govinfo:USCOURTS-dcd-1_24-cv-03365-0

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

LIAT ATZILI, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v. Civil Action No. 1:24-cv-03365 (CJN)

ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Several victims of the October 7 attacks against Israel claim here that the corporate entities
that operate the Binance cryptocurrency exchanges assisted the terrorists who carried out th ose
attacks. ECF 47. In particular, Plaintiffs contend that BAM Management US Holdings, Inc. and
BAM Trading Services Inc. (collectively, BAM), as well as Binance Holdings Limited (BHL), are
liable under federal antiterrorism statutes and state tort law because they failed to implement
adequate sanctions controls and did not report or remove terrorist-linked users despite warnings
that accounts associated with Hamas and Iran were transacting on their platforms. Those
Defendants move to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and failure to state a claim for relief.
ECF 63; ECF 64.
Although Plaintiffs suffered horribly from the October 7 attacks, and although the amended
complaint raises serious concerns about how users associated with terrorists might exploit the lack
of controls on the Binance platforms, Plaintiffs ’ allegations fail to establish that the assistance
BAM and BHL provided to Hamas was substantial or connected enough to the October 7 attacks
to merit liability. The Court of Appeals’s recent holding that “[a]lleging that a defendant generally

knew its assistance was going to a terrorist organization is insufficient ” dooms Plaintiffs’ claims
for aiding-and-abetting liability. Atchley v. AstraZeneca UK Ltd. , 165 F.4th 592, 608 (D.C. Cir.
2026); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2333(d)(2). Plaintiffs’ primary liability claims fail because the alleged
compliance defects in BAM’s and BHL’s operation of their cryptocurrency platforms do not
constitute “activities” that “involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 2331(1). And without a surviving federal claim, the Court declines to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ “novel” claims under state law. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). The Court
accordingly grants BAM’s and BHL’s motions to dismiss.
I. Background
To resolve the pending motions to dismiss, it is helpful to understand Plaintiffs’ allegations
regarding the structure and conduct of BAM and BHL, the funding and execution of the October
7 attacks, and the procedural posture of this case.1
A. The Binance Entities and Operations
In July 2017, Changpeng Zhao founded BHL to operate a cryptocurrency exchange
accessible at Binance.com. ECF 47 ¶ 116. This exchange now hosts millions of users conducting
trillions of dollars in virtual transactions across more than 180 countries. Id. As of March 2018,
more than a third of its users resided in the United States. Id. ¶ 124. Plaintiffs allege that “Zhao
and [BHL] understood that they were operating Binance.com in violation of numerous U.S. laws”
and that they consequently “hired several advisors to counsel them on managing their U.S. legal
exposure.” Id. ¶¶ 149, 151. When presented with a choice of a “ low risk approach of active
outreach to regulators [to] resolve all potential issues ” and a “moderate risk approach in which

1 “At the motion to dismiss stage,” the Court of course “accept[s] as true all of the complaint’s
relevant allegations of fact.” Urquhart-Bradley v. Mobley, 964 F.3d 36, 40 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2020).

[BHL] would establish a U.S. entity that w [ould] become the target of all built -up enforcement
tensions . . . and insulate [BHL] from legacy and future liabilities,” BHL went with the latter
approach. Id. ¶¶ 151–53 (alterations adopted) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
In September 2019, Zhao launched BAM to provide American users a cryptocurrency
exchange accessible at Binance.US. Id. ¶ 117. BAM took several steps to comply with U.S.
financial services regulations, such as registering Binance.US as a money services business with
the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN). Id. ¶ 118. This registration obligated BAM
to “develop, implement, and maintain an effective” anti -money laundering (AML) program with
know your client (KYC) controls. Id. ¶¶ 140–43.
Plaintiffs allege that although BHL “represented to the public, U.S. regulators, and U.S.
courts that Binance. [US] was the exclusive Binance trading platform for U.S. users,” BHL
“simultaneously engaged in a widespread and covert effort to permit U.S. customers, particularly
its VIP users, to continue to use the Binance.com access point to the Binance Platform.” Id.
¶¶ 176–77. As evidence of this deception, Plaintiffs assert that “Zhao directed [BHL] to implement
a plan to encourage customers to circumvent [BHL]’s geographic blocking of US -based IP
addresse[s] by using a VPN to conceal their US location.” Id. ¶ 180. And they allege that BHL’s
Chief Compliance Officer drafted a “‘VIP Handling’ document” that “instructed [BHL] employees
to make sure th[at] U.S. customers opened new accounts ‘with no US documents allowed’ and to
inform the customer ‘to keep this confidential.’” Id. ¶ 183 (citation omitted).
Plaintiffs also allege that, beyond having insufficient controls, BHL failed to act after
learning that users associated with terrorist organizations, including Hamas, were engaged in
transactions on its platform. “In April 2019, [BHL] received reports from its third -party service
provider, identifying Hamas-associated transactions.” Id. ¶ 192. But it did not file a suspicious

activity report (SAR) with FinCEN about this activity. Id. BHL “also failed to file a SAR with
FinCEN on its connections to BuyCash, a money transmitter that OFAC designated in October
2023 for its involvement in Hamas fundraising,” despite being “aware of extensive suspicious
activity involving this entity” bef ore the formal designation. Id. ¶ 208. Furthermore, “[i]n one
instance, in July 2020, after a third -party service provider flagged accounts associated with ISIS
and Hamas, the former Chief Compliance Officer . . . instructed compliance personnel to check if
he is a VIP account, if yes, to offboard the user but let him take his funds and leave.” Id. ¶ 210
(alterations adopted) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). And “[b]etween December
29, 2021 and July 5, 2023, the [Israeli National Bureau for Counter Terror Financing (NBCTF)]
issued at least nine . . . Seizure Orders identifying and seizing funds from dozens of Binance
accounts affiliated with various terrorist organizations, including individuals associated with
Hamas.” Id. ¶ 217.
Eventually, BHL’s and Zhao’s inadequate compliance controls caught up with them. In
November 2023, the U.S. Department of Justice announced criminal settlements with BHL and
Zhao. Id. ¶ 222. “Zhao pleaded guilty to violating federal law by failing to maintain an effective
AML program and conducting an unlicensed money transmitting business.” Id. ¶ 223. BHL “and
its CEO admitted that its own data showed it caused at least $890 million in transactions between
U.S. users and users [BHL] identified as Ira nians between August 2017 and October 2022.” Id.
¶ 224. BHL agreed to pay a financial penalty of more than $4.3 billion, and Zhao agreed to pay
$50 million as part of his plea agreement. Id. ¶ 226.
B. The October 7 Attacks
Plaintiffs allege that, since at least 2017, Hamas has relied on cryptocurrency exchanges to
avoid sanctions controls while engaging in financial transactions. Id. ¶ 74. In aid of its terrorist

