redhibition.” 10 Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ negligence 
claims are dismissed. 
B. LPLA Claims 
Next, Defendant moves for dismissal of Plaintiffs’ LPLA claims. “To 
maintain a successful products liability action under the LPLA, a plaintiff 
must establish four elements: (1) that the defendant is a manufacturer of the 
product; (2) that the claimant’s damage was proximately caused by a 
characteristic of the product; (3) that this characteristic made the product 
‘unreasonably dangerous’; and (4) that the claimant ’s damage arose from a 
reasonably anticipated use of the product by the claimant or someone else.”
11 
Under the LPLA, 
[a] product is unreasonably dangerous if and only if: (1) The 
product is unreasonably dangerous in construction or composition 
as provided in R.S. 9:2800.55; (2) The product is unreasonably 
dangerous in design as provided in R.S. 9:2800.56; (3) The product 
is unreasonably dangerous because an adequate warning about 
the product has not been provided as provided in R.S. 9:2800.57; 
or (4) The product is unreasonably dangerous because it does not 
conform to an express warranty of the manufacturer about the 
product as provided in R.S. 9:2800.58.
12 
 
Here, Plaintiffs have alleged that Defendant’s firearm was unreasonably 
dangerous because of a design defect, a manufacturing defect, and a failure to 
warn. Defendant argues that Plaintiffs have failed to allege a claim under any 
of these theories. 
 
 
10 McCleary, 2019 WL 5295699, at *3 (citation modified). 
11 Stahl v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 283 F.3d 254, 260–61 (5th Cir. 2002). 
12 LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2800.54. 

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1. Design Defect 
Pursuant to the LPLA: 
A product is unreasonably dangerous in design if, at the time it left 
its manufacturer’s control: (1) There existed an alternative design 
for the product that was capable of preventing the claimant’ s 
damage; and (2) The likelihood that the product’s design would 
cause the claimant ’s damage and the gravity of that damage 
outweighed the burden on the manufacturer of adopting such 
alternative design and the adverse effect, if any, of such alternative 
design on the utility of the product.
13 
“A complaint sufficiently pleads a design defect claim by alleging an 
alternative design in general terms, including the general characteristics of 
the alternative design.”14 Although “courts do not require that plaintiffs plead 
extremely detailed factual allegations to survive a motion to dismiss,” the 
pleading must provide enough facts to create factual plausibility and must do 
more than provide “labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the 
elements.”
15 
Plaintiffs’ Complaint alleges only that “a feasible alternative design 
existed that would have prevented the uncommanded discharge while 
maintaining the firearm’s utility.”
16 Plaintiffs do not allege “any facts relating 
to a viable alternative design.”17 Courts have routinely held that “a conclusory 
 
13 Id. § 9:2800.56. 
14 Baudin v. AstraZeneca Pharms. LP, 413 F. Supp. 3d 498, 506 (M.D. La. 2019) 
(citation modified). 
15 Celino v. Biotronik, Inc., 536 F. Supp. 3d 89, 106 (E.D. La. 2021) (citation modified); 
Flagg v. Stryker Corp., 647 F. App’x 314, 318 (5th Cir. 2016). 
16 Doc. 1. 
17 Rivers v. Remington Arms Co., LLC, No. CV 17-17124, 2018 WL 746392, at *4 (E.D. 
La. Feb. 7, 2018). 

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allegation that an alternate design exists will not suffice.” 18 Accordingly, 
Plaintiffs have not pleaded sufficient facts to support a claim under the LPLA 
for a design defect. 
2. Manufacturing Defect 
Pursuant to the LPLA, “[a] product is unreasonably dangerous in 
construction or composition if, at the time the product left its manufacturer’s 
control, the product deviated in a material way from the manufacturer’s 
specifications or performance standards for the product or from otherwise 
identical products manufactured by the same manufacturer.”
19 “Under the 
statute, a claimant must show not only what a manufacturer’s specifications 
or performance standards are for a particular product, but how the product in 
question materially deviated from those standards so as to render it 
‘unreasonably dangerous.”20 Plaintiffs’ Complaint alleges only that “the P320 
deviated from Defendant’s design specifications and/or performance standards 
in a manner that rendered the firearm unreasonably dangerous.”
21 Here again, 
Plaintiffs’ allegations are overly conclusory and lack any facts regarding 
Defendant’s standard for the firearm or how the one received by Plaintiffs fell 
below that standard.22 Accordingly, Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim under 
the LPLA for a manufacturing defect. 
 
