govinfo:USCOURTS-laed-2_25-cv-00804-1

1 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA 
 
TAIUJUAN BURCHES, 
 Plaintiff 
CIVIL ACTION 
 
 
VERSUS 
 
NO. 25-804 
 
EQUIFAX INFORMATION 
SERVICES, LLC, ET AL., 
 Defendants 
SECTION: “E” (5) 
 
 
ORDER AND REASONS 
 Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6), filed by Defendant Trans Union LLC (“Trans Union”)1 and joined by Defendant 
Experian Information Solutions, Inc. (“Experian”), 2 seeking dismissal of Plaintiff 
Taiujuan Burches’s Third Amended Complaint as to all claims asserted against Trans 
Union and Experian for failure to state cl aims under the Fair Credit Reporting Act 
(“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.3 Plaintiff filed an Opposition, 4 and Defendant Trans 
Union, joined by Experian, filed a Reply. 5 Plaintiff then requested, 6 and the Court 
granted,7 leave to file a Sur-reply, which was subsequently filed in the record.8 
BACKGROUND 
On October 11, 2024, Plaintiff filed suit in the United States District Court for the 
Middle District of Louisiana, asserting claims against all Defendants under the FCRA and 
 
1 R. Doc. 260. 
2 R. Doc. 268 (Motion requesting the Court permit Expe rian to join Trans Union’s Motion to Dismiss); R. 
Doc. 270 (Order granting the request and permitting Experian to join Trans Union’s Motion to Dismiss). 
Accordingly, where applicable, any argument made by Tr ans Union in the Motion to Dismiss is attributed 
to Experian as well. 
3 R. Doc. 260-1 at pp. 1-2. 
4 R. Doc. 272. 
5 R. Doc. 286. 
6 R. Doc. 297. 
7 R. Doc. 300. 
8 R. Doc. 301. 

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claims against certain debt collector Defend ants (which do not include Trans Union and 
Experian) under the Fair Debt Co llection Practice Act (“FDCPA”). 9 O n D e c e m b e r 3 0 , 
2024, Trans Union filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3), (b)(5), and (b)(6) for improper venue, insufficient 
service, and failure to state a claim.10 On April 22, 2025, the Middle District of Louisiana 
held it is an improper venue for Plaintiff’s suit because “none of the defendants reside in 
the Middle District of Louisiana and . . . Pl aintiff . . . failed to make any personal 
jurisdiction arguments or explain where the acts or omissions of the defendants 
occurred.”11 Accordingly, the Middle District of Louisiana transferred Plaintiff’s action to 
this Court.12 
On July 23, 2025, Plaintiff requested, 13 and the Court granted, 14 leave to file a 
Second Amended Complaint, which was then filed into the record. 15 Experian then 
answered the Second Amended Complaint, 16 and Trans Union filed a Motion to Dismiss 
the same. 17 On September 26, 2025, Plaintiff requ ested leave to file a Third Amended 
Complaint.18 Trans Union opposed the request,19 and Plaintiff filed a reply.20 Trans Union 
then filed a Motion for Leave to File a Sur-reply, representing that “[a] closer examination 
of Plaintiff’s Motion reveals Plaintiff’s relian ce on fabricated and/or non-existent legal 
authorities,” and requested leave “to briefly address the misrepresentations in Plaintiff’s 
 
9 R. Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 108-121. 
10 R. Doc. 39. 
11 R. Doc. 105. 
12 Id. at pp. 4-5. 
13 R. Doc. 145. 
14 R. Doc. 151. 
15 R. Doc. 152. 
16 R. Doc. 154. 
17 R. Doc. 163. 
18 R. Doc. 169. 
19 R. Doc. 179. 
20 R. Doc. 183. 

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Motion.”21 On October 20, 2025, the Court granted Trans Union leave to file the Sur-
reply,22 which was then filed into the record.23 
After reviewing Trans Union’s Sur-reply, the Court set oral argument on Plaintiff’s 
Motion for Leave to File a Third Amended Complaint, and warned Plaintiff he “should be 
prepared to discuss the citations” in the Reply that Trans Union identified as suspicious.24 
At oral argument, the Court granted Plainti ff leave to file a Third Amended Complaint 
and informed Trans Union that its Motion to Dismiss would be denied without prejudice 
if Plaintiff filed the Third Amended Complaint into the record.25 Plaintiff subsequently did 
so,26 and the Court then denied Trans Union’s Motion to Dismiss without prejudice.27 
In his Third Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserts the following claims against the 
consumer reporting agencies (“CRA”) Trans Union and Experian: (1) negligent 
noncompliance with the FCRA under 15 U.S.C. § 1681 o, and (2) willful noncompliance 
with the FCRA under 15 U.S.C. § 1681n. 28 Trans Union, joined by Experian, requests the 
Court dismiss Plaintiff’s clai ms against them for negligent and willful noncompliance, 
arguing Plaintiff’s claims asserted against th em in the Third Amended Complaint fail to 
state a claim for which relief may be granted.29 
LEGAL STANDARD 
 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedu re 12(b)(6), a district court may dismiss 
 
21 R. Doc. 188 at p. 2. 
22 R. Doc. 189. 
23 R. Doc. 190. 
24 R. Doc. 195. The Court notes that Plaintiff’s improper use of AI and hallucinated citations continued. 
Plaintiff again improperly used AI while preparing his filings, even after being warned by the Court that 
“any future filing containing fabricated citations will result in sanctions against him personally.” R. Doc. 
218. On May 11, 2026, the Court sanctioned Plaintiff for his Rule 11 violations. R. Doc. 313; R. Doc. 314. 
25 R. Doc. 217; R. Doc. 218. 
26 R. Doc. 221. 
27 R. Doc. 223. 
28 R. Doc. 221 at ¶¶ 85-120. 
29 R. Doc. 260-1. 

