govinfo:USCOURTS-tned-3_25-cr-00048-13

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 
 ) 
 Plaintiff, ) 
 ) 
v. ) No.: 3: 25-CR-48-TAV-DCP 
 ) 
BRYAN HARDISON, ) 
 ) 
 Defendant. ) 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 
 
 This criminal matter is before the Cour t on defendant’s “Motion to Dismiss for 
Prosecutorial Misconduct and Vindictive Prosecution” [Doc. 205], to which the 
government responded [Doc. 207]. Thereafter, defendant filed a “Motion to Dismiss the 
Indictment in [sic] Pursuant to Multiple Franks Violations in [sic] Pursuant to the 4th 
Amendment” [Doc. 212], “Motion to Reopen Suppression Litigation, Compel Production 
and Authentication of Discovery, and For a Franks (Hearing)” [Doc. 214], and “Pro Se 
Notice of Renewal and Incorporation of Prior Motions and Request for Leave to 
Supplement Following Superseding Indictme nt” [Doc. 215]. For the reasons below, 
defendant’s motions [Docs. 205, 212, 214, 215] are DENIED.1 
I. Timeliness 
 In response to defendant’s “Motion to Dismiss for Prosecutorial Misconduct and 
Vindictive Prosecution” [Doc. 205], the gove rnment argues that defendant’s pretrial 
 
1 Because all of defendant’s motions [Docs. 205, 212, 214, 215] raise overlapping issues, 
the Court addresses all of those motions cumulatively in this memorandum opinion and order. 

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motion deadline expired on October 23, 2025, and the Court prohibited defendant from 
filing any untimely pretrial motion without first filing a motion for leave and showing good 
cause for the late filing [Doc. 207, p. 1]. The government contends that defendant’s motion, 
filed on April 20, 2026, is un timely, and defendant failed to first seek leave to file the 
motion and/or show good ca use for the late filing [ Id.]. Nonetheless, the government 
acknowledges that defendant can likely establish good cause for his belated filing based on 
a recently disclosed inaccuracy in the search warrant affida vit supporting the search 
warrant [Id.]. However, the government argues that defendant has not shown good cause 
with respect to any other issues in his untimely motion [Id. at 2]. 
 The Court finds that all of defendant’s pe nding motions [Docs. 205, 212, 214, 215] 
are untimely. Pursuant to Rule 12(c), the Court may “set a deadline for the parties to make 
pretrial motions,” and a motio n is untimely if a party “does not meet the deadline.” See 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(c)(1), (3). However, the Court may consider the pretrial motion “if the 
party shows good cause.” Id. “Good cause is a flexible standard heavily dependent on the 
facts of the particular case as found and weighed by the district court in its equitable 
discretion.” United States v. Walden, 625 F.3d 961, 965 (6th Cir. 2010); see United States 
v. Trujillo-Molina , 678 F. App’x 335, 338 (6th Cir. 2017) (“Good cause is a ‘flexible 
standard’ requiring an explanation for both the delay and the potential prejudice.”) (citation 
omitted) (emphasis in original). At bottom, “it requires [defendant] to articulate some 
legitimate explanation for the failure to timely file.” Walden, 625 F.3d at 965. 
 Here, the Court set a pretrial motion dead line for October 23, 2025, after extending 
the deadline five times, twice while defendant was representing himself [Docs. 18, 27, 37, 

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51, 62]. In denying defendant’s sixth request for an extension on November 14, 2025, the 
Court informed defendan t that if he “discovers a pretri al motion that he could not have 
previously filed by the deadline, he may move for leave to file the motion” [Doc. 96, p. 4]. 
The Court ordered that defendant “must show good cause for the belated filing and must 
attach a copy of the proposed pretrial motion to his motion for leave” [Id.]. 
 Defendant filed the instant motio ns on April 28, 2026 [Doc. 205; see Doc. 205-1], 
April 28, 2026 [Doc. 212; see Doc. 212-1], and May 1, 2026 [Docs. 214, 215; see Docs. 
214-1, 215-1], approximately six months af ter the pretrial motion deadline expired [ See 
Doc. 62 (extending pretrial motions deadli ne to October 23, 20 25); Doc. 96 (denying 
further extension of the pr etrial motions deadline)]. See Cretacci v. Call , 988 F.3d 860, 
865–66 (6th Cir. 2021) (explaining that, under the prison mailbox rule, courts treat pro se 
prisoner filings, filed through the prison mail system, as filed on the date when the prisoner 
delivered the notice to prison authorities for mailing). 
 Additionally, defendant’s motions totally di sregard the Court’s prior order to first 
seek leave to file an untimely pretrial motion and largel y ignore the Court’s directive to 
show good cause for any such untimely pretrial motions [ See Doc. 96, p. 4]. 2 However, 
defendant does, in at least some of his motions, mention newly discovered evidence 
regarding the accuracy of a statement in the search warrant affidavit [See e.g., Doc. 212, p. 
 