18 Rivers, 2018 WL 746392, at *4 (citation modified); Celino, 536 F. Supp. 3d at 106; 
Robertson v. AstraZeneca Pharmeceuticals, LP, No. 15- 438, 2015 WL 5823326, at *4 (E.D. 
La. Oct. 6, 2015). 
19 LA REV. STAT. § 9:2800.55. 
20 Lyles v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, USA, Inc., 871 F.3d 305, 311 (5th Cir. 2017) 
(citation modified). 
21 Doc. 1. 
22 Compare Rivers, 2018 WL 746392, at *3 (holding that the plaintiff identified an 
allegedly defective condition in the composition of the rifle when he alleged that “the 

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3. Failure to Warn 
Finally, a product is unreasonably dangerous due to a failure to provide 
an adequate warning if, “at the time the product left its manufacturer’s control, 
the product possessed a characteristic that may cause damage and the 
manufacturer failed to use reasonable care to provide an adequate warning of 
such characteristic and its danger to users and handlers of the product.”
23 An 
“adequate warning” is “a warning or instruction that would lead an ordinary 
reasonable user or handler of a product to contemplate the danger in using or 
handling the product and either to decline to use or handle the product” or use 
the product in a manner that would avoid the danger.
24 Therefore, “the 
manufacturer is liable for an inadequate warning only if the defect proximately 
caused the plaintiff’s injury. The plaintiff bears the burden of proving that ‘but 
for’ the inadequate warning, the accident in question would not have 
occurred.”25 
Plaintiffs’ Complaint alleges that Defendant failed to “provide adequate 
warnings or instructions regarding the risk of uncommanded discharge 
without trigger activation.”
26 They further allege that “Defendant failed to 
provide recall notice or corrective instruction to Plaintiff despite having the 
means to do so” and that “the inadequate warnings were a proximate cause of 
 
composition defect relates to the XMP trigger, which may have been manufactured using 
excess bonding agent and which can, under certain circumstances, unintentionally 
discharge”). 
23 LA REV. STAT. § 9:2800.57. 
24 Id. § 9:2800.53. 
25 Fernandez v. Tamko Bldg. Prods., Inc., 2 F. Supp. 3d 854, 860 (M.D. La.), on 
reconsideration in part (Apr. 11, 2014). 
26 Doc. 1. 

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Plaintiff’s injuries and damages.”27 Defendant correctly points out that these 
allegations are insufficient where Plaintiff has not alleged that “but for” a 
sufficient warning or recall notice she would not have used the P320 pistol or 
that she would have handled it differently. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have failed 
to state a claim for failure to warn under the LPLA. 
Having found that Plaintiffs have not sufficiently pleaded any claim, the 
Court must consider whether leave to amend their Complaint should be 
given.
28 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) “requires courts ‘freely give 
leave [to amend] when justice so requires.’”29 The Fifth Circuit has held that 
courts “may not dismiss a complaint under [R]ule 12(b)(6) ‘unless it appears 
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim 
which would entitle him to relief.’”30 Accordingly, Plaintiffs shall be given leave 
to amend. 
 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED. Plaintiffs 
may amend their LPLA claims within 20 days of this Order to the extent that 
they can remedy the deficiencies identified herein. Failure to amend will result 
in dismissal of this action. 
 
 
 
27 Id. 
28 Because Plaintiff Lopez’s loss of consortium claim is derivative of Plaintiffs’ LPLA 
and negligence claims, it is also subject to dismissal. 
29 Carver v. Atwood, 18 F.4th 494, 498 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting FED. R. CIV. PRO. 15). 
30 Stripling v. Jordan Prod. Co., LLC, 234 F.3d 863, 873 (5th Cir. 2000). 

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 New Orleans, Louisiana this 21st day of May, 2026. 
 
____________________________________ 
 JANE TRICHE MILAZZO 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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