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a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted if the plaintiff 
has not set forth factual allegations in suppo rt of his claim that would entitle him to 
relief.30 “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual 
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”31 “A claim 
has facial plausibility when the plaintiff plea ds factual content that allows the court to 
draw the reasonable inference that the defend ant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 32 
The Court, however, does not accept as true legal conclusions or mere conclusory 
statements, and “conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual 
conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss.” 33 Indeed, “[t]hreadbare 
recitals of the elements of a cause of acti on, supported by mere conclusory statements”34 
or “naked assertion[s]”35 devoid of “further factual enhancement,”36 are not sufficient. 
 “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not pe rmit the court to infer more than the 
mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that 
the pleader is entitled to relief.’”37 However, “legal conclusions can provide the framework 
of a complaint, [if] they [are] supported by factual allegations.”38 “Determining whether a 
complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires 
the reviewing court to draw on its ju dicial experience and common sense.” 39 “Although 
 
30 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); Cuvillier v. Taylor , 503 F.3d 397, 401 (5th Cir. 
2007). 
31 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). 
32 Id. 
33 S. Christian Leadership Conf. v. Sup. Ct. of the State of La. , 252 F.3d 781, 786 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing 
Fernandez-Montes v. Allied Pilots Ass’n, 987 F.2d 278, 284 (5th Cir. 1993)). 
34 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663, 678 (citations omitted). 
35 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557. 
36 Id. 
37 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)). 
38 Id. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level[.]” Twombly, 
550 U.S. at 545. 
39 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. 

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detailed factual allegations are not requir ed,” “[d]ismissal is appropriate when the 
complaint ‘on its face show[s] a bar to relief.’” 40 Whether a plaintiff “will be able to offer 
sufficient proof to support [his or her] clai ms is more appropriate in the context of a 
motion for summary judgment or a trial on the merits” rather than in a motion to 
dismiss.41 “[I]ntensive disputes of material fact . . . are usually more appropriate for 
summary judgment . . . .”42 
LAW AND ANALYSIS 
I. Plaintiff asserts claims against Tr ans Union and Experian under the 
Fair Credit Reporting Act for negligent and willful noncompliance with 
the FCRA based on (1) failure to maintain reasonable procedures to 
ensure maximum accuracy, (2) failure to conduct reasonable 
reinvestigations, and (3) failure to block identity theft information. 
 
A. The FCRA authorizes consumers to bring a civil action against 
CRAs for negligent and willful noncompliance with the duties 
imposed by the FCRA. 
 
“Concerned by ‘abuses in the credit re porting industry,’ Congress enacted the 
FCRA”
43 to combat inaccurate credit reportin g because “[t]he banking system is 
dependent upon fair and accurate credit reporting.” 44 Congress found that “[i]naccurate 
credit reports directly impair the efficiency of the banking system, and unfair credit 
reporting methods undermine the public confid ence which is essential to the continued 
functioning of the banking system.”45 Congress further found “[t]here is a need to insure 
that consumer reporting agencies exercise th eir grave responsibilities with fairness, 
 
40 Cutrer v. McMillan, 308 Fed.Appx. 819, 820 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (citations omitted). 
41 Smith v. GE Healthcare, Inc., No. 3:19-CV-00492, 2019 WL 4565246, at *7 (W.D. La. Sept. 4, 2019). 
42 Dong Phuong Bakery, Inc. v. Gemini Soc'y, LLC, No. CV 21-1109, 2022 WL 898750, at *5 (E.D. La. Mar. 
28, 2022). 
43 Hammer v. Equifax Info. Servs., L.L.C., 974 F.3d 564, 567 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing St. Paul Guardian Ins. 
Co. v. Johnson, 884 F.2d 881, 883 (5th Cir. 1989)). 
44 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(1). 
45 Id. 

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impartiality, and a respect for the consumer’s right to privacy.” 46 In line with its goal of 
combatting inaccurate credit reporting, Congress stated the FCRA’s purpose is “to require 
that consumer reporting agencies adopt reas onable procedures for meeting the needs of 
commerce for consumer credit, personnel, insurance, and other information in a manner 
which is fair and equitable to the consumer.” 47 “Where possible, courts construe these 
obligations consistently with the Act's ‘ambitious objective . . . which uses expansive terms 
to describe the adverse effects of unfair and inaccurate credit reporting and the 
responsibilities of consumer reporting agencies.’” 48 Consistent with this goal, the Fifth 
Circuit has held that “[t]he FCRA is to be liberally construed in favor of the consumer.”49 
The FCRA authorizes consumers to bring a civil action against CRAs for negligent 
noncompliance with duties imposed by the FCRA. 50 Specifically, the FCRA provides that 
“[a]ny person who is negligent in failing to comply with any requirement imposed under 
[the FCRA] with respect to any consumer is liable to that consumer in an amount equal 
to the sum of . . . any actual damages sustained by the consumer as a result of the failure” 
and, “in the case of any successful action to enforce any liability under this section, the 
costs of the action together wi th reasonable attorney’s fees.” 51 Actual damages awarded 
pursuant to the FCRA “may include out-of-p ocket monetary losses, injury to credit 
reputation and mental anguish, humiliation, or embarrassment.”52 
The FCRA also authorizes consumers to bring a civil action against CRAs for willful 
 
46 Id. at (a)(4). 
47 Id. at (b). 
48 Reyes v. Equifax Info. Servs., L.L.C., 140 F.4th 279. 285 (5th Cir. 2025) (first quoting Hammer, 974 F.3d 
at 567; and then quoting Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 62 (2007)). 
49 Wagner v. TRW, Inc., 139 F.3d 898, 1998 WL 127812, at *1 (5th Cir. 1998) (unpublished). 
50 15 U.S.C. § 1681o. 
51 Id. 
52 Childers v. Rent-A-Center East, Inc., 751 F.Supp.3d 650, 664 (E.D. La. 2024) (citing Fischl v. Gen. Motors 
Acceptance Corp., 708 F.2d 143, 151 (5th Cir. 1983)). 