activities, Hamas has received significant support from Iran, including “tens of millions of dollars
in cryptocurrency transfers” and “shared . . . expertise in rocket development and training,
enabling Hamas to manufacture advanced weapons locally.” Id. ¶¶ 74 –75. This general aid
eventually progressed to the support of the specific terrorist attacks at issue in this suit.
In December 2020, Hamas started training for what would become the October 7 attacks.
Id. ¶ 81. Hamas conducted complex drills to prepare and even “built a mock Israeli military base”
to practice storming buildings and taking hostages. Id. ¶¶ 83–84. According to later reporting,
“Iranian security officials helped to plan the attack and ‘gave the green light for the assault.’” Id.
¶ 85. “By September 2023, hundreds of Hamas militants had traveled to Iran for training, learning
tactics such as using drones . . . [and] paragliders.” Id. ¶ 78. On October 7, 2023, Hamas put this
training and financial support to use, launching attacks “ on several fronts throughout Israel.” Id.
¶ 90.
Plaintiffs are victims of the October 7 attacks. Liat Atzili was captured by terrorists on
October 7 and held in captivity for 54 days. Id. ¶¶ 303–06, 325–26. The day after her release, she
learned that Hamas had killed her husband, Aviv, on the day of the attack and had taken his body
to Gaza. Id. ¶ 331. Hamas had also killed their dog and severely damaged their house. Id. ¶¶ 333–
34.
Keith and Aviva Siegel attempted to hide in their safe room after hearing sirens and rockets
on the morning of October 7. Id. ¶¶ 343–44. The terrorists eventually found them, shot Keith in
the hand, injured Aviva’s knee, and t ook them to underground tunnels in Gaza. Id. ¶¶ 347–49,
352–53. While in captivity, the Siegels were routinely deprived of food and water. Id. ¶ 355.
Hamas released Aviva after 51 days, but it kept Keith hostage and continued to torment him until
finally releasing him after 484 days. Id. ¶¶ 367, 378, 380–81.

Shai Siegel, Keith and Aviva’s oldest son, was trapped in a saferoom in his own house for
over 24 hours. Id. ¶ 389. Although he was able to avoid capture, he lost his house and “is now
living away from family and friends and continues to grapple with his own experience on October
7th, coupled with the experience of having both of his parents being taken hostage.” Id. ¶ 394.
The rest of Keith and Aviva’s children —Elan Tiv, Shir Siegel, and Gal Siegel —and Keith’s
siblings—Lucy Siegel, Lee Siegel, and David Siegel —also allege that they “suffered lasting and
permanent injuries, as well as tremendous pain and suffering,” from witnessing their family
members be taken hostage. Id. ¶¶ 395, 398.
C. Procedural History
A year after her release, Liat Atzili filed this suit against Iran , Hamas, BAM, BHL, and
Zhao. ECF 1. Members of the Siegel family later joined as plaintiffs. ECF 47. Together, they
raise several claims under federal antiterrorism law and state tort law for the injuries they suffered
due to the October 7 attacks. Id. ¶¶ 425–636.
BAM and BHL moved to dismiss the amended complaint. ECF 63; ECF 64. While
briefing on th ose motions was ongoing, they also moved to stay discovery. ECF 71. Plaintiffs
opposed that request for a stay and filed their own motion to compel discovery. ECF 80. The
Court held oral argument on these motions last month.2 See Min. Entry of Apr. 21, 2026.
II. Legal Standards
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) authorizes a defendant to move for dismissal due
to a “lack of personal jurisdiction.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). “[W]hen personal jurisdiction is in

2 An ongoing dispute about proper service of Hamas and Zhao has been running on a parallel track
to the proceedings involving BAM and BHL. The Court recently authorized Plaintiffs’ request for
alternative service under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f)(3) for Hamas but denied it as to
Zhao. ECF 101.

question, a court must first determine that it possesses personal jurisdiction over the defendants
before it can address the merits of a claim.” Kaplan v. Cent. Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran,
896 F.3d 501, 510 (D.C. Cir. 2018). “T he plaintiff has the burden of establishing a factual basis
for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant.” Crane v. N.Y. Zoological Soc’y, 894
F.2d 454, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1990). “In determining whether such a basis exists, factual discrepancies
appearing in the record must be resolved in favor of the plaintiff.” Id.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) also permits dismissal where a plaintiff “fail[s]
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). At the motion -to-
dismiss stage, courts “accept the plaintiff’s factual allegations as true and construe the complaint
liberally, granting plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.”
Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (alterations adopted) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). “Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate where, taking all factual
allegations as true and construing all inferences in the plaintiff ’s favor, a plaintiff’s pleadings do
not present ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Goodrich v. Bank
of Am. N.A., 136 F.4th 347, 353 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007)).
III. Personal Jurisdiction
Plaintiffs advance two theories of personal jurisdiction in this case. They contend first that
the Court has personal jurisdiction over both BAM and BHL under the District of Columbia’s
long-arm statute. ECF 81 at 15–19; ECF 83 at 3–6. Plaintiffs argue, in particular, that the Court
“may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly or by an agent, as to a claim

for relief arising from the person’s . . . transacting any business in the District of Columbia.”3 D.C.
Code § 13-423(a)(1). They also maintain that the Court has personal jurisdiction over BHL
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2) based on a signed stipulation in which BHL
agreed to waive objections to service. ECF 83 at 6–8; see also ECF 20. BAM and BHL respond
that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over them due to their minimal connections to the District
and the absence of a link between their contacts in the District and Plaintiffs’ injuries. ECF 63 -1
at 12–14; ECF 64-1 at 6–7. BHL further objects that Rule 4(k)(2) is inapplicable here because the
stipulation also provides that Plaintiffs would forego arguing that BHL had waived any defenses,
including lack of personal jurisdiction. ECF 64 -1 at 9 ; ECF 87 at 2–3. Because the Court
concludes that the D.C. long-arm statute appears to provide personal jurisdiction over BAM and
BHL, it does not address whether Rule 4(k)(2) applies.4
“With limited exceptions, the [District]’s ‘transacting any business’ clause has been
interpreted to provide jurisdiction to the full extent allowed by the Due Process Clause.” United
States v. Ferrara , 54 F.3d 825, 828 (D.C. Cir. 1995). “[T]he statutory and constitutional
jurisdictional questions, which are usually distinct,” therefore “merge into a single inquiry: would
exercising personal jurisdiction accord with the demands of due process?” Thompson Hine, LLP
v. Taieb, 734 F.3d 1187, 1189 (D.C. Cir . 2013) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

