govinfo:USCOURTS-ncwd-5_25-cr-00015-0

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
STATESVILLE DIVISION 
5:25-CR-00015-MEO-DCK 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
 
 v. 
 
ROSHODE JAWADE CHAPMAN, 
 
Defendant. 
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MEMORANDUM & ORDER 
 
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendant ’s Motion to Suppress (Doc. 
No. 24). For the reasons set forth below, the Court will deny the motion. 
I. BACKGROUND 
The Court finds the following facts based on the bodycam video footage, the 
documentary evidence submitted in relation to the Motion to Suppress, and the officer 
testimony provided during the Court’s May 27, 2026 hearing on this Motion. 
On February 24, 2024, the Hic kory Police Department and North Carolina ’s 
Alcohol Law Enforcement (ALE) division were conducting a joint operation . The 
operation centered on reducing the number of viol ent incidents at the Gateway Bar 
& Pub in Hickory, North Carolina. Around 1:30 a.m., officers observed a silver Kia 
Sportage leaving the parking lot. Upon running the plate through law e nforcement 
databases, officers learned that t he vehicle was registered to Zsakeia Witherspoon , 
that the tag was expired, and that the vehicle had an inspection violation. Off icers 
also observed that the taillight appeared to be broken. Mr. Chapman was the front -
seat passenger in the vehicle. 

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Officers initiated a traffic stop, and the Kia pulled over without any issues. 
Officer McKee approached the vehicle and began to interact with Witherspoon . He 
explained the purpose of the stop and a sked for her identification. A n ALE special 
agent approached the passenger side and began to speak with Defendant. 
Witherspoon could not locate her identification, and after approximately two minutes, 
she showed Officer McKee a picture of her driver’s license on her phone. 
During this time, Officer McKee observed a strong odor of marijuana coming 
from the vehicle. He asked Witherspoon and Defendant, “Be honest with me, okay, 
how much marijuana do y’all have?” Witherspoon responded, “I had a blunt earlier.” 
When asked where it was, Witherspoon indicated toward the console, and Defendant 
picked up the blunt from the vehicle’s ashtray and reached toward the driver ’s side 
window. It appears from the bodycam video that Defendant handed the blunt to 
Officer McKee, while Witherspoon reached toward and may have touched the blunt 
as Defendant was handing it toward the window. Witherspoon stated, “I smoked 
earlier.” 
Both occupants were ordered out of the Kia and frisked for safet y. Offi cer 
McKee searched Witherspoon ’s person, and other officers patted down Defendant. 
Both occupants were then a sked to stand at the front of a patrol car. Officers then 
searched the vehicle. They found two loaded firearms in the g love box, apparent 
marijuana residue, and an additional blunt between the driver’s seat and console. 
Officers then began to detain Defendant. He fled on foot. Officers took him to 
the ground and handcuffed him a short distance away. Officers searched Defendant 

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incident to arrest and found: 
• cash; 
• a clear pla stic bagg ie containing a substance officers suspected was crack 
cocaine, which was underneat h Defendant when officers took him to the 
ground; and 
• three blue pills in one of his pockets. 
While on scene, Witherspoon stated that she did not own any guns and knew nothing 
about the firearms in her vehicle. 
Officer McKee transported Defendant to the Hickory Police Depar tment. 
Officers read Defendant his Miranda rights, which he waived. Defendant then made 
statements confirming his possession of the firearms and the suspected crack cocaine. 
II. LEGAL STANDARD 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the federal 
government from violating “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures ....” Vernonia 
Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652 (1995) (quoting U.S. Const. amend IV); see 
also Elkins v. United States , 364 U.S. 206, 213 (1960) (extending the Fourth 
Amendment via the Fourteenth Amendment to state law enforcement actions). “A 
traffic stop constitutes a ‘seizure’ under the Fourth Amendment and is thus subject 
to a reasonableness requirement.” United States v. Williams, 808 F.3d 238, 245 (4 th 
Cir. 2015) (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996). 
The Fourth Circuit applies the two -prong test from Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 
88 (1968) , to determine the constitutionality of a traffic stop. United States v. 
Vaughan, 700 F.3d 705, 709 (4th Cir. 2012). The first question is whether the officer 

