govinfo:USCOURTS-njd-2_24-cv-10980-2

NOT FOR PUBLICATION 
 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 
 
HENRY GOODELMAN, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
TICKETMASTER, et al., 
Defendants. 
 Civil Action No.: 24-10980 
 
 
OPINION & ORDER 
 
 
 
 
 
CECCHI, District Judge. 
Before the Court are five motions to di smiss Pro Se Plaintiff Henry Goodelman’s 
(“Plaintiff”) Second Amended Complaint (E CF No. 77) (“SAC”), filed by defendants 
Ticketmaster, LLC (“Ticketmaster”) (ECF No. 79), New Meadowlands Stadium Co., LLC 
(“NMSC”) (ECF No. 80), OpenStageIT, Ltd. (“OpenStage”) (ECF No. 109), Live Nation 
Entertainment, Inc. (“Live Nation”) (ECF No. 1 10), and Ignition Music Limited (ECF No. 126) 
(collectively, “Defendants”). Plaintiff also filed a motion for leave to file a preliminary injunction 
(ECF No. 112). For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ motions are GRANTED and 
Plaintiff’s motion is DENIED. 
I. BACKGROUND 
This case arises from an online ticket sale for the Oasis reunion tour . The sale occurred 
during the Jewish holiday of Rosh Hashanah. See generally SAC. On Rosh Hashanah, Orthodox 
Jews, like Plaintiff, refrain from using “electric ity, handling money, or accessing the internet” in 
accordance with their religious beliefs. Id. at 3. As such, Plaintiff alleges that he could not 
participate in either the presale or gene ral sale due to his observance. Id. The concerts were 
scheduled for August 31 and September 1, 2025, at MetLife Stadium. Id. Plaintiff emailed PageID:
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Defendants the day the presale was announced —September 30, 2024—asking for a “religious 
accommodation” so that he could participate in the sale. Id. Plaintiff asserts Defendants did not 
provide an accommodation. Id. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants intentionally discriminated 
against him because they “were explicitly notified in advance” that having the ticket sale on Rosh 
Hashanah would prevent him from participating and proceeded without providing an 
accommodation. Id. 
Plaintiff first filed suit in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Bergen County in November 
2024. ECF No. 1. Plaintiff filed an order to sh ow cause for preliminary injunctive relief which 
the Superior Court denied without prejudice for f ailure to set forth a factual basis evidencing 
immediate or irreparable harm. ECF No. 44-1 at 9. Defendants removed the case to this Court in 
December 2024. ECF No. 1. This Court then pe rmitted Plaintiff to a mend his Complaint and 
Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). ECF Nos. 33, 35. Defendants filed motions 
to dismiss which the Court granted but permitted Plaintiff to amend and file the instant SAC. ECF 
No. 76. Plaintiff now asserts two counts. First, Plaintiff contends that Defendants violated the 
New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“NJLAD”) by discriminating against Plaintiff in a place 
of public accommodation and second contends that Defendants aided and abetted NJLAD 
violations. SAC at 9–10. The five motions to dismiss before the Court then followed. 
II. LEGAL STANDARD 
To survive dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must meet the pleading requirements 
of Rule 8(a)(2) and “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief 
that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted). In 
evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint, a court must “draw all reasonable inferences in favor of 
the non-moving party.” Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008) (citation PageID:
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omitted). Ultimately, a complaint “that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or . . . tenders ‘naked 
assertions’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement,’” will not withstand dismissal. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 
at 678 (citations and brackets omitted). 
III. DISCUSSION 
A. Count I: Religious Discrimination by a Place of Public Accommodation 
Plaintiff alleges religious discriminati on under the NJLAD. Under the NJLAD, “[a]ll 
persons shall have the opportunity to . . . obt ain all the accommodations, advantages, facilities, 
and privileges of any place of public accommodation . . . without discrimination because of . . . 
creed.” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-4. 1 To “state a claim under the NJ LAD for discrimination by a 
place of public accommodation, a Plaintiff must : (1) demonstrate that he is a member of a 
protected class; (2) show that th e defendant’s actions were motiv ated by discrimination; and (3) 
demonstrate that others outside the protected cla ss did not suffer similar adverse actions.” 
Santiago v. Elchebli , No. 20-650, 2021 WL 4473179, at *6 (D.N.J. Sept. 30, 2021); see also 
Partovi v. Felician Coll ., No. A-1961-09T1, 2011 WL 867275, at *8 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
Mar. 15, 2011). “‘[C]onclusory allegations of di scrimination [cannot] satisfy the pleading 
requirements’ for an NJLAD public accommodation claim.” Florentino v. City of Newark , No. 
19-21055, 2020 WL 5105291, at *14 (D.N.J. Aug. 31, 2020) (quoting Partovi, 2011 WL 867275, 
at *8). 
 
