govinfo:USCOURTS-njd-3_25-cv-16957-1

NOT FOR PUBLICATION 
 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 
 
 
MARTELLI DEVELOPMENT GROUP, LLC, 
et al., 
 
 Plaintiffs/Counterclaim Defendants, 
 
v. 
 
WARREN DIAMOND, et al., 
 
 Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs. 
 
 
 
 
 
Civil Action No. 25-16957 (GC) (JBD) 
 
MEMORANDUM ORDER 
 
 
CASTNER, District Judge 
THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs Warren 
Diamond, Faith Perlmutter Diamond and Birdie Golf, LLC (collectively, “Diamond”)’s application 
for an Order to Show Cause why a preliminary injunction with temporary restraints should not 
issue pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (Rule) 65 .1 (ECF No. 42.) 
Plaintiffs/Counterclaim Defendants Salvatore Martelli, Martelli Development Group, LLC, The 
Ridge at SunEagles, LLC, Veritas Hospitality, LLC, Veritas Golf, LLC, and Veritas Management 
Group, LLC (collectively, “Martelli”) individually, and derivatively on behalf of Nominal 
Defendants Mulligan Golf, LLC, Above Par Golf, LLC, Above Par Hospitality, LLC, and Above 
Par Management, LLC (collectively, “Joint Ventures”), opposed, and Diamond replied. (ECF Nos. 
48, 51); and 
WHEREAS at the core of this dispute is the souring of the business relationship between 
Martelli and Diamond. The instant matter was removed by Diamond from Superior Court of New 
 
1 The Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441. PageID:
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Jersey, Monmouth County, on October 27, 2025. (ECF No. 1.) On November 12, 2025, Martelli 
moved for temporary and preliminary restraints against Diamond, asserting that Diamond’s 
conduct threatened the financial viability of the parties’ various joint ventures, (see generally ECF 
No. 8-1), which the Court denied on December 15, 2025, (ECF No. 25). On February 26, 2026, 
Diamond answered the Complaint, asserted counterclaims against Martelli, and brought a third-
party complaint against various individuals and entities related to Diamond and 
Martelli’s businesses. (See ECF No. 31.) The parties are also engaged in litigation in the 
Superior Court of New Jersey, Monmouth County, Chancery Division, regarding the issues 
raised in the counterclaims and third-party complaint. ( See generally ECF No. 48-13); and 
WHEREAS Diamond now seeks injunctive and declaratory relief arising from purported 
agreements between, on one side, Warren Diamond, Faith Diamond, and Birdie Golf, LLC, who 
purportedly became secured parties through the agreements, and on the other side, Salvatore 
Martelli, Martelli Development Group, LLC, Mulligan Golf, LLC, Veritas Golf, LLC, and The 
Ridge at SunEagles, LLC, who purportedly pledged certain assets as collateral through these 
agreements. (See generally ECF No. 42-2.) 
 Diamond asserts that on May 27, 2025, Martelli 
defaulted on these agreements, entitling Diamond to various rights and remedies related to the 
secured collateral. (See generally id.) Diamond alleges that Martelli has not complied with the 
terms of the agreements and argues that Court intervention is necessary because, among other 
things, Martelli has “diverted trust funds,” “altered corporate records,” and “obstructed access to 
financial information” related to these agreements. (Id. at 18); and 
WHEREAS “[a]n injunction is a drastic and extraordinary remedy, which should not be 
granted as a matter of course.” Barnes v. Edwards, Civ. No. 13-4239, 2014 WL 3953189, at *3 
(D.N.J. Aug. 13, 2014) (quoting M onsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 165 (2010)). PageID:
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“[T]he party seeking a preliminary injunction bears the burden of establishing its entitlement to 
such extraordinary relief.” Sebela Int'l Ltd. v. Actavis Lab ’ys FL, Inc. , Civ. No. 17 -4789, 2017 
WL 4782807, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 20, 2017). A plaintiff seeking a temporary restraining order or 
preliminary injunction must establish that (1) the plaintiff is reasonably likely to succeed on the 
merits, (2) the plaintiff is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, (3) 
the balance of equities tips in the plaintiff's favor, and (4) an injunction is in the public interest. 2 
See HR Staffing Consultants, LLC v. Butts , Civ. No. 15 -3155, 2015 WL 3492609, at *7 (D.N.J. 
June 2, 2015) (quoting Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)). The first and 
second elements are considered “threshold” factors; absent either, the Court cannot issue injunctive 
relief. Mallet & Co. v. Lacayo, 16 F.4th 364, 380 (3d Cir. 2021). The movant must establish these 
elements by making “a clear showing.” Del. State Sportsmen’s Ass’n, Inc. v. Del. Dep’t of Safety 
& Homeland Sec. , 108 F.4th 194, 202 (3d Cir. 2024) (quoting Mazurek v. Armstrong , 520 U.S. 
968, 972 (1997)) (emphasis in original); and 
WHEREAS to establish irreparable harm, a movant must “demonstrate[] a significant risk 
that [they] will experience harm that cannot adequately be compensated after the fact by monetary 
damages.” Adams v. Freedom Forge Corp. , 204 F.3d 475, 484 -85 (3d Cir. 2000) (citation 
modified); see also Reilly v. City of Harrisburg , 858 F.3d 173, 179 n.4 (3rd Cir. 2017) (“[T]he 
availability of money damages for an injury typically will preclude a finding of irreparable harm.”). 
This is “not an easy burden” to carry. Adams v. Freedom Forge Corp., 204 F.3d 475, 484-85 (3d 
Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). Moreover “[t]he irreparable harm alleged must be actual and 
 
