govinfo:USCOURTS-ctd-3_23-cv-01294-3

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT 
 
 : CIVIL CASE NO. 
 : 3:23-CV-01294 (JCH) 
VINCENT S. MICELI, : 
 Plaintiff, : 
 : 
v. : 
 : MAY 29, 2026 
WEARABLE HEALTH SOLUTIONS, INC., : 
HARRYSEN MITTLER, : 
PETER PIZZINO, : 
 Defendants. : 
 
RULING ON MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES (DOC. NO. 164) 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The plaintiff, Vincent S. Miceli (“Mr. Miceli”), moves this court to award attorneys’ 
fees and costs against the defendant, Wearable Health Solutions, Inc., and Harrysen 
Mittler, jointly and severally. See Motion for Attorneys’ Fees (Doc. No. 164). Mr. Miceli 
asks for fees in the amount of $107,015.44, and costs in the amount of $2,849.04, to be 
awarded. Id. No opposition was filed. 
The matter was tried to a jury from March 17 to March 20, 2026. On March 20, 
2026, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Mr. Miceli in the amount in the amount of 
$223,870.44 in unpaid wages, $419,165.87 in severance, and $223,870.44 in double 
damages under the wage act. See Judgment. (Doc. No. 162). The court entered 
Default Judgment against Mr. Mittler. See Ruling for Default Judgment. (Doc. No. 166). 
II. LEGAL STANDARD 
As a general matter, the “starting point” in analyzing whether claimed attorney's 
fees are appropriate is the lodestar. See Millea v. Metro-North R.R. Co., 658 F.3d 154, 

 
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166 (2d Cir. 2011). The “lodestar” is “the product of a reasonable hourly rate and the 
reasonable number of hours required by the case.” Id. 
“The reasonable hourly rate is the rate a paying client would be willing to pay.” 
See Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass'n v. Cnty. of Albany, 522 F.3d 
182, 190–91 (2d Cir. 2008). In calculating the reasonable hourly rate, the court applies 
a presumption in favor of calculating fees based on the prevailing rates in the forum in 
which the litigation was brought. See Kyros Law P.C. v. World Wrestling Enter., Inc., 78 
F.4th 532, 547 (2d Cir. 2023). Thus, “[w]hen an attorney's requested hourly rate is 
higher than rates found to be reasonable in the relevant market, it is within the Court's 
discretion to reduce the requested rate.” See Savino v. Computer Credit, Inc., 164 F.3d 
81, 87 (2d Cir. 1998). 
As for the reasonableness of the hours expended, a district court must conduct 
“a conscientious and detailed inquiry into the validity of the representations that a 
certain number of hours were usefully and reasonably expended.” See Lunday v. City 
of Albany, 42 F.3d 131, 134 (2d Cir. 1994). A party may “satisf[y] his burden by 
providing detailed itemization of the hours expended reconstructed through 
contemporaneous billing records.” See Hernandez v. Berlin Newington Assocs., LLC, 
No. 3:10-cv-1333 (VLB), 2016 WL 5339720, at *5 (D. Conn. Sept. 22, 2016). Counsel 
“should make a good faith effort to exclude from a fee request hours that are excessive, 
redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 
(1983). 
Adjustments to the lodestar calculation “are appropriate only in ‘rare 
circumstances,’ because the ‘lodestar figure [already] includes most, if not all, of the 

 
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relevant factors constituting a reasonable attorney's fee.’ ” See Millea, 658 F.3d at 167 
(quoting Perdue v. Kenny A ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 553–54 (2011)). For example “ 
‘[t]he novelty and complexity of a case generally may not be used as a ground for 
[adjusting the lodestar]’ because they are already included in the lodestar calculation 
itself, being ‘fully reflected in the number of billable hours recorded by counsel.’ ” Id. 
(quoting Perdue, 559 U.S. at 553). Similarly, “the quality of an attorney's performance 
generally should not be used to adjust the lodestar because considerations concerning 
the quality of a prevailing party's counsel's representation normally are reflected in the 
reasonable hourly rate.” Perdue, 559 U.S. at 553. 
The party seeking fees bears the burden of demonstrating that its request is 
reasonable and must provide the court with sufficient information to assess its 
application. See Evans v. State of Conn., 967 F. Supp. 673, 691 (D. Conn. 1997) (“The 
burden is on the fee applicant to produce satisfactory evidence, in addition to the 
attorney's own affidavits, showing that the requested rates are in line with those 
prevailing in the community for similar services.”); Hernandez, 2016 WL 5339720, at *5 
(finding party satisfied burden by producing contemporaneous billing records). In 
addition to evidence adduced by counsel, “[a] district court may take judicial notice of 
the rates awarded in similar cases and may rely on its own familiarity with the rates 
prevailing in the district.” See Hernandez, 2016 WL 5339720, at *3. 
III. DISCUSSION 
The jury returned a verdict for Mr. Miceli on Count One of his Complaint for 
Breach of Contract; and Count Two of his Complaint for Violation of Connecticut’s Wage 
Statute. See Judgment (Doc. No. 162). Mr. Miceli’s Employment Agreement (Trial 
Exhibit 3), provided that: 

