govinfo:USCOURTS-tned-3_03-cr-00066-0

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 
 ) 
 Plaintiff, ) 
 ) 
v. ) No.: 3:03 -CR-66-TAV-DCP-1 
 ) 
ELKER E. JONES, ) 
 ) 
 Defendant. ) 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 
This matter is before the Court on defendant’s counseled motion for a 
compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) [Sealed Doc. 34] The government 
responded in opposition [Doc. 35], and de fendant replied [Doc. 36]. Defendant 
subsequently filed a supplement to his motion [Sealed Doc. 38], the government filed a 
supplemental response [Doc. 40], and defendan t filed a supplemental reply [Sealed Doc. 
42]. Defendant subsequently filed an additional supplement to his motion [Doc. 44]. For 
the reasons set forth more fully below, defendant’s motion for a sentence reduction under 
either § 3582(c)(1)(A) or § 3582(c)(1)(B) [Sealed Doc. 34] is DENIED. 
I. Background 
On June 11, 2003, defendant pled guilty to bank robbery by force or violence, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d) (Count 1); using and carrying a firearm during and 
in relation to a crime of violence, in viola tion of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (Counts 2 & 4); 
Hobbs Act robbery, in viola tion of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (Coun t 3); and being a felon in 
possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) a nd 924(a)(2) (Count 5) PageID
#: <pageID>
 
2 
[Docs. 8, 15]. The Honorabl e R. Leon Jordan, United Stat es District Judge, sentenced 
defendant to a total of 435 months’ imprisonment, consisting of 51 months as to Counts 1, 
3, and 5, to be served concurrently with each other, 84 months as to Count 2, consecutive 
to any other terms imposed, and 300 months as to Count 4, consecutive to any other terms 
imposed [Docs. 19, 20]. Upon motion of th e government, Judge Jordan subsequently 
reduced defendant’s sentence to a total of 326 months’ imprisonment [Doc. 25].1 
According to the Bureau of Prisons’ webs ite, defendant is presently scheduled for 
release on April 21, 2027. Inmate Locator, Federal Bu reau of Prisons, available at 
https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (accessed May 11, 2026). 
II. Legal Standard 
A court generally lacks “the authority to change or modify [a sentence, once 
imposed,] unless such authority is expressly granted by statute.” United States v. 
Thompson, 714 F.3d 946, 948 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing United States v. Curry, 606 F.3d 323, 
326 (6th Cir. 2010)). “O ne exception—commonly referred to as ‘compassionate 
release’—permits the court to reduce a term of imprisonment if it finds, among other 
things, that ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction.’” Rutherford 
v. United States, 608 U.S. ___, slip op. at 1 (2026) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i)). 
The First Step Act of 2018’s amendment of § 3582(c)(1)(A) revised this exception. First 
Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, 5239 (2018); Rutherford, slip op. 
 
1 Notably, this order did not set forth how that 326-month reduced sentence was to be 
distributed among the counts of conviction [See Doc. 25]. PageID
#: <pageID>
 
3 
at 4. Prior to the First Step Act, a distri ct court could grant relie f under § 3582(c)(1)(A) 
only on motion of the Director of the Bure au of Prisons. Now a court may modify a 
defendant’s sentence upon a mo tion by a defendant if the defendant has exhausted all 
administrative rights to appeal a failure of th e Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the 
defendant’s behalf or after the lapse of 30 da ys from the receipt of such a request by the 
warden of the defendant’s facility, whichever is earlier. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). 
If the defendant surmounts this preliminary hurdle, the Court may grant a sentence 
reduction “after considering the factors set forth in § 3553(a) to the ex tent that they are 
applicable” if it finds: 
(i) extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction; or 
 
(ii) the defendant is at least 70 years of age, has served at least 30 years in 
prison, pursuant to a sentence imposed under section 3559(c), for the offense 
or offenses for which the defendant is currently imprisoned, and a 
determination has been made by the Dire ctor of the Bureau of Prisons that 
the defendant is not a danger to the safety of any other person or the 
community, as provided under section 3142(g); 
 
and that such a reduction is consiste nt with applicable policy statements 
issued by the Sentencing Commission . . . . 
 