3 As relevant here, “the term ‘person’ includes . . . a corporation, partnership, association, or any
other legal or commercial entity, whether or not a citizen or domiciliary of the District of Columbia
and whether or not organized under the laws of the District of Columbia.” D.C. Code § 13-421.

4 The Court also does not address the Parties ’ arguments as to whether BAM is the alter ego of
BHL because this issue does not affect resolution of the pending motions . See ECF 63-1 at 41–
45; ECF 64-1 at 13–15; ECF 81 at 5–7, 20–26; ECF 83 at 14; ECF 86 at 12–18; ECF 87 at 7. As
will be explained, BAM and BHL separately have sufficient suit-related contacts for the Court to
exercise personal jurisdiction over each of them under the D.C. long -arm statute. And Plaintiffs
fail to plead a plausible claim of aiding -or-abetting or primary liability under federal law even if
the Court assesses the allegations against BAM and BHL collectively.

“A court’s jurisdiction over a defendant satisfies due process when there are ‘minimum contacts’
between the defendant and the forum ‘such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into
court there.’” Id. (first quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); and then
quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson , 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) ). In addition,
“submission through contact with and activity directed at a sovereign may justify specific
jurisdiction ‘in a suit arising out of or related to the defendant ’s contacts with the forum.’” J.
McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 881 (2011) (quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de
Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8 (1984)). The D.C. long-arm statute relatedly requires
“a nexus between the plaintiff’s claim and the defendant’s business activities in the forum
jurisdiction.” Shoppers Food Warehouse v. Moreno , 746 A.2d 320, 332 (D.C. 2000); see also
Forras v. Rauf, 812 F.3d 1102, 1106 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (explaining that although the “provision has
been held ‘to be coextensive (for cases that fit within its description) with the Constitution’s due
process limit[,]’ . . . subsection (a)(1) still ‘contemplates a connection that is related to the claim
in suit’” (alterations adopted) (quoting Crane v. Carr, 814 F.2d 758, 762–63 (D.C. Cir. 1987))).
Plaintiffs allege a number of links between both BAM and BHL and the District. The
amended complaint alleges that “[a]t all relevant times, [BHL] intentionally maintained substantial
connections to the United States, including in the District of Columbia, from which it generated,
among other things, web traffic, user base, transaction volume, and profit.” ECF 47 ¶ 122 .
Plaintiffs also cite consumer complaints made by D.C. users against BAM in a Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau database as evidence that residents of the District used its platform. ECF 81-15
at 3, 6–7. Focusing on Plaintiffs’ allegations that BAM is “registered to do business in the district”
and that “[t]he Binance Platform remains accessible to District of Columbia residents,” ECF 47
¶¶ 55, 57, BAM protests that “allegations that D.C. residents could access BAM’s interactive

website are not tantamount to allegations that any D.C. residents actually engaged in any business
transactions with BAM, as required to establish personal jurisdiction,” ECF 63-1 at 13 (alteration
adopted) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). But this objection ignores that Plaintiffs
plead that “[t]he Binance Defendants derived substantial revenue from their business in the U.S.,
deriving substantial revenue in this District ”—which would not be possible unless business
transactions actually took place in the District.5 ECF 47 ¶ 133.
Other relevant allegations confirm the extent of BAM’s and BHL’s D.C.-based contacts,
which appear to be “voluntary and deliberate, rather than fortuitous .” Mouzavires v. Baxter, 434
A.2d 988, 995 (D.C. 1981). Plaintiffs allege that BHL “had several employees who worked from
and reside in this District, including its Global Head of Intelligence and Investigations, its Global
Money Laundering Reporting Officer, at least one member of its Global Advisory Board, and its
Vice President of Global Intelligence and Investigations.” 6 ECF 47 ¶ 127. Given that “physical

5 In the amended complaint, “Plaintiffs collectively refer to Defendants Binance Holdings Limited
. . . , Changpeng Zhao . . . , BAM Management US Holdings, Inc. . . . , and BAM Trading
Services, Inc . . . as the ‘Binance Defendants’ or ‘Binance entities.’” ECF 47 ¶ 29. References,
as here, to the “Binance Defendants” therefore encompass both BAM and BHL.

6 The cited paragraph of the amended complaint refers to “Binance” having these D.C. -based
employees, which by Plaintiffs’ own naming conventions, sweeps in only BHL. See ECF 47 ¶¶ 29,
127. Plaintiffs nonetheless contend in their response to BAM’s motion to dismiss that “BAM
maintains a physical presence in the District and maintains various employees in ‘the precise type
of positions’ with ‘decision -making capability surrounding the issues that form the basis for this
Amended Complaint’ in the District, including employees on the investigations, policy and
compliance, and money laundering reporting teams.” ECF 81 at 16 (quoting ECF 47 ¶ 127). As
support for this claim, Plaintiffs cite the aforementioned paragraph, as well as another paragraph
about relevant employees that more broadly alleges that “[t]hese individuals were specifically
involved in the Binance Defendants’ negligent acts and wi th the decision-making that caused the
Binance Platform to be defective in design, guarding, and manufacture.” ECF 47 ¶ 126. In
addition, Plaintiffs cite exhibits establishing that at least some of the relevant employees worked
for BAM. See, e.g., ECF 81-17 at 3 (“Binance.US is also deepening its presence in Washington
D.C., having last week named Josh Wilsusen . . . as its first Chief Policy Officer .”). The Court
consequently concludes that Plaintiffs have alleged that both BAM and BHL had compliance -
related employees working in the District.

