govinfo:USCOURTS-ncmd-1_21-cr-00072-0

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
 P l a i n t i f f , 
 
 v. 
 
TOCEE MARTINZE MITCHELL, 
 
 D e f e n d a n t . 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
 
 
 
 
1:21CR72-1 
 
 
 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 
LORETTA C. BIGGS, District Judge. 
Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for Compassionate Rele ase, (ECF No. 54), 
filed March 16, 2023. The gove rnment responded in opposition on March 24, 2023. (ECF 
No. 56.) The Court, having considered the arguments of the parties set forth below, finds that 
Defendant has failed to show ex traordinary and compelling reas ons for sentence reduction. 
Further, the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3 553(a) counsel against sentence reduction. 
Accordingly, Defendant’s motion will be denied. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Defendant is currently 38 years old. (ECF No. 36 ¶ 2.)1 On October 6, 2021, he pled 
guilty to one count of possession of a firearm as a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). 
(ECF No. 36 ¶ 1–2.) This offe nse was subject to a Guidelines range of 110 to 120 months. 
(Id. ¶ 92.) The Court varied downward from the Guidelines and imposed a sentence of 94 
months, followed by three years of supervised release. (ECF No. 39 at 2–3.) Defendant has 
 
1 The Pre-Sentence Report, (ECF No. 36), is filed with the Court under seal. 

2 
served approximately 36% of this sentence, an d (pending credit for good conduct) he is 
scheduled for release on October 12, 2027. (ECF No. 60-2 at 3.) 
Defendant contends that compassionate rele ase is appropriate for several reasons. 
First, he points to health issues he has dealt with for much of his life, including diagnoses of 
an unspecified “disruptive disord er,” a “severe receptive and ex pressive language disorder,” 
and a “psychotic disorder.” (ECF No. 54 at 1.) While in grade school, he was determined to 
be “mentally handicapped.” (E CF Nos. 54 at 1; 36 ¶ 81.) According to Defendant, these 
issues persist. (See ECF No. 54 at 1.) Defendant also acknowledges that he has a “history of 
alcohol abuse.” ( Id.) Alternatively, Defendant argues that he should be released to help his 
mother care for his ailing grandmother. ( Id.) His grandmother suffered a stroke, and his 
mother is taking care of both his grandmother and his eldest child. ( Id.) Finally, Defendant 
points to his rehabilitation efforts as a reason fo r release. (ECF Nos. 54 at 1; 64 at 1–2.) 
Defendant also argues that the § 3553(a) factors weigh in favor of his release because of his 
personal characteristics, including a lack of criminal history, 2 his dedication to rehabilitation, 
his family support, and his plan for reentry into society. 
The government argues that Defendant’s medical conditions do not rise to the level of 
“extraordinary and compelling,” as they do not “substantially diminish his ability to provide 
self-care” in the prison environment. (ECF No. 60 at 8.) In particular, the government points 
to the fact that Defendant “has not sought any medical attention for his conditions in nearly 
a year.” (Id. at 9.) Additionally, the government argues that Defendant’s need to provide care 
to his grandmother is not extraordinary and co mpelling, since he is not the only person 
 
2 When sentenced, Defendant had a criminal history category of V. (ECF No. 46 at 3:6.) The 
sentencing court considered that this classification might have “somewhat overrepresent[ed]” the need 
for punishment in Defendant’s case, in light of a lack of serious violent or drug-related offenses. (Id. 
at 17:19-24.) 

3 
available to care for her. ( Id. at 9–13.) The government contends that Defendant’s 
rehabilitation is not so extrao rdinary that it, along with the other factors presented, would 
counsel towards release. ( Id. at 13–14.) Finally, the govern ment argues that the § 3553(a) 
factors do not weigh in favor of release, as allo wing Defendant to serve about a third of an 
already-reduced sentence would not promote ju st punishment, adequate deterrence, or 
protection of the public. (Id. at 14.) 
II. DISCUSSION 
Defendant must show the following to r eceive a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3582(c)(1)(A): (1) that he has exhausted all applicable administrati ve remedies; (2) that 
extraordinary and compelling reasons warranting sentence reduction exist; and (3) that the 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors weigh in favor of sentence reduction. United States v. Centeno-Morales, 
90 F.4th 274, 279 (4th Cir. 2024). The Court mu st also find that Defendant does not pose a 
danger to any other person or to the commu nity. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(a)(2); 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3582(c)(1)(A). 
A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies 
The government does not contest exhaustion. (ECF No. 60 at 5 n.2.) The record 
reflects that Defendant made a request in writ ing for a sentence reduct ion to his warden on 
May 30, 2022, which was de nied on July 8, 2022. (ECF No. 60-1 at 1–3.) Over thirty days 
have passed since the request was made. The Court finds that Defendant has satisfied the 
exhaustion requirement. See § 3582(c)(1)(A); United States v. Ferguson , 55 F.4th 262, 268 (4th 
Cir. 2022) (holding that the exhaustion require ment is satisfied when a defendant “waits 30 
days from the date of [his] initial request” (quoting United States v. Muhammad , 16 F.4th 126, 
131 (4th Cir. 2021))). 

