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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
IN RE: POWERSCHOOL HOLDINGS, 
INC. AND POWERSCHOOL GROUP, 
LLC CUSTOMER SECURITY BREACH 
LITIGATION 
 
This Document Relates To: 
Track One 
 

MDL No. 3149 
 
ORDER DENYING 
POWERSCHOOL’S MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION AND FOR 
CERTIFICATION OF 
INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL 
 
(Doc. No. 465) 
 
 Before the Court is a motion seeking reconsideration pursuant to Rules 54 and 59 of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure1 or, in the alternative, certification of an interlocutory 
appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1292(b) filed by Defendants PowerSchool Corporation and 
PowerSchool Group, LLC (collectively, “PowerSchool”). (Doc. No. 465.) For the reasons 
set forth below, the Court DENIES the motion in its entirety. 
 
1 Further reference “Rule” or “Rules” is to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, unless otherwise 
stated. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 On March 18, 2026, the Court issued an order granting in part and denying in part 
PowerSchool’s motion to dismiss. (Doc. No. 436.) As relevant here, the Court determined 
that Track One Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged Article III standing to survive a motion to 
dismiss by pleading various injuries, including actual or attempted fraud, imminent risk of 
future harm from identity theft or fraud, diminution in value of personal information, 
expense of time and money on mitigation efforts, and loss of the benefit of the bargain. (Id. 
at 9–14.) 
PowerSchool now moves for reconsideration for Track One, asserting that the 
Court’s standing analysis was clear error on two grounds: (1) the Court did not assess 
Article III standing on a plaintiff-by-plaintiff basis and instead allowed all named Plaintiffs 
to proceed based on the injury of at least one Plaintiff; and (2) the Court declined to follow 
the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Kisil v. Illuminate Educ., Inc ., No. 23 -4114, 2025 WL 
2589000 (9th Cir. Sept. 8, 2025), on the ground that it is unpublished. (Doc. No. 465-1 at 
7–10.) PowerSchool contends that, under controlling Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit 
authority, the 121 Plaintiffs it labels the “No-Injury Plaintiffs” — those who have not 
alleged exposure of sensitive personal information such as Social Security or financial 
data— should be dismissed. ( Id. a t 9, 21, 23.) If unsuccessful on reconsideration, 
PowerSchool requests that the Court certify the two legal questions to the Ninth Circuit 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and stay Track One discovery pending any Ninth Circuit review. 
(Id. at 20–26.) 
Plaintiffs filed a response in opposition (Doc. No. 489), to which PowerSchool 
replied (Doc. No. 494). With the matter fully briefed, the Court finds the motion suitable 
for determination on the papers and without oral argument. See CivLR 7.1.d.1. This Order 
follows. 
/// 
/// 
/// 
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II. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
 PowerSchool asserts reconsideration is proper because the Court committed clear 
error. (Doc. No. 465 -1 at 11–20.) Plaintiffs assert PowerSchool has not satisfied the 
demanding standard for reconsideration because it merely repeats arguments the Court 
already rejected. (Doc. No. 489 at 6–8.) 
A. Legal Standard 
 A district court has inherent jurisdiction to modify, alter, or revoke a prior order. 
United States v. Martin, 226 F.3d 1042, 1049 (9th Cir. 2000). “Reconsideration [of a prior 
order] is appropriate if the district court (1) is presented with newly discovered evidence, 
(2) committed clear error or the initial decision was manifestly unjust, or (3) if there is an 
intervening change in controlling law.” Sch. Dist. No. 1J v. ACandS, Inc. , 5 F.3d 1255, 
1263 (9th Cir. 1993); see CivLR 7.1.i. 
 Reconsideration should be used conservatively, because it is an “extraordinary 
remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests of finality and conservation of judicial 
resources.” Carroll v. Nakatani , 342 F.3d 934, 945 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Marlyn 
Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co. , 571 F.3d 873, 880 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(“[A] motion for reconsideration should not be granted, absent highly unusual 
circumstances . . . .”). A motion for reconsideration may not be used to relitigate old 
matters, or to raise arguments or present evidence that reasonably could have been raised 
earlier in the litigation. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker , 554 U.S. 471, 486 n.5 (2008); see 
Kona Enter., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000). “A party seeking 
reconsideration must show more than a disagreement with the Court’s decision.” United 
States v. Westlands Water Dist. , 134 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1131 (E.D. Cal. 2001); accord 
Huhmann v. FedEx Corp ., No. 13-CV-00787-BAS NLS, 2015 WL 6128494, at *2 (S.D. 
