govinfo:USCOURTS-njd-2_24-cv-09010-0

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 
 
DARRYL TOWNSEND, 
 
Civil Action No. 24-09010 (MCA)(JRA) 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
 
 
Plaintiff, 
 v. 
VICTORIA L. KUHN, et al., 
 
Defendants. 
 
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on a motion to dismiss (ECF No. 16.) pursuant 
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) brought by Commissioner Victoria L. Kuhn, Assistant 
Commissioner Erin Nardelli, Assistant Commissioner Melinda Haley, Assistant Commissioner 
Donna Gies, Assistant Commissioner Willie Bonds, Officer Steven Jonaitis, and Officer Jayme 
Tartaglia (collectively, “Defendants”), which seeks dismissal of pro se Plaintiff Darryl 
Townsend’s (“Townsend” or “Plaintiff”) Complaint. (ECF No. 1.) Townsend is a convicted and 
sentenced state prisoner and brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the New Jersey Civil 
Rights Act (“NJCRA”), N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:6-1 et seq.
1 He alleges that Defendants violated his 
First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by implementing and enforcing a New Jersey Department 
of Corrections (“NJDOC” or “DOC”) policy restricting inmates from receiving adult content 
through the JPay digital tablet platform and through regular mail. For the reasons set forth below, 
Defendants’ motion is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. 
 
1 The Court considers the § 1983 and NJCRA claims together. PageID:
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I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
A. Factual Background 
Townsend is a convicted state prisoner serving what amounts to a life sentence at New 
Jersey State Prison in Trenton. ( ECF No. 1, Compl. ¶ 16.) He brings suit against five NJDOC 
senior administrators— Commissioner Kuhn and Assistant Commissioners Nardelli (Division of 
Operations), Haley (Division of Legal Affairs), Gies (Division of Administration), and Bonds —
as well as correctional officers Jonaitis and Tartaglia, who are assigned responsibility for screening 
digital content sent to inmates’ JPay tablet accounts. (Id. ¶¶ 4–13.) Townsend also names Officers 
Koch, Boyle, Cyrus, and Mendoza and fictitious defendants who have neither appeared nor been 
successfully served.2 Those defendants are not addressed in this Opinion. 
Townsend challenges the NJDOC’s recent policy change banning adult inmates from 
receiving “nude, non-nude and non- obscene sensual adult content” transmitted to their personal 
tablets via JPay, as well as similar content received through regular mail. (Id. ¶¶ 17, 19.) Plaintiff 
alleges that each commissioner personally “enacts and implements the DOC policies and 
administrative codes for all facilities to follow, and is directly responsible for the implementation, 
upholding, and enforcement of the DOC policy banning inmates from receiving non-obscene adult 
content.” (Id. ¶¶ 35–39.) 
He further alleges that beginning on or about October 13, 2020, the officer defendants 
screened and withheld from him approximately 10 to 15 or more 30-second videograms and digital 
photographs sent to his JPay account by outside parties, which he characterizes as “non-obscene” 
content that officers “falsely labeled” as prohibited. (Id. ¶¶ 19–21.) Townsend alleges that in 
“[m]any instances in which videograms were withheld from Plaintiff[,] defendants did not provide 
 
2The U.S. Marshal returned summonses for Officers Koch, Boyle, and Mendoza unexecuted on 
August 7, 2025. (ECF No. 8.) Officer Cyrus does not appear to have been issued a summons. PageID:
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any due notice of their rejection whatsoever and Plaintiff had to find out on his own.” (Id. ¶ 19.) 