4 
B. Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons 
The Court may reduce a defendant’s senten ce if it finds that “extraordinary and 
compelling reasons warrant such a reduction” and “such a reduction is consistent with 
applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i); see also 
United States v. Hargrove , 30 F.4th 189, 194 (4th Cir. 2022 ). Previously, the compassionate 
release policy statement, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, was only applicable to motions filed by the BOP, 
not defendants, United States v. McCoy, 981 F.3d 271, 283–84 (4th Cir. 2020). District courts 
were thus unconstrained by § 1B1.13 and were “empowered to consider any extraordinary and 
compelling reason for release that a defendant might raise.” Id. at 284 (quoting United States v. 
Brooker, 976 F.3d 228, 230 (2d Cir. 2020)) (cleaned up). However, the amendments to the 
Guidelines that took effect on November 1, 202 3, clarify that § 1B1.13 now applies to all 
compassionate release motions, whether filed by defendants or the BOP. U.S.S.G.§ 1B1.13(a). 
The Court will apply the amended version of § 1B1.13. See United States v. Davis, __ F.4th __, 
2024 WL 1662931, at *6 (4th Cir. 2024) (remanding case with instructions to apply the new 
amended policy statement). 
1. Medical Conditions 
A defendant’s medical conditions may constitute extraordinary and compelling reasons 
for release if he is “suffering from a serious functional or cognitive impairment . . . that 
substantially diminishes” his ability to care fo r himself in the prison environment. U.S.S.G. 
§ 1B1.13(b)(1)(B)(ii). Though Defendant has de scribed several conditions that under some 
circumstances might be considered “serious func tional or cognitive impairment,” he has not 
in any way alleged that they diminish his ability to care for himself. ( See ECF No. 54 at 1.) 
Nor do Defendant’s health records suggest th at his mental conditions or alcohol abuse 
disorder are seriously affecting his ability to care for himself. ( See ECF No. 61 at 2–3, 7, 24, 

5 
27, 43, 49 (describing Defendant’s psychiatric condition as normal and noting a lack of mental 
health diagnosis).)3 Defendant has not sought medical treatment for any of the conditions 
that he complains of in his Motion. (See generally ECF No. 61.) Defendant has failed to present 
sufficient evidence from which the Court can fi nd that his mental conditions warrant his 
release. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson , Crim. No. ELH-14-0429, 2023 WL 8090628, at *14 
(D. Md. Nov. 21, 2023) (rejecting a defendant’s assertion that he had “high anxiety and PTSD” 
because BOP reports stated that he “voiced no current problems or complaints of a 
psychological nature” and “[s]howed no signs of psychological distress or impairment 
suggestive of active mental illness”). 
Moreover, the Court at sentencing took De fendant’s mental conditions and alcohol 
abuse issues into account when determining his sentence. (See ECF No. 46 at 4:13-21, 16:1-
16.) Defendant has presented no evidence to su ggest that his conditions have gotten worse 
since sentencing. His motion refers to a mental evaluation he received in 2021 while in BOP 
custody prior to his sentencing. (ECF Nos. 54 at 1; 36 ¶ 72.) No more recent events or 
symptoms have been identified. Nor does De fendant describe how these conditions have 
changed such that they impair his ability to care for himself in the prison setting. Cf. United 
States v. Gray, No. 4:09CR00029-003, 2021 WL 4812977, at *1 & n.1 (W.D. Va. Oct. 15, 2021) 
(finding no extraordinary and compelling reasons by way of health conditions when those 
conditions were “well-managed” and had existed well before the defendant entered custody). 
The Court finds that under these circumst ances, Defendant’s medical conditions do 
not rise to the level of “extraordinary and compelling reasons” to support his request for a 
sentence reduction. 
 