2 Although the Court has overlooked defendant’s failure to comply with the Court’s prior 
order in this instance, in deference to his pro se status, it will not do so again. Any further untimely 
pretrial motions that are not filed in compliance with the Court’s prior directive for the defendant 
to first seek leave from the Court to file such motion and show good cause for the untimely filing 
[see Doc. 96, p. 4] will be summarily denied on that ground. 

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8; Doc. 214, p. 1]. Specifically, defendant has repeatedly raised arguments that the search 
warrant affidavit contained false statements th at there was a K-9 search of a confidential 
informant’s vehicle at a traffic stop that resu lted in the confidential informant identifying 
defendant as a drug dealer [See e.g., Doc. 150, pp. 3, 20; Doc. 159, pp. 10, 20]. On April 
18, 2026, a few days before trial was set to commence, the government filed a supplement 
to a prior filing indicating that it had recentl y learned that the search warrant affidavit 
incorrectly stated that a K-9 sniff of the vehicle at the traffic stop occurred, and, rather, the 
search of the vehicle at the traffic stop was based on consent [Doc. 203, p. 1]. 
 In light of this newly disclosed informa tion regarding an inaccurate statement in the 
search warrant affidavit, which defe ndant has previously challenged under Franks v. 
Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), the Court finds good cause to permit defendant to 
belatedly raise challenges to the statements in the search warrant relating to the alleged K-9 
sniff of the vehicle. Defenda nt has not, however, shown good cause for any other issues 
raised in his motions, and those motions [Docs. 205, 212, 214, 215] are therefore DENIED 
as untimely to the extent they raise any ground s for relief beyond a challenge to the 
statements in the search warrant affidavit regarding an alleged K-9 sniff of a vehicle during 
a traffic stop.3 
 
 
 
3 Although the Court denies all other grounds for relief as untime ly, the Court will 
nonetheless briefly address the merits of these arguments, as an alternative basis for denial of the 
motions. 

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II. Franks Issues 
A. K-9 Search Statement 
Turning first to the search warrant affidavit’s statement about the K-9 sniff search, 
which the government now admits was incorrect [see Doc. 203], defendant argues that this 
new information raises serious questions about the truthfulness, completeness, and 
reliability of the affidavit [Doc . 214, p. 2]. And the discre pancy regarding a K-9 search 
versus a consent search is material because the affidavit used the traffic stop as support for 
probable cause [Id. at 3, 7]. Specifically, defendant argues that this distinction is important 
because a K-9 search versus a consent sear ch involves different facts, witnesses, 
documentation, legal standards, etc. [Id. at 5]. Defendant contends that, if a K-9 was not 
present at the traffic stop, the affidavit creat ed a false impression ab out how the relevant 
evidence was discovered [Id.]. Defendant asks the Court to review the sufficiency of the 
affidavit after removing the false K-9 statement [Id. at 7; see also Doc. 212, p. 8]. 
The government, on the other hand, argues that this information should not result in 
the suppression of evidence because the incorrect statement in the affidavit “was not made 
knowingly, intentionally, or with reckless di sregard for the truth, and it was not essential 
to the probable cause finding” [Doc. 207, p. 2]. 
As the Court previously explained [see Doc. 213, p. 33], under the Franks test, the 
defendant must (1) make a substantial prelimin ary showing that specified portions of the 
affiant’s statements are delib erately or recklessly false, and (2) demonstrate that the 
challenged statements are necessary to a finding of probable cause. Franks, 438 U.S. at 
171. Further, the Court previously addr essed defendant’s arguments regarding the 