Id. Defendant seeks relief under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) [Sealed Doc. 34]. 
If the exhaustion requirement is satisfied, courts must then follow the statute’s 
three-step test: 
At step one, a court must “find[ ]” whether “extraordi nary and compelling 
reasons warrant” a sentence reduction. At step two, a court must “find[ ]” 
whether “such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements 
issued by the Sentencing Commission.” The Commission’s policy statement 
on compassionate release resides in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. Thus, if § 1B1.13 is 
still “applicable,” courts must “fo llow the Commission’s instructions in PageID
#: <pageID>
 
4 
[§ 1B1.13] to determine the prisoner's eligibility for a sentence modification 
and the extent of the reduction authorized.” At step three, “§ 3582(c)[(1)(A)] 
instructs a court to consider any app licable § 3553(a) factors and determine 
whether, in its discretion, the reduction authorized by [steps one and two] is 
warranted in whole or in part under the particular circumstances of the case.” 
 
United States v. Jones, 980 F.3d 1098, 1107–08 (6th Cir. 2020) (internal citations omitted). 
In considering a compassionate release moti on, “district courts may deny compassionate 
release motions when any of the three prerequisites listed in § 3582(c)(1)(A) is lacking and 
do not need to address the others” but must “address all three steps” if granting such a 
motion. United States v. Elias, 984 F.3d 516, 519 (6th Cir. 2021). 
III. Analysis 
A. Exhaustion 
The Court first examines whether defe ndant has satisfied § 3582(c)(1)(A)’s 
exhaustion requirement, which is a mandatory prerequisite to consideration of a 
compassionate release request on the merits. United States v. Alam, 960 F.3d 831, 833–34 
(6th Cir. 2020). “When ‘prope rly invoked,’ mandatory claim-processing rules ‘must be 
enforced.’” Id. at 834 (quoting Hamer v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of Chi. , 138 S. Ct. 
13, 17 (2017)). The only exceptions to such a mandatory claim-processing rule are waiver 
and forfeiture. Id. (citing United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002)). 
In this case, the government concedes that the exhaustion requirement has been 
satisfied [Doc. 40, p. 7]. Ac cordingly, the Court will pro ceed to evaluate defendant’s 
compassionate release request according to the three-step test explained above. PageID
#: <pageID>
 
5 
B. Extraordinary a nd Compelling Reasons 
 
Turning to whether defendant has set fo rth extraordinary and compelling grounds 
for relief, the Court first notes that the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
previously held that “[i]n cases where incarcerated persons file motions for compassionate 
release, federal judges may skip step two of the § 3582(c)(1)(A) inquiry and have full 
discretion to define ‘extraordinary and compelling’ without consulting the policy statement 
of § 1B1.13.” United States v. Jones, 980 F.3d 1098, 1111 (6th Cir. 2020). This was so 
because the applicable policy statement, United States Sentencing Guideline § 1B1.13, as 
written at the time, did not contemplate inma te-filed motions for compassionate release, 
but instead, was limited to circumstances where the Bureau of Prisons filed a motion on an 
inmate’s behalf. Id. at 1109–10; see also U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.13 
(U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018). 
However, the Sentencing Commission amende d the policy statement in § 1B1.13, 
effective November 1, 2023, to encompass inmate-filed motions for compassionate release. 
U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.13 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2023). It thus appears 
that the Sixth Circuit’s prior ru ling that § 1B1.13 is not an applicable policy statement to 
inmate-filed motions for compassionate release is no longer consistent with the Guidelines. 
See United States v. Nash, No. 23-3635, 2024 WL 1979067, at *3 (6th Cir. Apr. 30, 2024) 
(noting the amendment to § 1B1.13 and stating that “prior to [the date of amendment], no 
guideline policy statement applied to comp assionate-release mo tions brought by 
defendants, and a district cour t could deny a defendant-filed motion without reference to PageID
#: <pageID>
 