He also identifies specific withholding incidents attributed to Officers Jonaitis, Koch, Mendoza, 
Tartaglia, Boyle, and Cyrus between September 2020 and July 2024. (Id. ¶ 21.) He further alleges 
that when items were rejected, officers “did not specify what acts or depictions in the videos they 
considered to be prohibited content” and responded to grievances by citing the general policy 
“without specifying what part of the policy they violated or what specific content they considered 
to violate said policy.” (Id. ¶ 22.) According to the Complaint, the withheld materials are “ non-
obscene” and do not depict sadism, masochism, sado-masochism, bestiality, child pornography, or 
sexual penetration. ( Id. ¶¶ 21, 33.) The DOC policy allegedly bans inmates “from receiving 
pornographic, nude, non- obscene and non- nude sensual content to the privacy of their tablets” 
even though inmates are permitted to watch movies and television programs that depict male and 
female individuals “in bikinis or with pasties covering nipples, on beaches, dancing provocatively, 
wearing lingerie, and even depicts nudity and sexual acts and penetration.” (Id. ¶¶ 23-24.) 
Townsend further contends that the DOC policy serves no legitimate penological interest 
and was “implemented to spite, harass and oppress inmates by denying them something that is of 
popular interest among inmates which they know [inmates] like and which brings them a 
semblance of joy with the little bit of liberty they have left.” (Id. ¶ 25; see also id. ¶ 26 (alleging 
that the policy is designed to “repress, suppress and frustrate [inmates’] natural attraction” and to 
“psychologically torment and torture inmates’ psyche.”).) He further characterizes the policy as 
an attempt to “act like Iranian ‘moral’ police by compelling inmates to follow and accept their 
moral, political and religious principles.” (Id. ¶ 29.) 
Townsend asserts four causes of action: (1) violation of the First Amendment’s Free 
Speech Clause based on the DOC’s policy banning non-obscene adult content (Count I, against all 
defendants); (2) violation of the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause on the theory that the PageID:
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policy imposes Defendants’ religious and moral values on inmates (Count II, against all 
defendants); (3) violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause based on 
Defendants’ alleged failure to provide adequate notice when rejecting digital conte nt (Count III, 
against the officer defendants); and (4) violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection 
Clause (Count IV, against all defendants). (Compl. ¶¶ 41–59.) 
Plaintiff states that “[t]his suit seeks injunctive relief ordering defendants to end the policy 
banning non[-]obscene adult sensual content sent to the privacy of inmates’ tablets or via any other 
means, and ordering defendants to forward to Plaintiff all such content that has been withheld from 
him.” (Id. ¶ 40.) In the relief section, he seeks declaratory relief, injunctive relief, compensatory 
and punitive damages, costs, and attorneys’ fees. (Id. ¶ 61.) 
B. Procedural History 
Townsend filed his Complaint on September 6, 2024. (ECF No. 1.) The Court granted his 
application to proceed in forma pauperis on September 11, 2024. (ECF No. 3.) Summonses were 
issued on October 16, 2024. (ECF No. 5.) Defendants Kuhn, Nardelli, Haley, Gies, Bonds, and 
Jonaitis were served on August 1, 2025; Defendant Tartaglia was served on August 13, 2025. 
(ECF Nos. 9, 10.) After obtaining a sixty -day extension, Defendants filed the present motion to 
dismiss on October 20, 2025. (ECF Nos. 12, 16.) 
Townsend did not file a brief in opposition. On November 12, 2025, he filed a letter 
requesting a thirty- day extension of time to respond (ECF No. 17), but no opposition brief 
followed. On January 13, 2026, Townsend filed a letter and a proposed order to show cause 
seeking injunctive relief. (ECF Nos. 18, 19.) On January 23, 2026, Magistrate Judge Almonte 
entered a text order directing that the pending motion to dismiss be resolved first, after which 
Townsend may renew any request for injunctive relief . (ECF No. 21.) On February 6, 2026, 
Townsend filed a motion for the appointment of pro bono counsel. (ECF No. 22.) Magistrate PageID:
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Judge Almonte administratively terminated that motion on February 13, 2026, because it was not 
filed on the DNJ form, and directed Townsend to refile using the form available on the Court’s 
website. (ECF No. 23.) Most recently, on April 28, 2026, Townsend filed a letter raising 
complaints of retaliation. (ECF No. 24.) 