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noncompliance with the duties imposed by the FCRA. 53 If the violation was willful, the 
FCRA provides recovery for punitive damages as well as actual damages.54 “Malice or evil 
motive need not be established for a punitive damages award, but the violation must have 
been willful.” 55 The Fifth Circuit has held that , generally, to establish willful 
noncompliance, the CRA must have “knowing ly and intentionally committed an act in 
conscious disregard for the rights of others.” 56 A CRA’s conduct has been held as willful 
noncompliance with the FCRA when it in volves willful misrepresentations or 
concealments.57 
Plaintiff asserts claims against Trans Union and Experian for negligent and willful 
noncompliance with the FCRA.58 Trans Union and Experian move to dismiss these claims, 
arguing: (1) Plaintiff’s allegations are conclusory and fail to satisfy the applicable pleading 
standards; (2) the reported information is a ccurate based on Plaintiff’s own admissions; 
(3) Plaintiff raises legal disputes that are not objectively verifiable; (4) Plaintiff’s request 
for injunctive relief fails as matter of law; (5) Plaintiff cannot recover for alleged lost 
business opportunities under the FCRA; and (6) further amendment would be futile.59 
The Court first addresses Plaintiff’s claims against Trans Union and Experian for 
failure to maintain reasonable procedures to ensure maximum possible accuracy. The 
Court then turns to Plaintiff’s remaining claims against Trans Union and Experian for the 
alleged failure to conduct reasonable reinvest igations and failure to block identity-theft 
information. 
 
53 15 U.S.C. § 1681n. 
54 Id. at (a)(2). 
55 Fischl, 708 F.2d at 151. 
56 Pinner v. Schmidt, 805 F.2d 1258, 1263 (5th Cir. 1986). 
57 Id. 
58 R. Doc. 221 at ¶¶ 85-120. 
59 R. Doc. 260-1 at p. 2. 

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B. Plaintiff has stated a claim unde r 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) against 
Trans Union and Experian for negligent and willful 
noncompliance with the FCRA by failing to maintain reasonable 
procedures to ensure maximum accuracy with respect to the 
Discover/Capital One account. 
 
First, Plaintiff alleges Trans Union and Ex perian violated the duty imposed by 15 
U.S.C. § 1681e(b),
60 which requires CRAs, when preparing a consumer report, to “follow 
reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the information 
concerning the individual abo ut whom the report relates.” 61 “A plaintiff must prove the 
following to recover for a claim under § 1681e( b): “(1) the defendant reported inaccurate 
information about the plaintiff; (2) the defendan t either negligently or willfully failed to 
follow reasonable procedures to assure maxi mum possible accuracy of the information 
about the plaintiff; (3) the plaintiff was inju red; and (4) the defendant's conduct was the 
proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury.”62 
“The threshold question under both § 1681e(b) and § 1681i is whether the plaintiff’s 
consumer reports contained inaccurate information.” 63 Information is considered 
inaccurate under the FCRA “either because it is patently incorrect, or because it is 
misleading in such a way and to such an extent that it can be expected to adversely affect 
credit decisions.”64 Additionally, to be actionable un der the FCRA, an alleged inaccuracy 
reported by a CRA must be “sufficiently objectively verifiable.”65 
The only alleged inaccuracy sufficiently pleaded with respect to Trans Union 
 
60 R. Doc. 221 at ¶¶ 86-89 (Plaintiff’s claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) against Trans Union); Id. at ¶¶ 105-
108 (Plaintiff’s claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) against Experian). 
61 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b). 
62 Iraheta v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC , Case No. 5:17-cv-1363, 2018 WL 3770295, at *3 (W.D. La. 2018) 
(citing Nelski v. Trans Union, LLC , 86 F. App’x 840, 844 (6th Cir. 2004)). See also Harter v. RealPage, 
Inc., 218 F. Supp. 3d 535, 540-41 (E. D. Tex. 2016 (providing roughly the same elements). 
63 Dill v. Experian Info. Sols. Inc., Civil Action No. 3:23-CV-1399-G-BW, 2026 WL 958784, at *8 (N.D. Tex. 
2026) (citing Reyes, 140 F.4th at 286). 
64 Sepulvado v. CSC Credit Servs., Inc., 158 F.3d 890, 895 (5th Cir. 1998). 
65 Reyes, 140 F.4th at 288 (citing Mader v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 56 F.4th 264, 270 (2d Cir. 2023)). 

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concerns the account originally reported by Trans Union under Discover Financial 
Services (“Discover”). Plaintiff’s allegation of inaccuracy rests upon the well-known 
relationship between Discover and Capital On e, N.A. (“Capital One”). The Court takes 
judicial notice that, on May 18, 2025, Capital One completed its acquisition of Discover.66 
That fact does not, standing alone, esta blish that Trans Union reported inaccurate 
information. It does, however, provide the context necessary to evaluate Plaintiff’s 
allegation that the same account was report ed with conflicting creditor identities 
following the Capital One acquisition. 
Plaintiff alleges Trans Union “repeatedly published and maintained inaccurate, 
contradictory, fraudulent, and mixed-fi le information,” including a “false 
Discover/Capital One tradeline[.]” 67 Plaintiff further alleges “[t]he account originally 
reported under Discover Financial Services appears on Plaintiff’s credit reports still 
labeled as Discover, despite Discover allege dly transferring, selling, or migrating the 
account to Capital One[,] N.A.” 68 According to Plaintiff, “[b]ecause the Discover label 
remains on Plaintiff’s report, the credit reco rd reflects two different creditors—Discover 
and Capital One—associa[t]ed with the same alleged account, causing confusion and 
mixed-file contamination.” 69 Plaintiff also alleges that, despite his disputing the 
Discover/Capital One tradeline with Trans Union, his credit report continued to reflect 
 
66 Federal Rule of Evidence Rule 201 provides that a court may take judicial notice of a fact that is not 
subject to reasonable dispute because it: (1) is ge nerally known within the trial court’s territorial 
jurisdiction, or (2) can be accurately and readil y determined from sources whose accuracy cannot 
reasonably be questioned. The Court takes judicial notice of this fact because its accuracy cannot reasonably 
be questioned, and it can be accurately and readily determined from sources that cannot be questioned. 
See, e.g. , C APITAL ONE, https://investor.capitalone.com/news-re leases/news-release-details/capital-one-
completes-acquisition-discover [https://perma.cc/F46K-UR5W]. 
67 R. Doc. 221 at ¶ 86. 
68 Id. at ¶ 64. 
69 Id. at ¶ 65. 