6 
any policy statement”); see also United States v. Ringgold , No. ELH-17-232, 2023 WL 
7410895, at *5–6 (D. Md. Nov. 8, 2023) (“[I]t appears that the Fourth Circuit’s conclusion 
in McCoy, 981 F.3d at 281, to th e effect that ‘§ 1B1.13 is not an ‘applicable’ policy 
statement,’ is no longer consistent with th e Guidelines. This is because the Policy 
Statement is now expressly applicable to de fendant-filed motions pur suant to 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3582(c)(1)(A).”). However, “[t]he new policy statement largely preserves the discretion 
district courts held to consider any extr aordinary and compelling reason for release.” 
United States v. Davis, No. 3:20-cr-16, 2023 WL 7356579, at *2 (W.D. N.C. Nov. 7, 2023). 
As amended, § 1B1.13(b) states that “[e]xtraordinary and compelling reasons exist 
under any of the following circumstances or a combination thereof,” and discusses when 
the medical circumstances of the defendant , the age of the defe ndant, the family 
circumstances of the defendant, the defendant’s victimization in custody, and other reasons 
may constitute extraordin ary circumstances. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL 
§ 1B1.13(b)(1)–(6). 
Recently, the Supreme Court provided some guidance as to the meaning of the term 
“extraordinary and compelling.” “The term ‘extraordinary’ means ‘most unusual,’ ‘far 
from common,’ or ‘having little or no precedent.’” Rutherford, slip op. at 8. 
“‘Compelling,’ meanwhile, means ‘tending to convince or convert by or as if by 
forcefulness of evidence.’” Id. “Putting these definitions together ‘extraordinary and 
compelling’ reasons for compa ssionate release are those that are especially unusual and 
convincing.” Id. at 8–9. Thus “[w]hile the terms ‘extraordinary’ and ‘compelling’ leave PageID
#: <pageID>
 
7 
room for judgment, they are not so flexible as to encompass any consideration.” Id. at 11. 
Rather, “[t]heir meaning depends on context: A reason is ‘extraordinary’ and ‘compelling’ 
only if it is sufficiently unusual and convincing to ‘warrant’ compassionate release.” Id. 
1. COVID-19 Risk 
Defendant’s first ground for seeking compassionate release is his contention that his 
medical conditions increase his risk of su ffering severe symptoms if he contracts 
COVID-19 [Sealed Doc. 34, p. 2 ]. Defendant specifically stat es that, at the time of his 
motion, he was a 52-year-old African Americ an male with a medical history including 
chronic periodontitis, hyperlipidemia, asthma, and obesity, and a family history of gastric 
cancer [Id.]. 
The amended policy statement provides that the following may be extraordinary 
and compelling reasons for release: 
(A) The defendant is suffering from a te rminal illness (i.e., a serious and 
advanced illness with an end-of-life trajectory). A specific prognosis of 
life expectancy (i.e., a probability of death within a specific time period) 
is not required. Examples include metastatic solid-tumor cancer, 
amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS ), end-stage organ disease, and 
advanced dementia. 
 
(B) The defendant is— 
 
(i) suffering from a serious physical or medical condition, 
 
(ii) suffering from a serious functional or cognitive impairment, or 
 
(iii) experiencing deteriorating physic al or mental health because 
of the aging process, that substantially diminishes the ability of 
the defendant to provide self-care within the environment of a 
correctional facility and from which he or she is not expected 
to recover. PageID
#: <pageID>
 
8 
 
(C) The defendant is suffering from a medical condition that requires 
long-term or specialized medical care that is not being provided and 
without which the defendant is at risk of serious deterioration in health 
or death. 
 
(D) The defendant presents the following circumstances— 
 
(i) the defendant is housed at a correctional facility affected or at 
imminent risk of being affected by (I) an ongoing outbreak of 
infectious disease, or (II) an ongoing public health emergency 
declared by the appropriate federal, state, or local authority; 
 
(ii) due to personal health risk fa ctors and custodial status, the 
defendant is at increased risk of suffering severe medical 
complications or death as a result of exposure to the ongoing 
outbreak of infectious disease or the ongoing public health 
emergency described in clause (i); and 
 
(iii) such risk cannot be adequately mitigated in a timely manner. 
 