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had a legitimate basis for the traffic stop. United States v. Rusher, 966 F.2d 868, 875 
(4th Cir. 1992). The second considers whether the duration and scope of the stop were 
“sufficiently limited.” Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983). 
“Police officers do not need a warrant to search an automobile if they have 
probable cause to believe it contains evidence of criminal activity.” United States v. 
Patiutka, 804 F.3d 684, 690 (4th Cir. 2015) (citing United States v. Ross , 456 U.S. 
798, 809 (1982)). “[P]robable cause turns on a ‘totality-of-the-circumstances analysis’ 
and requires ‘a practical, common-sense decision whether ... there is a fair probability 
that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.’” United 
States v. Gondres-Medrano, 3 F.4th 708, 714 (4th Cir. 2021) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 
462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)). “[O]nce police have probable cause, they may search ‘every 
part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search.’” United 
States v. Kelly, 592 F.3d 586, 590 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting Ross, 456 U.S. at 825). 
III. DISCUSSION 
Defendant does not contest the validity of the traf fic stop. He instead 
challenges the scope of the stop under Terry’s second prong. Defendant argues that 
Officer McKee’s statement that he smelled marijuana coming from the vehicle lacks 
credibility because (1) other officers do not corroborate this odor in their reports, and 
(2) Officer McKee does not make a direct statement about an “odor” or “smell” of 
marijuana on the bodycam video. Defendant further argues that Officer McKee’s 
report of the incident states that Witherspoon handed Officer McKee the blunt, when 
it appears instead from the video that Defendant handed him the blunt. Defendant 

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then argues that Officer McKee’ s statement regarding the odor of marijuana is 
unreliable and should be disregarded . From there, Defendant argues that the scope 
of the vehicle stop was unconstitutional, and any further search of the vehicle and 
Defendant were also unconstitutional. 
Officer McKee testified before the Court during the hearing on Defendant ’s 
Motion to Suppress on May 27, 2026. McKee confirmed under oath that he smelled 
an odor of marijuana coming from the v ehicle during the incident in question. The 
Court observed Officer McKee ’s testimony and found him credible. Further, Officer 
McKee’s question to Witherspoon naturally implied the fact that he smelled 
marijuana when he asked her, “Be honest with me, okay, how much marijuana do 
y’all have?” After Witherspoon admitted she had smoked a blunt , Officer McKee 
asked where it was. Defendant immediately reached for a blunt and handed it to 
Officer McKee . At this point , officers not only had probable cause to search the 
automobile based on the smell of mar ijuana. They also had observed contraband 
inside the vehicle, further warranting a search of the entire car. 
Defendant argued in brief and at the hearing that the legalization of CBD and 
other substances in North Carolina makes it impossible to distinguish between illegal 
marijuana and legal products derived from the same pla nt. The Fourt Circuit , 
however, has made clear that the odor of marijuana alone can provide probable cause 
for searching an entire vehicle. See United States v. Humphries , 372 F.3d 653, 658 
(4th Cir. 2004) (“We have repeatedly held that the odor of marijuana alone can provide 
probable cause to believe that marijuana is present in a particular place. ”) (citing 

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United States v. Scheetz, 293 F.3d 175, 184 (4th Cir. 2002)). The smell of marijuana 
certainly doesn’t guarantee its presence. But under the probable cause inquiry, it can 
provide a fair probability that marijuana is present . See Gates, 462 U.S. at 238 
(probable cause requires a “fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime 
will be found in a particular place.”). 
Here, however, we need not rely on the odor of marijuana alone. The facts of 
this cas e invo lve an admission of the presence of marijuana and a seizure of 
marijuana that was in the vehicle at the time of the traffic stop. The traffic stop was 
fewer than three minutes old when the marijuana was discovered. The Court finds 
both the scope and duration of the stop were reasonable under the circumstances, 
especially where Officer McKee was waiting for Witherspoon to look for her driver’s 
license for most of that period. The simple question , “how much marijuana do y’all 
have?” did not somehow turn this short period that was limited in scope into an 
unconstitutional traffic stop. The Terry stop was legal, and during that stop, officers 
obtained probable cause to search the vehicle and Defendant. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Suppress (Doc. 
No. 24) is DENIED. 
SO ORDERED. 
 
 Signed: May 28, 2026 
 
 

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