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conflicting creditor identities and ownership confusion. 70 These inaccuracies are not 
based on legal disputes, such as the validity of the debt, but are “sufficiently objectively 
verifiable.”71 These allegations are sufficient, at the pleading stage, to plausibly allege an 
inaccuracy in the Trans Union credit reports.72 
The allegation that there is an inaccura cy in Plaintiff’s Di scover/Capital One 
tradeline is the only sufficiently pleaded inaccuracy in Plaintiff’s allegations against Trans 
Union under 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b). Plai ntiff’s remaining allegations concerning 
inaccuracies associated with account information furnished by the Defendants other than 
Trans Union and Experian and reported by Trans Union are conclusory, as Plaintiff does 
not sufficiently allege what is inaccurate ab out the reported information. For example, 
Plaintiff generally alleges inaccuracies in his credit reports, including “date opened, 
balance, account status, payment history, charge-off information, and creditor name[.]”73 
Plaintiff does not sufficiently allege which furnisher provided the information, the specific 
information in the report that is inaccurate , or why it is inaccurate. Allegations in a 
complaint are insufficient when they consist of “‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further 
 
70 Id. at ¶¶ 86-88. 
71 Reyes, 140 F.4th at 288. 
72 Trans Union and Experian also argue that the allega tions in Plaintiff’s Complaint concede the reported 
information was accurate. R. Doc. 260-1 at pp. 5-7. Specifically, they argue that because Plaintiff alleges the 
CRAs reported the accounts as furnished, Plaintiff fa ils to plausibly allege the reported information was 
inaccurate. Id. T h e y a r g u e t h i s i s s o b e c a u s e C R A s m e r e l y collect and report information provided by 
furnishers, and “the furnisher of cr edit information stands in a far be tter position to make a thorough 
investigation of a disputed debt than the [CRA].” Id. at p. 7 (quoting Gorman v. Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP, 
584 F.3d 1147, 1156 (9th Cir. 2009 )). Plaintiff, however, does not allege that Trans Union and Experian 
reported the accounts exactly as repo rted. Rather, he alleges they “maintain, publish, verify, and circulate 
false, inconsistent, and damaging information about Plaintiff.” R. Doc. 221 at ¶ 1. Even if the CRAs did 
report the information exactly as it was furnished, as CRAs they had an independent obligation under the 
FCRA to adopt reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy. The FCRA expressly imposes 
that obligation on CRAs, which “must bear some respon sibility for evaluating the accuracy of information 
obtained from [furnishers].” Stevenson v. TRW Inc., 987 F.2d 288, 293 (5th Cir. 1993). Permitting Trans 
Union and Experian to rely solely on information provided by furnishers to ensure maximum possible 
accuracy would conflict with the text of the FCRA and undermine the Fifth Circuit’s instruction that “[t]he 
FCRA is to be liberally construed in favor of the consumer.” Wagner, 139 F.3d 898, 1998 WL 127812, at *1. 
73 R. Doc. 221 at ¶ 87. 

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factual enhancement.’” 74 Because Plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient facts regarding 
alleged inaccuracies in other tradelines, Plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action under 
the FCRA against Trans Union and Experian as to the remaining information reported by 
the CRAs. 
Although the threshold question under § 1681e(b) is whether there is an inaccuracy 
in a credit report, the FCRA “does not impose strict liability for any inaccurate credit 
report, but only a duty of reasonable care in preparation of the report.” 75 “That duty 
extends to updating procedures, because ‘pre paration’ of a consumer report should be 
viewed as a continuing process and the obligati on to insure accuracy arises with every 
addition of information.” 76 Accordingly, the existence of an inaccuracy alone does not 
establish an FCRA claim; rather, Plaintiff must plausibly allege that the inaccuracy 
resulted from the negligent or willful failur e to adopt reasonable procedures to ensure 
maximum possible accuracy when the report was prepared.77 “The standard of conduct by 
which the trier of fact must judge the adequacy of agency procedures is what a reasonably 
prudent person would do under the circumstances.”78 
Because the Court has determined that the only plausibly alleged inaccuracy 
supporting Plaintiff’s claim against Trans Union under 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) concerns the 
Discover/Capital One tradeline, the Court co nsiders only whether Plaintiff has plausibly 
alleged facts that, taken as true, allow the Co urt to raise the reasonable inference that 
Trans Union failed to follow reasonable procedures in preparing the consumer report as 
to Plaintiff’s Discover/Capital One tradeline. 
 
74 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). 
75 Thompson v. San Antonio Retail Merchs. Ass’n, 682 F.2d 509, 513 (5th Cir. 1982). 
76 Id. (citing Lowry v. Credit Bureau, Inc. of Georgia., 444 F.Supp. 541, 544 (N.D. Ga. 1978)). 
77 Sepulvado, 158 F.3d at 895. 
78 Id. (citing Bryant v. TRW, Inc., 487 F.Supp. 1234, 1242 (E.D. Mich. 1980)). 