II. LEGAL STANDARD 
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain “sufficient 
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 
A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw 
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. The standard 
demands more tha n “a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (citing 
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). A pleading that offers only “labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic 
recitation of the elements of a cause of action” will not do. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 
In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court first separates the factual and legal elements 
of the claims, accepting well -pleaded facts as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in the 
plaintiff’s favor, while disregarding bare legal conclusions and formulaic recitations of the 
elements of a cause of action. Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011); Iqbal , 556 
U.S. at 678. The Court then determines whether the surviving factual allegations state a 
plausible—not merely conceivable — claim for relief. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 
211 (3d Cir. 2009). The Court may consider the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, and 
matters of public record. Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010). 
Because Townsend is proceeding pro se , the Court construes his pleadings liberally and 
holds them to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by counsel. Haines v. Kerner, 
404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972); Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). That obligation does PageID:
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not require the Court to supply missing factual allegations or credit conclusory assertions 
untethered to any factual support. See Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc. , 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d 
Cir. 2013). Nor does Townsend’s failure to oppose the motion entitle Defendants to dismissal as 
a matter of course; the Court independently assesses whether the Complaint states a plausible 
claim. See Stackhouse v. Mazurkiewicz, 951 F.2d 29, 30 (3d Cir. 1991). 
III. DISCUSSION 
As a threshold matter, to the extent Townsend’s April 28, 2026 letter (ECF No. 24) 
advances new factual allegations or asserts a claim for retaliation not pleaded in the Complaint, 
the Court declines to consider it as an amendment to his Complaint . A complaint may not be 
amended through briefs, letters, or other correspondence filed with the Court. See e.g., Pa. ex rel. 
Zimmerman v. PepsiCo, Inc., 836 F.2d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 1988) (“[I]t is axiomatic that the 
complaint may not be amended by the briefs in opposition to a motion to dismiss.”). To the extent 
Townsend wishes to assert a retaliation claim arising from the conduct described in his April 28, 
2026 letter (ECF No. 24), he may seek leave from the Magistrate Judge to file a motion to amend, 
but new or amended claims not be advanced through correspondence to the Court. The Court’s 
analysis is limited to the four claims pleaded in the Complaint. 
A. Official Capacity Claims for Damages and Injunctive Relief 
Defendants seek dismissal of all claims asserted against them in their official capacities. 
(ECF No. 16-1 at 6-8.) Townsend brings his civil rights claims against Defendants in both their 
official and individual capacities and seeks injunctive relief and damages. Section 1983 provides 
a cause of action against every “person” who, acting under color of state law, deprives a citizen of 
a federal right. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989), 
the United States Supreme Court held that “[n]either a state nor its officials acting in their official 
capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.” The Supreme Court further clarified, however, that “a state PageID:
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official in his or her official capacity, when sued for injunctive relief, would be a person under § 
1983 because ‘official-capacity actions for prospective relief are not treated as actions against the 
State.’” Will, 491 U.S. at 71 n. 10 (quoting Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n. 14 (1985); 
Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159–60 (1908)). 
Here, the Court grants the motion to dismiss to the extent Plaintiff sues Defendants in their 
official capacities for damages. The official capacity claims for injunctive relief are also dismissed 
as to Counts II and IV, which fail to state a claim for relief. The motion to dismiss is denied as to 
the official capacity claims for injunctive relief in Counts I and III, which, as set forth below, 
survive Defendants’ motion to dismiss. 
B. First Amendment Claims (Counts I and II) 
1. First Amendment Free Speech (Count I) 
Townsend contends that the NJDOC’s policy prohibiting inmates from receiving adult 
content violates the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause. In broad terms, prisoners retain First 
Amendment rights only to the extent “not inconsistent with [their] status as a prisoner or with the 
legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system.” Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 
(1974). Prison regulations and policies restricting an inmate’s First Amendment rights are valid if 
“reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). 
Prison officials are also accorded “wide-ranging deference” in the adoption and execution of such 
policies. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547–48 (1979). 