 
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Attorney's Fees. If any Party hereto shall bring an action at law or in equity to 
enforce its rights under this Agreement, the prevailing Party in such action shall 
be entitled to recover from the Party against whom enforcement is sought its or 
his costs and expenses incurred in connection with such action (including 
reasonable fees, disbursements and expenses of attorneys and costs of 
investigation). 
 
Connecticut’s Wage Statute, Conn. Gen. Stat. §31-72 further provides that Mr. 
Miceli “shall recover . . . costs and such reasonable attorney's fees as may be allowed 
by the court.” 
 Mr. Miceli submited the Affidavit of his Attorney, Anthony R. Minchella, and 
included a detailed printout of attorneys’ time billed and rates, and Mr. Miceli requests 
that the Court award attorneys’ fees in the amount of $107,015.44 and costs in the 
amount of $2,849.04. See Motion for Attorney’s Fees. Upon reviewing the rates, the 
court finds this request reasonable. 
 Mr. Minchella has 30 years of legal experience. Mr. Michella detailed his billing 
practices and provided precise timekeeping records to the court. Mr. Michella’s billing 
rate, for this matter, was $475.00 per hour, a rate below his usual billing rate. This is in 
line with rates for attorneys with similar experience. See generally McCullough v. World 
Wrestling Ent., Inc., No. 3:15-CV-1074 (JAM), 2021 WL 4472719 (D. Conn. Sept. 30, 
2021), aff'd sub nom. Kyros L. P.C. v. World Wrestling Ent., Inc., 78 F.4th 532 (2d Cir. 
2023) (awarding, in 2021, $550 per hour for a highly experienced lead counsel); see, 
also, Esposito v. Nations Recovery Ctr., No. 3:18-cv-02089 (VLB), 2021 WL 2109077 
(D. Conn. May 25, 2021) (awarding, in 2021, $450 per hour for national recognized 
consumer counsel). 
 The requested rate of $175.00 for Mr. Borden is reasonable. Mr. Borden billed 
minimal time and below his current rate of $275. It appears at the time of his billing in 

 
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this case he had just begun practicing law. This $175 rate falls within approved rates of 
time for beginning counsel. See Rozell v. Ross-Holst, 576 F. Supp. 2d 527, 545-47 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding that $250 is reasonable for junior associates). 
 The paralegal rates of $125 to $150 per hour are reasonable. The District of 
Connecticut has awarded similar rates before. See, supra, McCullough ($150 
reasonable for paralegal time in complex federal litigation); Dipippa v. Fulbrook Capital 
Mgmt., 2020 WL 1940759 (finding $115 reasonable for paralegal time several years 
earlier), citing Negron v. Patriot Auto Sales, LLC, No. 3:17-CV-583 (JCH), 2019 WL 
4463440, at *4 (D. Conn. Sept. 17, 2019) (concluding that $150/hour rate for a paralegal 
is appropriate). 
 The requested rate of $75 per hour for legal assistants, law students, or clerks is 
reasonable. See Esposito (excluding clerical paralegal work but approving $100 for law 
clerk work involving legal tasks). 
 Turning to the number of hours charged, the court finds that the hours are clearly 
reasonable. Mr. Michella did not charge for his work for preparing and filing a Motion for 
Summary Judgment, which was later withdrawn. Additionally, there were no charges 
for some office conferences, which may have been charged. Finally, there were no 
charges for numerous office legal activities that were not charged for, as was 
appropriate. Finally, the trial was continued on the eve of trial twice, necessitating time 
spent re-preparing, which is reasonable. Mr. Minchella detailed the hours and activities 
clearly in billing for appropriate tasks and used his time wisely during this litigation. The 
court grants all requested fees and costs as reasonable. 
 

 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
 For the reasons stated above, the court finds the requested fees and costs 
reasonable for Mr. Miceli and grants attorney’s fees in the amount of $107,0155.44; and 
costs in the amount of $2,849.04, against the defendant, Wearable Health Solutions, 
Inc., and Harrysen Mittler, jointly and severally. 
 
SO ORDERED. 
Dated at New Haven, Connecticut this 29th day of May 2026. 
 
 
 /s/ Janet C. Hall 
 Janet C. Hall 
 United States District Judge 

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