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statements in the affidavit about the existence of a K-9 search during the traffic stop under 
the second prong of Franks [ See Doc. 213, p. 35]. Indeed, in that order, the Court 
acknowledged the government’s admission that the statement regarding the K-9 search was 
inaccurate, but concluded that “probable cause exists even if details about the traffic stop 
were removed from the affidavit” and therefore “defendant’s argument regarding the K-9 
does not provide a meritorious basis for a Franks hearing” [Id.]. Specifically, the Court 
relied upon the information in the search warrant affidavit regarding the existence of 
controlled buys of narcotics from defendant as independently establishing probable cause 
for the search warrant [Id. at 21–26, 33–35]. 
Defendant’s arguments in his new motions to dismiss primarily center around the 
first prong of the Franks test, rather than this second prong, on which the Court has already 
found that a Franks hearing is not warranted. Defendant does make conclusory allegations 
that, without this information (and other challenged information in the affidavit), there is 
insufficient probable cause for issuance of the search warrant [Doc. 205, p. 6]. Defendant 
further attempts to rebut th e evidence of the co ntrolled buys from the search warrant 
affidavit, as an independent ground estab lishing probable cause, by arguing that the 
government is not charging hi m with those controlled buys [ Id. at 7]. But whether the 
government is currently proceeding with charges against defendant based on the controlled 
buys is irrelevant to whether the affidavit’ s information about those controlled buys was 
sufficient to support a finding of probable ca use for a search warrant. Accordingly, the 
Court finds that defendant has not raised any meritorious ground for revisiting the Court’s 
prior determination that he has not met the required showing under the second prong of the 

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Franks test, even considering the newly disclose d inaccuracy. To the extent his motions 
seek to raise or reopen a Franks challenge based on this newly discovered inaccuracy about 
the K-9 search, they are therefore DENIED. 
B. Photo Array Statement 
Similarly, in his motions, defendant attemp ts to reargue his claims regarding the 
search warrant affidavit’s statements regarding a six-photo array shown to the confidential 
informant [Doc. 205, p. 7; Doc. 212, pp. 1–5; Doc. 214, pp. 1, 4]. But, as with the K-9 
search issue, the Court previously addressed this issue and concluded that “even if the 
affidavit included an incorrect statement about the . . . photo-array, the Court finds that 
there is still probable cause for the search warrant based on the controlled buys . . .” [Doc. 
213, p. 34]. For the same reasons discussed, supra, defendant has not raised any 
meritorious ground for revisiting the Court’s prior determination that he has not met the 
required showing under the second prong of the Franks test. Accordingly, to the extent his 
motions seek to raise or reopen a Franks challenge based on this argument, they are 
DENIED. 
III. Discovery 
Next, defendant argues that the government has not met its discovery obligations 
under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) and its progeny, Giglio v. United States, 405 
U.S. 150 (1972), the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a),
4 Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of 
 
4 The Jencks Act codified Jencks v. United States , 353 U.S. 657 (1957), in which the 
Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to inspect, for impeachment 
purposes, prior statements ma de to government agents by government witnesses. See United 
States v. Roseboro, 87 F.3d 642, 645 (4th Cir. 1996) (noting that Congress enacted the Jencks Act 

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Criminal Procedure, and/or the Court’s Due Process Protections Act order [Doc. 205, pp. 
1–2]. Defendant largely raises vague asser tions that material evidence has not been 
provided, that the government acted with reckless disregard for its obligations, and that he 
has been prejudiced by the nondisclosure [Id. at 3–5, 13]. Defendant appears to assert that 
some evidence related to the traffic stop discussed supra has not been disclosed [Id. at 16; 
Doc. 212, pp. 2–3, 7]. 
“There is no general constitu tional right to discovery in a criminal case.” 
Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977). Rather, “in most criminal prosecutions, 
the Brady rule, Rule 16 and the Jencks Act, exhaust the universe of discovery to which the 
defendant is entitled.” United States v. Presser, 844 F.2d 1275, 1285 n.12 (6th Cir. 1988). 
However, “the government typically is the sole judge of what evidence in its possession is 
subject to disclosure.” Id. at 1281. 
Here, the government represented in writing that it fully complied with its discovery 
obligations, and would continue to do so [D oc. 186, p. 1]. The Court relies on this 
representation in resolving defendant’s motions to dismiss. 5 See Puertas v. Overton, 168 
 
in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Je ncks, to codify, and, in some respects, regulate, 
the Supreme Court’s decision). 
 