entry into the State—either by the defendant in person or through an agent, goods, mail, or some
other means—is certainly a relevant contact,” Walden v. Fiore , 571 U.S. 277, 285 (2014) , the
decision to hire key employees in the District supports personal jurisdiction here. After all,
“[j]urisdiction is proper . . . where the contacts proximately result from actions by the defendant
himself that create a ‘substantial connection’ with the forum State.” Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985) (quoting McGee v. Int’l Life Ins., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957)).
Plaintiffs also highlight that BAM joined D.C.-based professional associations. ECF 47 ¶ 134.
Although this sort of connection would likely be insufficient on its own, when considered with the
other allegations, it is more evidence of an “affiliation with the [District].” Walden, 571 U.S. at
286.
Plaintiffs therefore allege business activities by both BAM and BHL in the District , but
whether there is a sufficient nexus between those activities and Plaintiffs’ claims is a closer
question. Considerations of due process and the D.C. long-arm statute require that “the litigation
results from alleged injuries that ‘arise out of or relate to’ those activities” that BAM and BHL
“‘purposefully directed’” at the forum. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472 (first quoting Helicopteros
Nacionales, 466 U.S. at 414; and then quoting Keeton v. Hustler Mag ., Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774
(1984)); see also Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown , 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011)
(“[S]pecific jurisdiction is confined to adjudication of issues deriving from, or connected with, the
very controversy that establishes jurisdiction .” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) ).
Given that “[t]he requirement of a nexus between the plaintiff’s claim and the defendant’s business
activities in the forum jurisdiction has been stated in the disjunctive ,” “if the claim either arises
out of or relates to the nonreside nt defendant ’s business activity, specific jurisdiction may be
exercised.” Shoppers, 746 A.2d at 332. “The first half of that standard asks about causation; but

the back half, after the ‘or,’ contemplates that some relationships will support jurisdiction without
a causal showing.” Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1026 (2021).
Plaintiffs contend that they satisfy this nexus requirement because their “claims arise out
of BAM’s [and BHL’s] decisions to drive users to the Binance Platform through both the
Binance.com and Binance.us apps to increase the profits of BAM and BHL, despite lacking
adequate KYC, AML, and sanctions -monitoring controls.” ECF 81 at 17 –19; ECF 83 at 5 –6.
Although Plaintiffs’ nexus theory is somewhat novel, it appears to be just enough to satisfy the bar
set by existing precedent.
Plaintiffs allege that BAM’s and BHL’s decisions not to implement sufficient anti-money
laundering and sanctions controls were made in the District , and that those decisions led to the
financing of the October 7 attacks that ultimately injured them. ECF 47 ¶¶ 186, 206–10, 493, 568,
622. Whether these allegations are sufficient hinges on the Court of Appeals’s decision in
Bernhardt v. Islamic Republic of Iran, which held in a comparable case involving the financing of
terrorist entities that a plaintiff must “allege some relation between the sanctions evasion by the
foreign defendants and the injuries suffered in the terrorist attack.” 7 47 F.4th 856, 866 (D.C. Cir.
2022) (emphasis added). There, the Court concluded that the plaintiff had not alleged a sufficient
nexus between the terrorist attack that caused her injuries and the foreign bank defendants that
allowed evasion of sanctions controls because transactions associated with the terrorist-linked
intermediaries lacked any specific connection to al-Qaeda—the terrorist group that carried out the
attack. See id. at 864–66.

7 BAM’s and BHL’s reliance on Cockrum v. Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., which required
“a more exacting nexus ,” 319 F. Supp. 3d 158 (D.D.C. 2018), is misplaced because that case
predated the Supreme Court’s clarification of the requirement in Ford Motor Co. v. Montana
Eighth Judicial District Court, 141 S. Ct. 1017 (2021).

Unlike the plaintiff in Bernhardt, who “fail[ed] to allege any aid flowing indirectly through
the[] intermediary banks to al -Qaeda,” id. at 865, Plaintiffs here specifically allege that “ [BHL]
was aware that Hamas, PIJ, and other architects of the October 7th Attacks were using Binance to
fundraise,” ECF 47 ¶ 209; see also id. ¶ 255 (“[BHL], as well as its senior officers and employees,
including Zhao, were aware that members of Hamas were using the Binance Platform to fund
terrorism.”). As for BAM, Plaintiffs argue that “in fulfilling its function to serve as a regulatory
shield for BHL so that BHL could flout AML, KYC, and sanctions regulations, BAM ratified and
made possible BHL’s facilitation of terrorist financing through the Binance Platform.” ECF 81 at
19; see also ECF 47 ¶¶ 154, 221, 258. Such allegations are sufficient given that Plaintiffs “did not
need to allege the [compliance] evasion caused the [October 7 attacks]” nor “ to identify specific
dollars spent on the terrorist attack.” Bernhardt, 47 F.4th at 866. In addition, where “a defendant
uses forum contacts as an instrument for achieving the wrong alleged,” there is enough of “‘an
affiliation between the forum and the underlying controversy’” for the Court to exercise personal
jurisdiction. Atchley v. AstraZeneca UK Ltd., 22 F.4th 204, 234 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (quoting Bristol-
Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal. , 582 U.S. 255, 262 (2017)) , cert. granted , judgment
vacated, 144 S. Ct. 2675 (2024), and opinion reinstated in relevant part, 165 F.4th 592 (D.C. Cir.
2026). Although the question is a close one, t he Court concludes that Plaintiffs have made the
“prima facie showing” required to establish personal jurisdiction. Edmond v. U.S. Postal Serv.
Gen. Couns., 949 F.2d 415, 424 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
IV. Federal Claims
Plaintiffs assert two kinds of federal claims against BAM and BHL. First, they contend
that BAM and BHL aided and abetted Hamas by allowing it to transact on Binance leading up to