Cal. Oct. 16, 2015). 
B. Clear Error 
 PowerSchool advances two interrelated grounds for reconsideration. First, 
PowerSchool argues that the Court committed clear error by declining to analyze each 
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named plaintiff’s standing individually, as it contends Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit 
precedent require. (Doc. No. 465-1 at 11–13.) PowerSchool maintains that the Court may 
not allow all named plaintiffs to proceed based on the injury of a single individual, but 
must instead require each plaintiff to demonstrate his or her own concrete harm, and that 
more than seventy percent of the named plaintiffs— the “No-Injury Plaintiffs”— did not 
allege exposure of sensitive data such as Social Security numbers or financial information 
and therefore lack standing under current law. (Id. at 7–8, 12–13.) 
Second, PowerSchool contends that the Court overlooked relevant authority by 
declining to follow Illuminate , which dismissed similar claims in what PowerSchool 
characterizes as a nearly identical data breach case. PowerSchool argues that the Court 
disregarded Illuminate solely because it is unpublished, even though Illuminate itself rested 
on binding Supreme Court authority in TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413 (2021). 
(Id. a t 7 –9, 18 –19.) PowerSchool maintains that exposure of non- sensitive direct 
information cannot support a claim, and that the Court’s reliance on three published Ninth 
Circuit opinions
2 is misplaced because those decisions do not relieve each named plaintiff 
of the obligation to demonstrate standing for that plaintiff’s own claims. (Id. at 9, 12–20.) 
Plaintiffs respond that the Court correctly applied TransUnion with the Ninth Circuit 
decisions in Healy, Zappos, and Krottner , which together establish that at the pleading 
stage—though not at summary judgment —general allegations of injury suffice in data 
breach cases. (Doc. No. 489 at 8–9.) Plaintiffs note the Court’s recognition that allegations 
of sensitive data exfiltration, misuse, or dark-web exposure established standing, and that 
benefit-of-the-bargain and diminution -in-value theories also support standing. ( Id. at 9, 
18.) Plaintiffs further assert that each Plaintiff has alleged an imminent risk of future harm. 
(Id. at 14.) As to Illuminate , Plaintiffs maintain that Healy and Zappos control over the 
 
2 Namely, Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2010) , In re Zappos.com, Inc., 
Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 888 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2018), and Healy v. Milliman, Inc., 164 F.4th 
701 (9th Cir. 2026). 
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unpublished disposition and that the Court correctly held that an unpublished decision 
cannot displace binding published precedent. ( Id. at 11, 12, 24.) Plaintiffs distinguish 
Illuminate on the ground that it involved less sensitive data and no alleged misuse, whereas 
the PowerSchool breach involved sensitive information, including Social Security 
numbers, and actual misuse, which under binding precedent supports standing. (Id. at 12–
13.) Plaintiffs further argue that Sanford v. MemberWorks, Inc ., 625 F.3d 550 (9th Cir. 
2010), is inapposite because it is not a data breach case, does not address risk-of -future-
harm injuries, and addresses mootness following settlement rather than class-action 
standing at the pleading stage. (Id. at 8, 15, 24.) The question here, Plaintiffs assert, is not 
mootness but whether the case may proceed with multiple plaintiffs alleging concrete 
harms. (Id. at 17.) Plaintiffs add that PowerSchool is improperly attempting to relitigate 
matters already decided merely because a new judge is presiding. (Id. at 18, 24.) Finally, 
Plaintiffs argue that TransUnion’s requirement that each class member demonstrate 
concrete injury attaches at class certification and summary judgment, not at the motion-to-
dismiss stage. (Id. at 12, 17.) 