5 The Court notes that the time for disclosu re under the Jencks Act has not yet passed; 
however, the Court relies on the g overnment’s representation that it has and will continue to 
comply with its discovery obligations. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a); see also United States v. Fletcher, 
295 F. App’x 749, 753 (6th Cir. 2 008) (“[A]ny [Jencks Act] materi als disclosed prior to trial 
exceeded the government’s obligations under the Act.”); United States v. Reed, No. 11-20551-53, 
2014 WL 12703713, at *2 (E.D. Mich. May 29, 2014) (“The Government will be required, of 
course, to turn over any statements after their witnesses testify but, until such time, the Government 
is not mandated by the Constitution or the Jencks Act to produce the statements.”). 

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F. App’x 689, 706 (6th Cir. 2006) (“The Supreme Court ha s repeatedly held that a 
defendant can reasonably rely on the prosecuti on’s representation that it has disclosed all 
Brady evidence.”); see also United States v. Hernandez, 31 F.3d 354, 361 (6th Cir. 1994) 
(noting that the court is entitled to accept a prosecutor’s representations that documents do 
not contain any Brady material); United States v. Faller , No. 1:13-CR-29, 2014 WL 
12691595, at *5 (W.D. Ky. May 29, 2014) (stating that “the undersigned is entitled to rely 
on the [government’s] representations as it has no reason to believe that the [government] 
has made any false representations regarding its Brady compliance”); United States v. 
Bothra, No. 2:18-CR-208, 2020 WL 13980286, at *3 (E.D. Mich. June 5, 2020) (denying 
the defendant’s motion to compel discovery where the government represented that it 
complied with its obligations under Brady, the Jencks Act, and Rule 16); United States v. 
Kollman, No. 1:10-CR-44, 2011 WL 6016893, at *3 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 2, 2011) (relying on 
the government’s representations that it would comply with its obligations under Brady 
and Giglio). 
Furthermore, to “challenge the government ’s representation that it does not have 
Brady evidence, [the defendant] must do more than speculate that Brady material exists.” 
United States v. Stark, 758 F. App’x 518, 520 (6th Cir. 2019) (citing United States v. Lucas, 
841 F.3d 796, 809 (9th Cir. 2016)). Defendant has not identified any alleged exculpatory 
materials withheld by the government, therefore, his claims are merely speculative. 
Accordingly, to the extent that defenda nt’s motions seek relief based on the 
government’s failure to meet its discovery obligations, the motions are DENIED. 
 

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IV. Prosecutorial Miscondu ct and Vindictiveness 
Defendant sprinkles various allegations of prosecutori al vindictiveness and/or 
prosecutorial misconduct throughout his motions . Defendant alleges that the prosecutor 
has committed fraud on the court by (1) being complicit in manufacturing evidence (related 
to defendant’s Franks arguments) and (2) withholding discovery [Doc. 205, p. 5; Doc. 212, 
pp. 4, 6]. Defendant further asserts prosec utorial vindictiveness because defendant is 
exercising his legal rights to challenge evidence and complaining about the search warrant 
affiant violating policies [Doc. 205, pp. 3, 18]. 
First, to the extent that defendant alle ges prosecutorial misc onduct based on his 
Franks and discovery arguments, the Cour t has addressed these arguments supra and 
determined that they are mer itless. Accordingly, defendant also has not established any 
prosecutorial misconduct on those same grounds. 
Turning to prosecutorial vindictiveness, the Court notes that “the [g]overnment 
retains ‘broad discretion’ as to whom to prosecute.” Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 
607 (1985) (quotation omitted). “‘[S]o long as the prosecutor has probable cause . . . , the 
decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, 
generally rests entirely in his [or her] discretion.’” Id. at 607 (quoting Bordenkircher v. 
Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978)) (alternation in original). A defendant claiming vindictive 
prosecution must demonstrate “a realistic li kelihood of vindictiven ess” by showing that 
“(1) the prosecutor has some stake in deterring the [defendant’s] exercise of his rights and 
(2) the prosecutor’s conduct was somehow unreasonable.” United States v. Howell , 17 
F.4th 673, 687 (6th Cir. 2021) (citing United States v. LaDeau, 734 F.3d 561, 566 (6th Cir. 