1 As the Court explained in its Opinion and Order dismissing the FAC, the NJLAD “does not 
explicitly prohibit discrimination based on religion.” ECF No. 33 at 4. However, courts have 
interpreted the NJLAD’s prohibition against discrimination based on creed to include a prohibition 
against religious discrimination. Id. (collecting cases); see also, e.g. , Abramson v. William 
Patterson Coll. of N.J. , 260 F.3d 265, 282 (3d Cir. 2001) (applying the NJLAD to a religious 
discrimination claim). PageID:
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The core of Plaintiff’s allegations is that “after being placed on explicit notice . . . 
Defendants deliberately chose not to explore or implement reasonable accommodations.” SAC at 
4. This, Plaintiff contends, was a “deliber ate act of discrimination, or at minimum deliberate 
indifference to the rights of Orthodox Jews.” Id. at 3.2 Plaintiff’s SAC, like the FAC, falls short 
of alleging that Defendants’ actions were motivated by discrimination. See ECF No. 33 at 5–6. 
To determine whether a defendant’s actions were motivated by discrimination in the public 
accommodation discrimination context, courts focus on “whether [the] defendant acted with an 
actual or apparent design to discourage present or future use of the public accommodation by 
plaintiff on account of [their] protected status.” Turner v. Wong, 832 A.2d 340, 356 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 2003); see also Jones v. Pi Kappa Alpha Int’l Fraternity, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 3d 518, 
531–32 (D.N.J. 2019) (“[B]ehavior may be actionable [under the NJLAD] if it is outrageous 
enough to imply a design to discourage an in dividual’s use of that public accommodation on 
account of her protected status.”). Courts have found the possibility of discriminatory motivation 
when, for example, “a resort owner allegedly stated, ‘I don’t want those kinds of people here,’ and 
‘you shouldn’t bring those of kinds of people here.’” Epps v. DGMB Casino, LLC, No. A-0406-
 