the October 7 attacks. ECF 47 ¶¶ 563 –73. Second, they argue that BAM and BHL directly
committed acts of international terrorism. Id. ¶¶ 574–600.
A. Aiding-and-Abetting Liability
The Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA) amended the Anti-Terrorism Act
(ATA) to impose liability “for an injury arising from an act of international terrorism committed,
planned, or authorized by an organization that had been designated as a foreign terrorist
organization” against “any person who aids and abets, by knowingly providing substantial
assistance.” 18 U.S.C. § 2333(d)(2). “To state a claim of aiding and abetting under the ATA,
plaintiffs thus need to plead three statutory elements: (1) an injury arising from an act of
international terrorism; (2) which act was committed, planned, or authorized by a designated
Foreign Terrorist Organization; and (3) that defendants aided or abetted the act of international
terrorism by knowingly providing substantial assistance.” Atchley, 165 F.4th at 601–02. BAM
and BHL do not contest Plaintiffs’ allegations a s to the first two elements, but do argue as to the
third that they did not knowingly nor substantially assist Hamas in carrying out the October 7
attacks. ECF 63-1 at 15–21; ECF 64-1 at 20–31.
Liability under this provision of JASTA attaches only where a defendant “ aids and abets,
by knowingly providing substantial assistance.’” 18 U.S.C. § 2333(d)(2). Although “[n]othing in
the statute defines any of those critical terms ,” “terms like ‘aids and abets ’ are familiar to the
common law.” Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh , 143 S. Ct. 1206, 1218 (2023). “In enacting JASTA,
Congress provided additional context by pointing to Halberstam v. Welch , 705 F.2d 472 ([D.C.
Cir.] 1983), as ‘providing the proper legal framework’ for ‘civil aiding and abetting and conspiracy
liability.’” Twitter, 143 S. Ct. at 1218 (alteration adopted) (quoting JASTA, Pub. L. No. 114-222,
§ 2(a)(5), 130 Stat. 852, 852 (2016)). Under Halberstam, six factors “help determine whether a

defendant’s assistance was ‘substantial’: ‘(1) the nature of the act assisted, (2) the amount of
assistance provided, (3) whether the defendant was present at the time of the principal tort, (4) the
defendant’s relation to the tortious actor, (5) the defendant’s state of mind, and (6) the duration of
the assistance given.’” Atchley, 165 F.4th at 603 (quoting Twitter, 143 S. Ct. at 1219). The “‘basic
thrust’” of these factors is “attaching liability to ‘conscious, voluntary, and culpable participation
in another’s wrongdoing .’” Id. (quoting Twitter, 143 S. Ct. at 12 20, 1223). And in practice,
“[c]ulpability is measured by ‘the twin requirements’ of ‘knowing’ and ‘substantial’ assistance,
which ‘work in tandem’ to permit a court to ‘infer conscious and culpable assistance,’ with a ‘lesser
showing of one demanding a greater showing of the other. ’” Id. (alteration adopted) (quoting
Twitter, 143 S. Ct. at 1222).
In addition, the “defendants must have ‘aided and abetted the act of international terrorism
that injured the plaintiffs.’” Id. (quoting Twitter, 143 S. Ct. at 1225). Aiding-and-ability liability
therefore attaches only where there is a sufficient nexus “ between the alleged assistance and the
wrongful act.”8 Twitter, 143 S. Ct. at 1224. “Like the ingredients of culpability, nexus operates
on a sliding scale . . . measured by the closeness of the relationship between defendants’ assistance
and the act of international terrorism that injured plaintiffs. ” Atchley, 165 F.4th at 604. “When
there is a direct nexus between the defendant’s acts and the tort, courts may more easily infer such
culpable assistance.” Twitter, 143 S. Ct. at 1230. “But, the more attenuated the nexus, the more
courts should demand that plaintiffs show culpable participation through intentional aid that
substantially furthered the tort.” Id.

8 This nexus standard is distinct from the nexus standard for personal jurisdiction , as it concerns
the connection between the alleged assistance and the terrorist act rather than the relationship
between forum contacts and the claims in the suit.

Two recent decisions applying these considerations have illustrated the bounds of aiding-
and-abetting liability under JASTA. On one side of the line, the Supreme Court held in Twitter,
Inc. v. Taamneh that victims of a terrorist attack failed to state an aiding-and-abetting claim against
social media companies accused of “ knowingly allowing ISIS and its supporters to use their
platforms and benefit from their ‘recommendation’ algorithms, enabling ISIS to connect with the
broader public, fundraise, and radicalize new recruits .” 143 S. Ct. at 1217, 1231. The Court
concluded that the victims’ claims could not survive a motion to dismiss because , among other
pleading defects, they “never allege[d] that, after defendants established their platforms, they gave
ISIS any special treatment or words of encouragement .” Id. at 1226. It further emphasized that
“[t]he fact that these algorithms matched some ISIS content with some users . . . does not convert
defendants’ passive assistance into active abetting.” Id. at 1227. And it explained that aiding-and-
abetting liability does not attach where “defendants [were] bystanders, watching passively as ISIS
carried out its nefarious schemes.” Id.
On the other side of the line, the Court of Appeals held in Atchley v. AstraZeneca UK Ltd.
that aiding-and-abetting claims could proceed against pharmaceutical manufacturers and suppliers
alleged to have “ paid illegal cash bribes directly to [terrorists] and supplied extra, off -the-books
batches of valuable medical goods that Jaysh al-Mahdi monetized on the black market to fund its
operations against Americans .” 165 F.4th at 596, 601. The Court concluded that the victims
“allege enough to support reasonable inferences that defendants knew their ongoing dealings with
the Ministry of Health materially supported terrorist attacks against Americans ” and pointed out
that “[i]t is not business as usual for sophisticated transnational companies to provide cash and in-
kind bribes to a known terrorist organization over a period of years when that organization is
openly maiming and killing U.S. citizens.” Id. at 609, 611. Distinguishing the case from Twitter,

