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Opinion

govinfo:USCOURTS-dcd-1_25-cv-02032-0

U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia · 2026-05-29

· GavelSight synced 2026-09-06 03:51:14

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
 
 
ROMAN PERALES, 
 
Plaintiff, 
 
v. 
 
SCOTT S. HARRIS , in his official capacity as 
Clerk of the United States Supreme Court, et al., 
 
Defendants. 
 
 
 
 
Case No. 25-cv-2032 (JMC) 
 
 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
Pro se Plaintiff Roman Perales sues over his failure to successfully file a petition for writ 
of certiorari and an emergency motion at the United States Supreme Court. He seeks an order 
compelling Defendants—the Clerk of the Supreme Court and a case manager in the Clerk’s 
office—to accept and docket his filings. Because the Court lacks jurisdiction over his claims for 
mandamus or other equitable relief against Defendants, the Court will GRANT their motion to 
dismiss.1 
Perales is a resident of Texas. ECF 1 ¶ 4. On September 7, 2023, he sent a document to the 
Supreme Court of Texas which requested that the Court issue an order admitting him to the Texas 
state bar as a licensed attorney. ECF 1-2 at 15. The Supreme Court of Texas denied the request in 
a November 17, 2023 letter to Perales. Id. Perales then attempted to file a petition for a writ of 
certiorari at the U.S. Supreme Court regarding the denial. ECF 1 ¶ 8. But the Clerk’s office refused 
 
1 Unless otherwise indicated, the formatting of citations has been modified throughout this opinion, for example, by 
omitting internal quotation marks, emphases, citations, and alterations and by altering capitalization. All pincites to 
documents filed on the docket in this case are to the automatically generated ECF Page ID number that appears at the 
top of each page. 

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to file and docket the petition on the grounds that it “fail[ed] to comply with the Rules of th[e] 
Court,” including that the “letter appended” from the Supreme Court of Texas “d[id] not appear to 
be an order from the Supreme Court of Texas denying discretionary review.” Id. ¶ 9. In response, 
Perales filed a document styled as an “Emergency Motion” with the Supreme Court arguing that 
the Clerk’s office had committed misconduct and that his certiorari petition complied with the 
Court’s rules. Id. ¶ 10. This motion was also rejected for “fail[ure] to comply with the Rules of 
th[e] Court.” Id. ¶ 12. 
Thus stymied, Perales filed a lawsuit in this Court against Scott Harris, the Clerk of the 
United States Supreme Court, and one of Harris’s employees in the Clerk’s office. ECF 1 ¶¶ 5–6. 
Perales seeks an order compelling Defendants to docket his motion, or, alternatively, an order 
compelling Defendants to file and docket the petition for writ of certiorari. ECF 1 at 9. Defendants 
moved to dismiss the complaint. ECF 9. Defendants argue that they were improperly served, and 
that this Court lacks jurisdiction over a lawsuit to compel the Clerk of the Supreme Court to take 
any action. See id. 
The Court agrees on both points. Perales is not proceeding in forma pauperis and is 
therefore responsible for serving Defendants with process, consisting of the summons and a copy 
of the complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c). But a party cannot personally serve a summons and 
complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2) (“Any person who is at least 18 years old and not a party may 
serve a summons and complaint.”). Moreover, a plaintiff has 90 days after filing a complaint to 
effect Rule 4 service on a defendant. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). Perales has admitted that he personally 
served the summonses in this case, see ECF 6 at 2–3; ECF 12 at 1, which rendered service 
improper, Olson v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 256 F.R.D. 8, 10 (D.D.C. 2009). Additionally, because 

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Perales did not accomplish proper service before the 90-day deadline to serve elapsed, dismissal 
is also proper under Rule 4(m). 
Attempting to remedy this error, Perales has moved to extend the deadline to serve. See 
ECF 12. The Court may decline to grant a motion to dismiss for insufficient process when a 
plaintiff is “pro se and could still serve process consistent with the Federal Rules,” Bullock v. Hana 
Indus., Inc., No. 22-cv-2608, 2024 WL 620440, at *2 (D.D.C. Feb. 14, 2024), and is required to 
extend the deadline to accomplish service if the failure to do so was for “good cause,” Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 4(m). But in this case, the Court will DENY the motion for extension of time to perfect service, 
ECF 12, because allowing Perales to properly serve Defendants would be an exercise in futility. 
Regardless of the resolution of service issues, this case must be dismissed because the Court lacks 
subject-matter jurisdiction over any of Perales’s claims against Defendants. 
It is the “right and duty of the Supreme Court to correct the irregularities of its officer and 
compel him to perform his duty.” In re Marin, 956 F.2d 339, 340 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (quoting Griffin 
v. Thompson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 244, 257 (1844)). “[T]his supervisory responsibility is exclusive 
to the Supreme Court and . . . neither a district court nor a circuit court of appeals has jurisdiction 
to interfere with it by mandamus or otherwise.” Id. As such, the lower courts lack “subject matter 
jurisdiction to review any decision of the Supreme Court or its Clerk.” Id. Perales’s attempt to 
distinguish this case from the rule of In re Marin on the ground that In re Marin dealt with only a 
petition for certiorari, whereas Perales’s suit involves an emergency motion, is unpersuasive. 
Because the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Perales’s claims, the Court must dismiss 
the action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). 
Finally, Perales’s motion for leave to file a surreply is also pending with the Court. See 
ECF 19. “[S]urreplies are generally disfavored, . . . and the determination of whether to grant or 

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deny leave is entrusted to the sound discretion of the district court.” Crummey v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 
794 F. Supp. 2d 46, 62 (D.D.C. 2011). Even considering Perales’s pro se status, the Court does 
not find that Perales has met the requirements for filing a surreply, in that his brief simply rehashes 
arguments already made to the Court. See id. Accordingly, the Court DENIES the motion. 
* * * 
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a surreply, ECF 19, is 
DENIED. Plaintiff’s motion to extend the time to serve, ECF 12, is DENIED. Defendants’ motion 
to dismiss, ECF 9, is GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s complaint, ECF 1, is DISMISSED. 
A separate order accompanies this memorandum opinion. 
SO ORDERED. 
 __________________________ 
 JIA M. COBB 
 United States District Judge 
 
Date: May 29, 2026 
 

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