2 “The standard for a preliminary injunction and a TRO is the same.” Mirashi v. Doe, Civ. 
No. 25-1805, 2025 WL 893003, at *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 21, 2025). PageID:
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imminent, not merely speculative.” Moneyham v. Ebbert , 723 F. App’x. 89, 92 (3d Cir. 2018) ; 
and 
WHEREAS Diamond argues that irreparable harm is being suffered in three ways. (ECF 
No. 42 -2 at 22 -25.) First, Diamond states that a “trust obligation over all distributions and 
proceeds” was created after Martelli purportedly defaulted on their agreements, and Diamond 
points to various cases that purportedly support injunctive relief in such a scenario. However, the 
cases Diamond cites are inapposite, as each pertain s to a trust established under the Perishable 
Agricultural Commodities Act (PACA) —not one established through private contract. Even 
assuming the PACA applies, the Court finds that Diamond’s argument in this regard is still lacking. 
In Tanimura & Antle, Inc. v. Packed Fresh Produce, Inc., 222 F.3d 132 (3d Cir. 2000), the Third 
Circuit stated that injunctive relief is appropriate in a case involving a PACA trust when “it is 
shown that the trust is being depleted and the likelihood is great that there will be no funds available 
to satisfy a legal judgment against the delinquent buyer. ” Id. at 139. Here, Diamond makes no 
such showin g of depleted funds or insolvency . Rather, Diamond states that The Ridge at 
SunEagles, LLC, one of the parties’ development projects, “has continued to sell market‑rate units 
and generate[s] millions of dollars in proceeds.” (ECF No. 42-2 at 8); and 
WHEREAS second, Diamond argues that “the loss of corporate control constitutes 
irreparable harm ,” noting that Martelli “continue[s] to exercise voting and managerial rights” 
despite purportedly losing them after the default event . (Id. at 23 -24.) The Court notes that 
Diamond cites no case from this Circuit in support of this proposition. In those cases where courts 
from this Circuit have granted preliminary injunctions arising from a loss of corporate control, 
those injunctions have been narrowly tailored to, for example, prevent a stock sale. See, e.g., 
Marine Elec. Sys., Inc. v. MES Financing, LLC, 644 F. Supp. 3d 84, 95-96 (D.N.J. Dec. 6, 2022). PageID:
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