the Court emphasized that “defendants here had bespoke dealings with Jaysh al -Mahdi” that
amounted to a “voluntary, tailored relationship.” Id. at 612–13.
Against this backdrop, Plaintiffs’ claims for aiding-and-abetting liability against BAM and
BHL merit dismissal. As to culpability, Plaintiffs fail to allege that BAM and BHL provided the
degree of “knowing and substantial assistance to the primary tortfeasor” required to establish
aiding-and-abetting liability under JASTA. Twitter, 143 S. Ct. at 1222. Plaintiffs do put forth
some allegations that BAM and BHL had or should have had notice that terrorist organizations
“were using Binance to fundraise.” ECF 47 ¶ 209. They allege, for example, that senior employees
“receiv[ed] information ‘regarding HAMAS transactions’ on Binance ” in February 2019 ; that
“[BHL] received reports from its third -party service provider, identifying Hamas -associated
transactions,” in April 2019; and that the Israeli NBCTF “issued at least nine . . . Seizure Orders
identifying and seizing funds from dozens of Binance accounts affiliated with various terrorist
organizations, including individuals associated with Hamas,” between December 2021 and July
2023. Id. ¶¶ 191–92, 217–18 (citation omitted). But “[a]lleging that a defendant generally knew
its assistance was going to a terrorist organization is insufficient .” Atchley, 165 F.4th at 608; see
also Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc. v. Estados Unidos Mexicanos , 145 S. Ct. 1556, 1567 (2025)
(“When a company merely knows that ‘some bad actors’ are taking ‘advantage’ of its products for
criminal purposes, it does not aid and abet.” (quoting Twitter, 143 S. Ct. at 1228)); Twitter, 143 S.
Ct. at 1226 (“[I]t might be that bad actors like ISIS are able to use platforms like defendants’ for
illegal—and sometimes terrible —ends . . . . Yet, we generally do not think that internet or cell
service providers incur culpability merely for providing their services to the public writ large .”).
After all, “the ATA imposes liability for aiding and abetting ‘acts of international terrorism,’ not
for incidentally supporting a terrorist organization.” Atchley, 165 F.4th at 608 (alteration adopted)

(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2333(d)(2)). That BAM and BHL were aware that some “Hamas-associated
transactions,” ECF 47 ¶ 192, were happening on their platforms that are “ generally available to
the . . . public” is not enough to establish a culpable “state of mind with respect to their actions and
the tortious conduct,” Twitter, 143 S. Ct. at 1226, 1229.
Notably, Plaintiffs fail to plead “[p]erhaps the strongest support for [an] inference of
culpable association” in these sorts of aiding-and-abetting cases: allegations of an “‘unusual’ kind
of assistance.” Atchley, 165 F.4th at 610. “[T]here are no allegations that [BAM and BHL] treated
[Hamas-linked users] any differently from anyone else.” Twitter, 143 S. Ct. at 1227. Instead,
Plaintiffs merely allege that BAM and BHL helped high-dollar, VIP clients evade sanctions
detection on occasion.9 See, e.g., ECF 47 ¶¶ 177, 180 –81, 183. Because the special treatment
alleged was given to “VIP users” generally, id. ¶ 177, rather than users associated with Hamas in
particular, this set of facts falls short of the kind of “bespoke dealings” and “voluntary, tailored
relationship” with a terrorist entity at issue in Atchley, 165 F.4th at 612 –13. Providing extra
attention to high-volume customers who could generate BAM and BHL the most amount of money
is simply not the same as “consciously and selectively cho[osing] to promote . . . a particular
terrorist group.” Twitter, 143 S. Ct. at 1228. And the alleged assistance is a far cry from
“knowingly structur[ing] their transactions to facilitate [terrorists’] diversion of funds, drugs, and
medical devices.” Atchley, 165 F.4th at 609 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Furthermore, the assistance that BAM and BHL allegedly provided was not particularly
substantial. Focusing on “ the ‘basic thrust’ of Halberstam’s elements” instead of treating each
factor “‘as immutable components,’” several considerations counsel against imposing aiding-and-

9 Crucially, Plaintiffs allege that BHL flagged users as VIPs if they were “high-volume traders”—
not because they had ties to terrorist organizations. ECF 47 ¶ 411.

abetting liability here. Twitter, 143 S. Ct. at 1220 (quoting Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 478 n.8, 489).
Starting with the relationship between BAM and BHL on the one hand and Hamas on the other,
Plaintiffs do not allege a “voluntary, tailored relationship [of] the type courts require under the
common law to ground aiding-and-abetting liability in culpable misconduct.” Atchley, 165 F.4th
at 613; see also Bernhardt, 47 F.4th at 872 (“The fourth factor considers the closeness of any
relationship between the defendant and the terrorist organization.” (emphasis added)). Plaintiffs
do not plead that BAM and BHL had a direct relationship with Hamas or any other terrorist
organization, as their evidence of a relationship illustrates that there were multiple degrees of
separation between the entities.10 See, e.g., ECF 47 ¶¶ 208–09 (alleging that BAM and BHL failed
to act after “Binance user addresses were found to interact with bitcoin wallets associated with
the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Hamas’ Al -Qassam Brigades, Al Qaeda, and the
Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ)” (emphases added)). Rather, Plaintiffs implicitly acknowledge this
lack of a direct connection by focusing on BAM’s and BHL’s alleged “direct and deliberate
relationship to Hamas’s financing” rather than with Hamas itself when discussing this Halberstam
factor. ECF 81 at 36. Such an attenuated c onnection is nothing like the “bespoke dealings” the
defendants had with terrorists in Atchley by which they allegedly “directly supplied Jaysh al-Mahdi
with cash and drugs to win its business.” 165 F.4th at 612. And that BAM and BHL “w[ere] not

10 Despite primarily pleading that BAM and BHL were aware of “Hamas-associated transactions”
and “accounts affiliated with various terrorist organizations,” ECF 47 ¶¶ 192, 217, Plaintiffs do in
one instance allege that “[BHL], as well as its senior officers and employees, including Zhao, were
aware that members of Hamas were using the Binance Platform to fund terrorism,” id. ¶ 255. Even
reading these somewhat inconsistent allegations most charitably to Plaintiffs, however, awareness
that some individuals who were members of Hamas were among the millions of users o n their
platforms is hardly evidence that BAM and BHL had a n “active, direct, and particularized”
relationship with Hamas in the manner contemplated by Halberstam and its progeny. Atchley, 165
F.4th at 612.