As relevant here, the First Amendment does not protect obscene material. Miller v. 
California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) (“[O]bscene material is unprotected by the First Amendment.”). 
However, materials that constitute indecent sexual expression not rising to the level of obscenity 
are constitutionally protected. Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union , 521 U.S. 844, 874–75 
(1997); see also Ramirez v. Pugh, 379 F.3d 122, 129 n.2 (3d Cir. 2004) (explaining same); Darby PageID:
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v. N.J. Dep’t of Corr., No. 20- 1360 (FLW), 2022 WL 2347145, at *4 (D.N.J. June 29, 2022) 
(same). The NJDOC’s policy, codified at N.J. Admin. Code 10A:18- 2.14, authorizes staff to 
withhold correspondence containing material that, taken as a whole, appeals to a prurient interest 
in sex, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value, or depicts sexual conduct in a 
patently offensive manner. N.J. Admin. Code 10A:18-2.14(a)(6)(i)–(iii).
3 
To determine whether a prison policy or regulation violates the Constitution, courts analyze 
the challenged regulation under the factors set forth in Turner, supra, to ascertain whether it is 
“reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Sharp v. Johnson, 669 F.3d 144, 156 (3d 
Cir. 2012) (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 89). First, “(1) there must be a “valid, rational connection” 
 
3 That subsection reads in relevant part: 
(a) Any correspondence for an inmate may be withheld in the mail 
room or taken from an inmate’s possession by the correctional 
facility Administrator, designee, or custody staff if it falls within 
one of the following categories: 
. . . . 
6. The correspondence contains material, which, based upon the 
experience and professional expertise of correctional 
administrators and judged in the context of a correctional facility 
and its paramount interest in maintaining safety, security, order, 
and rehabilitation: 
i. Taken as a whole, appeals to a prurient interest in sex; 
ii. Lacks, as a whole, serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific 
value; 
iii. Depicts, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct, including 
patently offensive representations or descriptions of ultimate 
sexual acts, masturbation, excretory functions, lewd exhibition of 
the genitals, child pornography, sadism, bestiality, masochism, 
extreme close-up photos, any touching, manipulation, spreading, or 
opening of the genitals or buttocks (any gender), pornography, or 
sexually explicit material . . . . 
N.J. Admin. Code § 10A:18-2.14(a)(6). PageID:
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between the prison regulation and the legitimate, neutral governmental interest put forward to 
justify it (the ‘First Turner Factor’)[.]” If that factor is satisfied, Courts consider “(2) whether the 
inmate has alternative means of exercising the right at issue; (3) the burden that the accommodation 
would impose on prison resources; and (4) whether any ready alternatives to the regulat ion exist 
that would fully accommodate the inmate's rights at de minimis cost to valid penological objectives 
(Turner factors 2–4 are the ‘Other Turner Factors’).” Id. (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 89- 91). The 
prison bears the burden of establishing the first Turner factor. See id. If the prison can meet its 
“slight” burden by showing that there is a “valid, rational connection” between the policy and the 
government’s “legitimate, neutral” interest put forward to justify the policy, the court proceeds to 
analyze factors two through four. See id. The ultimate burden of persuasion that a prison policy 
or regulation is unconstitutional rests with the inmate. See id. at 157 (citation omitted). 
Defendants argue that “[t]he Court should find N.J.A.C. 10A:18-2.14 constitutionally valid 
because it meets the four elements of the Turner test.” (ECF No. 16-1 at 22.) Defendants’ motion 
falls short, however, because they do not meet their burden, albeit slight, of establishing the first 
Turner factor. See Sharp, 669 F.3d at 156. The regulation at issue, N.J. Admin. Code 10A:18-2.14 
refers to “safety, security, order, and rehabilitation ,” and, as Defendants contend, “courts have 
recognized that prohibi ting pornography or obscene materials is necessary to maintain prison 
security and to further rehabilitative goals for incarcerated persons.” (See ECF No. 16-1 at 22.) 