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Plaintiff alleges “[t]he account originally reported under Discover Financial 
Services appears on Plaintiff’s credit report still labeled as Discover, despite Discover 
allegedly transferring, selling, or migr ating the account to Capital One[.]” 79 As a result, 
Plaintiff alleges “the credit record reflects two different creditors . . . associa[t]ed with the 
same alleged account, causing confusion and mixed-file contamination.” 80 Plaintiff 
further alleges Trans Union “repeatedly published and maintained inaccurate, 
contradictory, fraudulent, and mixed-file inform ation relating to Plaintiff, including . . . 
[a] false Discover/Capital One tradeline[.]” 81 Plaintiff also alleges that he disputed the 
Discover/Capital One tradeline with Trans Un ion, yet his credit reports continued to 
reflect conflicting creditor identities and ownership confusion.82 
The Court finds these allegations raise a reasonable inference that the alleged 
inaccuracy concerning the Dis cover/Capital One tradeline resulted from Trans Union’s 
failure to adopt and use reasonable procedu res to ensure maximum possible accuracy. 
Taking as true Plaintiff’s allegations that th e account was inaccurately reported and that 
Trans Union continued to report conflicting and inconsistent creditor information after 
Plaintiff disputed the tradeline, Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that Trans Union failed to 
employ reasonable procedures to ensure maximum possible accuracy when preparing 
subsequent reports containing the identifi ed inaccuracy. Put more simply, Plaintiff 
plausibly alleges that, had Trans Union ad opted and used reasonable procedures to 
ensure maximum possible accuracy, it would have detected the repeated inconsistencies 
and inaccuracies as to the Discover/Capital One tradeline rather than republishing them 
 
79 R. Doc. 221 at ¶ 64. 
80 Id. at ¶ 65. 
81 Id. at ¶ 86. 
82 Id. at ¶¶ 86-89. 

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in later credit reports. 
The Court next considers whether Plainti ff has plausibly alleged facts that, taken 
as true, raise a reasonable inference that Plaintiff was injured by Trans Union’s inclusion 
of the Discover/Capital One trad eline inaccuracy on his credit reports as a result of its 
failure to adopt and follow reasonable procedu res. Plaintiff alleges that Trans Union’s 
“inaccurate reporting and failure to correct Pl aintiff’s file directly caused: denials of 
personal and business credit; loss of business funding opportunities; higher interest rates 
and financial costs; reputational harm; emotional distress, anxiety, embarrassment, and 
sleep disruption; additional expenses for mailings, monitoring, and fraud prevention; 
[and] time and resources spent attempti ng to correct the false information.” 83 These 
allegations, taken together with Plaintiff’s allegations concerning Trans Union’s repeated 
reporting of the Discover/Capital One tradel ine inaccuracy, raise a reasonable inference 
that Trans Union’s failure to employ reasonable procedures to ensure maximum possible 
accuracy caused Plaintiff injury. 
Consistent with the Fifth Circuit’s admoni tion that the FCRA is to be liberally 
construed in favor of the consumer, and consi dering Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court 
finds that Plaintiff has plausibly alleged a claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) against Trans 
Union with respect to the alleged inaccu racy regarding the Discover/Capital One 
tradeline. The Court will allow Plaintiff’s claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) to proceed with 
respect to this violation only. 
The Court now turns to Plaintiff’s allegations against Experian and whether he has 
sufficiently pleaded a claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b). The only alleged inaccuracy 
 
83 Id. at ¶ 101. 

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sufficiently pleaded with respect to Experian is the same alleged inaccuracy concerning 
the Discover/Capital One tradeline. Plaintiff alleges “Experian published multiple false, 
inconsistent, and unverified tradelines relate d to Plaintiff, including: Discover/Capital 
One account still coded as ‘Discover[.]’” 84 Plaintiff further alleges that “Experian’s 
reporting contained conflicting data across . . . ownership labels (‘Discover’ vs ‘Capital 
One’).”85 Plaintiff alleges that “[d]espite Capital One’s acquisition of Discover’s portfolio, 
. . . Experian[’s] . . . . reports continue to display the tradeline under ‘Discover Financial 
Services[,]’ creating inconsistent and contradictory creditor identifiers[,]” 86 including 
“Discover appearing as a creditor; Capital On e appearing as a creditor; both entities 
showing conflicting data; a false impression of two separate debts; [and] mixed-file and 
false delinquency reporting.” 87 According to Plaintiff, this inconsistency results in “two 
different creditors appearing on Plaintiff’s reports for the same alleged account: ‘Discover 
Financial Services’ (legacy label)[; and] ‘Capital One’ (current servicer/owner)[.]”88 These 
inaccuracies are not based on legal disputes, such as the validity of the debt, but are 
“sufficiently objectively verifiable.” 89 These allegations are sufficient, at the pleading 
stage, to plausibly allege an inaccuracy in the Experian credit reports. 
As with Trans Union, the allegation that there is an inaccuracy in Plaintiff’s 
Discover/Capital One tradeline is the only sufficiently pleade d inaccuracy in Plaintiff’s 
allegations against Experian under 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b). Plaintiff’s remaining allegations 
concerning inaccuracies associated with ac count information furnished by Defendants 
 
84 Id. at ¶ 105. 
85 Id. at ¶ 106. 
86 Id. at ¶ 192. 
87 Id. at ¶ 369. 
88 Id. at ¶ 201. 
89 Reyes, 140 F.4th at 288. 

15 
other than Trans Union and Experian and reported by Experian are conclusory, as 
Plaintiff does not sufficiently allege what is inaccurate about the reported information. 90 
Because Plaintiff has failed to plead suffici ent facts regarding inaccuracies in other 
tradelines based on information provided by other Defendants, the Plaintiff has failed to 
state a cause of action under the FCRA agai nst Experian has the remaining Defendants’ 
information reported by the CRAs. 
In conclusion, the allegations against Experian raise only the reasonable inference 
that Experian reported inaccurate and confl icting data concerning the Discover/Capital 
One tradeline. The Court now considers whether Plaintiff has plausibly alleged facts that, 
taken as true, raise a reasonable inference that Experian failed to follow reasonable 
procedures in preparing its consumer reports as to the Discover/Capital One tradeline. 
Plaintiff alleges “[t]he account originally reported under Discover Financial 
Services appears on Plaintiff’s credit report s still labeled as Discover, despite Discover 
allegedly transferring, selling, or migrating the account to Capital One[,] N.A.” 91 As a 
result, Plaintiff alleges “the credit record reflects two different creditors . . . associa[t]ed 
with the same alleged account, causing confusion and mixed-file contamination.” 92 
Plaintiff also alleges “Experian’s reporting contained conflicting data across . . . ownership 
labels (‘Discover’ vs ‘Capital One’).”93 
For substantially the same reasons discu ssed as to Trans Union, the Court finds 
these allegations raise a reasonable inferenc e that the alleged inaccuracy concerning the 
Discover/Capital One tradeline resulted fr om Experian’s failure to adopt and use 
 