3 Defendant’s medical records, (ECF No. 61), are filed with the Court under seal. 

6 
2. Family Circumstances 
Extraordinary and compelling reasons fo r sentence reduction may exist when a 
defendant establishes that an “immediate fa mily member,” such as a grandparent, is 
incapacitated and “the defendant would be th e only available caregiver for such family 
member.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(3)(D); see also United States v. Barton , No. 1:11CR349-1, 
1:12CR255-1, 2022 WL 1157978, at *5 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 18, 2022) (denying motion where sisters 
were caring for defendant’s aging father). That is not the case here. Though it appears from 
the record that Defendant’s grandmother is in deed incapacitated, Defendant’s own account 
suggests that his mother “is now taking care of her.” (ECF No. 54 at 1.) In addition, the Pre-
Sentence Report states that his grandmother spends most of her time in an assisted living 
facility. (ECF No. 36 ¶ 59). 
Defendant’s desire to care for his grandm other and ease the financial burden his 
imprisonment has placed on his family is admirable; however, it does not present extraordinary 
and compelling reasons in favor of sentence reduction. See, e.g., United States v. Hooks, 3:18-cr-
59-MOC-DCK-1, 2021 WL 796156, at *3 (W.D.N.C. Mar. 2, 2021) (defendant was not the 
only available caregiver for terminally-ill moth er; other family memb ers lived nearby, and 
mother was also under hospice care); United States v. Holt , No. 1:20-cr-0055-2 (RDA), 2021 
WL 2457064, at *6 (E.D. Va. June 16, 2021) (not ing that even if it would be “cumbersome” 
for others to provide care, that does not mean a defendant is the “only” available caregiver). 
3. Rehabilitation 
A defendant’s rehabilitation “is not, by itself, an extraordinary and compelling reason” 
for release. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(d); see also 28 U.S.C. § 994(t). However, the court may consider 
rehabilitation “in combination with other circumstances in determining whether and to what 
extent” a sentence reduction is warranted. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(d); see also 28 U.S.C. § 994(t). 

7 
While Defendant’s efforts toward rehabilitation are to be commended, they do not rise 
to the level of extraordinary and compelling reasons to support his request for a sentence 
reduction. He reports enrollment in the “Challenge Program,” (ECF No. 64 at 1–2), a 
residential program meant to provide treatm ent for substance abuse problems and serious 
mental illnesses, FIRST STEP ACT Approved Programs Guide 9, Fed. Bureau of Prisons (Feb. 
2021), https://www.bop.gov/inm ates/fsa/docs/2021_fsa_program_guide.pdf, as well as 
other classes encouraging pro-social behavior, (ECF No. 64 at 1–2). Defendant has also 
maintained a spotless disciplinary record duri ng his time in custody. (ECF No. 60-3.) 
However, this conduct is what is expected of any inmate. See United States v. Logan , 532 F. 
Supp. 3d 725, 735 (D. Mi nn. 2021) (“Prisoners are supposed to follow the rules, take classes, 
work at a job, and otherwise attempt to improve themselves. That a prisoner does so means 
that he has met baseline expectations, not that he has done something extraordinary.”) These 
efforts do not rise to the level of extraordin ary and compelling reasons for release, whether 
on their own or when considered alongside the above-discussed factors. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(d); 
see, e.g., United States v. McCain, No. 1:06CR203-1, 2023 WL 7385546, at *8 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 8, 
2023) (finding no extraordinary and comp elling reasons where defendant showed 
rehabilitation but made no other successf ul arguments in favor of release); see also 28 U.S.C. 
§ 994(t). 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court fi nds that Defendant has not presented 
extraordinary and compelling reasons in support of a sentence reduction. 
C. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) Factors 
While the Court is not required to consider the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 
in light of its finding that Defendant has not presented extraordinary and compelling reasons 