Defendants cite to Waterman v. Farmer, 183 F.3d at 213- 18 (3d Cir. 1999) (finding a rational 
connection between the prison’s goal of rehabilitation and withholding pornographic materials 
from incarcerated sex offenders) and Ramirez v. Pugh, 486 F. Supp. 2d 421, 433 (M.D. Pa. 2007) 
(finding that a rational connection exists between the prison’s goal of institutional security and 
withholding pornography from incarcerated persons) to support their claim of a legitimate 
penological interest. PageID:
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The cases cited by Defendants, however, do not involve the regulation at issue here and 
both cases were resolved after development of the factual record. The Third Circuit’s decision in 
Waterman dealt with sex offenders incarcerated at the Adult Diagnostic and Treatment Center 
(“A.D.T.C.”) in Avenel, New Jersey; in that context, the Third Circuit held that “it is beyond 
dispute that New Jersey has a legitimate penological interest in rehabilitatin g its most dangerous 
and compulsive sex offenders.” 183 F.3d at 215 (citing O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 
348 (1987) (recognizing rehabilitation as a “valid penological objective”). Moreover, as stated in 
Ramirez v. Pugh, 379 F.3d at 127 “experts [had] testified [in Waterman] that sex offenders’ 
exposure to pornography would thwart specific rehabilitative strategies and treatments 
administered by prison staff.” Put simply, Waterman involved a different population of offenders 
and was decided after a hearing. In contrast, Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s challenge at 
the pleading stage, but it is not obvious or beyond dispute that New Jersey has the same interest in 
rehabilitating prisoners in the general prison population, many of whom are not sex offenders. 
Ramirez v. Pugh likewise does not establish at the pleading stage that N.J. Admin. Code 10A:18-
2.14(a)(6) serves a legitimate penological interest. There, an inmate challenged a prison regulation 
implementing a statutory ban on the use of federal funds to distribute sexually explicit material to 
prisoners. The district court granted the government’s motion to dismiss, holding that the 
regulation was valid because, intuitively, it was rationally connected to the government's asserted 
interest in prisoner rehabilitation. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding the record 
inadequate as a matter of law to demonstrate the validity of the restriction “under Turner’s first 
prong on a motion to dismiss, without any analysis or inquiry into the interests involved and the 
connection between those interests and the restriction at issue.” 379 F.3d at 128. The Ramirez 
court concluded that the connection between the restriction at issue and the government's PageID:
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rehabilitative interest was not so obvious as to eliminate the need for the development of a factual 
record. Id. at 129. 
The lesson that can be drawn from Waterman and Ramirez is that the Turner analysis 
usually requires a factual record. See Enoch v. Perry , 2020 WL 4057643, at *10 (W.D. Pa. July 
20, 2020) (“The Turner analysis is exceedingly fact-intensive and does not lend itself to resolution 
on a motion to dismiss.”); s ee also Reynolds v. Quiros, 25 F.4th 72, 82 (2d Cir. 2022) (affirming 
district court’s finding that a prison regulation restricting sexually explicit materials did not violate 
plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights following a two -day bench trial, including testimony from 15 
witnesses). Because Defendants have not met their burden and the record is not sufficiently 
developed, the Court denies the motion to dismiss the First Amendment challenge to N.J. Admin. 
Code 10A:18-2.14(a)(6) in Count I. 