90 See R. Doc. 221 at ¶ 106. 
91 Id. at ¶ 64. 
92 Id. at ¶ 65. 
93 Id. at ¶ 106. 

16 
reasonable procedures to ensure maximum possible accuracy when preparing credit 
reports. 
The Court next considers whether Plainti ff has plausibly alleged facts that, taken 
as true, raise a reasonable inference that Plaintiff was injured because Experian included 
the Discover/Capital One inaccuracy on his credit reports as a result of its failure to adopt 
and follow reasonable procedures. Plaintiff a lleges “Experian’s inaccurate reporting and 
unlawful reinvestigations caused significant ha rm to Plaintiff, including: credit denials 
and loss of business funding; increased inte rest rates; decrease d creditworthiness; 
reputational damage; emotional distress, an xiety, embarrassment and sleep disruption; 
out-of-pocket mailing and dispute expenses; [a nd] loss of time spent resolving errors.” 94 
These allegations raise a reasonable infere nce that Experian’s failure to employ 
reasonable procedures to ensure maximu m possible accuracy when reporting the 
Discover/Capital One account caused Plaintiff injury. 
Consistent with the Fifth Circuit’s admoni tion that the FCRA is to be liberally 
construed in favor of the consumer, and consi dering Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court 
finds that Plaintiff has plau sibly alleged a claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) against 
Experian only for the inaccuracy regarding the Discover/Capital One account. The Court 
will allow Plaintiff’s claim unde r 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) to proceed against Experian with 
respect to this violation only. 
C. The Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1681i 
against Trans Union and Experian for negligent and willful 
noncompliance with the FCRA by failing to conduct reasonable 
reinvestigations. 
 
Second, Plaintiff alleges Trans Union and Experian violated the duty imposed by 
 
94 Id. at ¶ 119. 

17 
15 U.S.C. § 1681i, which provides: 
if the completeness or accuracy of an y item of information contained in a 
consumer's file at a consumer reporting agency is disputed by the consumer and 
the consumer notifies the agency directly, or indirectly through a reseller, of such 
dispute, the agency shall . . . conduct a reasonable reinvestigation to determine 
whether the disputed information is inaccurate and record the current status of the 
disputed information, or delete the item from the file . . . before the end of the 30-
day period beginning on the date on whic h the agency receives the notice of the 
dispute from the consumer or reseller.
95 
 
“If the reinvestigation does not resolve the dispute, the consumer may file a brief 
statement setting forth the nature of the dispute.”96 
To state a claim for a violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681i, a plaintiff must allege that: “(1) 
[he] disputed the completeness or accuracy of an item of information contained in [his] 
consumer credit file held with the CRA and th at [he] notified the CRA directly of that 
dispute; (2) the CRA did not reinvestigate fr ee of charge and either record the current 
status of the disputed information or delete the item from the plaintiff’s file in the manner 
set forth by § 1681i(a)(5) within the statuto ry period; (3) the CRA’s noncompliance was 
negligent or willful; (4) the plaintiff suffere d injury; and (5) the plaintiff’s injury was 
caused by the CRA’s failure to reinvestigate and record the current status of the disputed 
information or delete the item from the file.”97 Plaintiff asserts Trans Union and Experian 
negligently and willfully violated 15 U.S.C. § 1681i by failing to conduct reasonable 
reinvestigations to determine whether the disputed information in his consumer credit 
file was inaccurate.98 
 After alleging an inaccuracy, the next elem ent of a claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1681i is 
 
95 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(1)(A). 
96 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(b). 
97 Childers, 751 F.Supp.3d at 662 (citing McCoy v. SC Tiger Manor, LLC, 2022 WL 621000, at *7 (M.D. La. 
Feb. 11, 2022)). 
98 R. Doc. 221 at ¶¶ 90-93, ¶¶ 98-99 (Plaintiff’s cl aim under 15 U.S.C. § 1681i against Trans Union); Id. at 
¶¶ 109-12, ¶¶ 116-17 (Plaintiff’s claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1681i against Experian). 

18 
that the CRA must be given notice that th e completeness or accuracy of an item of 
information contained in a consumer credit file is disputed. The FCRA does not require a 
certain form, but whatever form of notice is given must include enough details to provide 
the CRA with notice that an item of inform ation is inaccurate or incomplete. The Court 
will address whether Plaintiff sufficiently pleaded facts raising a reasonable inference that 
he disputed the completeness or accuracy of an item of information contained in his Trans 
Union and/or Experian consumer credit files, and that Plaintiff provided those CRAs 
adequate notice of the dispute. 
Plaintiff’s allegations fall far short of the necessary factual specificity required to 
survive the instant motion to dismiss these claims. Plaintiff alleges as to Trans Union that 
he “disputed all inaccurate tradelines wi th [Trans Union] through certified mail, 
providing more than sufficient identi ty-verification and documentation.”99 Plaintiff fails 
to attach the certified letter he alleges he sent or otherwise specify when he informed the 
CRAs of the dispute, what information he provided, which documents he provided, or 
which tradelines he specifically disputed. Because Plaintiff’s allegations are conclusory 
and do not contain sufficient facts which, taken as true, would allow the Court to 
reasonably infer that Plaintiff informed Tr ans Union that he disputed the completeness 
or accuracy of any item of information contained in his consumer credit file held with the 
CRA. 
Similarly, as to Experian, Plaintiff alleges he “submitted multiple certified disputes 
to Experian with substantial fraud documentation, including identity-theft statements, 
proof of address, and explanations.”100 Again, however, Plaintiff fails to attach the certified 
 
99 Id. at ¶ 90. 
100 Id. at ¶ 109. 

19 
letter he alleges he sent or otherwise specif y when he informed the CRAs of the dispute, 
what information he provided, which docume nts he provided, or what tradelines he 
specifically disputed. These allegations are conclusory and do not plead facts which, taken 
as true, allow the Court to reasonably infer that Plaintiff informed the CRA that it disputed 
the completeness or accuracy of an item of information contained in his consumer credit 
file held with the CRA. 
 Because Plaintiff fails to sufficiently al lege a necessary element of his claims 
against Trans Union and Experian under 15 U. S.C. § 1681i—namely, that he notified the 
CRAs of the dispute—he fails to state a clai m against them under that statute. The Court 
will dismiss Plaintiff’s claims under 15 U.S.C. § 1681i as to Trans Union and Experian. 
D. The Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1681c-2 
against Trans Union and Experian for negligent and willful 
noncompliance with the FCRA by failing to block identity theft 
information. 
 