U.S.
 SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.13(b)(1). 
 Although his motion was filed before the amendment to the Guidelines, defendant’s 
motions is best construed as proceeding under § 1B1.13(b)(1)(D), as he does not indicate 
that he is suffering from a terminal illness, a condition that limits his ability to provide 
self-care, or a condition causing serious deterioration [See Sealed Doc. 34]. 
Under the final subsection of § 1B1.13(b)(1), defendant’ s health issues may be 
extraordinary and compelling grounds for releas e when combined with the increased risk 
of contracting, or becoming severely ill from, COVID- 19; however, defendant has not 
adequately established all thre e requirements of § 1B1.13(b)(1 )(D). First, defendant has 
not established that he is housed at a correctional facility affected by an ongoing outbreak 
of COVID-19. Indeed, records indicate that defendant is now listed as being located in the PageID
#: <pageID>
 
9 
Orlando RRM field office. Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Inmate Locator, 
www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (last accessed May 14, 2026). In other words, defendant is now 
located at a residential reentry center, sometimes referred to as a “h alfway house,” rather 
than a prison facility. Accord ingly, it does not a ppear that defendant is housed at a 
correctional facility with an ongoing or imminent COVID-19 outbreak. 
Moreover, the Sixth Circuit has previously held that “a defe ndant’s incarceration 
during the COVID-19 pandemic—when the defendant has access to the COVID-19 
vaccine—does not present an ‘extraordinary and compelling reason’ warranting a sentence 
reduction.” United States v. Lemons, 15 F.4th 747, 751 (6th Cir. 2021). Defendant admits 
that he has received at least three doses of the COVID-19 vaccination [Sealed Doc. 34, p. 
3]. Therefore, given defendant’s access to the COVID-19 vaccine, the Court does not find 
that defendant’s risk of severe medical complications associated with contracting 
COVID-19 cannot be adequately mitigated in a timely manner. Accordingly, defendant 
has not established that medical circumstances constitute an extraordinary and compelling 
ground for release. 
Defendant’s medical circumstances, pursuan t to § 1B1.13(b)(1), do not rise to the 
level of an extraordinary and compelling reason warranting compassionate release. 
 2. Change in Law 
Next, defendant argues that the altered sentencing scheme for § 924(c) offenses, 
which would result in a reduced sentence, if he were sentenced today, constitutes an 
extraordinary and compelling ground for relief [S ealed Doc. 34, pp . 13–14]. In a PageID
#: <pageID>
 
10 
supplement, defendant explicitly relies on § 1B1.13(b)(6) of the Sentencing Guidelines 
[Sealed Doc. 38, p. 5]. That section of the amended policy statement provides that 
non-retroactive changes in law can constitute an extraordin ary and compelling reason for 
release under certain conditions. See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.13(b)(6). 
However, in April 2025, the Sixth Circuit invalidated section 1B1.13(b)(6). United States 
v. Bricker, No. 24-3286, 2025 WL 1166016, at *1 (6th Cir. Apr. 22, 2025). Based in part 
on the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 
603 U.S. 369 (2024), which re duced the interpretive deferenc e afforded to agencies, the 
Sixth Circuit determined that the Commissi on “overstepped its authority and issued a 
policy statement that is plainly unreasonabl e under the statute and in conflict with the 
separation of powers.” Bricker, 2025 WL 1166016, at *1; see also Moctezuma-Reyes v. 
Garland, 124 F.4th 416, 420 (6th Cir. 2024) (clarifying when courts should independently 
interpret statutes). 
In reaching its conclusion, the Bricker majority clarified th at the Sixth Circuit’s 
decision in United States v. McCall , 56 F.4th 1048 (6th Ci r. 2022) (en banc), which 
predates the amended policy statement, remains the law of this Circuit. In contrast to the 
policy statement contained in § 1B1.13(b)(6) of the Guidelines, the McCall court held that 
the fact “that a defendant might receive a diffe rent sentence today than he received years 
ago represents the routine business of our legal system” and “cannot supply an 
extraordinary and compelling reason to reduce a lawful sentence whose term Congress 
enacted, and the President signed, into law.” Id. at 1065. In other words, because Loper 