When reconsideration rests on a claim of clear error or manifest injustice, “[m]ere 
doubts or disagreement about the wisdom of a prior decision . . . will not suffice . . . To be 
clearly erroneous, a decision must [be] more than just maybe or probably wron g; it must 
be dead wrong.” Heathman v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, No. 12-cv-201-IEG-RBB, 
2013 WL 1284184, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2013). “[C]learly erroneous is a very exacting 
standard.” Id. “[I]t is a clear error of law to not apply controlling Supreme Court 
precedent.” Smith v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist ., 727 F.3d 950, 955 (9th Cir. 2013). District 
courts within the Ninth Circuit are bound by the Circuit’s published opinions on point. See 
Hart v. Massanari , 266 F.3d 1155, 1170 (9th Cir. 2001). Unpublished Ninth Circuit 
dispositions, by contrast, “are not precedent.” 9th Cir. R. 36-3(a). They may be cited under 
limited conditions but do not displace controlling published authority. 9th Cir. R. 36-3(b). 
 Article III standing requires plausible allegations that (1) the plaintiff suffered an 
injury in fact that is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; (2) the injury is fairly 
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traceable to the defendant; and (3) the injury would likely be redressed by a favorable 
decision. TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 423; Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs., 
Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180–81 (2000); see also City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101 
(1983) (“[T]hose who seek to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts must satisfy the 
threshhold [sic] requirement imposed by Article III of the Constitution by alleging an actual 
case or controversy.”). The parties agree that this standard governs; they disagree about 
what it demands of named plaintiffs at the motion-to-dismiss stage in a data breach action. 
The standing inquiry calibrates to the procedural posture. At the pleading stage, 
“[g]eneral allegations” of injury may suffice. Lujan v. Defs. Of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 
560–61 (1992). At summary judgment, plaintiffs must come forward with evidence that 
produces a genuine issue of material fact, and at trial, a plaintiff must affirmatively prove 
the injury supporting standing. Healy , 164 F.4th at 708–09. Two published Ninth Circuit 
decisions address Article III standing at the pleading stage in data breach cases: Krottner 
v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2010), and In re Zappos.com, Inc., Customer 
Data Sec. Breach Litig., 888 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2018). Under Krottner, “the possibility of 
future injury may be sufficient to confer standing on plaintiffs; threatened injury constitutes 
‘injury in fact.’” 628 F.3d at 1142 (citation omitted). A plaintiff who has not yet suffered 
misuse of personal information can still claim injury in fact by showing “a credible threat 
of real and immediate harm” arising from the theft of a laptop holding the plaintiff’s 
unencrypted personal information. Zappos, 888 F.3d at 1027 (citing Krottner, 628 F.3d at 
1143). Imminent-risk harms “qualify as concrete injuries in fact when they are based on a 
risk of harm that is either ‘certainly impending’ or ‘substantial.’” Id. at 1024 (citation 
omitted). The risk of future harm must be “‘fairly traceable’ to the conduct being 
challenged.” Id. at 1029 (citation omitted). 
Before class certification, Article III is satisfied so long as at least one named 
plaintiff has standing; unnamed class members need not demonstrate standing at that stage. 
Healy, 164 F.4th at 706. After certification of a class seeking money damages, both named 
and unnamed class members must produce evidence of Article III standing at summary 
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judgment under the usual summary-judgment standard, and standing must be supported by 
the evidence adduced at trial. Id. at 707. TransUnion abrogated Zappos in part, holding that 
“the mere risk of future harm, standing alone, cannot qualify as a concrete harm— at least 
unless the exposure to the risk of future harm itself causes a separate concrete harm.” 
TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 436. Healy recognized that Zappos was abrogated by TransUnion 
only to the extent Zappos would have permitted unnamed class members to go to trial 
without proving standing. Healy , 164 F.4th at 708. After TransUnion , all class members 
must demonstrate standing at summary judgment or trial. Id. at 705. At the pleading stage, 
however, Zappos remains controlling. Healy cites Zappos with approval for the proposition 
that Article III is satisfied earlier in a case so long as one named plaintiff has standing and 
a putative plaintiff class has not yet been certified. Id. at 706. 