Third, Plaintiff alleges Trans Union and Experian violated the duty imposed by 15 
U.S.C. § 1681c-2, which requires CRAs to “b lock the reporting of any information in the 
file of a consumer that the consumer identifies as information that resulted from an 
alleged identity theft”
101 no later than 4 business days a fter receiving: “(1) appropriate 
proof of the identity of the consumer; (2) a copy of an identity theft report; (3) the 
identification of such information by the consumer; and (4) a statement by the consumer 
that the information is not information relating to any transaction by the consumer.” 102 
Plaintiff asserts Trans Union and Experian negligently and willfully violated this duty by 
failing to block the reporting of informatio n he identified as resulting from alleged 
 
101 15 U.S.C. § 1681c-2(a). 
102 Id. at (a)(1)-(4). 

20 
identity theft, despite receiving the documentation required to trigger their duty to block 
the identified information.103 
Plaintiff alleges that he “has repeatedly been the victim of identity theft and mixed-
file errors, resulting in numerous unauthoriz ed accounts appearing on Plaintiff’s credit 
reports from Trans Union and Experian.”104 Plaintiff alleges he “repeatedly disputed these 
accounts through certified mail, providing each CRA and furnisher with detailed 
evidence[,] including: identity theft affida vits; police information; government-issued 
identification; proof of current and prior ad dresses; fraud statements; written disputes; 
[and] supporting documentation showing identity mismatch.” 105 Nonetheless, Plaintiff 
alleges that “[d]espite receiv ing legally sufficient informat ion proving inaccuracy, Trans 
Union and Experian failed to block identity-theft-related data as required under 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1681c-2, and instead continued publishing and republishing false information.”106 
Plaintiff’s allegations are conclusory and do not plead sufficient facts which, taken 
as true, allow the Court to draw the reasonable inference that Plaintiff provided the notice 
and documentation required to trigger Tran s Union’s and Experian’s duties under § 
1681c-2. Plaintiff does not provide copies of the information he sent to each CRA, identify 
the specific information he requested to be blocked, or explain how the documentation he 
provided satisfied the statutory requiremen ts. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against 
Trans Union and Experian under 15 U.S.C. § 1681c-2 will be dismissed. 
 
 
103 R. Doc. 221 at ¶¶ 94-97 (Plaintiff’s claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1681c-2 against Trans Union); Id. at ¶¶ 113-
15 (Plaintiff’s claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1681c-2 against Experian). 
104 Id. at ¶ 34. 
105 Id. at ¶ 37. 
106 Id. at ¶ 38. 

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II. Plaintiff’s requests for injunctive relief, declaratory relief, equitable 
relief, and damages for lost business opportunities will be dismissed. 
 
“Plaintiff . . . seeks injunctive, declaratory, and equitable relief, including a Court-
ordered directive requiring Defendants an d the CRAs to delete all inaccurate, 
unverifiable, mixed-file, or identity-theft- related information, suppress reinsertion, 
correct personal identifying information, an d notify all third parties who previously 
accessed the inaccurate data.”107 Plaintiff also seeks injunctive, declaratory, and equitable 
relief against all Defendants in paragraphs 454, 464, and 468 of the Third Amended 
Complaint. For example, Plaintiff seeks inju nctive relief ordering all Defendants to 
correct Plaintiff’s file, notify all CRAs of all corrections, implement reasonable procedures 
to ensure maximum possible accuracy, and prevent reinsertion of inaccurate 
information.108 
The Fifth Circuit has held that the FCRA does not provide private litigants with a 
right to seek injunctive relief against CRAs. 109 “Fifth Circuit precedent is clear: a private 
litigant is not entitled to injunctive relief against a credit reporting agency under the 
FCRA.”110 As the Fifth Circuit explained, the FC RA “expressly refer[s] to damages and 
attorney fees without ment ioning injunctive relief.” 111 Additionally, the FCRA expressly 
grants the power to pursue injunctive reli ef to the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”). 112 
These facts “[demonstrate] that Congress vest ed the power to obtain injunctive relief 
solely with the FTC.” 113 Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief will be 
 
107 Id. at ¶ 8. 
108 Id. at ¶ 464. 
109 Washington v. CSC Credit Servs., Inc., 199 F.3d 263, 268 (5th Cir. 2000). 
110 Stevens v. Experian Info. Systs., Inc., 2025 WL 2628094, at *2 (E.D. Tex. 2025). 
111 Washington, 199 F.3d at 268 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n, 1681o). 
112 Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1681s). 
113 Id. 