8 
that support his request for a sentence reduction, it will address the arguments Defendant has 
raised that relate to those factors. Courts must impose a sentence or sentence reduction that 
is “‘sufficient, but not greater than necessary’ to comply with the statutory purpose of 
sentencing.” United States v. Banks, No. 1:12CR193-1, 2020 WL 6568607, at *3 (M.D.N.C. Oct. 
7, 2020) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)). Among the various § 3553(a) factors, this Court finds 
that the sentencing factors most applicable here are: (1) “the nature and circumstances of the 
offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant” and (2) “the need for the sentence 
imposed” to reflect the seriousness of the crim e, deter criminal cond uct, and protect the 
public. See § 3553(a)(1)–(2); see United States v. Bethea, 54 F.4th 826, 831 (4th Cir. 2022) (obliging 
district courts to consider the § 3553(a) senten cing factors “to the extent those factors are 
applicable”). 
1. Seriousness of the Offense 
The conduct underlying Defendant’s conviction is serious. As a felon, Defendant knew 
he was prohibited from possessing a firearm. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). In the instant offense, 
he did more than just possess a firearm. The record evidence discloses that Defendant was in 
a fist fight with one of his neighbors. (ECF N o . 3 6 ¶ 7 . ) D u r i n g t h a t f i g h t , D e f e n d a n t 
retrieved a firearm and shot th e neighbor in the stomach. ( Id. ¶¶ 7–9.) Defendant then fled 
the scene, leaving the firearm in his house and his neighbor on the ground. (Id. ¶¶ 7, 9–10.) 
Defendant’s willingness to not only illegal ly possess a firearm but use it on another 
person to resolve an altercation makes the need for his sentence to protect the community a 
priority. It suggests that his sentence must be designed to deter him from future unlawful 
conduct, since his previous state court punishments did not do so. Moreover, his absconding 

9 
from the scene of the crime, along with his criminal history, demonstrate a lack of respect for 
the law that his sentence must address. 
2. Defendant’s History and Characteristics 
Defendant has struggled with alcohol abuse and other serious mental health challenges 
for much of his life. ( See generally ECF No. 54.) He had a difficult childhood in which he 
witnessed violence regularly. (ECF Nos. 46 at 4:7-12; 36 ¶¶ 55–58.) Defendant nevertheless 
maintains a close relationship with his family , particularly his grandmother, and he has 
consistently expressed a desire to provide care for her. (ECF Nos. 46 at 14:24–15:9; 54 at 1.) 
Though Defendant has a somewhat lengthy criminal history, ( see ECF No. 36 
¶¶ 30–41), the Court at sentencing noted that most of his charges were “for driving offenses 
for alcohol and use of substances,” not “violent acts or sales of drugs on a large basis,” (ECF 
No. 46 at 17:4–11). When he was sentenced, he had one previous felony conviction for fleeing 
arrest in a motor vehicle, which he did while intoxicated. (ECF No. 36 ¶ 33.) Defendant’s 
conduct in the instant case demonstrates an escalation in his criminal behavior. His sentence 
here thus reflects an increased need for specific deterrence and protection of the public. 
3. Need for the Sentence Imposed 
Defendant’s sentence was a downward variance from the Guidelines range. (ECF No. 
46 at 18:5–8.) In reaching this sentence, th e Court at sentencing considered Defendant’s 
personal and family history, hi s upbringing, his struggles wi th mental health and drug 
addiction, the offense conduct, and the seriousness of his past offenses relative to his criminal 
history category. ( Id. at 15:25–18:4.) Defendant has now served just over a third of that 
already reduced sentence. See United States v. Kibble, 992 F.3d 326, 331 (4th Cir. 2021) (holding 
that courts may consider the amount of time defendants have served for § 3553(a) purposes). 
A reduction or release at this time, in the context of Defendant’s offense conduct and criminal 

10 
history, would not adequately “reflect the seriousness of the offense” or “promote respect for 
the law.” § 3553(a)(2)(A). 
Defendant has introduced evidence of his rehabilita tion efforts and his clean 
disciplinary record, which the Court has taken into consideration and discussed in more detail 
above. While commendable, these efforts do not outweigh the considerations that led the 
Court to Defendant’s initial sentence. See United States v. Hargrove, 30 F.4th 189, 200 (4th Cir. 
2022); see also United States v. Bryant , No. 2:17-cr-432-DCN, 2023 WL 5431581, at *4 (D.S.C. 
Aug. 23, 2023). 
The seriousness of Defendant’s current offense and the length of his sentence served 
disfavor release under the § 3553(a) factors. However, these factors have no effect on the 
Court’s ruling here, since Defendant failed to show extraordinary and compelling reasons for 
a sentence reduction. 
For the reasons stated herein, the Court enters the following: 
 
ORDER 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Compassionate 
Release, (ECF No. 54), is DENIED. 
This, the 3rd day of March 2025. 
/s/ Loretta C. Biggs 
United States District Judge 
 

Passage view · GavelSight