Measured against this framework, neither of PowerSchool’s grounds establishes 
clear error. On the first, the Court has considered PowerSchool’s arguments distinguishing 
between named plaintiffs alleging exfiltration or misuse and those PowerSchool labels 
“No-Injury Plaintiffs,” but those arguments misapprehend what TransUnion , Healy, and 
Zappos together require at the motion- to-dismiss stage. Healy expressly preserves 
Zappos’s pleading-stage rule that Article III is satisfied where at least one named plaintiff 
alleges injury and the class has not been certified. Id. at 706. The prior order applied that 
rule. PowerSchool’s preferred individualized inquiry attaches at summary judgment and 
trial, not on a Rule 12 motion. Id. at 705, 707. Plaintiffs’ allegations that their sensitive 
information was exfiltrated in the PowerSchool breach and, in some instances, has surfaced 
online suffice to plead injury in fact under Krottner and Zappos at this stage; the more 
granular sorting PowerSchool seeks is properly conducted through discovery and on a 
developed record. 
On the second ground, PowerSchool’s reliance on Illuminate fares no better. 
Whatever weight Illuminate may carry as persuasive authority, its status as an unpublished 
disposition forecloses its use to override the published Ninth Circuit decisions that govern 
this Court’s analysis. Hart, 266 F.3d at 1170; 9th Cir. R. 36-3(a). The prior order’s reliance 
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on TransUnion, Healy, and Zappos—each binding —reflects application of, not departure 
from, controlling precedent. Smith, 727 F.3d at 955. Sanford does not change the result; it 
neither arises in the data breach context nor addresses risk- of-future-harm standing at the 
pleading stage, and it cannot displace the framework Healy and Zappos supply. The factual 
distinctions Plaintiffs draw between Illuminate and this case —including allegations of 
Social Security number exposure and actual misuse—reinforce that Illuminate , even if 
instructive in another setting, does not undermine the conclusion reached in the prior order. 
PowerSchool has not shown that the prior ruling was “dead wrong” on either ground. 
Heathman, 2013 WL 1284184, at *1. 
For the foregoing reasons, PowerSchool has not carried its burden under the exacting 
clear-error standard. The prior order applied the controlling published authorities—
TransUnion, Healy, Krottner, and Zappos — to the allegations before the Court at the 
motion-to-dismiss stage and correctly declined to substitute the unpublished disposition in 
Illuminate for binding Ninth Circuit precedent. PowerSchool’s disagreement with that 
analysis, and its preference for individualized standing scrutiny better suited to summary 
judgment or trial, does not render the prior ruling “dead wrong.” Id. 
 C. Conclusion 
 PowerSchool’s motion rests on arguments the Court already considered and rejected. 
The prior o rder denied dismissal because, under the Twombly/Iqbal pleading standard, 
Plaintiffs are entitled at this stage to develop their allegations through discovery. 
PowerSchool identifies no newly discovered evidence, no intervening change in 
controlling law, and no clear error in the Court’s application of Healy, Zappos, Krottner, 
and TransUnion at the pleading stage. The unpublished disposition in Illuminate does not 
displace the published authority on which the Court relied. This case is complex, involving 
numerous similar and distinct legal theories applied to the same facts against various 
defendants, with variations among Plaintiffs, as supported by cases from different 
jurisdictions. Therefore, challenging inconsistencies in prior Orders now —unless they 
clearly contain errors—only impedes judicial efficiency in resolving all disputes fairly and 
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promptly. These issues will likely be addressed soon, but not right now. Because 
PowerSchool has not satisfied the threshold for reconsideration, the Court DENIES its 
motion. 
III. MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION OF INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL 
PowerSchool requests, in the alternative, that the Court certify two questions for 
interlocutory appeal and stay this action pending the Ninth Circuit’s resolution: (1) whether 
each named plaintiff in a proposed class action must individually demonstrate concrete 
harm to survive a motion to dismiss; and (2) whether a plaintiff can claim concrete harm 
where only non-sensitive information was exposed in a data breach. (Doc. No. 465-1 at 10, 
20–26.) PowerSchool also seeks a stay of discovery, contending that continued discovery 
as to plaintiffs who may later be dismissed would be inefficient and wasteful. (Id. at 26.) 
Plaintiffs oppose certification, arguing that PowerSchool fails to satisfy the statutory 
criteria of 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and that certification is reserved for exceptional 
circumstances. (Doc. No. 489 at 7, 19, 21–22.) 