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dismissed.114 
In paragraph 465 of the Third Amended Co mplaint, Plaintiff “seeks a declaratory 
judgment that Defendants violated the FCRA.” 115 The Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 
U.S.C. § 2201, “[confers] on federal courts unique and substantial discretion in deciding 
whether to declare the rights of litigants.” 116 A declaratory judgment is not a substantive 
cause of action, but rather “a remedy availabl e to a litigant who can point to an existing 
right that the Court has jurisdiction to enforce.” 117 Section 2201 is “an authorization, not 
a command.”118 It gives federal courts the authority to declare rights, but does not impose 
a duty to do so. In this case, Plaintiff has as serted substantive claims that have placed at 
issue whether Defendants violated the FCRA, which is the issue on which Plaintiff seeks 
declaratory judgment. There is no need for a declaratory judgment in this action. 119 The 
Court in its discretion will dismiss Plaintiff’s request for declaratory relief. 
Finally, Plaintiff seeks damages for his lo st business opportunities and for denial 
of business credit. Plaintiff alleges that, as a result of Defendants’ unlawful conduct, 
“Plaintiff has suffered substantial and ongoing harm, including[,] but not limited to: a. 
denial of personal and business credit; b. denial of business funding opportunities 
exceeding $150,000; c. increased interest rates; d. reputational and professional harm; e. 
emotional distress, anxiety, and embarrassm ent; f. disruption of sleep and daily 
functioning; g. out-of-pocket expenses for mailings, monitoring, and identity theft 
mitigation; h. loss of time spent correcting errors; and i. reduced borrowing power and 
 
114 Plaintiff makes no state law claim for injunctive relief. 
115 R. Doc. 221 at ¶ 465. The equitable relief Plaintiff seeks is a declaratory judgment. 
116Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 286 (1995). 
117 Fisher v. Beers, 2014 WL 3497572, at *4 (E.D. La. 2014). 
118 Public Affairs Assocs., Inc. v. Rickover, 369 U.S. 111, 112 (1962). 
119 Id. 

23 
financial stability.”120 However, “the FCRA does not cover reports used or expected to be 
used only in connection with commercial business transactions,”121 and Plaintiff may not 
recover damages for his lost business opportun ities, including denial of business credit, 
denial of business funding opportunities, or any other business-related damages. 
Plaintiff’s requests for injunctive relief ; declaratory relief; equitable relief; and 
damages based on lost business opportunities—including denial of business credit, denial 
of business funding opportunities, and an y other business-related damages—will be 
dismissed. 
III. Leave to amend the complaint will not be granted. 
Plaintiff requests that, in the event the Court grants any portion of the instant 
motion, the Court grant him leave to file a Fourth Amended Complaint to cure any 
identified deficiencies.122 
Under Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[a] party may amend its 
pleading once as a matter of course” within 21 days of service or 21 days after service of a 
responsive pleading or motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f). 123 In all other cases, a party 
may amend its pleading only with the opposing party's written consent or leave of court, 
which leave should be freely granted when justice so requires. 124 More than 21 days have 
passed since service of the complaint, and the opposing parties do not consent to 
amendment. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request to amend is governed by Rule 15(a)(2), which 
 
120 R. Doc. 221 at ¶ 6. 
121 Hall v. Phenix Investigations, Inc., 642 Fed.Appx. 402, 405 (5th Cir. 2016) (citing Bacharach v. Suntrust 
Mortg., Inc., 2015 WL 6442493, at *3-4 (E.D. La. 2015)). 
122 R. Doc. 272 at p . 10 . Plaintiff has filed a p leading ti tle d “ Four th Amen ded Co mp laint .” R. Doc. 280 . 
However, that pleading only amended certain allegations concerning Defendant Affirm, Inc., which has 
been dismissed from this action with prejudice. R. Doc. 299. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Third Amended 
Complaint remains the operative complaint in this action. 
123 FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(1)(A), (B). 
124 FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2). 

24 
provides that the “court should freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.”125 
The five relevant factors courts consider in determining whether leave to amend is 
proper or there is substantial reason to deny the request are: (1) undue delay, (2) bad faith 
or dilatory motive, (3) repeated failure to cure deficiencies by previous amendments, (4) 
undue prejudice to the opposing party, and (5) futility of the amendment.126 
Although a district court usually grants a pro se plaintiff liberal leave to amend his 
or her complaint, “[e]ven pro se plaintiffs . . . are not constitutionally or otherwise entitled 
to multiple opportunities to amend their pleadings.”127 Plaintiff has already been afforded 
three opportunities to amend his Complaint. Those amendments have not remedied the 
defects in his claims. To the contrary, Pl aintiff continues to rely on unsupported 
assertions and legal conclusions despite prior opportunities to cure the deficiencies in his 
complaint. “And, while leave to amend ‘is to be freely given, that generous standard is 
tempered by the necessary power of a district court to manage a case.’”128 
The Court will not permit Plaintiff another opportunity to amend. Plaintiff has had 
several opportunities to plead his claims and has failed to do so. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s 
request to amend will be denied, and any claim dismissed by this Order and Reasons will 
be dismissed with prejudice. 
CONCLUSION 
IT IS ORDERED that Trans Union’s Motion to Dismiss and Experian’s Motion 
to Dismiss are DENIED as to Plaintiff’s claim that they violated 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) 
based on alleged inaccuracies in credit re ports relating to the Discover/Capital One 
 
125 FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2). 
126 Gregory v. Mitchell, 634 F.2d 199, 203 (5th Cir. 1981). 
127 Lofthus v. Long Beach Veterans Hosp., 214 F. Supp. 3d 908, 912 (C.D. Cal. 2016). 
128 Neutron Depot, L.L.C. v. Bankrate, Inc. , 798 Fed.Appx. 803, 808 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing Schiller v. 
Physicians Res. Grp. Inc., 342 F.3d 563, 566 (5th Cir. 2003)). 

25 
tradeline; and GRANTED with respect to all other claims against Trans Union and 
Experian under 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b), which claims are DISMISSED WITH 
PREJUDICE. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Trans Union’s and Experian’s Motion to 
Dismiss is GRANTED with respect to claims against them under 15 U.S.C. § 1681i and 
15 U.S.C. § 1681c-2, and these claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Trans Union’s and Experian’s Motion to 
Dismiss is GRANTED with respect to Plaintiff’s requests against Trans Union and 
Experian for injunctive relief, declaratory re lief, equitable relief, and for damages based 
on alleged lost business opportunities—includ ing denial of business credit, denial of 
business funding opportunities, and any other business-related damages—and these 
requests are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 20th day of May, 2026. 
 
 
______________________ _________ 
SUSIE MORGAN 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
 
 

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