 The Court also denies the motion to dismiss as to i ndividual Defendants Jonaitis and 
Tartaglia who allegedly withheld non-obscene videos and pictures from Plaintiff. According to 
Defendants, “the DOC’s policy does not just cover explicitly graphic material, but rather it 
encompasses material which prison staff deem to appeal to a ‘prurient interest in sex’ or ‘lacks, as 
a whole, serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.”’ Defendants claim that “[c]ontrary 
to Townsend’s assertions that the material was ‘non-obscene,’ officers Jonaitis, Koch, Tartaglia, 
and Boyle repeatedly withheld videos or pictures from Townsend because they repeatedly made 
determinations that Townsend’s correspondence fell under the categories contemplated by 
N.J.A.C. 10A:18-2.14.” (ECF No. 16 -1 at 16- 17.) Whether the withheld materials are obscene 
and/or fall within the parameters of the policy are questions of fact that cannot be resolved at the 
motion to dismiss stage. Jonaitis and Tartaglia are not entitled to “deference,” as Defendants 
suggest prior to discovery and the development of an adequate record. Indeed, the Court must 
accept Plaintiff’s well-pleaded facts as true at the motion to dismiss stage, and Defendants ask the PageID:
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Court to resolve disputed facts in their favor and inject facts that are outside the pleadings . 
Therefore, the motion to dismiss the First Amendment claims against Jonaitis and Tartaglia is 
denied. 
Defendants also contend that Townsend’s First Amendment claims against Commissioner 
Kuhn and Assistant Commissioners Nardelli, Haley, Gies, and Bonds fail for lack of personal 
involvement. (ECF No. 16- 1 at 9 -12.) As noted above, Defendants are sued in their official 
capacities for injunctive relief and in their individual capacities for damages. Petitioner alleges 
that each commissioner personally “enacts and implements the DOC policies and administrative 
codes for all facilities to follow, and is directly responsible for the implementation, upholding, and 
enforcement of the DOC policy banning inmates from receiving non- obscene adult content.” 
(Compl. ¶¶ 35–39.) As Defendants contend, s upervisory liability generally requires some 
affirmative conduct by the supervisor, but this may include a supervisor’s implementation or 
maintenance of a policy, practice, or custom that harme d the plaintiff. See Parkell v. Danberg, 
833 F.3d 313, 330 (3d Cir. 2016); Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 129 n.5 (3d Cir. 
2010). Thus, a person who has final policymaking authority may be held liable under § 1983 if 
that person establishes a policy that is unconstitutional and that injures the plaintiff. Chavarriaga 
v. N.J. Dep’t of Corr., 806 F.3d 210, 223 (3d Cir. 2015); Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1118 
(3d Cir. 1989). “[T]o establish a claim against a policymaker under § 1983 a plaintiff must allege 
and prove that the official established or enforced policies and practices directly causing the 
constitutional violation.” Chavarriaga, 806 F.3d at 223. At summary judgment, Plaintiff will have 
to prove that these Defendants created or enforced the policy at issue. See Parkell, 833 F.3d at 
331. But at this early stage, the Court finds that the allegations against Kuhn, Nardelli, Haley, PageID:
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Gies, and Bonds are sufficient to show personal involvement under at least one theory of liability.4 
Therefore, the motion to dismiss is denied on the First Amendment claims in Count I as to Kuhn, 
Nardelli, Haley, Gies, and Bonds. 
2. Establishment Clause (Count II) 
Defendants also move to dismiss Townsend’s Establishment Clause claim in Count II . 
Plaintiff contends that the DOC’s policy forces Defendants’ “religious moral values” on inmates 
in violation of the Establishment Clause, compelling him to “accept [D]efendants’ religious moral 
values hidden under the guise of a DOC policy.” (Compl. ¶ 48.) The Court agrees with Defendants 
that this claim fails as a matter of law. 
The Establishment Clause prohibits the government from endorsing or establishing a 
religion. O’Malley v. Brierley, 477 F.2d 785, 790 (3d Cir. 1973). Pursuant to Kennedy v. 
Bremerton School District, the Clause must be interpreted by reference to historical practices and 
understandings, and its core prohibition targets governmental actions that historically constituted 
an establishment of religion—foremost among which is legal coercion of religious p articipation. 