physically present at the terrorist attack[s] on [October 7]” further highlights the several degrees
of separation between them and the October 7 attacks. Bernhardt, 47 F.4th at 871.
To be sure, “[g]reater access to capital —the alleged aid —is important to [Hamas]’s
terrorist efforts, which depend on depositing, transferring, and expending money,” and thus can
“weigh[] in favor of finding substantial assistance ” under the first factor concerned with “the
‘nature of the act encouraged.’” Id. at 870–71 (quoting Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 483). Yet it is
worth reiterating that Plaintiffs do not allege that BAM and BHL “directly supplied [Hamas] with
cash.” Atchley, 165 F.4th at 612. They instead blame BAM and BHL for not taking more
aggressive action to stop others from financially assisting terrorists . See ECF 47 ¶ 208. That
attenuation, however, illustrates that “[Hamas’s] ability to benefit from these platforms was merely
incidental to defendants’ services and general business models; it was not attributable to any
culpable conduct of defendants directed toward [Hamas].” Twitter, 143 S. Ct. at 1229. Concluding
that BAM and BHL can be held liable for the October 7 attacks merely because their generally
available services are financial-related and money is fungible would contravene Twitter’s warning
that it is error to focus “primarily on the value of defendants’ platforms to [terrorists], rather than
whether defendants culpably associated themselves with [the terrorists ’] actions.” Id. That
Plaintiffs allege that BAM and BHL were aware that Hamas-associated accounts were operating
on their platforms for several years in advance of the October 7 attacks does not save their
argument either, as “a lengthy financial relationship does not terrorism assistance make.”
Bernhardt, 47 F.4th at 872.
Moving to nexus , Plaintiffs fail to allege a sufficient connection between BAM’s and
BHL’s alleged assistance and the October 7 attacks that injured Plaintiffs—particularly given their
minimal culpability. Even though “[r] equiring an overly rigid nexus is especially inappropriate

when a plaintiff alleges that a defendant provided financial assistance,” Atchley, 165 F.4th at 606;
see also Holder v. Humanitarian L. Project, 561 U.S. 1, 31 (2010) (emphasizing that “[m]oney is
fungible” for terrorist organizations) , Plaintiffs’ allegations establish only an attenuated link
between BAM and BHL and the October 7 attacks. Once again, BAM and BHL did not fund
Hamas—at most they allegedly did not stop others from transferring money to Hamas-associated
accounts on their platforms. Twitter’s pronouncement that “the question is whether defendants
gave substantial assistance to [terrorists] with respect to the [specific] attack,” 143 S. Ct. at 1229,
therefore appears to govern here rather than Atchley’s exception for “funding-based claims,” 165
F.4th at 606. Given that Plaintiffs do not allege that any particular Binance transaction supported
the October 7 attacks, they fail to adequately link any alleged assistance from BAM and BHL to
their injuries. See Twitter, 143 S. Ct. at 1224 (“[I] t is not enough, as plaintiffs contend, that a
defendant have given substantial assistance to a transcendent ‘enterprise’ separate from and
floating above all the actionable wrongs that constitute it.”).
But even treating the hosting of a cryptocurrency platform on which users associated with
Hamas could transmit currency without being detected as a form of “financial assistance,” there is
not much “closeness . . . between defendants’ assistance and the act of international terrorism that
injured plaintiffs.” Atchley, 165 F.4th at 604, 606 . Plaintiffs allege that BAM and BHL were
“aware that Hamas, PIJ, and other architects of the October 7th Attacks were using Binance to
fundraise.” ECF 47 ¶ 209. This accusation of “merely fail[ing] to act while [Hamas] (like
everybody else) used their platforms ,” however, lacks a “close[] and . . . distinct tie” to Hamas’s
“acts of terrorism” against Plaintiffs. Atchley, 165 F.4th at 605. Plaintiffs do not allege that BAM
and BHL engaged in any conduct like “persistently pursu[ing] opportunities to do business with
[Hamas] in particular [or] ma[king] corrupt payments that directly financed [Hamas]’s sustained

campaign of terrorist attacks .” Id. (alteration adopted) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). And they do not allege specific facts about any “activity [BAM and BHL] helped
[Hamas] to undertake,” which could permit liability whe re later injuries were “a natural and
foreseeable consequence of the activity.” Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 488 (emphasis added). In light
of BAM’s and BHL’s relatively minimal culpability “for providing their services to the public writ
large,” Twitter, 143 S. Ct. at 1226, such weak allegations of a nexus cannot establish aiding -and-
abetting liability under JASTA.
Finally, Plaintiffs’ theory of liability would improperly encompass every potential act of
terrorism perpetuated by Hamas. Plaintiffs downplay the degree of nexus required to link BAM
and BHL to the October 7 attack s, see ECF 81 at 32; cf. ECF 83 at 34 (arguing that “it would in
fact be perfectly justifiable under these circumstances for Plaintiffs to impose liability on Binance
for any terror attack in Israel in light of everything BHL knew and did” in the context of whether
Plaintiffs’ in juries were for eseeable), but in doing so, they implicitly illustrate that imposing
aiding-and-abetting liability on BAM and BHL for the October 7 attacks has no limiting principle
because any attack carried out by Hamas could theoretically have been funded with money linked
to a Binance transaction. “[I]f a plaintiff’s theory would hold a defendant liable for all the torts of
an enterprise, then a showing of pervasive and systemic aid is required to ensure that defendants
actually aided and abetted each tort of that enterprise.” Twitter, 143 S. Ct. at 1230. Plaintiffs fall
well short of making this showing given the lack of any tailored assistance or substantial financial
contributions on the part of BAM and BHL. Consequently, as in Twitter, “the expansive scope of

plaintiffs’ claims” therefore “put[s] . . . to rest” any doubt that dismissal of the aiding-and-abetting
claims is required.11 Id. at 1228.
B. Primary Liability
The ATA further provides that “[a]ny national of the United States injured in his or her
person, property, or business by reason of an act of international terrorism, or his or her estate,
survivors, or heirs, may sue therefor in any appropriate district court of the Uni ted States.” 18
U.S.C. § 2333(a). The statute defines an act of “international terrorism” to encompass “activities”
that (1) “involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal
laws of the United Sta tes or of any State ”; (2) “appear to be intended” to “ intimidate or coerce a
civilian population,” “influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion,” or “affect
the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping ”; and (3) “occur