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2013)) (citation modified). Here, defendant fails to show either that the government had a 
stake in deterring the exercise of his right s or that the prosecutor’s conduct was 
unreasonable. 
As to the government’s stake in deterring the exercise of defendant’s rights, “pretrial 
motions do not generally provide a sufficient basis for vindictiveness[.]” United States v. 
Zakhari, 85 F.4th 367, 381 (6th Ci r. 2023) (citation omitted). Rather, “[d]efense counsel 
routinely file pretrial motions to suppress evidence[,]” and it is not realistic “to assume that 
a prosecutor’s probable response to such motions is to seek to penalize and to deter.” United 
States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 381 (1982); see also United States v. Suarez, 263 F.3d 
468, 479–80 (6th Cir. 2 001) (describing the government’s burden to respond to pretrial 
suppression motions as “rather minimal”). Defendant’s pretrial motions to suppress 
evidence and statements are routine pretrial motions [See Docs. 115, 118, 180, 181]. While 
defendants’ motions led to th e burden of filing a response, the Court finds that these 
motions are unlikely to “inflict[a] a mortal bl ow” to the government’s ability to prove its 
case. See Ladeau, 734 F.3d at 569. Further, “a defendant before trial is expected to invoke 
procedural rights that inevitably impose some ‘burden’ on the prosecutor.” Suarez, 263 
F.3d at 479–80. Thus, defe ndant has not shown a prosecu torial stake in deterring 
defendant’s right to file pretrial motions. 
Turning to the second require ment, defendant has not s hown that the prosecutor’s 
conduct was unreasonable. Nota bly, defendant’s initial prosecu tion could not have been 
based on his filing of pretrial motions, as t hose motions were necessa rily filed after the 
start of this prosecution. To the extent th at defendant’s arguments can be construed as 

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alleging vindictiveness based on the filing of a superseding indictment, “the mere presence 
of a superseding indictment bringing ad ditional charges is not sufficient to be 
presumptively unreasonable.” Suarez, 263 F.3d at 480. Rath er, “a potentially vindictive 
superseding indictment must add additional charges or subs titute more severe charges 
based on the same conduct charged less heavily in the first indictment.” Id. In this case, 
the superseding indictment modified Count Two from charging possession with intent to 
distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B), 
to charging only the lesser included offense of possession with intent to distribute cocaine, 
in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C) [Compare Doc. 8 with Doc. 193; see also 
Doc. 195]. The superseding indictment also dropped the forfeiture allegations contained 
in the original indictment [ Id.]. Since the superseding indictment clearly does not add 
additional charges or substitute more seve re charges, and indeed, only includes 
modifications that benefit defendant, the requirements for vindictiveness are not met. 
For the reasons above, defendant failed to demonstrate prosecutorial misconduct or 
vindictiveness, and, to the extent his motions seek relief based on such, they are DENIED. 
V. Renewal of Prior Motions 
 Finally, defendant seeks to renew all of his pr ior pretrial motions in this case in light 
of the filing of the supersedin g indictment [Doc. 215]. But the supe rseding indictment, 
which the Court described supra, does not have any affect on defendant’s prior pretrial 
motions. Accordingly, to the extent defendant renews or re-raises any previously filed and 
adjudicated pretrial motion, such is denied for the reasons previously set forth on the record 
denying those motions in the first instance. 

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VI. Conclusion 
 
Accordingly, defendant’s motions [D ocs. 205, 212, 214, 215] are DENIED. 
Defendant is hereby on notice that the Court has fully adjudicated these issues addressed 
herein, and any subsequent filings seeki ng to re-raise these same arguments will be 
summarily denied. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
s/ Thomas A. Varlan 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
 
 

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