597 U.S. 507, 535–37 (2022). 
The Complaint does not state a cognizable Establishment Clause claim. The NJDOC’s 
restriction on obscene material does not compel Townsend to engage in religious practice, 
participate in religious observances, or affirm any religious belief. It does not penalize him for 
failing to adhere to any religious rite. The policy is facially neutral, applies uniformly to all 
inmates without regard to religion, and purportedly rests on penological interests in security, order, 
 
4 Defendants point to Plaintiff’s failure to show that these Defendants directed their staff to 
confiscate the materials at issue, or that they knew his materials were being wrongly confiscated 
and acquiesced in those violations, but the Court does not construe Plaintiff to raise such claims 
in his Complaint, which clearly bases the Commissioners’ liability on their alleged creation and 
enforcement of the policy. PageID:
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and rehabilitation—not religious mandate. See N.J.A.C. 10A:18-2.14(a)(1)–(2). That Townsend 
characterizes the policy’s moral dimension as implicitly religious does not transform a neutral, 
generally applicable prison regulation into an Establishment Clause violation. Count II is 
dismissed without prejudice. 
C. Procedural Due Process (Count III) 
Defendants also seek dismissal of Count III, which is directed against the officer 
defendants, including Defendants Jonaitis and Tartaglia, and alleges that Defendants’ practice of 
rejecting inmates’ digital videos “without providing them any due notice whatsoever ” or 
identifying the specific prohibited conduct violates Plaintiffs constitutional rights to due process 
(Compl. ¶¶ 52 –56.) Defendants assert that to bring this claim, Plaintiff had to exhaust state 
remedies by seeking relief in the New Jersey Appellate Division, and they glean this rule from 
Supreme Court decisions dealing with property interests. See Parratt v. Taylor , 451 U.S. 527, 
543-44 (1981); Hudson v. Palmer , 468 U.S. 517, 532- 33 (1984). The Court does not construe 
Townsend to assert a property interest in Count III ; rather, he asserts a liberty interest in 
communicating by mail. In Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F.4th 182, 186 (3d Cir. 2021), the Third Circuit held 
that a prisoner’s receipt of mail is a protected liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Thus, “prisons must notify inmates when their incoming mail is rejected.” Id. at 184; see also 
Procunier v. Martinez , 416 U.S. 396, 417- 419 (1976). Therefore, when prison staff rejected 
Townsend’s digital videos, notification was required. Plaintiff sufficiently alleges that his digital 
videos were rejected without notice on a number of occasions by Defendants Jonaitis and Tartaglia. 
At this early stage, Plaintiff states a claim under Vogt, and the Court denies the motion to dismiss 
as to Count III against Defendants Jonaitis and Tartaglia. PageID:
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D. Equal Protection (Count IV) 
Count IV alleges that Defendants’ “actions and omissions . . . violated Plaintiff’s rights 
under the Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause.” (Compl. ¶ 58.) That is 
the entirety of Townsend’s equal protection allegation. 
To state a § 1983 equal protection claim, a plaintiff must allege purposeful discrimination 
and demonstrate that he received different treatment from that received by similarly situated 
individuals. Shuman ex rel. Shertzer v. Penn Manor Sch. Dist., 422 F.3d 141, 151 (3d Cir. 2005). 
He must also plead that a state actor intentionally discriminated against him because of his 
membership in a protected class. Lande v. City of Bethlehem , 457 F. App’x 188, 192 (3d Cir. 
2012). Townsend’s single conclusory allegation identifies no protected class, no similarly situated 
individuals, and no facts suggesting discriminatory intent. There is nothing in the Complaint or 
the regulation to suggest that NJDOC’s policy does not apply uniformly to all incarcerated persons 
regardless of any protected characteristic. A bare assertion that defendants violated the Equal 
Protection Clause, unmoored from any supporting factual content, is precisely the type of pleading 
Iqbal and Twombly foreclose. See Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 
1997). Count IV is dismissed without prejudice. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The motion to dismiss is granted with prejudice as to the official capacity claims for 
damages and without prejudice as to Counts II and IV. The motion to dismiss is otherwise denied. 
An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion. 
 
 
5/29/26 s/Madeline Cox Arleo 
Madeline Cox Arleo 
United States District Judge PageID:
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