11 The Court is aware that a different district court previously allowed aiding-and-abetting claims
to proceed against BHL in a suit brought by other victims of the October 7 attacks. See Raanan v.
Binance Holdings Ltd. , No. 24-cv-697, 2025 WL 605594, at *18 –24 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2025).
But several factual and legal differences distinguish that case from this one. Beginning with the
pleadings, the plaintiffs in Raanan put forth more specific allegations of substantial assistance and
knowledge than Plaintiffs here. See, e.g., id. at *20 (“The plaintiffs also allege that, from October
2020 to September 2023, Hamas and PIJ executed thousands of transactions on Binance, with a
total value of at least approximately $60 million. The plaintiffs further allege that Hamas
publicized its use of Binance, pointing to a 2019 video that Hamas used to solicit donations, which
instructs viewers to create a new account on one of the trading platforms, including, notably,
Binance.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). Next, the court in Raanan did not
seem to grapple with the fact that BHL’s alleged assistance in helping certain users evade sanctions
controls was based on customers’ VIP status as high-volume users rather than their connections to
Hamas. Finally, and most importantly, Atchley controls the Court’s analysis here unlike in
Raanan—a decision that predated Atchley and came from a court that would not have been bound
by Atchley anyway. The Court of Appeals made clear in Atchley that “[a]lleging that a defendant
generally knew its assistance was going to a terrorist organization is insufficient ,” 165 F.4th at
608, and, for all the reasons already discussed, Plaintiffs have failed to state a plausible claim for
aiding-and-abetting liability under the standard from that case . This conclusion is not an outlier,
as another district court in the same district as the Raanan court recently granted BHL’s motion to
dismiss in a similar case. See Troell v. Binance Holdings Ltd., No. 24-cv-7136, 2026 WL 636849,
at *21–22 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2026).

primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States .” Id. § 2331(1). Plaintiffs raise
two claims of direct liability under the ATA. ECF 47 ¶¶ 574–600. The first is based on a violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 2339A, which criminalizes “[w]hoever provides material support or resources or
conceals or disguises the nature, location, source, or ownership of material support or resources,
knowing or intending that they are to be used in preparation for, or in carrying out, a violation of”
various terrorism-related statutes. And the second relies on a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1),
which imposes liability on “[w]hoever knowingly provides material support or resources to a
foreign terrorist organization.”
Plaintiffs have not pleaded a plausible primary liability claim under the ATA. None of the
conduct BAM and BHL allegedly undertook rises to the level of “activities” that “involve violent
acts or acts dangerous to human life .” 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1). Plaintiffs plead that “[t]he material
assistance provided by the Binance Defendants to Hamas was dangerous to human life because it
constituted material support for Hamas to finance the planning, training, and execution of the
attacks.” ECF 47 ¶ 581. As has already been discussed, however, s uch alleged assistance was
limited to BAM and BHL not taking action to enforce stricter sanctions controls after receiving
warnings that accounts associated with Hamas were using their platforms. Holding that BAM’s
and BHL’s alleged inaction here “involve[d] violent acts or acts dangerous to human life ” would
stretch the ATA’s statutory requirements beyond any reasonable interpretation. 18 U.S.C.
§ 2331(1); see also Strauss v. Crédit Lyonnais, S.A. , 379 F. Supp. 3d 148, 159 (E.D.N.Y. 2019)
(concluding that allegations about “ Defendant’s indirect contribution, through banking services,
to terrorist activities ” did not satisfy the statutory requirement after examining dictionary
definitions of “violent ” and “dangerous”), aff’d in part , appeal dismissed in part , 842 F. App’x
701 (2d Cir. 2021). After all, “[d]irect liability under the ATA requires proof that . . . the

defendant”—not terrorists that the defendant allegedly assisted —“committed ‘an act of
international terrorism.’” Keren Kayemeth LeIsrael - Jewish Nat’l Fund v. Educ. for a Just Peace
in the Middle E. , 66 F.4th 1007, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (emphasis added) (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 2333(a)).
There is a divide among courts—that the Court of Appeals has declined to “take a position
on”—as to “ whether mere financial support can be viewed as an act of international terrorism ”
under the ATA. Id.; see also Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC , 882 F.3d 314, 32 6–28 (2d Cir. 2018) ;
Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., 549 F.3d 685, 690 (7th Cir. 2008) (en banc). But the
Court need not wade into that debate because Plaintiffs do not allege that BAM and BHL provided
“direct monetary donations to a known terrorist organization,” Linde, 882 F.3d at 327, or “[gave]
money to Hamas,” Boim, 549 F.3d at 690. It is readily apparent under the ATA’s s tatutory
requirements for direct liability that “the provision of banking services, in and of itself, is
insufficient . . . to show that the services involved an act of violence or threat to human life.” Weiss
v. Nat’l Westminster Bank, PLC. , 993 F.3d 144, 162 –63 (2d Cir. 2021) . As another court held
when adjudicating a similar suit brought against BHL, allegations that “ the defendants enabled
customers associated with Hamas and PIJ to engage in cryptocurrency transactions ” “ do not
support the conclusion that the defendants committed a terrorist act.” Raanan, 2025 WL 605594,
at *16.
V. State-Law Claims
Plaintiffs also raise various tort claims against BAM and BHL.12 See ECF 47 ¶¶ 447–562,
601–36. They argue that the Court possesses supplemental jurisdiction over these state-law claims

12 Plaintiffs conceded in their opposition briefs that the Court should dismiss their negligence per
se and manufacturing defect claims. See ECF 81 at 11 n.5; ECF 83 at 1 n.1.

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Id. ¶ 51. A “district court[] may decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over a claim ,” however, if it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original
jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); see also ECF 63-1 at 23 (BAM arguing that “[b]ecause
Plaintiffs have no viable federal claims, their state -law claims should be dismissed as well” ).
“[W]hen state and federal claims are joined and the federal claims are dismissed before trial, the
state claims should ordinarily be dismissed as well.” Network Project v. Corp. For Pub. Broad. ,
561 F.2d 963, 970 (D.C. Cir. 1977); see also United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715,
726 (1966) (“[I]f the federal claims are dismissed before trial, even though not insubstantial in a
jurisdictional sense, the state claims should be dismissed as well.”).
“[G]uided by consideration of the factors enumerated in 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c),” Edmondson
& Gallagher v. Alban Towers Tenants Ass’n , 48 F.3d 1260, 1265–66 (D.C. Cir. 1995), the Court
declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state-law claims. Not only has the
Court “dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction,” but most of the claims “raise[]
a novel or complex issue of State law ” in seeking to fit the operation of modern cryptocurrency
platforms into traditional torts. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).
VI. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants BAM’s and BHL’s motions to dismiss. The
Court also denies the outstanding discovery -related motions as moot. An Order will be entered
contemporaneously with this Memorandum Opinion.

DATE: May 29, 2026
CARL J. NICHOLS
United States District Judge

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