PageID #: <pageID>
 
11 
Bright reduced courts’ deference to Co mmission policy statements, and the Bricker 
majority held that section 1B1.13(b)(6) is “plainly unre asonable,” “we [are] bound by 
McCall’s views on the plain meaning of ‘e xtraordinary and compelling.’” Bricker, 2025 
WL 1166016, at *1–*9 (citing United States v. Ferguson , 868 F.3d 514, 515 (6th Cir. 
2017)). 
More recently, the Supreme Court addressed this issue, and held that “Congress’s 
nonretroactive change to §924(c)—considered by itself or in combination with other 
factors—cannot make a prisoner eligible for compassionate release.” Rutherford, slip op. 
at 16. The Court stated that , to the extent the Sentenci ng Guidelines’ policy statement 
counsels otherwise, “the Commission’s policy statement is invalid.” Id. The Court 
specifically concluded that the disparity creat ed by the amendment of § 924(c) does not 
satisfy § 3582(c)(1)(A)’s “extraordinary and compelling” requirement. Id. at 9. The Court 
reasoned that “[f]ar from ‘extraordinary,’ nonretroactive amendments to criminal penalties 
are the norm.” Id. Further, the Court stated that “[ i]t is hard to see how Congress’s 
deliberate decision not to extend newly reduced penalties to those already sentenced could 
be a convincing reason that ‘warrants’ a reduction.” Id. (emphasis in original) (alteration 
omitted). Further, the Court found that the nonretroactive change to § 924(c)’s sentencing 
scheme also “fall[s] well outside the heartla nd of compassionate re lease, which has long 
been defined by a prisoner’s personal circumstances.” Id. at 10. Accordingly, the Supreme 
Court concluded that the disparity that results from Congress’s decision to leave a sentence 

PageID #: <pageID>
 
12 
untouched cannot serve as an extraordinary and comp elling ground for relief under 
§ 3582(c)(1)(A). Id. at 17. 
In light of the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Bricker and the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Rutherford, it is clear that the Court is not to consider the non-retroactive amendment to 
§ 924(c)’s sentencing scheme as an extrao rdinary and compelling ground for relief under 
§ 3582(c)(1)(A). 
 3. Combination of Factors 
Finally, defendant suggests that the combination of his health conditions, his 
unusually long sentence, and his rehabilitative efforts provide grounds for his release under 
§ 1B1.13(b)(5) of the Sentencing Guidelines’ policy statement [Sealed Doc. 38, p. 10]. 
Section 1B.13(b)(5) sets forth “[o]ther [r]easons that may be deemed extraordinary 
and compelling grounds for compassionate release. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL 
§ 1B1.13(b)(5). Specifically, that section states that “other circumstances or combination 
of circumstances that, when considered by themselves or together with any of the reasons 
described in paragraphs (1) through (4), are similar in gravity to those described in 
paragraphs (1) through (4)” may also warrant compassionate release. Id. 
But the Supreme Court has made clear that courts cannot consider the 
non-retroactive amendments to § 924(c), even in combination with other factors, in 
determining whether a defendant has shown extraordinary and compelling grounds for 
release. Rutherford, slip op. at 16 (“Congre ss’s nonretroactive change to 
§924(c)—considered by itself or in combination with ot her factors—cannot make a 

PageID #: <pageID>
 
13 
prisoner eligible for compassionate release.”). Even considering just defendant’s health 
conditions in combination with his rehabilitative efforts, the Court finds that these factors 
together are not “similar in gravity” to th e circumstances described in subsections 
(1) through (4) of § 1B1.13(b). Accordingly, the Court is not convinced that defendant has 
established extraordinary and compelling reasons that warrant release. 
IV. Conclusion 
For the reasons set forth more fully above, defendant’s motion [Sealed Doc. 34] is 
DENIED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
s/ Thomas A. Varlan 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
 
 
 
 

PageID #: <pageID>

Passage view · GavelSight