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), a district court may certify an interlocutory order for 
appeal where (1) the order involves a controlling question of law, (2) there is substantial 
ground for difference of opinion as to that question, and (3) an immediate appeal may 
materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. Certification under § 1292(b) 
is reserved for “exceptional situations in which allowing an interlocutory appeal would 
avoid protracted and expensive litigation.” In re Cement Antitrust Lit ig., 673 F.2d 1020, 
1026 (9th Cir. 1981). The substantial-ground-for-difference-of-opinion prong concerns the 
clarity of the controlling law; to determine whether it is satisfied, courts must “examine to 
what extent the controlling law is unclear.” Couch v. Telescope Inc., 611 F.3d 629, 633 
(9th Cir. 2010). The party seeking certification bears the burden of demonstrating that each 
requirement is met, and the conjunctive nature of the statute means that the failure of any 
one element defeats certification. 
PowerSchool first contends that a substantial ground for difference of opinion exists 
because the Court’s denial of its motion to dismiss conflicts with decisions in other districts 
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and appellate courts dismissing claims where plaintiffs did not allege exposure of sensitive 
data or concrete harm. (Doc. No. 465-1 at 22–24.) Plaintiffs respond that Ninth Circuit law 
on standing in data breach cases is settled and that PowerSchool’s disagreement with the 
Court’s ruling does not generate a substantial ground for a difference of opinion. (Doc. No. 
489 at 20–22.) Plaintiffs further note that the Court has already determined that all Plaintiffs 
have standing, rendering the individualized standing question immaterial at this stage. (Id. 
at 19.) 
The Court agrees with Plaintiffs. Under Couch , the controlling inquiry is “to what 
extent the controlling law is unclear,” not whether reasonable jurists could disagree about 
how settled law applies to particular facts. 611 F.3d at 633. PowerSchool’s showing rests 
on out-of-circuit and out -of-district authorities reaching different outcomes on different 
factual records. That a court applying a different evidentiary record reached a different 
result does not establish that the governing legal standard is unsettled within this Circuit. 
Were it otherwise, the substantial- ground prong would collapse into a generalized 
invitation to relitigate any motion-to-dismiss ruling that found contrary support in another 
jurisdiction—a result inconsistent with the “exceptional” character of § 1292(b) review 
described in In re Cement Antitrust Litigation, 673 F.2d at 1026. Because PowerSchool has 
not identified ambiguity in the controlling Ninth Circuit law governing standing in data 
breach cases, the second § 1292(b) requirement is not satisfied. The third requirement, that 
an immediate appeal materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation , is 
independently dispositive. PowerSchool argues that resolving the certified questions now 
would promote judicial economy by streamlining the case, avoiding unnecessary 
discovery, and facilitating settlement. (Doc. No. 465- 1 at 24 –26.) Plaintiffs respond that 
appellate review would delay rather than advance resolution and that, in any event, a 
successful appeal would not terminate the litigation because Plaintiffs have alleged misuse 
of their data. (Doc. No. 489 at 19, 22–24.) 
Plaintiffs have the better of this argument. The “materially advance” inquiry asks 
whether appellate resolution would meaningfully shorten the path to final judgment, 
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consistent with § 1292(b)’s purpose of avoiding “protracted and expensive litigation.” In 
re Cement Antitrust Litig., 673 F.2d at 1026. Where, as here, Plaintiffs have pleaded misuse 
of their data as an independent theory of injury, even a favorable appellate ruling on the 
standing questions PowerSchool proposes would leave the misuse-based claims intact. The 
efficiency gains PowerSchool identifies, narrowed discovery and potential settlement, are 
speculative and must be weighed against the certain delay an interlocutory appeal would 
impose. On this record, the balance does not tip toward certification, and the materially-
advance requirement is not met. 
Because PowerSchool has not satisfied the two independent prongs of § 1292(b), the 
Court need not separately address whether the proposed questions present controlling 
issues of law, and the request for a stay of discovery falls with the underlying motion. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES PowerSchool’s Track One 
motion for reconsideration pursuant to Rules 54 and 59, DENIES PowerSchool’s motion 
for certification of interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C.§ 1292(b), and DENIES the related 
request to stay discovery. 
 IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated: May 29, 2026 
 
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