2 To the extent Plaintiff alleges that Defendants intentionally discriminated by scheduling the sale 
on Rosh Hashanah in the first instance, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim. Plaintiff has not 
plausibly alleged that Defendants intentionally scheduled the sale on Rosh Hashanah to 
discriminate against Orthodox Jews. In the SAC, Plaintiff twice describes the “initial scheduling” 
of the sale on Rosh Hashanah as “inadvertent.” SAC at 3. Inadvertence does not constitute intent. 
See Inadvertence, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (“An accidental oversight”). Plaintiff 
also alleges that once Defendants proceeded with the sale as scheduled after being informed of the 
holiday, Defendants “transform[ed] what might otherwise appear neutral into intentional 
exclusion.” SAC at 4. This underc uts Plaintiff’s allegations of inte ntional discrimination at the 
onset in two ways. It alleges that Defendants we re unaware of the religious conflict when they 
initially scheduled the ticket sale on Rosh Hashanah and it concedes that the decision to have the 
sale on Rosh Hashanah was neutral. This cannot support an inference of intentional 
discrimination. See Santiago, 2021 WL 4473179, at *6 (Plaintiff must “allege facts sufficient to 
create an inference that discrimination motiv[at]ed Defendants’ actions”). PageID:
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24, 2026 WL 60248, at *5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 8, 2026) (discussing Franek v. 
Tomahawk Lake Resort , 754 A.2d 1237, 1242 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000)). In another 
example, a court found that a defendant store ow ner may have been motivated by discrimination 
when she used racial slurs to an African Americ an patron who refused to pay for a stale donut. 
Turner, 832 A.2d at 356. 
Conversely, courts have dismissed discrimination claims when a plaintiff provides 
conclusory allegations of discrimin atory motivation. For example, in Morris v. T.D. Bank , the 
plaintiff alleged that the defendant violated the NJLAD because plaintiff, who was African 
American, was mistakenly identified as a bank robber after the actual bank robber had already left 
the bank. 185 A.3d 215, 221 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Di v. 2018). The court affirmed the claim’s 
dismissal because there was “nothing in the re cord, except plaintiff’s supposition that the bank’s 
employee was racially motivated.” Id. Similarly, in N.W. v. Greater Egg Harbor Regional High 
School District, the court affirmed summary judgment on an NJLAD claim when a school security 
guard used a racial slur one time when inter acting with a student. No. A-5079-16T4, 2018 WL 
6332247, at *4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Dec. 5, 2018). The court noted that there was no 
“evidence defendant acted with an actual or apparent design to discourage plaintiff from attending 
the school.” Id. 
Here, Plaintiff’s claims are unlike those in cases in which courts have found a 
discriminatory motive. There are no allegations of explicit religious animus or remarks, or that 
Defendants’ conduct was “outrageous enough to imply” that they wanted to “discourage” Plaintiff 
from purchasing tickets because of his religion. Jones, 431 F. Supp. 3d at 532. Rather, Plaintiff’s 
allegations are akin to those cases in which courts have dismissed allegations as conclusory. That 
is, Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendants did not accommodate his religious needs after he PageID:
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requested an accommodation do not provide any furt her factual support to suggest this decision 
was motivated by Plaintiff’s religion. For exam ple, there is nothing to suggest that Defendants 
have accommodated people of other religions but re fused to do so here. Accordingly, the SAC 
must be dismissed because Plaintiff does not su fficiently allege that Defendants acted with a 
discriminatory motive. 
Plaintiff’s opposition brief and the cases he relies on are unavailing. He argues that 
discriminatory intent “is present when a party, after receiving notice of discriminatory impact, 
refuses to act and instead enforces the exclusionary policy.” ECF No. 85 at 2. The cases Plaintiff 
cites, however, do not support this proposition. Plaintiff relies on Slohoda v. United Parcel 
Service, Inc. which was an employment discrimination case based on marital status and did not 
discuss how notice of a discriminatory impact amounts to discriminatory motive. 504 A.2d 53 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986). Richter v. Oakland Board of Education involved a school that 
did not accommodate a teacher’s requests to eat lu nch earlier in the day due to her diabetes. 252 
A.3d 161, 165–66 (N.J. 2021). The issue was whether a plaintiff is “required to establish an 
adverse employment action . . . to be able to proceed with an [NJ]LAD failure-to-accommodate 
disability claim.” Id. at 166. Richter, too, does not stand for the proposition that action taken after 
notice amounts to intentional discrimination in a public accommodation claim. Moreover, Richter 
involved an inapplicable area of the law—disability accommodations in the employment context. 
See Franek, 754 A.2d at 1242 (trial court erred when it made “overgeneralized use of specific 
principles” used in employment discrimination cases in a public accommodation discrimination 
case). Finally, Plaintiff references Estate of Komninos. ECF No. 85 at 2. The citation provided, 
however, links to an appeal from the denial of Social Security benefits under a case named Hall v. 
Berryhill from the Western District of New York. See No. 15-619, 2018 WL 1071508 (W.D.N.Y. PageID:
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Feb. 27, 2018). Plaintiff uses the same case for the proposition that “Courts have long held that 
discriminatory intent may be inferred where a facially neutral policy is knowingly applied in a 
manner that foreseeably excludes a protected class.” ECF No. 85 at 2. That case, however, does 
not address the NJLAD, let alone a standard for finding discriminatory intent. In sum, Plaintiff 
has not sufficiently stated a claim for a violation of the NJLAD. 
B. Count II: Aiding and Abetting Unlawful Discrimination 
Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants aided and abetted unlawful discrimination. SAC at 
10. “The NJLAD prohibits any person . . . to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any 
of the acts forbidden under the act.” K.J. v. Greater Egg Harbor Reg’l High Sch. Dist. Bd. of 
Educ., 431 F. Supp. 3d 488, 514 (D.N.J. 2019). To es tablish an aiding and abetting claim under 
the NJLAD, a plaintiff “must demonstrate that the defendants: (1) aided another in performing a 
wrongful act that caused an injury; (2) were aware of their role in the illegal activity at the time it 
was committed; and (3) knowingly and substantial ly assisted with the main violation.” Yuli v. 
Lakewood Bd. of Educ., Civ. No. 13-4617, 2014 WL 5308187, at *9 (D.N.J. Oct. 16, 2014). “An 
individual cannot be held liable for aiding and abetting unless there is an underlying violation of 
the NJLAD.” Greater Egg, 431 F. Supp. 3d. at 514. Because, as discussed above, Plaintiff has 
failed to plead a violation of the NJLAD, he has not pled an NJLAD claim under an aiding and 
abetting theory. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated herein, Defendants’ motions are granted, and the SAC is dismissed 
without prejudice. 
Accordingly, IT IS on this 28th day of May 2026, PageID:
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ORDERED that Defendants’ motions to dismiss (ECF Nos. 79, 80, 109, 110, 126) are 
granted, and Plaintiff’s SAC (ECF No. 77) is dismissed without prejudice; and it is further 
ORDERED that Plaintiff shall have thirty (30) days from entry of this Opinion and Order 
to submit an amended complaint that addresses the deficiencies identified in this Opinion. Insofar 
as Plaintiff submits a further amended complain t, he shall also provide a form of the amended 
complaint that indicates in what respect it differ s from the current complaint, by bracketing or 
striking through materials to be deleted and underlining materials to be added. See L. Civ. R. 
15(a)(2); and it is further 
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a preliminary injunction (ECF No. 112) 
is DENIED as moot. 
SO ORDERED. 
CLAIRE C. CECCHI, U.S.D.J. 
s/ Claire C. Cecchi PageID:
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